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A Gulf Cooperation CouncU Currency Union: 
Appropriateness and Implications 
By Emilie Rutledge 
Abstract: 
The six states, that together comprise the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), plan 
to adopt a single currency by 2010. If they are able to enact the necessary 
policy reforms and devolve some national sovereignty to supranational 
monetary and statistical institutions, capable of conducting a common monetary 
policy and managing the 'Gulf dinar', it will undoubtedly become the world's 
second most significant currency union. It may also be seen as a viable reserve 
currency, particularly by neighbouring states, and could even be used to invoice 
oil sales. 
The aim of this thesis is two-fold. Firstly, it assesses the appropriateness of a 
currency union for the GCC, against the optimal currency area criteria. It also 
examines the degree to which the GCC states have implemented the policy 
prerequisites for currency union, according to the experience of European 
Monetary Union. 
Secondly, it undertakes a qualitative cost- benefit analysis of currency union 
for the GCC as a whole and for each constituent state. This, in part, involves a 
review of post currency union monetary policy options and political-economy 
implications. The analysis employs both primary evidence collected through a 
GCC-wide business survey and from interviews with a panel of regional experts, 
and secondary evidence from published official sources. 
This research should add to the ongoing debate on the utility of currency unions 
in general and assess the validity of employing optimal currency area theory to 
a region which remains, to a high degree, dependent on oil. It also provides 
contextually based findings useful to regional policy makers. 
It concludes that a currency union will have significant benefits, but primarily 
indirect ones. Conventional benefits such as reduced transaction costs and 
eliminating exchange rate risks will be outweighed by benefits which will accrue 
from greater budgetary transparency, increased fiscal discipline and further 
economic diversification. 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published in 
any format,c including electronic and the internet, without the author!s·prior written· consent. All 
information derived from this thesis must be acknowledged appropriately. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In July 2006, the UAE's central bank governor Sultan Bin Nasser AI-Suwaidi, in an 
interview with the Financial Times, 1 stressed that despite some economic 
integration obstacles "plans for a single currency were serious and would be 
implemented by 2010." Nevertheless the path towards a Gulf Cooperation Council 
(here on referred to as GCC2) currency union, first set out in 1981 and restated in 
2001, has been slow and the scheduled launch date of 2010 is fast approaching. 
The idea of a common currency among the GCC states is not new. Prior to the 
GCC's formation in 1981; the external Indian Rupee was used by many Gulf states 
whilst under British colonial rule. Initially, after their independence, Qatar and 
Dubal had a common currency, the Riyal, as they had established a currency 
board, this arrangement was terminated in 1973.3 In 1975, the Central Bank of 
Kuwait commissioned a report from Robert Mundell into the possibility of 
establishing a regional currency union (here on referred to as CU). Interestingly 
the plan, which never came to fruition, was for a CU which would only include the 
smaller Gulf Emirates, excluding Oman and Saudi Arabia.4 
The region's historical experience with economic and monetary cooperation 
therefore seems to imply the presence of an underlying preference for CU. Indeed, 
soon after its formation in 1981, the GCC adopted a far reaching Economic 
Agreement5 which provided a framework for economic integration In the region 
and set out the necessary steps towards achieving full economic and monetary 
1 Khalaf, Roula "UAE shifts 10% of its reserves into euros", Financial Times, July 13 2006. 
2 The GCC states include Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates. 
3 The Qatar-Dubai Currency Agreement was signed on 21 March 1966 and introduced the Qatar 
and Dubai Riyal as the currency unit in both states, this arrangement lasted until 1973. See 
www.pjsymes.com/au/artlclesiQatarDubai.htm (accessed at 25/02/04). 
4 AI-Halli, A. F., "A Special Interview with Robert Mundell- Nobel laureate in Economics" A/ Watan, 
~translated from Arabic) 1999. 
The Economic Agreement, which was signed in 1981, envisaged, even at this early stage, a 
process of economic integration which would lead to a CU. 
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integration; the 'Unified Economic Agreement' stated that the GCC would 
"endeavour to establish a joint currency. "6 
A shared culture, language, religion and resource dependence has endowed the 
GCC with a strong unified direction. This has resulted in the bloc, without doubt, 
becoming the most effective regional organisation within the Middle East. Yet, 
apart from the signing of a Free Trade Agreement in 1983, between 1981 and 
2000 little progress was made towards deepening economic integration. 
It was not until the 22nd GCC summit convened in Muscat in 2001 that the GCC 
re-energised their economic integration efforts. A revised Economic Agreement 
was signed, it set out concrete steps towards creating a common market and a 
GCC single currency. Although broadly based on the original 'Unified Economic 
Agreement' of 1981, the language was more specific. Article 4 of the new 
Economic Agreement stipulated that all members would work to a specific time 
table in order to prepare for monetary and currency unificatlon.7 
The new Economic Agreement listed specific steps that would need to be taken in 
order to establish a GCC CU. They included fostering a high level of 
harmonization in all economic policy areas, particularly fiscal and monetary policy 
and setting economic convergence criteria related to monetary and fiscal stability. 
It was agreed that a customs union be established as soon as possible, 
convergence targets set in 2005, a common market be in place by 2007 and for 
the GCC single currency to be launched by 2010.8 
6 GCC Secretariat General, "Unified Economic Agreemenf, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Riyadh, 
1981, (online:available at:www.gccMsg.org). 
7 A new economic agreement was ratified at the 22nd GCC summit in Muscat on 21 December 
2001. 
8 The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC}, Secretariat General, The 
Economic Agreement Between the GCC States, Adopted by the GCC Supreme Council, 22nd 
Session, Muscat, Sultanate of Oman, 31 December 2001. (Available at: http://www.gcc-sg.org). 
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Kuwait's move in 2002 to peg its currency to the dollar aligning itself with the other 
five state's de facto dollar pegs was one concrete step towards CU.9 Then, in 2003 
the GCC set up a customs union that harmonized external tariffs to 5 percent and 
removed intra-regional ones. However, more recently, the process seems to have 
faltered somewhat. The final stage of the customs union, scheduled for the end of 
2005, was delayed following discord resulting from Bahrain's decision to "go it. 
alone" and sign a bilateral FTA with the US.10 
It was widely anticipated that the GCC would officially adopt convergence targets 
at the 2005 GCC summit convened in Abu Dhabi. Indeed in the months prior to 
the summit several regional newspapers indicated that GCC bureaucrats had 
agreed on the style of convergence criteria and that these would be along the lines 
of the European Maastricht criteria. In the event, the summit's final communique 
made no specific mention of CU convergence criteria. At the time of writing, it Is 
clear that significant preparations still need to take place, and they will need to be 
implemented soon if the 2010 deadline for CU is to remain viable. 
As all of the GCC state's sovereign currencies are now pegged to the US dollar, 
therefore the bloc already meets a key CU precondition; stable bilateral exchange 
rates. However a range of convergence targets, particularly fiscal policy ones, still 
need to be officially agreed upon. A GCC common market has yet to come into 
being and no final decision has been made on the nature and mandate of the 
GCC central bank- which itself has yet to be created. 
1. 1 Thesis Objectives 
The thesis has two main objectives, firstly to assess the appropriateness of a CU 
for the GCC economic bloc and secondly to undertake a qualitative cost - benefit 
9 Prior to this, most GCC states had de facto exchange rate pegs against the US dollar, only 
Kuwait was pegged to an undisclosed basket of currencies. Consequently this was not considered 
to be a particularly difficult step for the GCC states In the CU preparation process. 
1
° For more information on this please refer to chapter six (section 6.3.4). 
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analysis of a GCC CU. 11 This analysis will first deal with the bloc as a whole then 
consider the costs and benefits for each of the six constituent states individually. 
Primary evidence has been gathered through conducting interviews with a panel 
of regional experts and a GCC wide business survey. It is hoped that in meeting 
these objectives, this thesis will be the first in depth and most comprehensive 
assessment of the planned GCC CU to date.12 
The GCC economic bloc is significant on the global stage primarily because of its 
hydrocarbon resource endowment. GCC states control 40 percent of the world's 
proven oil reserves and currently provide the market with 18 million barrels of oil 
per day (some 23 percent of total world oil supply). 13 Even though the GCC has a 
population of just 35 million and a combined GOP of $597bn (comparable to that 
of the Netherlands), a single GCC currency would undoubtedly constitute, after the 
European Monetary Union (here on referred to as EMU), the most important 
instance of CU to date. 
Any cost - benefit analysis of a group of countries considering forming a CU must 
take into account Robert Mundell's seminal work on Optimum Currency Areas 
(here on referred to as OCA).14 In 1961 Mundell set out a series of OCA criteria, 
which together act as a benchmark against which a given region's suitability for 
CU can be tested. According to OCA theory, groups of economies with high levels 
of intra-regional trade, factor market mobility, economic diversification and 
business cycle synchronisation stand to benefit most from having a CU. 
11 For reasons which will become clear a quantitative cost-benefit analysis is not feasible i.e. many 
of the cost and benefit variables cannot be adequately quantified. 
12 Notable works that cover some aspects of the proposed GCC CU and are covered in the 
literature review include: Abed, G.T., Erbas, S. N. and Guerami, B. "The GCC Monetary Union: 
Some Considerations for the Exchange Rate Regime", IMF Working Paper, April2003; Fasano, U. 
and Staff Team, Monetary Union among Member Countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, IMF, 
2003; Laabas, B. and Limam, 1., Are GCC Countries Ready for Currency Union? Arab Planning 
Institute, Kuwait, April 2002 and Sturm, M. and Siegfried, N. "Regional Monetary Integration in the 
Member States of the Gulf Cooperation Council". European Central Bank, Occasional Paper 
Series, No. 31, June 2005. 
13 BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2006. 
14 Mundell, R. A. "A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas" The American Economic Review, Vol. 51, 
No.4, pp. 657-665, September 1961. 
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The principle advantage of CU, from a Mundellian point of view, is the reduction in 
transaction costs and the elimination of exchange rate risk, while the key 
disadvantage is the loss of independent monetary policy (no longer being able to 
adjust interest rates to absorb economic shocks). It follows, that the more 
economically synchronised the prospective members are prior to CU the more 
likely it is that they will be suited to a 'one size fits all' monetary policy. 
Research by Laabas and Limam carried out in 200215, concluded that the GCC did 
not, at that point, meet all of the OCA criteria adequately and that the bloc was 
particularly weak in terms of intra-regional trade, factor market mobility and 
economic diversification. It is worth noting that the countries that now make up the 
Eurozone, did not themselves, meet all of the OCA criteria satisfactorily prior to the 
launch of the euro. 16 It is also widely acknowledged that in reality, a CU will never 
be entered into for economic reasons alone. Ultimately any decision on CU will be 
borne out of political, as well as economic considerations, and only achieved 
through concerted political will. This thesis measures the GCC against the full 
range of OCA criteria and assesses the political rationale behind the policy of GCC 
economic integration which is set to culminate in CU. 
The experience of EMU both in the decisions and preparations in the lead up to 
the euro and Its performance ex post, as well as the role played by the European 
Central Bank (ECB) and Eurostat, offers the GCC a great deal of tangible 
guidance; this thesis also draws on evidence and findings garnered from EMU. 
Indeed the GCC secretariat itself has consulted with the ECB, and the latter in 
2005 produced a working paper "Regional Monetary Integration In the Member 
States of the GCC"17, which focused on outstanding CU preparations and 
assessed the level of economic convergence between GCC states. 
15 Laabas, B. and Limam, I.. Am GCC Countries Ready for Currency Union? Arab Planning 
Institute, Kuwait, April 2002. 
16 lssing, 0. "Economic and Monetary Union in Europe: political priority versus economic 
integration?" ECB Speeches Published in 2001, 23 February 2001, online: available 
http://www.ecb.int/presslkey/date/2001/htmllindex.en.html 
17 Sturm, M. and Siegffied, N. "Regional Monetary Integration in the Member States of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council", European Central Bank, Occasional Paper Series, No. 31, June 2005. 
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The issue of GCC CU does receive periodic press coverage in the Arabian Gulf, 
but much of the commentary tends to be superficial. Two contentions in particular 
are often put forward. One argues that the transition to a CU will be relatively 
straightforward because all the GCC currencies are pegged to the dollar, the other 
argues that few benefits will accrue to the GCC, because the common peg already 
reduces exchange rate risk and that levels of Intra-regional trade are weak. 
In fact, this thesis will demonstrate that a GCC CU has the potential to bring about 
many economic benefits - direct and arguably, more importantly, Indirect ones. 
However these benefits will very much depend on the degree of preparations 
made in the lead up to CU. At the regional level the GCC will need to have strong 
(autonomous) institutions capable of managing future monetary decisions, 
including a GCC central bank and a statistical organisation similar to that of EMU's 
Eurostat. 
1 .2 Specific Research Questions 
The aim of this doctoral research is to examine the appropriateness and 
implications of the scheduled 2010 GCC CU and to assess whether it is the 
optimum choice of currency regime as a bloc and for each GCC state individually. 
In order to achieve this aim this research will address the following questions: 
1. To what extent have existing exchange rate regimes been appropriate for 
the GCC economies in enabling them to meet their economic policy 
objectives? 
2. How appropriate is CU for the GCC economies and to what extent do they 
meet the OCA criteria? 
3. Are the GCC states taking adequate steps to adopt and implement the 
prerequisite policies for the establishment of a successful and sustainable 
CU? 
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4. What are the potential costs and benefits, both direct and indirect, of a GCC 
CU? 
5. Will CU bring net benefits for each GCC member state or will there be 
losers as well as winners? 
1.3 Research Methods 
A combination of qualitative and quantitative research methods is employed in 
addressing these research questions. Substantial fieldwork was carried out in the 
region in order to better understand the institutional and political framework of the 
GCC economic bloc. This primary evidence ensured that the research would not 
only provide contextually based and credible conclusions, but may also be of use 
to GCC policymakers in the lead up to CU. 
In-depth interviews with a panel of regional experts form a substantial element of 
the thesis' qualitative research and provide valuable primary evidence from which 
to draw upon. It was deemed crucial to document the opinions and views of 
regional experts so as to be able to gain a deeper insight Into the potential 
economic and socio-political implications of the project. Semi-structured interviews 
with regional 'stake-holders', including GCC government officials, central bankers, 
economists and academics, provides 'insider' information on the perceived costs 
and benefits of CU which will feed into the cost - benefrt assessment in this thesis. 
Considering the increasing role being given to the private sector in the 
development of the GCC economies It was also considered important to survey the 
opinions of GCC businesses. A GCC-wide business survey was carried out in 
order to gauge business sentiment towards the proposed CU. It also set out to 
assess the potential impact of GCC CU on the region's business community as 
well as shedding light on the level of preparation within the business community. 
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The use of quantitative techniques will also play an important part in the analysis 
presented in this thesis. Using descriptive statistics, a comparative examination of 
GCC macroeconomic indicators, economic structures and existing exchange rate 
arrangements will be undertaken. An in-depth, empirical examination of intra 
regional trade will contribute to the assessment of the degree to which the GCC 
meet the OCA criteria and a historical analysis of the GCC's monetary and fiscal 
indicators will establish the extent to which Maastricht style 18 monetary and fiscal 
convergence targets are satisfied. 
In addition, this thesis will employ econometric techniques to test for the long run 
convergence of the GCC economies: an important OCA criterion. Specifically it will 
test for cointegration between the real national incomes of the GCC states using 
Vector Auto Regression methods and for pair-wise colntegratlon between each 
GCC state and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is chosen because it is by far the 
largest economy within the GCC. Its economic conditions are therefore likely to 
have considerable weight in the future monetary policy of the bloc, therefore 
economic integration with Saudi Arabia should reduce the potential costs of a 
common monetary policy for other prospective members. 
1 .4 Structure of Thesis 
The breakdown of this thesis is briefly set out below and its structure is as follows: 
The "literature Review", (Chapter Two), begins with an assessment of the 
theoretical and applied literature on CU. It goes on to examine the contemporary 
research on CU, which has been particularly topical since the inception of EMU. 
Finally it reviews the literature that focuses specifically on GCC CU. In conclusion, 
the literature review summarises the salient issues surrounding the research topic 
which steer the direction of our investigation In following chapters. 
18 The Maastricht criteria included convergence in inflation rates, interest rates and exchange rates 
and limits on government deficits and debt, of which the final two were also part of the European 
Union's Stability and Growth Pact. 
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Chapter Three, "Methods and Methodology", discusses the mixed 
methodological approach taken in addressing the research questions and the 
quantitative and qualitative methods which will be employed. It discusses the 
extensive fieldwork carried out in the region (semi-structured interviews with 
regional experts and a GCC wide business survey) and the specific econometric 
models and statistical techniques to be employed in analysing whether the GCC 
states meet various convergence and OCA criteria. 
Chapter Four, "Economic Performance and Policy 1980 - 2005", has two 
objectives. Firstly, it provides a comprehensive economic background to the GCC 
for our analysis, and secondly, it addresses research question one. The chapter 
examines the stability and performance of the GCC economies since 1980. It then 
attempts to identify the national economic objectives of each of the GCC states, 
summarising similarities and contrasts between these policies. It concludes by 
evaluating how far existing exchange rate arrangements have been effective in 
achieving national economic policy objectives. 
Chapter Five, "Assessing the Suitability of the GCC States for Currency 
Union", examines the degree to which the GCC economies are suitable for CU, 
thus addressing research question two. This chapter investigates quantitatively 
and qualitatively the extent to which the GCC economies meet the five core OCA 
criteria: significant intra-regional trade, flexible labour and capital markets, 
diversified economies and synchronised economic cycles. It also analyses the 
GCC economies using econometric techniques specifically in order to determine 
the degree to which the OCA criterion of economic synchronisation Is met. 
Chapter Six, "Policy Prerequisites for a Successful Currency Union", 
addresses research question three. It begins by testing the GCC economies 
against Maastricht style monetary criteria and fiscal limits. Drawing on the findings 
from our primary research we ascertain the pace of preparations being made 
towards establishing supranational institutions, coordinating economic policies and 
preparing the private sector. Finally it attempts to establish whether there is 
sufficient political commitment to the CU project. 
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Chapter Seven, "The Potential Costs and Benefits of a GCC Currency Union", 
addresses research question four in determining the costs and benefits (both 
direct and indirect) of CU for the GCC as a whole. The analysis will draw upon the 
findings of previous chapters and that provided by the panel of regional experts 
and the GCC business survey. In addition to analyzing the economic costs and 
benefits of CU, several political economy factors are also considered. In particular, 
the case for establishing the single GCC currency as a regional anchorage and 
reserve currency will be assessed. 
Chapter Eight, "The National Distribution of Costs and Benefits", considers 
the relative costs and benefits of the CU for each GCC state individually. It 
examines the specific economic and political characteristics of the given state that 
will have a direct bearing on the degree to which they are affected by the CU. In 
addressing research question five the findings of the GCC business survey are 
again utilised. This chapter concludes by presenting a 'qualitative cost-benefit 
analysis' of the case for CU for each GCC state and whether there are net benefits 
for all or whether there are losers as well as winners from establishing the CU. 
Chapter Nine, "Conclusion", specifically addresses the main research questions 
by presenting the key findings of this research. It discusses the significance of a 
GCC CU and looks ahead to consider the prospects for progress to be made 
towards a GCC CU between now and 2010. Finally, it is also left to this chapter to 
indicate associated areas for further research. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
Since the early 1990s there has been a great deal of literature focusing on CU. 
The inception of European Monetary Union (EMU), which began with the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1991 and culminated with the eventual launch of the euro 
in 2002 has brought the issue to the forefront of contemporary economic 
debate. While the Eurozone case is the most recent example of CU, it is not the 
first, other unions such as the East Caribbean CU (1950)1 and the CFA Franc 
zone (1948)2 are well established. cu is also topical at present due to the 
increased advocacy of a 'bipolarisation of exchange rate regimes'3, and the 
perceived financial stabilization benefits accruing from fixed currency 
arrangements.4 In spite of the fact that GCC CU has not yet taken place, a 
number of important papers have been written on the subject, in particular 
those by Laabas and Limam,5 Fasano6 , Jadresic7 and Sturm and Siegfried.8 
It is generally accepted that the founding theoretical work on CU dates from the 
early 1960s with Mundell's seminal work on Optimal Currency Areas (OCA). 9 
This literature review will first examine Mundell's OCA, which is still considered 
by most to provide the theoretical underpinnings for researching CU. Secondly, 
the review will analyse more contemporary empirical work that has built upon 
the OCA criteria. Thirdly it shall look at the experience of EMU which should 
1 Eight East Caribbean States, formerly the British Caribbean Territories (Eastern Group), 
formed a currency board in 1950. 
2 The CFA Franc, pegged to the French Franc in 1948, is the common currency of fourteen 
countries in Central and West Africa. 
3 Either fully fixed or flexible, see Fisher, S. "Exchange rate regimes: Is the bipolar view 
correct?" Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 15, No.2, pp. 3-24, Spring 2001. 
4 Fixed exchange rate arrangements such as CU, currency boards or dollarisation have proved 
attractive for a number of developing countries experiencing national currency crises in recent 
decades. 
5 Laabas, B. and Umam, 1., Are GCC Countries Ready for Cu1T9ncy Union? Arab Planning 
Institute, Kuwait, April 2002. 
6 Fasano, U. and Staff Team, Monetary Union among Member Countries of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council, International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C., 2003, and 
Fasano, U. and Iqbal, Z. "Common Currency'', Finance and Development: A Quarterly 
Magazine of the IMF, Vol. 39, No.4, December 2002. 
7 Jadresic, E., "On a Common Currency for the GCC Countries" International Monetary Fund 
Polley Discussion Paper, December 2002. 
8 Sturm, M. and Siegfried, N. "Regional Monetary Integration in the Member States of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council", European Central Bank, Occasional Paper Series, No. 31, June 2005. 
9 Mundell, R. A., "A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas", The American Economic Review, Vol. 
51, No.4, pp. 657-665, September 1961. 
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provide valuable lessons for the GCC. Finally it will review the literature that 
specifically focuses on the planned GCC CU. 
2.2 OCA Theoretical Literature 
More than forty years ago, Mundell10 coined the term Optimal Currency Areas 
(OCA). In his ground breaking article, entitled "A Theory of Optimal Currency 
Areas" he discussed the appropriate domain of a currency area and the criteria 
required for its establishment. This work has become a benchmark for 
evaluating the likely success of CU for a given region. This thesis will in part, 
draw upon Mundell's OCA criteria when examining the potential success of the 
GCC'sCU. 
Mundell proposed that an OCA constitutes an economic region comprising of a 
homogenous collection of producers who face the same economic shocks. By 
'optimality', Mundell implies an exchange rate regime that can both maintain full 
employment and balance of payments equilibrium. According to Mundell's early 
work, a region can be considered an OCA if complete labour and factor mobility 
exists within it, which can substitute for flexible intra-regional or national 
exchange rates. 
Another key criterion of Mundell's OCA, is that the economic shocks affecting 
the states in a given region must be correlated. It follows that the greater the 
similarity of production structures among countries the greater the correlation 
will be between them. There has been much empirical work on economic shock 
correlation between prospective members of a CU .11 
McKinnon 12 , building on Mundell's initial OCA theory elaborates on several 
opaque terms. One such term, 'factor mobility', McKinnon assumes Mundell 
uses in a geographic sense because complete factor mobility between 
10 Ibid. 
11 See Bayoumi, T and Eichengreen, B., "Shocking Aspects of European Monetary Unification", 
CEPR Discussion Paper No. 643, London, May 1992 and Kim, Y. and Chow, H.K. "Optimum 
currency area in Europe: an alternative assessmenr Economic Letter.s 81, pp. 297-304, 2003. 
12 McKinnon, R. I., "Optimum Currency Areas" The American Economic Review, Vol. 53, No.4, 
pp. 717-725, September 1963. 
12 
industries - as Kenen 13 also points out- presents several practical problems. 14 
McKinnon contends that the more open the economies forming a CU are, the 
greater benefits accruing to them will be. Openness to trade, suggests 
McKinnon, will amplify the benefits from reducing transaction costs. In addition 
he also felt that the efficiency gains resulting from a common currency are 
more obvious for smaller economies.15 
Kenen 16 believed labour mobility within a given CU 'region' can never be 
sufficiently mobile to completely mitigate the impact of economic shocks. As 
Mundell suggests, labour is not homogenous therefore we cannot assume that 
labour is fully mobile. Kenen presented an alternative to complete labour 
mobility within a region arguing that well diversified economies are less likely to 
suffer from asymmetric shocks, therefore CU among such economies could be 
appropriate. On the other hand, he suggests that economies, characterised by 
a high degree of specialisation are more likely to suffer from asymmetric 
shocks. Therefore a flexible exchange rate and independent monetary policy 
are more appropriate for such countries so that they can adjust their terms of 
trade in an attempt to restore equilibrium to the balance of payments and 
achieve full employment. 
A decade later Mundell17 developed his theory of OCAs to include a role for risk 
sharing and portfolio diversification - this somewhat diminished the salience of 
his previous criterion - the symmetry of economic shocks. Mundell argued that 
by holding claims on each other's output18 members of a CU could be insured 
against asymmetric shocks. Hence, through capital market Integration, the 
impact of asymmetric shocks will be mitigated. This, he argues, is because 
income from capital assets in other member states will offset the decline in 
13 Kenen, P. B., •The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas: An Eclectic View", in Monetary 
Problems of the lntematlonal Economy, (eds. R.A. Mundell and A.K. Swoboda) pp. 41-60, 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1969. 
14 In reality labour is not a homogenous input into every production process and therefore an 
employee in one industry cannot be immediately substituted for an employee in another 
industry, as the phrase 'complete factor mobility' suggests. 
15 Through gaining preferential access to a larger market, small open economies could greatly 
benefit from the exploitation of new economies of scale using existing export industries. 
16 Op.cit. 
17 Mundell, R. A., "Uncommon Arguments for Common Currencies", in The Economics of 
Common Currencies, (eds. H.G. Johnson and A.K. Swoboda), pp.114-132, 1973. 
18 In the form of equity shares, dividends, interest payments and rental revenues. 
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domestic income in the affected state, allowing for consumption smoothing and 
providing a form of insurance. Mundell's later analysis creates a pivotal role for 
financial market integration in the adjustment to disturbances and the smooth 
functioning of an OCA. 
Later on Mundell19 expanded his OCA theory to look at the main incentives and 
disincentives for a group of countries in forming a CU. Mundell took into 
consideration the wider political economy implications of CU as well as the 
economic arguments, some of which have particular resonance for the GCC 
economies. For example, out of 17 factors which Mundell lists as disincentives 
for joining a CU, he cites "(if a country) wants to protect the secrecy of its 
statisticsn. In the list of 17 factors for joining, he cites "(If the countries want) to 
reinforce or establish an economic power bloc that will have more clout in 
international economic discussions". 
The core OCA criteria - the degree of intra·regional trade and economic 
diversification, labour mobility, capital flows and symmetry of economic shocks 
- as formulated by Mundell, McKinnon and Kenen have been applied 
quantitatively in later research. These criteria have been shown to provide a 
valuable explanation for a country's exchange rate regime. We will now discuss 
the empirical literature. Following this we will look at the applicability of OCA 
criteria to the case of the Eurozone (see section 2.4) and the GCC (see section 
2.5.2). 
2.3 Empirical and Applied Analysis 
A body of empirical literature examining the costs and benefits of CU through 
econometric analysis has been stimulated, in part, by the controversial findings 
of Rose. 20 Using econometric analysis21 Rose measured the effect of a CU on 
19 Mundell, Robert A. "Updating the agenda for monetary union" in Optimum Currency Areas: 
New Analytical and Policy Developments, (eds. Blejer, M.l., Frenkel, J.A., Leidennan, L., and 
Razin, A.), International Monetary Fund, 1997. 
20 Rose, A.K., "One Money, One Market, Estimating the Effect of Common Currencies on 
Trade" National Bureau for Economic Research Working Paper 7432, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, December 1999. 
21 Rose uses a multivariate regression model with cross sectional data of 186 countries 
spanning five separate years. In the model trade between two countries is dependent on the 
following explanatory variables; real GOP, real GOP per capita, volatility of nominal bilateral 
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bi-lateral trade between countries. Somewhat surprisingly, he found that a CU 
between countries would triple their bi-lateral trade. Rose undertakes several 
modifications of the 'gravity' model in order to reduce the possibility of model 
misspecification and he concludes that his results are robust. However, Rose 
admits that his model can give no indication of the causal direction between 
increasing trade and CU and he does not rule out the possibility that CU may in 
fact be the result of large bi-lateral trade flows and not vice versa. 
Rose's contention that a CU could triple bi-lateral trade between members has 
arguably increased the attractiveness of CU for a number of regions. One 
objective of economic policy in the GCC has been to increase intra-regional 
trade - which is currently considered to be rather low (see section 2.5.2). 22 The 
proposed CU is seen to be an important pillar of the GCC's regional economic 
integration strategy. However, an issue of sustained controversy in the 
econometric literature - one which may greatly influence the costs and benefits 
of a GCC CU - is where the direction of causality lies in the strong relationship 
between CU and trade. 
The empirical literature has shed some light on issues where the theoretical 
literature has been ambiguous. This has been the case in assessing the effect 
of CU on the economic specialisation of member states and consequently the 
degree of business cycle correlation between members. Authors such as 
Kenen23 and Krugman24, previously claimed that greater trade between 
countries would lead to the specialisation of production structures in those 
countries. In turn greater economic specialisation would result in a weaker 
correlation between those countries incomes and their supply shocks. 
However, Frankel and Rose25 , using empirical analysis, find that in fact there is 
a positive correlation between bilateral trade intensity and business cycles. 
They argue that greater trade integration between two countries will itself lead 
exchange rates, distance between the two countries, whether the two countries share a land 
border, have a common official language, share a trade agreement and have been colonized W the same power. 
A full analysis of intra-GCC trade is carried out in chapter 5, section 5.2. 
23 Op. cit. 
24 Krugman, P., "Lessons of Massachusetts for EMU" in The Transition to Economic and 
Monetary Union in Europe, (eds. F. Giavazzi and F. Torres} Cambridge University Press, New 
York, pp. 241-261, 1993. 
25 Frankel, J.A. and Rose, A. K., "Is EMU more Justifiable ex post than ex ante?" European 
Economic Revlew41, pp. 753-760, 1997. 
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to convergence in terms of income and business cycles. Therefore, trade 
cannot be considered independently from the business cycle in assessing the 
suitability of a country for membership of a CU because, to an extent, they are 
jointly determined. Moreover, levels of trade are influenced by national trade 
policy, as is the degree of economic convergence between countries at any 
one time. Therefore the criteria of significant intra-regional trade and 
synchronised business cycles might be considered to be 'endogenous' to the 
policy of forming a CU. 26 
Critically, Frankel and Rose propose that even if countries are not economically 
suited to joining a CU ex ante, they will be ex post of joining. If we extend this 
analysis regarding new entrants to EMU to other potential CUs, it appears that 
any concerns regarding the efficacy of a single monetary policy for new CU 
members are unwarranted. Even if business cycles are not correlated prior to 
joining a CU they will become synchronised following membership.27 
Frankel and Rose28 also assert that when examining historical trade patterns it 
is important to evoke the Lucas critique. 29 They argue that because trade 
between two given countries is dynamic, history is not necessarily a reliable 
guide to the future and therefore simply analyzing historical trade data is 
inadequate to be able to draw any conclusions regarding a region's future 
suitability as an OCA. 
2.4 Evidence from EMU and Possible Lessons for the GCC 
Sets of economic criteria for establishing an OCA cannot adequately provide a 
simple positive or negative answer to any given group of countries, on whether 
they should form a CU. It is therefore important to look at the GCC case 
comparatively in order to be able to gauge the potential success of its CU and 
draw lessons from the experiences of other CUs. However we must be careful 
26 Frankel, J.A and Rose, A.K. "The Endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area Criteria", 
NBER Working Paper 5700, August 1996. 
27 Ibid. 
28 lbid. 
29 Lucas, R. E., "Econometric policy evaluation: A critique" Carnegie-Rochester Conference 
Series on Public Policy 1, pp. 19-46, 1976. 
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in giving too much credence to such lessons as the economic and political 
composition of the GCC is unlike any previous CU region. 
While there are currently five CUs in existence30, the largest and most 
significant is that of the EMU, with 12 member states where the single currency 
in circulation is the euro. There is a significant body of literature relating to the 
experience of the EMU from which we draw upon in this section. 
Since the official launch of the euro a number of papers have examined the 
effect of the common currency on issues such as financial markets and 
economic stability in the Eurozone. The rather short history of the euro makes it 
somewhat difficult to draw strong conclusions with regard to the long term 
impact of the CU on member states. Having said this, certain matters have 
already begun to stand out as potential lessons for other regions, such as the 
GCC, that are considering embarking on a similar monetary course. This thesis 
will draw upon the experience of the EMU throughout the analysis in the 
following chapters. 
This section will cover the following areas: 
• Initially it focuses on the political impetus and rationale behind the 
establishment of EMU (section 2.4.1 ). 
• Following this, it looks at the literature related to the OCA criteria in the case 
of EMU; intra-regional trade (section 2.4.2), labour market mobility (section 
2.4.3), financial market integration (section 2.4.4) and economic 
convergence and growth (section 2.4.5). 
• Lastly it will examine the literature that assesses fiscal stability within the 
Eurozone and the impact of the Stability and Growth Pact on fiscal discipline 
and economic performance (section 2.4.6). 
30 Fasano, U. and Staff Team, Monetary Union among Member Countries of the Guff 
Cooperation Council, International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C., 2003. 
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2.4.1 Political Impetus 
Difficulties in the operationalisation of OCA theory often leaves as assessment 
of the cost-benefit balance of CU open to debate. Consequently the case can 
always be made for or against entering a CU based on political ideology. The 
debate within the UK provides a prime example of this.31 
The importance of political unity among the member states of a monetary union 
cannot be overstated. It is clear that the strong political will to form a CU in the 
case of Europe has been able to override the fact that the Eurozone in many 
instances is not a model OCA. EMU has been seen by some observers as a 
means to achieving greater political cohesion in Europe and indeed such 
rationale was initially stated by the architects of EMU. Willee2 argues that the 
process of economic integration in Europe which culminated in a single 
currency secured primary national security and foreign policy goals for its main 
architects. 
Willet contends that the European political elite ignored warnings which 
indicated that the region was not an OCA and that monetary union would only 
have net benefits for some countries. De Grauwe33 suggests that EMU appears 
to be welfare enhancing for a core group of members, but such a welfare case 
cannot be made across all member states. While Feldstein34 doesn't hesitate in 
claiming that the driving force behind EMU is primarily political and not based 
solely on economic merits. 
2.4.2 Intra-Regional Trade 
According to the empirical literature on CUs {section 2.3) the effect of a single 
currency on trade between members should be substantial. In particular 
research by Rose35 suggested that trade in a single currency could lead to a 
31 Munchau, W., "Lessons from Monetary Union" Financial Times, 4 January 2004. 
32 Willett, T. D., "Some Political Economy Aspects of EMU" Journal of Policy Modeling 22 (3), 
w>· 379-389, 2000. 
DeGrauwe, P., The Economics of Monetary Integration, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1992. 
34 Feldstein, M., QThe Political Economy of the European Economic and Monetary Union: 
Political Sources of an Economic Liability" The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 11, No. 
4 (autumn), pp. 23-42, 1997. 
35 Rose, op.cit. 
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tripling of trade between members. However, evidence drawn from the 
experience of EMU suggests that the real impact of the single currency on 
trade between members has been of a smaller magnitude and that the 
establishment of the single market was an important factor in stimulating intra-
regional trade. 
Micco, Stein and Ordonez36 examine a panel data set of post 1999 bilateral 
trade flows between the EMU members states. The authors find that the effect 
of EMU on bilateral trade between member countries has ranged between 4 
and 10 percent, much less than that initially presented by Rose. However, the 
authors conclude that while the size of the effect has been less than previous 
estimates, nevertheless the effect of EMU on trade is economically significant. 
Furthermore, as the sample used in the study examines only the first four years 
of the monetary union the effects may well become larger over time. 
Another study examined the impact of increasing trade among the EMU 
countries on price level integration. The removal of barriers to trade should lead 
to increasing cross border competition and arbitrage thus reducing price 
differences across the union. Rogers37 compared micro level annual price data 
of 139 items across 25 European Cities and 13 US cities between 1990 and 
2001. The author found striking evidence of price convergence in traded goods 
across European cities and that the price dispersal between European cities is 
now similar to that in the US. Importantly, most of the convergence in prices 
was found to take place between 1991 and 1994, the period when the 'single 
markef was being completed and much less convergence occurred after 1998 
after the single currency was launched. The evidence presented by Rogers 
therefore suggests that price convergence across Europe has been an ongoing 
process but was stimulated more by the establishment of the single market 
rather than the formal adoption of the common currency. 
36 Micco, A., Stein, E. and Ordonez, G. "The currency union effect on trade: Early evidence 
from EMU" Economic Policy, pp.315- 356, October 2003. 
37 Rogers, J.A. "Monetary union, price level convergence, and inflation: How close is Europe to 
the United States?" lntemational Finance Discussion Paper, No. 740, Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System, October 2002. 
19 
In chapter seven of this thesis, "The Potential Costs and Benefits of a GCC 
Currency Union", we examine the potential micro efficiency gains from the 
single currency and the potential effect on intra-regional trade and price levels 
using the findings of a GCC wide business survey carried out for this thesis 
(see section 7.2.1 and 7.2.2). 
2.4.3 Labour Mobility 
Labour mobility is a key criterion for Mundell's OCA and one that can be used 
as an alternative adjustment mechanism to economic disturbances in the 
absence of a fully flexible exchange rate. While the contention holds that the 
more mobile labour is within an economic region the more likely it is to perform 
successfully as an OCA, the Eurozone has illustrated that a relatively low level 
of labour mobility is not in itself a barrier to establishing a CU. 
European labour markets have been frequently compared with those of the US. 
Research by Dohse et af8 suggests that adjustments to economic shocks in 
the US often take the form of labour migration yet in Europe it is more often the 
case that individuals will simply leave the labour market. Additionally they found 
that regional unemployment disparities in Europe are particularly large while 
inter-regional labour mobility is limited.39 While legal barriers to labour migration 
within the EU have been more or less dismantled the presence of language 
differences still poses a formidable barrier.40 
Eichengreen,41 using a time-series model, examines the speed with which 
unemployment adjusts in various EU countries to the long-run equilibrium EU-
wide unemployment level. The results were compared with the same model for 
the US and again Eichengreen found that the US regional labour markets could 
adjust more quickly to their long run level than the Europeans, about 20 
38 Dohse, D., Krieger-Baden, C., and Soltwedel, R., "EMU Challenges European Labour 
Markets" International Monetary Fund Working Paper99/131, Washington D. C., 1999. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Feldstein, M., "The Political Economy of the European Economic and Monetary Union: 
Political Sources of an Economic Liability" The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 11, No. 
4 (autumn), pp. 23-42, 1997. 
41 Eichengreen, B., "Is Europe an Optimum Currency Area?" Centre for Economic and Policy 
Research DiscussiOn PaperNo. 478, London, November 1990. 
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percent faster. This empirical research illustrates how a high degree of labour 
mobility improves a country's ability to adjust quickly to economic shocks. 
Eichengreen42 puts forward a number of factors that affect labour mobility; 
these include incentives to move such as regional disparities in income, the 
incidence of asymmetric shocks, border controls and legal barriers, cultural 
patterns and historical trends. There is also a consensus that structural 
rigidities in Europe impede labour market mobility. Feldstein43 considers the 
obstacles to increasing the flexibility of Europe's labour markets as high 
unemployment benefits and minimum wages, excessive regulation and 
mandated fringe benefits. 
As we shall see later on in this literature review, GCC national labour mobility, 
much like that in the Eurozone, is fairly limited. However, the presence of a 
large expatriate labour force which is highly responsive to national shocks 
greatly increases the overall flexibility of the GCC labour market (see section 
2.5.2). 
2.4.4 Financial Market Integration 
The impact of the euro on the European financial markets has been particularly 
positive. According to research by Galati and Tsatsaronis44 the euro has led to 
the deepening of many of Europe's financial markets by lowering transaction 
costs, eliminating exchange rate risk and the relaxation of regulatory restraints. 
They argue the benefits have been clear in the corporate bond and equity 
markets, which collectively are now greater in size than the sum of their 
component national markets. Eichengreen45 argues that the effect of the euro 
on Europe's financial markets has been far more reaching than could have 
ever been expected and implies that Europe will become far more market 
42 Eichengreen, B., "One Money for Europe? Lessons from the U.S. Currency Union" Economic 
Policy 10, pp. 117-187, 1990. 
43 Op. cit. 
44 Galati, G. and Tsatsaronis, K., "The Impact of the Euro on Europe's financial markets", Bank 
for International Settlements Working Paper No. 100, July 2001. 
45 Eichengreen, B., "The Euro One Year On" Journal of Policy Modeling 22 (3), pp. 355-368, 
2000. 
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driven as a result. Galati and Tsatsaronis46 argue that the introduction of the 
euro has exposed areas where barriers to further financial market integration 
remain. They consider obstacles to include the diverging legal and taxation 
frameworks in member states as well as a lack of coordination in the issuance 
of sovereign bonds. 
Karlinge~7 finds that the markets for sovereign debts have remained 
segmented in the Eurozone illustrated by widening yield spreads since 1998. 
Karlinger suggests that this has resulted from the separate agencies issuing 
the bonds but also reflects the varying credit worthiness of the issuing country 
and the market's belief in the ECB's 'no bail-out' clause. However, in contrast 
Bernanke48 finds that there has been a convergence in sovereign debt yields 
among the Eurozone members. He concludes that this convergence has 
occurred as a result of the reduction in inflation risk and exchange rate risk 
provided by the single currency and has benefited many Eurozone economies. 
Diverging cross-border payments systems also constitute a significant obstacle 
to fully integrated financial markets in Europe. Important economic gains, 
argues Karlinger, could be realized if the cost of cross border transactions 
within the Eurozone were reduced to domestic levels. There have been some 
institutional efforts directed at removing some of these obstacles, such as the 
establishment of real-time gross settlement systems of the European System of 
Central Banks and European Banking Association. 
Prior to the launch of the euro, Eichengreen49 analysed the degree of economic 
integration in Europe by looking at differentials between regional stock prices in 
Paris and Dusseldorf and then compared this with the equivalent in Canada 
(using Toronto and Montreal stock market indices). Eichengreen found that the 
differentials between European markets were significant and that compared 
with those in Canada were five times more variable. On the other hand, 
46 Op. cit. 
47 Karlinger, L., "The Impact of Common Currencies on Financial Markets: A Literature Review 
and Evidence from the Euro area", Bank of Canada Working Paper 2002-35, 2002. 
46 Bemanke, B. S., "The Euro at Five: An Assessment" In The £uro at Five: Ready for a Global 
Role? (ed. Posen, AS.) lhe Institute for International Economics, Special Report 18, April 
2005. 
49 Eichengreen, B., "One Money for Europe? Lessons from the U.S. Currency Union" Economic 
Polley 1 o. pp.117 -187, 1990. 
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Eichengreen's results did show a convergence over time of stock prices in 
Europe when comparing the 1970s with the 1980s. An analysis of the equity 
returns in Europe provides a contrasting picture. Karlinger0 shows that the 
responsiveness of equity returns in various EMU countries to shocks 
originating from the Eurozone increased substantially in the run up to EMU and 
during its first two years. Such results indicate an increasing correlation among 
EMU equity returns and thus indicate growing financial market integration 
across the Eurozone. 
Before 1999 much debate centred on the strength of the new currency and its 
potential attractiveness as a reserve currency - as a possible competitor to the 
US dollar. Since its launch, the euro has performed, perhaps unsurprisingly, 
very similarly to the constituent currencies of the member countries, particularly 
the German mark. 51 Even though the euro is now the main rival to the US 
dollar its introduction has not as yet resulted in a major reallocation of official 
reserves outside of the Eurozone. 52 The attractiveness of the euro as a major 
reserve currency is correlated with its strength in international foreign exchange 
markets. The significant appreciation of the euro against the US dollar since its 
official launch in 200253 will increasingly lead to future reallocations of foreign 
exchange reserves, particularly in Asia but also those of the GCC, out of a 
weakening dollar into the strengthening euro. 54 
Russia and Iran - both oil exporting countries - have considered denominating 
their oil sales in euros. 55 Iraq, prior to the second Gulf war, was benefiting from 
its switch to invoicing oil in a strengthening euro. The future GCC currency may 
also challenge the dollar and euro to become the oil-invoicing currency. With 
nearly two fifths of the world's oil reserves held by the GCC states and 
50 Op. cit. 
51 Galati and Tsatsaronis, op.clt. 
52 Bemanke, op.cit. 
53 From the beginning of 2002 to the end of 2003 the US dollar declined by 30 per cent against 
the euro, according to Wolf, M., "The underrated dangers of the dollar's orderly decline" 
Financial Times, 17 December 2003. Since then there have been periods when the dollar has 
regained some ground but in the first half of 2006 the dollar continued to fall against the euro 
and by July 2006 the dollar's value had declined by 30 percent against the euro since its 
launch. 
54 Eichengreen, B., "The Euro One Year on" Journal of Policy Modeling 22 (3), pp. 355-368, 
2000. 
55 Islam, F., "When will we buy oil in euros?" The Observer, 23 September 2003. 
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increasing energy dependence upon them there could be a strong rationale for 
the GCC to switch to oil invoicing in its fledgling unified currency. Under this 
scenario instead of investing petro~dollars back into the US economy, in order 
to avoid exchange rate risk56 the GCC governments would hold them in their 
own currency and invest in domestic assets, greatly benefiting their financial 
markets and economic development. The prospect of such a scenario will be 
discussed later in this thesis {see chapter seven, section 7.5.1). 
2.4.5 Economic Convergence and Growth 
The Eurozone's economic experience since the launch of the euro has been 
somewhat mixed. While the euro has proved itself to be a strong trading 
currency against the US dollar, and inflation rates in Europe have remained 
low, Eurozone economic growth rates proved less resilient to the global 
economic downturn in 2000-2002 than the US and since the transfer of 
monetary sovereignty to the ECB output in the larger Eurozone economies has 
become more volatile. 57 Despite the occurrence of several demand side 
shocks, it appears that supply side dynamics have an important role to play in 
the persistence of weak economic growth in Europe. Consequently, Eurozone 
growth rates have also been disappointingly low over the last decade. 58 
Literature on economic convergence among the Eurozone members prior to 
monetary union suggested that a single monetary policy would not suit all 
members of the union. 59 Bayoumi and Eichengreen60 found that shocks to 
output and prices were significantly more idiosyncratic across the member 
states than across US states. Research on economic convergence post 
monetary union has shown that growth and inflation differentials continue to 
persist among the members, 61 although Alesina et af32 argue that this is not 
56 Islam, op. cit 
57 Posen, A. S., "The Euro's Success Within Limits" in The Euro at Five: Ready for a Global 
Role? (Ed. Posen, A.S.) The Institute for International Economics, Special Report 18, April 
2005. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Bayoumi, T and Eichengreen, B., "Shocking Aspects of European Monetary Unification" 
CEPR Discussion Paper No. 643, London, May 1992. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Alesina, A. F., Blanchard, O.J., Gall, J., Giavazzi, F. and Uhlig, H., Defining a 
Macroeconomic Framework for the Euro Area: Monitoring the European Central Bank No. 3, 
Centre for Economic Policy Research Report, 30 March 2001. 
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necessarily problematic as long as it is a temporary phenomenon and reflects a 
process of economic adjustment. 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen63 develop an OCA index which operationalises the 
OCA criteria using econometric techniques which sheds light on the economic 
convergence of the EMU countries. The authors use this index to identify three 
groups of countries, those that are ready to join the CU, those that are 
converging and those that show no signs of converging. The authors find that 
there is a strong relationship between trade and monetary integration. 
According to their index, the authors conclude that "countries among whom the 
completion of the single market has led to the greatest increase in bilateral 
trade have experienced the greatest increase in their readiness for monetary 
integration". 64 
One assumed benefit of the introduction of the euro was to be price 
convergence resulting from the enlarged market and greater competition. Thus 
far there appears to be little evidence of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) within 
the Eurozone. Not only is there considerable anecdotal evidence of price 
disparities between Eurozone countries there is also formal evidence that PPP 
has not occurred. Lopez and Papell65 found some evidence of a process of 
price convergence beginning as early as 1992 with the adoption of the 
Maastricht Treaty. They also found that evidence of PPP was greater within 
the core Eurozone countries compared to the periphery members, but this 
evidence was statistically insignificant. Overall their econometric analysis 
rejected the presence of PPP in the Eurozone. 
2.4.6 Fiscal Stability and Discipline 
The European Union's Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was designed to 
ensure discipline over government deficits and debt. According to Eichengreen 
62 Ibid. 
63 Bayoumi, T and Eichengreen, B. "Ever Closer to heaven? An Optimum-Currency-Area Index 
for European Countries", European Economic Review 41, pp.761-770, 1997. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Lopez, C. and Papell, D.H., "Convergence to Purchasing Power Parity at the 
Commencement of the Euro" University of Houston, April 2003. 
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and Wyplosz66 the fiscal rules in the SGP of the EU were designed with the aim 
of avoiding a situation where the debt default of a member state leaves the 
ECB with no option but to bail it out. In short, under the SGP, government 
budget deficits have to be kept to below 3 percent of GDP67 and debt under 60 
percent of GDP.68 Currently the ECB has a 'no bail-out' clause stating that it 
will not act as lender of last resort but in reality most believe that it would have 
little choice in such a position. 
Furthermore, if a sovereign bond default in the Eurozone was not dealt with 
promptly it could, suggest Eichengreen and Wyplosz69, in an integrated 
financial system lead to contagion in the government debt markets of the other 
member states. The economic consequences of such financial market 
contagion would be detrimental for the entire Eurozone. The risks of a systemic 
crisis in the Eurozone have not been addressed directly and instead are left to 
the 'constructive ambiguity'70 of the SGP. Consequently, salient questions 
remain over whether banking and finance supervision at a national level in the 
Eurozone provides sufficient scrutiny of the entire system. 
The design of the SGP has been criticised by academics and policy makers 
alike because it does not take into account the economic cycle and therefore 
prevents the full utilization of automatic stabilizers in the given economy. It is 
argued that unless government's can run significant surpluses in an economic 
upswing they would not be in a position to allow the automatic stabilizers to 
work in a downturn and in such a situation they would be likely to incur fines for 
breaching the SGP's deficit rule. 71 In fact this situation came to light in late 
2003 when Germany and France (the union's two largest economies 
respectively) found themselves breaking the deficit ceiling for a third year 
66 Eichengreen, B. and Wyplosz, C., "Stability Pact: More than a Minor Nuisance?" Economic 
Policy, April 1998. 
67 Except in conditions where GOP has declined by 2 percent and the deficit is small and 
temporary. 
68 Eichengreen and Wyplosz, op. cit. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Duisenberg, W. F., Presentation of the ECB's Annual Report 1998 to the European 
Parliament, Introductory statement delivered by President of the European Central Bank, 
Strasbourg, 26 October 1999. 
71 Eichengreen and Wyplosz, op. cit 
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running and facing punitive fines.72 However, the commitment of the European 
Finance Ministers to enforce such fines faltered and as a result the credibility of 
the Pact was called into question. 
Thus, the outlook for the SGP in its current form appears uncertain and there 
are increasing calls for a reworking of the pact. It is argued that what is 
required is a more flexible approach to short term deficits combined with strong 
commitment to medium-term fiscal discipline. 73 The design of future fiscal 
discipline rules for the GCC CU will therefore be important not just for stability 
but also for potential growth within the union. This issue is discussed in more 
detail later in this thesis (see chapter seven, section 7.3.1) 
2.5 GCC Currency Union Research 
A small, but growing body of literature focuses specifically on the subject of 
GCC CU. Several reports by the IMF, the ECB and Arab based research 
institutes have focused on the proposed monetary unification in the GCC. This 
section groups the literature into the following areas: 
• First, it looks at literature dealing with the historical roots of the GCC, intra-
regional political integration and the political implications of CU (section 
2.5.1). 
• Second, it surveys the literature on OCA criteria in the case of the GCC and 
GCC economic convergence (section 2.5.2). 
• Third, it discusses those papers that attempt to judge the overall cost-
benefit balance of GCC CU (section 2.5.3). 
• Fourth, it focuses on literature that specifically relates to the potential costs 
of a GCC CU (section 2.5.4). 
72 Staff writer "Europe and the Euro: The Death of the Stability Pact" The Economist, 29 
November 2003. 
73 HM Treasury, The Stability and Growth Pact: A Discussion Paper, London, March 2004. 
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• It then moves on to survey the literature concerned with the necessary 
preparations and preconditions for a GCC CU (section 2.5.5). 
• Finally, it reviews the literature analysing the choice of exchange rate 
arrangement for the future single currency (section 2.5.6). 
2.5.1 GCC Formation and Political Integration 
According to Looney74 the main catalyst for the formation of the GCC was 
security. The Iran-Iraq war of 1979 involved two of the Gulf region's largest 
countries and dramatically increased the desire for greater cooperation in the 
field of defence among the other smaller Gulf states. The GCC came into 
being, argues Peterson75 primarily due to cultural and ideological reasons, 
rather than economic. The continuing search for a broad Arab unity along with 
binding religious ties provided the cohesion among what became the Gulf 
Cooperation Council in 1981. While the GCC has ideological underpinnings, it 
has not allowed itself to become bogged down by these, as have many 
previous and contemporary Arab alliances. Unlike other alliances the GCC has 
embarked on a practical course for achieving mutual interests and objectives. 
In this regard Peterson argues that the GCC is succeeding, where other Arab 
attempts at unity and cooperation have largely failed. 
Laabas and Limam76 seem certain that the political drive to achieve and sustain 
monetary union is present among the leaders of the GCC states. While the 
statistical tests for economic convergence, as presented by Laabas and 
Limam, do not in their opinion provide a convincing economic case for CU, the 
authors argue that the political will - a pivotal pre-condition for a successful CU 
- is in place. In order to achieve their long term economic development 
objectives Peterson77 suggests that there is a wide acknowledgement within 
the GCC for economic integration and cooperation. He quotes a previous GCC 
74 Looney, R.E., "Economic Integration in the Gulf Region: Does the Future Hold More Promise 
than the Past?" Center for Contemporary Conflict, Strategic Insight, 1 March 2003. 
75 Peterson, E.R., The Gulf Cooperation Council: Search for Unity in a Dynamic Region, 
Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1988. 
76 Laabas, B. and Limam, 1., Are GCC Countries Ready for Currency Union? Arab Planning 
Institute, Kuwait, April 2002. 
77 Peterson, op. cit. 
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Secretary General, Abdulla Y. Bishara, as suggesting that there is a consensus 
among GCC leaders to move towards some form of confederalist system - the 
closest form of political and economic union. In order to achieve this far 
reaching regional integration the GCC states will require substantial political 
determination and coordination. 
Contrary to Peterson's argument other academics, such as Looney,78 have 
suggested that while governmental rhetoric embraces greater regional 
coordination the slow pace of the unification process indicates the hesitancy of 
GCC national leaders to relinquish sovereign powers as a precursor to CU. 
What is clear - as the Eurozone has shown - is that the process of full 
economic integration cannot be successful without a strong political will. In 
chapter six of this thesis, we discuss the political motivation behind the decision 
of the GCC leaders to form a CU and their political commitment to the project 
(see chapter six, section 6.5). 
2.5.2 OCA Criteria and Economic Convergence in the GCC 
The theoretical OCA literature laid down several key criteria for examining the 
potential for CU in a given region. To reiterate, these include a high degree of 
intra-regional trade and investment; labour and capital mobility, and correlation 
of economic shocks. Several papers reviewed below examine these criteria in 
relation to the GCC. 
In their report, Laabas and Umam79 examine the degree to which the GCC 
states meet the OCA criteria using quantitative and qualitative analysis. The 
authors conclude that the GCC states do not satisfy all of the OCA criteria. In 
particular, they find that intra-GCC trade is weak, there is not sufficient factor 
market mobility, the GCC economies are not diversified and there is no 
evidence of synchronised business cycles. They argue that the main factor 
favourable to the establishment of CU is the implicit political commitment of the 
7s L "t ooney, op. c1. 
79 Laabas, B. and Umam, I., Are GCC Countries Ready for Currency Union? Arab Planning 
Institute, Kuwait, April2002. 
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GCC leaders to achieve economic integration, although they do not elaborate 
on their assumption. 
Looney80 argues that the most prominent area where integration efforts have 
failed to achieve returns thus far among the GCC states has been in intra-
regional trade. According to Looney Intra-regional GCC trade is small and has 
grown little over the past decades. Jadresic81 also focuses on the low level of 
intra-regional trade and compares it with that of other regions. He illustrates 
that regional trade flows among European countries have been six to seven 
times greater than those in the GCC. 
Looney82 suggests that the low regional trade volumes have partly resulted 
from the pursuit of conflicting development strategies. Whilst states such as 
Saudi Arabia have pursued import substitution policies, others such as the 
United Arab Emirates have followed a free trade strategy. This has made it 
difficult for these countries to agree on the direction of joint trade policy. Laabas 
and Limam83 also comment on the weakness of intra-regional trade and point 
out that there has been little increase in the amount of intra-regional trade over 
the past four decades. 
Despite the fact that intra-regional trade volumes are low as a proportion of 
total GCC trade, Jadresic84 reveals that when oil related trade is excluded intra-
regional trade accounts for a much more significant proportion of total GCC 
trade. Consequently, Jadresic asserts that CU will stimulate intra-regional 
trade, which is predominantly non-oil trade and will thus lead to the realization 
of another important GCC economic policy objective - that of economic 
diversification and reducing dependence on hydrocarbons. In the case of the 
UAE, one report finds that a significant amount of non-oil trade - approximately 
one third of non-oil and re-exports - are destined for other GCC states and 
lran.85 
80 Looney, R.E., "Economic Integration in the Gulf Region: Does the Future Hold More Promise 
than the Past?" Center for Contemporary Conflict, Strategic Insight, 1 March 2003. 
81 Op. cit. 
82 Op. cit. 
83 Op. cit. 
84 Op. cit. 
85 Goyal, R., "Non-oil Growth, Competitiveness, and the Labour Market, in UAE: Selected 
Issues and Statistical Appendix" International Monetary Fund Country Report 03167, 2003. 
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Little research has been carried out on the dynamics of the GCC labour 
market, but generally national labour mobility is considered to be low for 
reasons such as strong family ties and responsibilities. Evidence from Saudi 
Arabia has shown that Saudis were unlikely to be willing to relocate, even 
within the kingdom, in order to find employment. 86 As well as this geographical 
inertia, there is little mobility of nationals between the public and private 
sectors. Sassanpour et atB? illustrates how most GCC Governments provide 
life-long employment for their nationals, and have enshrined these rights in 
legislature. The public sector provides generous wages and benefits that do not 
reflect labour productivity indicating a low level of wage flexibility. This has led 
to a preference among GCC nationals to work in the public sector and an 
aversion to working in the private sector, which is considered as less attractive 
and therefore less prestigious. Consequently the GCC states suffer from highly 
segmented labour markets, with the private sector employing mainly 
expatriates. 
It is important to consider the fact that a large proportion of the GCC populace 
- approximately one half according to Sassanpour - is expatriate. This element 
of the labour force is likely to be highly mobile, after all these agents have 
already emigrated on economic grounds. However, Sassanpou~ points out 
that the ability of these economic migrants to move between jobs, once 
resident in the Gulf, is restricted by the requirement that their employment is 
sponsored by a national. Without this national sponsorship, migrant labour, on 
which the private sector in the GCC states is heavily dependent, could become 
even more flexible in response to economic adjustments. In addition to this, 
according to Goyal89 the wages of non-nationals in the private sector are highly 
flexible and expatriate workers have been a key source of growth in the non-oil 
sectors of GCC economies. 
86 Bosbait, Mohammed and Wilson, Rodney, "Education, school to work transitions and 
unemployment in Saudi Arabia" Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 41, No. 4, pp. 533-545, July 2005. 
87 Sassanpour, C., Joharhi, G. Kireyev, A. and Petri, M., "Labour Market Challenges and 
Policies in the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries", International Monetary Fund, Washington 
D.C., November 1997. 
88 Op. cit. 
89 Op. cit. 
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Integration in the banking and finance sectors among countries of a monetary 
union is seen to be beneficial, as has been previously noted, in terms of greater 
risk sharing and opportunities for portfolio diversification ultimately improving 
the efficiency of capital and concomitantly economic growth. Additionally the 
banking sectors in the GCC would benefit from increased competition and 
more cross border activities by GCC banks on top of restructuring and 
consolidation in the industry. However, as Karlinger90 points out financial 
market integration presents new challenges that pose systemic risks to the 
entire financial system. It is therefore crucial that banking and finance 
supervision and regulation are designed to minimize existing and new risks. 
Jabe,-91 argues that significant economic integration has yet to materialize in 
the GCC banking and finance sector. This sector will require greater 
consolidation in order to take advantage of important economies of scale. 
Among a list of reforms, Jaber stresses that the development of deep and liquid 
capital markets through greater privatization in the GCC, as well as 
liberalization of restrictions on company listings and non-national investors, will 
lead to a more efficient allocation of resources and capital mobilization in the 
region. 
The symmetry of economic shocks impacting the GCC states is dependent on 
the similarity of their economic structures. The GCC economies tend to be 
highly specialized, this has occurred at an intra-industry level in the field of oil 
and gas production and its derivatives such as petrochemicals. However, other 
parts of the Gulf, such as Bahrain and Dubai (one of the seven Emirates of the 
UAE) have diversified into service sector areas such as banking, finance and 
tourism. 92 Stem and Siegfried93 argue that while there is a high degree of 
structural convergence among the GCC economies at present, as the 
diversification process continues this convergence will diminish making them 
less well suited to a common monetary policy. 
90 Op.cit. 
91 Jaber, M., "GCC Financial Markets and the Quest for Developmenr Middle East Polley, 
Washington, February 2000. 
92 Asad Rlzvi, S.N., "From Tents to High Rise: Economic Development of the United Arab 
Emirates• Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 664-678, October 1993. 
93 Stunn, M. and Siegfried, N. "Regional Monetary Integration in the Member States of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council", European Central Bank Occasional Paper Series, No. 31, June 2005. 
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Darrat and AI-Shamsi94 analyse the degree of economic convergence between 
the GCC states using econometric techniques. 95 The authors test for 
cointegration between several economic and financial variables of the GCC 
states, such as real GOP, inflation rates and money stock. They find evidence 
of a long run cointegrating relationship between the economic and financial 
variables of all six GCC states and therefore conclude that the slow process of 
economic integration cannot be due to any economic incompatibility. Instead, 
the authors suggest that this may be attributed to sociopolitical factors, 
although they do not elaborate as to their precise nature. 
In pointing out important areas for further research, Darrat and AI-Shamsi 
stress the value of establishing whether Saudi Arabia is the driving force 
behind the integration process. They recommend calculating impulse response 
functions of the underlying Vector Auto Regression Systems in order to identify 
the relative importance and causality of relationships between various GCC 
members. We employ such techniques in chapter five of this thesis, when we 
investigate the precise economic relationship between each GCC state and 
that of Saudi Arabia (see section 5.6). 
The degree to which the GCC economies meet each of the OCA criteria, as 
described in the literature review above, is discussed in detail in chapter five of 
this thesis. 
2.5.3 Assessing the Balance of Costs and Benefits of a GCC CU 
An in depth IMF study of GCC CU by a team led by Fasano96 , examines the 
likely net benefits of the proposed exchange rate regime. The authors argue 
that the GCC states are well positioned to successfully enact and sustain 
monetary union, provided that they undertake a range of supporting structural 
94 Darrat. A. F. and AI-Shamsi, F. "On the Path of Integration in the Gulf Region" Applied 
Economics, 37, pp. 1055- 1062, 2005. 
95 The authors test for unit roots in five economic variables of each GCC states, the variables 
are real GDP, CPI, M1, local exchange rates to SDRs and the monetary base. Having 
established that the time series are integrated of order one, they then test for colntegration 
between each of the economic variables for all six GCC states. In each case, they find 
evidence of at least one cointegrating vector, but sometimes two. 
96 Fasano, U., op.clt. 
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and institutional reforms. Some of these important reforms are discussed below 
in more detail (see section 2.5.5). Fasano points out the obvious benefits from 
CU as being lower transaction costs and the elimination of exchange rate 
uncertainty. While Fasano considers the indirect benefits to be the boosting of 
domestic investment and intra-regional trade, a bigger role in international 
capital markets as well as the potential for enforcing monetary and fiscal 
discipline. 
IMF papers, such as that by Jadresic97 , also assess the costs and benefits of 
CU for the GCC. Jadresic suggests that while the costs are likely to be low the 
benefits depend on a number of other integration measures. He stresses that 
CU should only be part of a broader economic strategy and policy base to 
generate further economic and political integration among the GCC states. 
A paper by Laabas and Limam98 of the Kuwaiti based Arab Planning Institute 
uses a combination of econometric techniques and qualitative analysis to 
assess the suitability of the GCC states for the CU. Their paper uses a 
Generalized Purchasing Power Parity model (G-PPP), of the type presented by 
Enders and Hum,99 and other informal tests100 based on the OCA literature to 
find if the GCC countries constitute an OCA. The authors find that G-PPP holds 
in the case of the GCC states and therefore that the GCC meets the 
requirements for an OCA. However, they point out that the G-PPP test was 
likely to hold from the outset because GCC exchange rates are stable and 
have been anchored to the US dollar for many years. This suggests that the G-
PPP test is perhaps not the best model for investigating whether the GCC 
constitutes an OCA. 
Interestingly, the econometric analysis presented by Laabas and Limam 101 
indicates that some GCC states are less favourable candidates to join a CU 
than others. One example they put forward to substantiate this is that there is a 
97 Jadresic, E., op.cit. 
98Laabas and Limam, op. cit 
99 Enders, W. and Hum, S., "Theory and Tests of Generalized Purchasing Power Parity: 
Common Trends and Real Exchange Rates in the Pacific Rim· Review of International 
Economics 2 (2), p179-190, 1994. 
100 Informal tests included analysing and rating OCA criteria such as openness, labour and 
capital mobility, commodity diversification and production structures. 
101 Op. cit. 
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relatively low correlation between certain macroeconomic variables of Oman 
with those of other GCC states. This suggests that the distribution of costs and 
benefits arising from CU are unlikely to be uniform across the member states. 
A central part of this thesis weighs up the costs and benefits of CU for each 
individual GCC state and analyses whether there will be losers as well as 
winners in the founding of a single GCC currency. A country by country 
analysis of the costs and benefits of CU is therefore presented in chapter eight. 
2.5.4 Potential Costs of a GCC CU 
The most significant cost involved with CU is the loss of ability to implement 
national monetary policy. Monetary policy is not widely deployed by the GCC 
states, largely due to their fixed exchange rate arrangements. Such fixed 
exchange rates, with free movement of capital, preclude the independent 
setting of interest rates. As Jbili and K.ramarenko 102 point out, monetary policy 
is directed at stabilizing the exchange rate and to maintaining the dollar peg 
and that it is limited to managing short term liquidity. While interest rates in the 
GCC must track those set by the Federal Reserve Bank of America in order to 
maintain the dollar pegs the GCC central banks do have a certain amount of 
discretionary monetary policy control. According to Jadresic, "In the short-term, 
individual monetary authorities may continue to have at least some capacity to 
influence domestic liquidity and interest rates". In chapter seven of this thesis 
we examine the potential cost of losing discretionary monetary policy to the 
GCC states (see section 7.3.1) and the appropriateness of continuing the 
existing exchange rate peg to the dollar following the launch of the CU (see 
section 7.3.2). 
Fasano 103 proposes that the loss of independent monetary policy will be limited 
because of the dominance of oil in the GCC economies. He suggests that 
important external shocks such as oil price changes will affect each economy 
similarly. Fasano's comments however, represent an over-simplification of their 
economic structures. Whilst all GCC economies are oil dependent they are not 
102 Jbili, A. and Kramarenko, V., "Choosing Exchange Regimes in the Middle East and North 
Africa" International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C., 2003. 
103 Op. cit. 
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homogenous (as we shall see in chapter four) and therefore the response to an 
oil price shock and its duration will vary across the GCC states. 
In addition to foregoing monetary policy as an economic tool, another 'cost' of 
CU is that it necessarily involves some fiscal policy restrictions for member 
states. It is generally considered that member governments of a CU should 
refrain from running 'excessive' budget deficits and not carry the burden of 
large debts because this could undermine the single currency. Excessive 
government borrowing by one member of a CU will not only raise the cost of 
borrowing for themselves but also by association for the other members of the 
CU. 
The implications of fiscal policy restrictions, of the type embodied in the EU's 
SGP, could be substantial for the GCC states; as currently they rely heavily on 
fiscal policy as a tool with which to manage their economies. When oil prices 
have been low GCC Governments have been reluctant to cut back on 
expenditure - particularly current spending - for fear of negatively affecting 
growth in the non-oil sectors of their economies. During times of weak oil 
prices, most GCC governments have run significant budget deficits and 
therefore they are likely to face difficulties in meeting fiscal deficit and debt to 
GOP limits.104 The degree to which the GCC states would be able to meet such 
fiscal discipline rules as part of the prerequisite conditions for establishing the 
CU is therefore discussed further in chapter six (see section 6.2). 
However, a paper by Fasano and Wang 105 presented econometric evidence 
with strong implications for fiscal policy in the GCC. Fasano and Wang 
examined the short and long run relationship between non oil GOP and 
government expenditure - both current and capital - over the period 1980-
1999 using econometric techniques. 106 The results indicated that there was no 
discernible relationship between changes in government spending and non oil 
104 Fasano, U. and Wang, a., "Testing the Relationship Between Government Spending and 
Revenue: Evidence from GCC Countries" International Monetary Fund Working Paper, 
November 2002. 
105 Fasano, U. and Wang, a., "Fiscal Expenditure Policy and Non-oil Economic Growth: 
Evidence from GCC Countries• International Monetary Fund Working Paper, December 2001. 
106 The authors use a multivariate cointegration and error-correction model to investigate the 
long run equilibrium relationship between fiscal expenditure policy and non-oil real GOP among 
members of the GCC. 
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GDP in the GCC states. The authors therefore concluded that government 
spending in these countries could be cut without jeopardizing non-oil economic 
growth. The underlying reasons for this result, suggest the authors, are in part 
due to recent structural and development strategy changes that have taken 
place in the region, such as progress in the privatization of utilities and their 
increasing openness to foreign private investment.107 
The research by Fasano and Wang may suggest that GCC efforts to diversify 
economies and reduce the role of the state in favour of the private sector have 
paid off in reducing the dependence of non-oil economic sectors on 
government spending. Prima facie, such results appear to indicate that the 
fiscal prudence required by CU may not be as potentially harmful or limiting to 
these countries, as first thought. Yet, the true extent of economic dependence 
on oil revenues is clearly much greater if we include oil sector GOP, on which 
other activities classed as non-oil GDP, such as petroleum-processing 
industries 108, are heavily dependent. 
Another paper by Fasano and Wang109 explored the nature of fiscal policy 
among the GCC states. Using econometric methods they find that government 
revenue and expenditure are cointegrated and therefore that fiscal policy in the 
GCC states is pro-cyclical to changes in oil revenues. 110 Accordingly the GCC 
states conform to a 'revenue-spend hypothesis', so that when oil prices fall and 
concomitantly government revenues decline, expenditure also falls (primarily 
through capital expenditure cut backs), when oil prices rise and government 
coffers swell spending thus increases. A number of recommendations are 
made by the authors that would enable the GCC states to avoid the volatility of 
the 'revenue.spend' economics. They recommend a medium-term expenditure 
framework and that formal oil stabilization funds should be adopted. Such 
medium-term economic policies are already being implemented in Oman and 
107 Fasano, U. and Wang, 0., op.cit. 
108 In most GCC national accounts such oil-based industrial activity is categorized as part of the 
'Manufacturing' sector. 
109 Fasano, U. and Wang, Q., "Testing the Relationship Between Government Spending and 
Revenue: Evidence from GCC Countries" International Monetary Fund Working Paper, 
November 2002. 
110 The authors use cointegration techniques including vector error-correction and vector auto-
regression models to examine the dynamic relationship between government revenue and 
expenditure among the members of the GCC. 
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Kuwait. To some degree they have reduced volatility in economic activity 
through smoothing government income and spending. 1110ther GCC states, 
such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia have unofficial funds that can act like oil 
price stabilization funds, with investment returns possibly acting to offset 
declines in hydrocarbon income following an oil price decline. Jadresic112 
argues that these oil price stabilization funds should play a role in allowing 
GCC states to meet future fiscal discipline rules. 
Fiscal policy has undoubtedly been influenced by government dependence on 
oil revenues in the GCC. However, the existing literature has not dealt 
sufficiently with the overall real costs to the GCC states of losing their ability to 
carry out fiscal policy over the course of the economic cycle. It is clear that the 
design of any fiscal rules as part of monetary union will need to take into 
account the strong correlation between oil prices and government incomes in 
the region if they are to be at all practical. This has been argued strongly by 
Jadresic. 113 
The pro-cyclical fiscal policies of the GCC states, and their high degree of 
hydrocarbon dependence, implies that certain types of nominal fiscal rules, 
such as the EU's SGP, which do not take into account the economic cycles of 
the member states are unlikely to be appropriate for the GCC. Indeed as has 
already been mentioned (see section 2.4.6) many European finance ministers 
and academics themselves would like the Stability and Growth Pact to be more 
flexible and pro-cyclical. In chapter seven of this thesis, we return to the issue 
of appropriately designed fiscal discipline rules for the GCC CU (see section 
7.4). 
111 Fasano and Wang, op. cit 
112 Op.cit. 
113 Op. cit. 
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2.5.5 Preparations for CU 
A paper by Fasano and lqbal114 discusses the design of an effective CU in the 
GCC and suggests a number of logistical and practical steps that still need to 
be taken. These include; choosing quantitative convergence criteria, fiscal 
rules, policy convergence, institutional design and development and 
complementary structural reform. 
Fasano115 makes the distinction between steps which must be taken before the 
establishment of the CU and those that if also taken will allow the GCC nations 
to achieve the full benefits from CU. He asserts that the following steps are 
necessary; establishing a common exchange rate policy and setting bilateral 
exchange rates, pooling foreign reserves, maintaining a sustainable fiscal 
position based on a medium-term framework with conservative oil price 
assumptions, determining targets for monitoring these balances. 
Several papers by the IMF have highlighted the importance of improving data 
provision across the GCC states as an essential part of the process of forming 
a CU. Improved data collection is necessary in order to assess economic and 
monetary convergence and adherence to policy objectives leading up to 
unification. According to Krueger and Kovarich 116 major changes to national 
statistical programs are needed that should begin as soon as possible. In 
addition to this, they point out that a significant lead time will be needed to build 
institutional capabilities and the legal infrastructure for comprehensive data 
collection. Fasano117 also stresses the value of adopting international 
standards in data dissemination. Based on the experience of the EU and the 
role of its statistical agency 'Eurostat', AI Mansouri and Dziobek118 suggest that 
a GCC regional statistical agency, "Gulfstat", should be formed. 'Gulfstat' 
should be tasked with developing a common methodology for collecting, 
114 Fasano, U. and Iqbal, Z. "Common Currency", Finance and Development A Quarterly 
Magazine of the IMF, Vol. 39, No. 4, December 2002. 
115 Fasano, U. and Staff Team, Monetary Union among Member Countries of the Guff 
Cooperation Council, International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C., 2003. 
116 Krueger, R. and Kovarich, E. "Some Principles for Development of Statistics for a 
Gulf Cooperation Council Currency Union" IMF Working Paper, June 2006 
117 Fasano, op.cit. 
118 AI-Mansouri, A.K.L. and Dziobek, Claudia "Providing Official Statistics for the Common 
Market and Monetary Union in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Countries: A Case for 
"Gulfstat" IMF Working PtJper, February 2006. 
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standardizing and harmonizing data across the GCC, a role which the authors 
consider to be of overriding importance. 
In an ECB report, Sturm and Siegfried119 recommend that the process of 
integration should be accompanied by the strengthening of national and 
supranational institutions in advance of CU and the coordination of national 
policies. The authors also stress the importance of setting up a supranational 
monetary institution at the GCC level in order to support the single monetary 
and exchange rate policy of the union. A number of issues related to the set up 
of the GCC central bank will need to be determined prior to the launch of the 
single currency, such as the mandate of the central bank, distribution of 
seigniorage and legal issues relating to its structure. The authors therefore 
recommend that such preparations are made well in advance of CU. 
Ensuring that preparations are made and preconditions for CU are met is 
critical if the GCC states are to achieve CU on time and to secure its future 
durability. Chapter six of this thesis, therefore examines in detail what concrete 
steps are being taken towards CU and the pace at which preparations are 
being made. 
2.5.6 The Post CU Choice of Exchange Rate Regime 
The choice of exchange rate arrangement will affect the credibility of the 
emerging GCC currency and to a degree the macroeconomic stability of these 
countries. Various papers have investigated the possible alternative exchange 
rate mechanisms following the establishment of a single GCC currency. 
Through qualitative analysis Jadresic120 concludes that a peg to the dollar 
emerges as a natural choice with a peg to the euro being the main alternative. 
A paper by Iqbal and Erbas 121 examines the external stability of GCC exchange 
rates under a dollar peg compared with an SDR122 peg. Despite the greater 
119 Stunn and Siegfried, op.cit. 
12o Op. cit. 
121 Iqbal, Z. and Erbas, S.N., "External Stability Under Alternative Nominal Exchange Rate 
Anchors: An Application to the GCC Countries" International Monetary Fund, January 1997. 
122 Special Drawing Rights, created by the IMF, is an international reserve asset and is based 
on a basket of key international currencies. 
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exchange rate volatility of the dollar relative to the SDR, the authors conclude 
from analyzing export and import elasticities that switching to an SDR peg is 
unlikely to improve exchange rate stability. 
Abed et af'23 specifically examine the impact of a dollar peg compared with a 
euro-dollar basket peg on two likely exchange rate regime objectives, that of 
external stability and international competitiveness. Through quantitative 
analysis they conclude that in retrospect the dollar peg has dominated the 
alternative euro-dollar basket peg in terms of the overall external balance of the 
GCC states. This is not necessarily surprising, considering the dominance of 
dollar-denominated oil exports in GCC trade. However, in terms of non-oil 
trade, despite being statistically insignificant, their results estimate that a euro-
dollar basket peg would have been preferable to the dollar peg in providing 
exchange rate stability. 
A qualitative assessment of the effect of both pegs on competitiveness is also 
provided by Abed et a/ and they suggest that in the future it is likely that a euro-
dollar basket peg, or a more flexible arrangement, would be superior to a fixed 
dollar peg. Their conclusion is reached in light of the fact that GCC policies are 
aimed at greater economic diversification and the long anticipated expansion in 
non-oil trade will require greater exchange rate flexibility in order to help 
improve international competitiveness. The authors add the caveat that the 
exchange rate regime alone cannot ensure global competitiveness for non-oil 
exports and that the GCC will need to use other tools, such as labour market 
reform, to guarantee future non-oil export growth. 
An examination of the dynamics of inter-regional trade patterns of the GCC 
states is instrumental in choosing an appropriate exchange rate mechanism for 
the new GCC currency and indeed in assessing the suitability of the existing 
dollar pegs in the region. Wilson 124 reveals the increasing importance of GCC 
trade with Asia. During the 1990s, the GCC benefited from trade surpluses with 
123 Abed, G.T., Erbas, S. N. and Guerami, B., "The GCC Monetary Union: Some 
Considerations for the Exchange Rate Regime" International Monetary Fund Working Paper, 
April2003. 
12
" Wilson, R. J. A., "The Changing Composition and Direction of GCC Trade" The Emirates 
Occasional Papers, Issue No.18, The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, Abu 
Dhabi, 1996. 
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the Asian region. The GCC trade position with Europe has almost been a 
mirror image of that with Asia. Whilst the GCC is Europe's sixth largest export 
market, with exports consisting mainly of manufactured products GCC exports 
to the region, which are predominantly oil and its derivatives, have dwindled. 
Recently only Saudi Arabia has exported a significant amount - although less 
than a fifth of its total exports - to the Eurozone economies. 
While GCC imports from Europe are significant GCC exports to Europe 
continue to be rather weak in spite of efforts to raise the level of trade between 
them through policies such as the Cooperation Agreement of 1989. According 
to Wilson 125, in many cases the expected rewards of this agreement have not 
accrued to the Gulf states. Joint EU-GCC Council meetings have taken place 
with the overarching aim of establishing a free trade area. Wilson argues that, 
thus far, little has been achieved, in part, due to institutional and organizational 
problems in the GCC as well as an inability to subvert national interests in 
favour of regional ones. 
Jbili and Kramarenko 126 suggest that a peg to the euro, or a basket of 
currencies, or even a floating currency all present viable alternatives for the 
GCC and the possibilities for such exchange rate options deserves further 
analysis. 
The potential for the new GCC currency to become a reserve and anchor 
currency within the wider gulf region is an issue that this research will consider. 
A strong and stable GCC currency could prove to be an attractive asset to 
domestic, regional and international investors, such a scenario would provide 
GCC governments with increased seigniorage revenues and substantially 
boost GCC financial markets. Additionally other regional central banks may 
choose to hold reserves in the currency as a hedge against exchange rate risk 
on their oil imports from the GCC. 
125 Wilson, R.J.A., EU-GCC relations: Towards a Free Trade Agreement and Beyond, A paper 
presented at a Conference on Gulf Cooperation Council Economies: 21st Century 
orportunities, AI Ahsa, 13-15 Feb 2001. 
12 Jblli, A. and Kramarenko, V., "Choosing Exchange Regimes In the Middle East and North 
Africa• International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C., 2003. 
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In chapter seven of this thesis, we discuss whether continuing to peg to the US 
dollar is the optimum regime for the new currency or whether an alternative 
choice would be more likely to enable the GCC states to achieve their 
economic policy objectives (see section 7.3.2). Following this chapter seven 
also discusses the potential economic and political case for establishing the 
new currency as an anchorage and reserve currency (see section 7.5.1). 
2.6 Summary 
This literature review has revealed a number of important issues to be 
addressed in analyzing the appropriateness of the GCC states for CU and the 
potential costs and benefits of full economic integration. The most salient 
issues raised will be analysed in detail in later chapters of this thesis. 
It has been established that the theoretical roots of OCA criteria date back to 
the 1960s with Mundell's groundbreaking research that presented a number of 
economic criteria required by member states in forming a CU, with important 
additions to the theory being made by McKinnon and Kenen. In later decades 
further developments in the OCA debate took place with the emergence of 
European integration and Mundell updated his OCA argument to include vital 
political economy considerations. 127 This theoretical and applied literature 
underpins our analysis of the prospective GCC CU. 
As we have seen, many papers on the experience of EMU have attempted to 
assess the optimality of the union through operationalising the OCA criteria. 
For example, Bayoumi and Eichengreen 128 used econometric techniques to 
create an OCA index while Feldstein 129 took a political-economy approach in 
assessing the balance of costs and benefits arising from CU. From this we can 
conclude that the variety of OCA criteria requires a mixed methodological 
approach to be taken, employing both qualitative and quantitative techniques. 
127 Mundell, Robert A. "Updating the agenda for monetary union" in Optimum Currency Areas: 
New Analytical and Policy Developments, (Eds. Blejer, M.l., Frenkel, J.A., Leiderman, L., and 
Razin, A.) International Monetary Fund, 1997. 
128 Bayoumi, T and Eichengreen, B."Ever Closer to heaven? An Optimum-Currency-Area Index 
for European Countries", European Economic Review41, pp.761-770, 1997. 
129 Feldstein, M., "The Political Economy of the European Economic and Monetary Union: 
Political Sources of an Economic Liability" The Joumal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 11, No. 
4 (autumn), pp. 23-42, 1997. 
43 
In the next chapter the methodological approach of this research is discussed 
in detail. While chapter five of the thesis employs the main OCA criteria 
discussed in this literature review in order to assess the appropriateness of CU 
for the GCC states. 
Previous research examined in this literature review, such as that by Fasano130 
and Sturm 131 , has discussed many of the prerequisite conditions and 
preparations required for a sustainable CU, from meeting convergence criteria 
to the building and designing of institutions to support the CU. This literature 
review has laid the ground work for an in-depth analysis of the presence of 
these policy prerequisites and the preparations being made for GCC CU, which 
is presented in chapter six of this thesis. 
A number of notable research papers discussed here have analysed the 
potential costs and benefits of the future GCC CU. In particular, Laabas and 
Limam132 and Fasano133 have attempted to establish the advantages and 
disadvantages of CU for the region, yet they have not been able to undertake a 
sufficiently in-depth assessment, nor have they attempted to gauge the 
distribution of costs and benefits across the GCC states. A central part of this 
thesis weighs up the costs and benefits of GCC CU for the region as a whole 
but also for the individual GCC states, and is presented in chapters seven and 
eight of this thesis. 
130 Fasano,U., op.cit. 
131 Sturm, M. and Siegfried, N. op.cit. 
132 Laabas and Limam, op.cit. 
133 Fasano, op.cit. 
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Clhapterr 3 : Methods and Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This thesis uses the OCA theory as its theoretical framework. In examining the 
application of OCA criteria to the GCC a combination of research methods and 
a pragmatic approach is adopted. The research attempts to establish whether 
or not CU is appropriate for the GCC regardless of whether or not it constitutes 
an OCA and to assess the potential costs and benefits of GCC CU. Both 
qualitative and quantitative techniques are used to determine the 
appropriateness of a single currency and to assess the costs and benefits for 
individual States and the GCC as a whole. 
The qualitative research included a considerable period of fieldwork in the 
region and collaborative work with the Dubai based Gulf Research Center 
(GRC). 1 Fieldwork helped ensure the credibility of the research and provided 
first hand experience of the contextual factors that are involved in the transition 
towards CU. Primary methods such as semi-structured interviews with regional 
experts, attending relevant conferences and presenting at seminars were used 
to collect information and data. 
Quantitative and empirical work was undertaken to assess the overall 
economic appropriateness of CU and to establish the potential costs and 
benefits of GCC CU. This included macroeconomic convergence testing and 
econometric modelling to test for shock symmetries. An important method of 
assessing the appropriateness was to gauge business sentiment on the issue. 
Collaborative work with the GRC included carrying out an extensive GCC 
business survey on the subject. The survey aimed to provide some insight on 
the potential micro economic impact of the CU as well as business 
expectations and their preparedness for the adoption of a single currency. 
1 The Gulf Research Center is an independent research institute located in Dubai, United Arab 
Emirates (UAE). The GRC was founded in July 2000 and is an entirely independent 
organisation that publishes a wide range of research papers and convenes conferences. The 
GRC (www.grc.ae) also incorporates Gulf in the Media (www.gulfinthemedia.com). · 
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This chapter discusses the aforementioned methods which were employed to 
address the research objectives and specific research questions as set out in 
chapter one. It is divided into the following sections: the first, section 3.2, 
discusses the pluralistic methodological approach which was adopted and the 
rationale behind it. In section 3.3 the formulation of the research process, its 
design and the stages involved in its construction are laid out. The qualitative 
and quantitative research methods are discussed in sections 3.4 and 3. 5 
respectively. The final section, 3.6, provides a summary of how the results of 
the various types of research methods were analyzed and interpreted. 
3.2 Methodological Approach 
The development of the OCA theory in the early 1960s greatly aided the 
analysis of monetary and economic integration and the basic contentions of the 
theory have continued to be valid until the present day. Yet the analytical 
approach of the original theory remains rather narrow and it was not able to 
provide a specific framework measuring the appropriateness of CU for a given 
region nor for identifying the potential costs and benefits. 2 
In fact, a number of different branches of economic theory are involved in 
analysing the appropriateness of CU for a given region and its potential costs 
and benefits. The subject area currently lacks a fully integrated methodology 
but several branches of economic theory have been able to provide analytical 
tools with which a more comprehensive approach to the costs and benefits of 
CU can be taken. For example, theories of microeconomics can provide some 
insights into how the adoption of a single currency affects business investment 
decisions; whereas international monetary economic theories are important in 
assessing the trade off between flexible versus fixed exchange rate regimes. 
2 Commission of the European Communities, One Market, One Money An Evaluation of the 
Potential Benefits and Costs of Forming and Economic and Monetary Union, October, 
European Economy No. 44, 1990. 
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The additions made to the OCA theory by Mundell in 19973 also added a 
further analytical dimension to the debate on CU, as did the experience of 
EMU, which was the contribution of political economy theories to the analysis 
of the cost- benefit balance. Therefore, analysing the prospects of a given CU 
involves utilising a number of different methodological approaches {see Table 
3.1). 
Consequently, this thesis employs a combination of quantitative and qualitative 
research methods in order to provide a comprehensive analysis of the 
appropriateness, and cost-benefit balance, of CU for the GCC states. 
According to Knox "The ability to blend, and use methods, which are 
appropriate for each individual piece of research, is an important issue for 
researchers and students to realise and incorporate into their research." 4 The 
appropriate methods for assessing the various costs and benefits of CU are set 
out in Table 3.1. 
3 Mundell, R. A. "Updating the agenda for monetary union" in Optimum Currency Areas: New 
Analytical and Policy Developments, (eds. Blejer, M.l., Frenkel, J.A., Leiderman, L., and Razin, 
A.), IMF, 1997. 
4 Knox, Karl "A Researcher's Dilemma - Philosophical and Methodological Pluralism" Electronic 
Journal of Business Research Methods, Vol. 2, Issue 2, pp. 119-128, October 2004. 
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~ (X) 
Table 3.1: Major Effects of GCC CU and Methods of Evaluation 
cu Economic Underlying 
Direct Channels of Effect 
Issue Theory 
Microeconomics Savings in transaction costs/ 
Microeconomic 
of Imperfect elimination of exchange rate 
Efficiency 
Markets uncertainty 
Loss of adjustment to asymmetric 
Macroeconomic Macroeconomic shock/ Coordination of economic and 
Stability Theory exchange rate policies/ Greater 
availability of external financing 
Political Economy Credibility of the CU project 
Regional Equity Micro and Macro 
Spatial distribution of micro and macro 
effects 
Economic 
Trade creation 
Integration 
International 
External Effects Monetary Additional seigniorage revenues 
Economics 
Political Economy 
Credibility of monetary policy and the 
economic integration project 
'-----------
Adapted from Commission of the European Communities, 1990, Op. Cit. 
Indirect Channels of Effect Methods of Assessment 
Enlarged market/ economies of scale Direct evaluation through 
Effect on investment decisions regional business survey 
Price stability and fiscal prudence as a Econometric techniques and 
consequence of convergence criteria empirical testing of Convergence ' 
rules Criteria 
Loss of sovereignty over monetary and 
Qualitative assessment including 
fiscal policy making/ Jeopardise I 
sustainability of CU 
regional Interviews 
Spatial distribution of micro and macro As with micro and macro (as 1 
effects (as above) above) I 
Empirical analysis of intra- ! 
Economic diversification I 
regional trade patterns I 
I 
Increased bargaining power in· Quali1ative assessment including I 
international negotiations regional Interviews 
I 
Increase investor confidence in region 
Qualitative assessment including I 
regionallnterviews I 
Whilst the methods outlined in table 3.1 prove useful tools in our investigation, it 
must be said that in assessing the overall appropriateness of CU for any given 
region, there is some difficulty in operationalising the OCA criteria and in 
particular the extent to which a region must meet any given criteria. In most 
cases, a quantitative measurement cannot be provided and instead the 
researcher must rely on qualitative analytical techniques. 
This thesis also draws on the pragmatic philosophy as described by Johnson.5 
He describes the philosophy of pragmatism as being "identified with the test of 
workability in ascertaining the truth of empirical propositions", and goes on to 
say that "workability is a crucial criterion in judging the truth or falsity of any 
empirical statement." Assessing the appropriateness and implications of CU for 
the GCC states involves an examination of not only the economies of these 
countries but also their specific political, institutional and cultural characteristics 
which will influence the outcome on any change of economic system. 
As a key part of this thesis is to ascertain the suitability of the GCC states for 
CU, in part within the framework of the OCA, it is necessarily pragmatic. This is 
because it looks at the real-life economic and political situations in the GCC that 
will have a bearing on the eventual outcome and potential success of CU. 
3.3 Research Process Design 
The research process consisted of six key stages and the outline of its design 
is illustrated in Figure 3.1. These stages are ouUined in more detail below. 
Stage 1 The initial idea for this PhD resulted from several factors, not least the 
lack of detailed research on the subject of GCC CU. A general interest in the 
region arose from research into Bahrain's economic diversification experience 
that was carried out while the author was based at Bahrain University in 1998. 
As part of a post graduate degree in economics the author focused upon the 
experience of EMU and read extensively on the topic of CU. Subsequent to the 
revised GCC economic agreement in 2001 and a renewed commitment by 
5 Johnson, Glen. L. Research Methodology for Economists, Philosophy and Practice, 
Macmillan Publishing Company, 1986. 
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GCC leaders to achieve full economic and monetary integration by 201 0 an 
interest in the specific area was developed. 
Stage 2 involved a thorough analysis of both the theoretical and applied 
literature on CUs. As well as the literature on OCAs a large amount of empirical 
literature exists on the EMU. 6 In addition an examination of the existing 
literature that specifically focused on the process of GCC economic integration 
was undertaken. This literature review guided the author in devising the main 
research questions of this thesis. 
Stage 3 involved selecting a range of research methods which were used to 
address the research questions. As has been discussed it was necessary to 
employ a range of methods as the research had political economy implications 
as well as purely economic ones. GCC academics and research institutions 
were contacted in order to facilitate the necessary fieldwork, and to participate 
in some form of collaborative work. Fieldwork involved interviews and a survey 
with stake holders in order to better understand the contextual variables 
influencing the process of integration and to ascertain the views of regional 
experts on the issue. A timetable for undertaking the planned fieldwork was 
also established. 
Stage 4 initiated the process of gathering and processing the data and 
information and the selected research methods were employed. GCC 
economic data was collected from regional statistical organizations, semi-
structured interviews with regional experts throughout the region were carried 
out and a GCC wide business survey was undertaken. Preliminary research 
findings were presented at seminars, and in published papers and newspaper 
articles. Additionally a substantial amount of empirical analysis was carried out 
involving assessing quantitative convergence criteria and econometric 
modelling of the GCC economies. 
Stage 5, involved analyzing and evaluating the information and data collated 
during stage 4. The results of the semi-structured interviews, the findings of the 
6 See chapter 2, the literature review for further details. 
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business survey and the empirical and econometric analysis of the GCC 
economies all provided evidence with which to answer this thesis' main 
research questions. 
Stage 6, the final stage of the process, involved providing credible conclusions 
which might be of use for policy makers in the GCC states in their transition 
towards CU. Furthermore it sought to contribute to the canon of literature on 
OCA theory. 
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Figure 3.1: Research Design Process 
STAGE ONE 
I 
Defining the scope of I 
the research 
I Research experien1 
in Bahrain I 
Study of EMU pre a~1 
post launch of Euro 
I Study of OCA and , I 
Currency Union theory 
I Discussions/Feedbac1 
from academics 
~ 
STAGE TWO 
I Fonnulating research I 
questions & hypotheses 
I 
Analysis of ~I 
theoretical literature I 
Analysis of applied I 
literature EMU 
I Review process of G~1 
economic integration I 
Structure/Revise k~1 
research questions 
~ 
STAGE THREE 
I 
Planning I 
I Selecting appropriate J~ 
analytical tools and metho 
~ Establishing links with G~l 
institutions I collaboration 
J Structuring fieldwork a~t 
data collection timetabl 
+ 
STAGE FOUR 
I 
Data and I infonnation collation 
I Conducting a GCCJI Collating Data from GCC ' I I Semi-structured interviews I I 
business survey Secretariat and regional bodies with regional experts 
Attending conferenc:~ 
presenting at semina 
+ STAGE FIVE 
I 
Analysis and evaluation I 
of findings 
I Analysis of intervieg~ I Empirical analysis 
.II Analysis of GCC p~litica~- . et ~ Econometric I and survey findings of GCC Economies economy and economiC poHCie modeling 
+ STAGE SIX 
I 
Writing up, conclusions I 
and recommendations 
I 
Testing hypotheses I 
in light of findings 
I Addressing and answering I 
research questions 
I Contextual conclusions and I 
policy recommendations 
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3.4 Qualitative Research Methods 
A thorough analysis of the institutional and political factors that led to the 
GCC's decision to embark on a process towards CU was necessary to 
adequately answer the questions put forward by this thesis. As a consequence, 
a considerable amount of fieldwork in the region was deemed necessary in 
order to see the contextual variables operating first hand. By being based in the 
region the political-economy factors behind the policy of economic integration 
were easier to ascertain. The fieldwork ensured that the research findings 
would more accurately reflect the potential implications of forming a CU. 
Visits to several GCC states and a period of research collaboration in the UAE 
provided substantial contextual knowledge; it allowed the author to investigate, 
through semi-structured interviews and meetings (both formal and informal) 
with policymakers, the domestic and regional preparations being made. These 
interviews with regional experts provided valuable information regarding the 
potential impact of the CU. Qualitative methods such as interviews with policy 
makers and independent economists with 'insider' information on a range of 
important factors provided valuable insights on issues such as political resolve, 
institutional integration and the degree of preparations being made by the 
public and private sectors. 
3.4.1 Collaborative Research 
In order to adequately address this contemporary and policy-relevant research 
it was felt that some collaboration with regional experts would provide more 
valid and credible, contextually based conclusions. Several institutes were 
contacted and the response from the GRC was particularly positive. The GRC 
is one of the few independent research institutes in the region and it brings 
together national and international researchers specialising in the region. 
Collaboration at the GRC took place on elements of the thesis' fieldwork in 
particular the business survey (see 3.5.1). Additionally, being based at the 
GRC provided the author with office facilities and opportunities to network at 
conferences which brought together many regional experts. A policy paper 
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entitled "Establishing a Successful CU - Preparations and Future Policy 
Choices"7 was produced and received press attention in Saudi Arabia, the UAE 
and Qatar. Additionally several articles on, or related to, the subject of this 
thesis were published in local newspapers which helped to generate feed 
back.8 
3.4.2 Semi-structured Interviews 
Semi-structured interviews - a key element of the qualitative research -
provided a valuable primary source of information on CU from regional experts. 
In order to fully understand the economic and socio-political implications of CU 
within this region it was crucial to understand and document the opinions and 
views of GCC experts and policymakers. Semi-structured interviews also 
helped to clarify the progress being made towards the synchronisation of GCC 
monetary policies and their economic systems. Broadly speaking interviews 
were conducted with regional economists, including central bank governors and 
executives, government ministers and officials, GCC Secretariat and AMF 
officials, academics, independent researchers and commercial bankers (see 
Table 3.2). 
7 Rutledge, E. "Establishing a Successful GCC Currency Union: Preparations and Future Policy 
fhoices" Gulf Research Center, Policy Analysis, Dubai, December 2004. 
Rutledge, E. and Janardhan, N., auS-Bahrain Trade deal exposes GCC chinks" The Daily 
Star, Beirut, 28 December 2004, Rutledge, E.,"GCC: High on rhetoric, low on action?" Khaleej 
Times, 1 May 2005 and Rutledge, E. "High time for a single GCC currency" Aljazeera.net, 
published online, 3rd October 2005. 
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Table 3.2: Semi-Structured Interviews in the GCC states 
No. 
Professional Category of Interviewee 
Interviewees 
Central Bank and Government officials 16 
GCC Secretariat and AMF officials 5 
Academics 7 
Independent researchers 6 
Commercial bankers 6 
Total number of interviewees 40 
The GRC provided access to an extensive network of regional academics and 
government officials and decision makers, across the GCC states, which 
facilitated access to relevant interviewees. Other contacts with interviewees 
were made when attending relevant conferences in the region. For example, 
attendance of a high-level seminar organised jointly by the Arab Monetary Fund 
and the IMF on the process of Arab economic integration provided several 
valuable contacts at central banks and ministries across the region. 9 
The interview questions were designed to provide insights into some of the key 
questions of this thesis, such as determining the appropriateness of CU and the 
level of monetary and institutional preparations taking place towards CU. The 
research questions were formulated and researchers at the GRC also provided 
feedback on the design and appropriateness of the interview questions. 
Interviews were carried out in the United Arab Emirates, Oman and Kuwait. 
Nationals from the other GCC states were interviewed whilst attending an AMF 
conference in Abu Dhabi and also via the telephone. 
'Elite' interviewees were chosen according to their expected knowledge of the 
economies of the GCC states, and regional experts with specialised or 'insider' 
knowledge on the issue of GCC economic integration and monetary union were 
approached (see Appendix A). The majority of interviewees were GCC 
nationals otherwise they were individuals who had held long standing positions 
9 Arab Monetary Fund and International Monetary Fund, 'High-Level Seminar on Arab 
Economic Integration: Challenges and Prospects' Abu Dhabi, UAE, 23-24 February 2005. 
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of relevance in the region. Potential interviewees were initially approached by 
letter or fax (see Appendix B) and invited to be interviewed if a given candidate 
was willing to be interviewed appointments were then made by telephone. Out 
of the 63 prospective interviewees identified, 48 agreed to be interviewed, of 
which only 40 interviewees were considered to be sufficiently informed on the 
subject area. 
Interviewees - including several central bank governors and government 
ministers- were interviewed using open-ended questions (see Appendix C). At 
times additional questions were asked depending upon the individual's 
expertise. The majority of interviewees preferred not to be recorded so they 
could express their personal views more freely; therefore responses and key 
points were taken in note form. After each interview the responses were logged 
into a Microsoft Access database. This type of database has the advantage of 
being able to display all the responses to a given question at one time, allowing 
themes and trends to be easily identified and analysed. 
After a satisfactory and representative sample of GCC experts had been 
interviewed a qualitative analysis of the results was undertaken. By using the 
database overlapping patterns and common themes were identified. The 
results of the interviews contributed to the analysis in chapters five, six and 
seven of this thesis. 
3.4.3 Seminars 
Whilst based in the region the author was able to present the initial research 
findings at several seminars. These provided good opportunities to receive 
useful feedback and generate dialogue on the subject. For instance, a seminar 
assembled at AI Aln University provided an opportunity to hear opinions and 
views on the issue from a group of academics (participants were encouraged to 
discuss the issues and express their points of view). This method augmented 
the information collected from the semi-structured interviews and offered an 
opportunity to discuss unanticipated issues that arose, in an informal manner. 
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3.4.4 Other Qualitative Resources 
The region's Arabic press and other local publications provided additional 
sources of information on the subject of CU and related economic integration. 
Due to the contemporary nature of the research topic, many of the preparations 
being made towards CU are unofficially disclosed through the region's press 
and therefore this is a valuable research resource. The GRC has an extensive 
database of publications on the GCC states and in addition translates many 
articles from Arabic into English that aren't available elsewhere. The GRC's 
Gulf in the Media web portal has collated more than one million articles from 
2001 focusing on the GCC countries from English and Arabic newspapers, as 
well as reports, background papers from academia and various international 
institutions. While based at the GRC the author had access to this valuable 
database and was able to carry out structured searches for relevant material. 
3.5 Quantitative research methods 
Quantitative research methods involved collating statistics in order to analyse 
the GCC economies, both in terms of the appropriateness of existing monetary 
policies and the region's suitability for CU. Statistical analysis of the 
macroeconomics of the GCC states was undertaken as well as convergence 
testing and econometric modelling. Data was collected from a number of 
institutions including the GCC Secretariat, the Arab Monetary Fund, regional 
central banks, and Ministries of Economy and Planning. A business survey was 
also carried out to look at the microeconomic impact of the CU. 
3.5.1 Business Survey 
A key area of collaboration with the GRC was formulating and carrying out a 
survey of GCC businesses. The survey "Business Survey on GCC Currency 
Union" was carried out in order to assess the micro economic impact of the CU 
on the private sector. The survey provides policy relevant evidence on the state 
of current GCC business expectations regarding the CU. The survey sought to 
ascertain the expectations of GCC companies regarding the effect of the single 
currency on their business and to assess business confidence on the potential 
success of the CU overall. It also questioned businesses on their preparations 
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for the CU which will have a bearing on the smoothness of the transition (see 
Appendix E). 
From the outset it was not possible to establish the sample frame of the survey, 
i.e. the size of the GCC business population, because the GCC states do not 
undertake and publish industrial censuses and therefore figures on the total 
number of private businesses operating in each of the individual GCC states 
are not available. In the absence of reliable data on the number of GCC 
businesses in operation, the required sample size could not be accurately 
estimated. 
A list of GCC companies was compiled from each GCC national Chambers of 
Commerce database. However, coverage of businesses at chambers of 
commerce was sometimes poor and therefore business contacts were also 
collected from a number of private online business directories. Only those 
companies with fax numbers and /or email addresses were selected to 
participate in the survey, these being the type of businesses most likely to be of 
economic significance and furthermore companies without fax or email would 
not have been able to participate in the survey. Once duplication of firms or 
branches of the same company was omitted, the number of companies collated 
from these sources amounted to more than eleven thousand. 
The number of businesses which were contacted per GCC state depended on 
several factors. While companies in the UAE were well represented in 
Chambers of Commerce and business directories, those in Bahrain and Qatar 
for example, were much less so (see Table 3.3). Also, more businesses in the 
UAE had email addresses than those in Saudi Arabia for example, therefore it 
was relatively cheaper to contact a greater number of companies in the UAE 
than it was in Saudi Arabia where companies had to be faxed the survey. (The 
project inevitably had some financial constraints). 
Prior to undertaking the survey a pilot survey of 20 companies was carried out 
in advance, face to face and over the telephone. Several amendments to the 
original business survey were then made, certain questions required more 
clarification, needed to be simplified or were removed altogether. It was 
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apparent from the pilot survey that some companies were not prepared to give 
information on their sales turnover as they felt this confidential. The anonymity 
of the responses therefore was guaranteed in the cover letter to the survey (see 
Appendix 0). 
Following the pilot survey, 532 companies were contacted directly by 
telephone, and asked to participate in the survey which was then emailed or 
faxed to them. The survey consisted of 'closed-end' questions which 
respondents could 'self-administer' either by fax or online. An Arabic version of 
the survey was also available to be administered via fax. In addition 1 0, 781 
companies were sent a fax and email (with link to the online survey - www.gcc-
economics.com) requesting their participation. The process of contacting 
companies and asking them to participate in the survey as well as the process 
of entering the results into SPSS was time consuming and labour intensive. 
Two interns working at the GRC - both economic graduates from American 
University of Sharjah - assisted in contacting companies, sending out the 
survey via email and fax. 
From the outset it was expected that the response rate from GCC businesses 
would be low. Due to the fact that surveys carried out via the internet tend to 
have low response rates. Furthermore, the survey did not offer any financial 
incentives for participation, unlike many polls now conducted by commercial 
polling agencies in the Middle East. 
The survey response rate, especially from those not directly telephoned, as 
expected was low at just 2. 7 percent overall. The method of telephoning 
companies and asking them to participate in the survey was considerably more 
successful than that of fax and email request for participation. Overall the total 
number of responses received was 307, 104 from telephoning (19.5 percent 
response rate) and 203 from fax and Online (1.9 percent response rate). The 
distribution of response rates across the GCC states ranged from 1.4 percent 
to 5.8 percent. The highest response rates were from Bahrain and Kuwait, 
which could suggest that there was more interest in CU in these two countries 
and the lowest response rates were from Oman and Qatar where it seems 
there may be more indifference concerning CU. 
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Table 3.3: Survey Distribution and Response Rate 
GCC Call & Fax/Online Actual Response 
Total 
State Fax/Online Only Responses Rate 
Bahrain 50 312 362 21 5.8% 
Kuwait 54 725 779 31 4.0% 
Oman 46 2530 2576 36 1.4% 
Qatar 47 409 456 8 1.8% 
SA 168 2887 3055 113 3.7% 
UAE 167 3918 4085 98 2.4% 
-
·--. ". 
Total 532 10,781 11,313 307 2.7% 
Source: GCC Busrness Survey on Currency Union, June-September 2005 
It must be said that the rather low overall response rate increases the likelihood 
of sampling error in the survey results. However, confidence intervals for a 
number of the survey's findings are provided where feasible throughout the 
analysis. The potential problem of sample bias - where those businesses who 
responded to the survey may be inherently more interested in and in favour of 
GCC CU - must also be taken into consideration. Consequently, the survey 
results should be taken as only broadly indicative of the perception of GCC 
private businesses and a guide to further research which should be carried out 
by the GCC governments themselves whose greater resources might be 
expected to elicit a much broader response. Nevertheless, it is hoped that this 
preliminary research should provide helpful guidelines as to the direction and 
content of any such additional investigation. 
The survey findings feed into the analysis throughout the thesis and in 
particular contributed towards the analysis of the preparations being made 
towards CU in chapter six and towards the costs and benefits for each state 
individually in chapter seven. In addition, a detailed analysis of the main 
economic characteristics of the business survey respondents is provided as an 
appendix to this thesis (see Appendix F). 
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3.5.2 Data Collation and Statistical Analysis 
Data was collated from a number of regional organizations including the Arab 
Monetary Fund, regional Central Banks and GCC Secretariat. In some cases 
statistical publications only available in Arabic were also utilised. Public 
provision of data in the GCC states and from some of these organizations is 
inadequate and several organizations had to be contacted directly and in some 
cases repeatedly in order to obtain data. In particular cases and in certain 
states economic data from the GCC states is frequently unavailable or 
inconsistent, as a consequence international sources of data, such as the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, were also required for the 
empirical analysis. In addition, data from the GCC Secretariat and Arab 
Monetary Fund on occasions contradict that of National Ministries of Economy 
even though the two regional organizations source their data from these 
ministries. 10 The GCC secretariat also declined to provide contemporary data 
on certain key convergence criteria such as government debt. 
The quantitative analysis in this thesis entailed examining comparative 
macroeconomic profiles of the GCC states using descriptive statistics. Relevant 
economic indicators were analysed over time and these included both GOP 
and income per capita growth, inflation rates, money supply growth and interest 
rates, as well as nominal and real exchange rates. The descriptive statistics of 
these economic indicators were examined, such as the mean and standard 
deviation of these variables across the GCC states as well as their dynamic 
trends. 
This statistical analysis of the GCC economies and their existing currency 
regimes was necessary in order to assess the stability and performance of their 
economies since following a de facto 11 or de jure 12 exchange rate peg to the 
US dollar and to be able to come to some conclusions as to whether these 
existing arrangements have therefore proved appropriate thus far for these 
economies (see chapter four). This assessment of the economic performance 
10 The author previously undertook research into Bahrain's economic diversification process 
and found that the sectoral breakdown of national Income presented In Bahrain's national 
accounts was quite different to that presented in Arab Monetary Fund publications. 
11 For Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, UAE and Saudi Arabia who have been pegged to the SDR. 
12 Oman is the only GCC state that was officially pegged to the US dollar prior to 2003. 
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of the GCC economies since pegging to the US dollar prepared the ground for 
an evaluation of the comparative benefits of CU (in chapters five and six). 
3.5.3 Empirical Convergence Testing 
The traditional OCA theory encompasses a number of economic criteria that 
the GCC states are assessed against in chapter five. In particular, the extent of 
GCC intra-regional trade, economic diversification and economic 
synchronisation was examined empirically in order to help determine whether 
the GCC can be considered an OCA or at least be able to form a viable CU. 
The share of intra-GCC trade as a proportion of total GCC trade and total non-
oil GCC trade was examined and its changing pattern over time was analysed. 
Further evidence was presented by calculating the Trade Intensity Ratios 
between the individual GCC states (in chapter five, section 5.2). The extent of 
GCC economic diversification was examined through an analysis of the sector 
contribution to GOP and hydrocarbon dependency ratios (in chapter four, 
section 4.2.2). 
In addition, empirical tests for economic convergence were undertaken using 
the Maastricht criteria and Stability and Growth Pact of the EMU as a starting 
point (see chapter six, section 6.2). This involved examining over time both 
monetary and fiscal indicators such as inflation rates, short term interest rates, 
as well as government budgets to GOP ratios, government debt to GOP ratios 
and foreign reserve cover to months of imports. Such statistical analysis 
indicated the extent of convergence since the forming of the GCC and the 
prospects for a sustainable GCC CU. 
3.5.4 Econometric Modeling 
Econometric analysis was undertaken in chapter five (section 5.6) in order to 
estimate the degree of economic integration and synchronization among the 
GCC economies. The specific techniques employed included testing for 
multivariate cointegration between the economic output of the GCC states. The 
presence of a cointegrating vector indicated a long term causal relationship 
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between these economies. Previous research by Darrat and Shamsi13 used 
this technique to test for integration between various economic and financial 
variables in the GCC states. 
In chapter five the econometric analysis undertaken by Darrat and Shamsi is 
extended and tests for pair-wise cointegration between the dominant economy 
in the region, Saudi Arabia, and each of the smaller GCC economies were 
undertaken. In addition to this, in the presence of cointegration, the short term 
dynamics were modelled using a Vector Error Correction Model and impulse 
response functions which indicated the adjustment time taken following a shock 
to return to the long run causal relationship. 
The degree of cointegration between each of the smaller GCC states and 
Saudi Arabia has important implications for the regional distribution of costs 
and benefits arising from CU. As the dominant regional economy Saudi Arabia 
stands to have considerable influence over regional monetary policy and 
therefore a lack of economic integration with the Kingdom may eventually result 
in a sub-optimal monetary policy for certain individual smaller GCC states. 
3.6 Summary 
This chapter has set out the research methodology and the methods used to 
address the thesis's key questions, outlined in chapter one. It explains why 
certain methods were used, why they were relevant and provides details on 
how information collated was interpreted and incorporated into the thesis. Due 
to the fragmented nature of the economic methodology and the difficulty in 
operationalising certain OCA criteria, some of the potential costs and benefits 
of GCC CU cannot be quantitatively or precisely measured. Having said this, it 
is possible to make partial quantifications or a qualitative assessment which 
can provide evidence for investigating the case for GCC CU. 
The qualitative and quantitative research presented in this thesis aims to shed 
light on the research questions which are addressed in detail in subsequent 
13 Darrat. Ali. F and Al-Shamsi, Fatima "On the Path of Integration in the Gulf Region" Applied 
Economics, 37, pp. 1055- 1062, 2005. 
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chapters of this thesis. The qualitative research in particular, provides 
information on the political-economy and institutional factors shaping regional 
economic integration policies. The quantitative methods help in assessing the 
macroeconomic convergence of the GCC states and in determining the likely 
costs and benefits of CU collectively and individually and ultimately its 
economic appropriateness for the region. 
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Chapter 4 : Economic Performance and Policy 1980 
-2005 
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to present an overview of the GCC's economic 
performance between 1980 and 2005 and an examination of the various states' 
economic policy objectives. It also seeks to establish how effective the economic 
policies, in particular the exchange rate and monetary policies, have been in 
meeting the economic objectives. It also looks at the similarities and contrasts 
between both their economic structures and policies in order to gauge how 
cohesive the GCC is as an 'economic region', and thus suitable for monetary 
union. 
Assessing the relative success of national economic policies is complicated by the 
fact that it is hard to isolate their impact from those caused by external shocks. 
This is particularly the case in the GCC states where cyclical global growth trends 
have a large bearing on both the demand for, and price of oil. It is also difficult to 
separate demand-side shocks from supply-side shocks in these economies. For 
instance, an increase in the price of oil will lead to a supply-side shock in the form 
of improved terms of trade, but at the same time, it will lead to a demand-side 
shock through increased liquidity and government expenditure. 
A lack of consistent and comprehensive economic data complicated the empirical 
analysis of these economies. National data sources were consulted, but because 
these data sets are sometimes incomplete and at times unreliable, data from 
regional and international organisations were also employed which tend to be more 
consistent for comparative purposes. As a consequence the empirical analysis 
uses data from various national, regional and international organizations. 
The chapter begins by providing an overview of the GCC state's economic 
performance between 1980 and 2005. It charts the region's economic growth and 
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development, initially focusing on hydrocarbon dependence it then looks at private 
versus public sector growth, the Balance of Payments and finally exchange rate 
performance. 
The second section of the chapter focuses on the economic policies that the GCC 
states have adopted to address their economic challenges. In particular, it details 
the economic policies of economic diversification, labour force nationalization, 
promoting the private sector, attracting FDI and the choice of monetary policies. It 
concludes by reviewing the level of GCC economic integration achieved thus far 
and focuses on intra-GCC economic policies and agreements. 
The chapter concludes by first summarising regional economic challenges and the 
contrasts between GCC states with respect to these. It then assesses the degree 
to which GCC economic policies have been, and can expect to be, successful in 
achieving their objectives. In particular, it considers the impact of GCC monetary 
policies on economic performance and assesses the utility of the existing monetary 
policies by weighing up the pros and cons of the pegged exchange rate regimes. 
4.2 GCC Economic Performance 
Before discussing in detail the GCC economic performance since 1980 we shall 
first provide a broad overview of this by way of an economic introduction. The 1980 
to 2000 period was characterized by low levels of growth and minimal inflation in 
the GCC states. Wrth the exception of Oman, most GCC states experienced 
several years of negative growth during the 1980s. However, throughout the 
1990s, GOP growth performance improved, for instance averaging 3.1 percent in 
Saudi Arabia over the decade. 1 The 1980s period was characterized by falling 
nominal levels of income per capita as population growth kept outstripped GOP 
growth, in the 1990s as population growth kept pace with GOP growth nominal 
GOP per income more of less stagnated. The highest average inflation rate during 
1 World Bank, World Development Indicators, June 2006. 
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the 1980s was recorded in Qatar at 3.8 percent and during the 1990s a maximum 
rate of 3.4 percent was recorded in the UAE.2 
Since 2000 the performance of the GCC economies has improved, particularly 
since the oil price boom began in 2002, in 2003 the median growth rate had 
increased to 7.2 percent. Even those non-OPEC member GCC states with low oil 
production have benefited economically from the increase in regional liquidity, 
illustrated by the 7 4 percent average growth of the GCC's stock market indices in 
2005.3 Despite this recent upturn in growth generating sufficient employment for 
nationals continues to be a problem and is of particular concern in Bahrain, Oman 
and Saudi Arabia. 
In general, the structure of GCC GOP by income over this period has changed little 
and has been dominated by the hydrocarbon and the public sectors. In addition, 
the growth of the hydrocarbon sector has outperformed that of the non-
hydrocarbon sectors in all GCC states with the exception of the UAE. In terms of 
government revenues, all GCC states remain heavily dependent on hydrocarbon 
revenues. For instance, during the 1990s oil revenues formed on average 75 
percent of total GCC government revenues. Such dependence has caused severe 
budgetary deficits during times of low oil prices and has led to unstable spending 
plans. The public sector's share of spending in the GCC economies has been 
consistent over the period of analysis averaging 39 percent in 1980, rising to 41 
percent in 1990 and falling slightly to 37 percent in 2003.4 
The GCC's balance of trade has been heavily dependent on the global price of oil 
over this period. Since 1980 the composition of GCC trade has shifted away from 
the US, and now the majority of trade - both imports and exports - is with Asia and 
Europe. On the whole the GCC has consistently underperformed in attracting FDI, 
although inflows have been increasing in recent years, nearly doubling from 0.4 
2 IMF, International Financial Statistics, May 2006. 
3 AMF, Regional Stock Market Websites. 
4 AMF, National Accounts, 2004. 
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percent in 2002 to 0.7 percent in 2004, however they remain low by global 
standards. 5 
In terms of monetary policy, all GCC currencies have had de facto pegs against the 
dollar throughout this period of analysis. While only Oman has had an official peg 
to the US dollar, the other GCC states, through pegs to the SDR or a basket of 
currencies have been effectively tied to the dollar and US interest rates for 
decades. Although this has afforded them exchange rate stability and a low 
' 
inflation environment it has at times of dollar depreciations led to rising import 
costs, for example in 2004, and has also prevented GCC central banks from using 
monetary instruments to foster growth during repeated times of low oil prices. 
4.2.1 Economic Growth and Development 
The median of average growth rates in the GCC economies during the period from 
1980 to 2004 is 4.1 percent. Yet there was considerable dispersal in the average 
economic growth rates, ranging from a high of 6.5 percent for Qatar to a low of 1. 7 
percent for Saudi Arabia (see Table 4.1). The performance of the GCC economies 
faired reasonably well when compared to the EMU average growth rate over the 
period, at 2.2 percent.6 
Over the period of analysis, the GDP growth rates in the GCC economies have 
also been very volatile. The standard deviations from the average growth rate and 
the coefficient of variations have been for the most part high. This has been the 
case in particular for Qatar and Kuwait and may well reflect the dominance of oil 
and gas sales in their national income. Compared to the EMU region, volatility in 
the GCC economies has been much higher. The coefficient of variation for the 
EMU GOP growth rates was only 0.54. With the exception of Oman which had a 
coefficient of 0.85, all other GCC economies had coefficients more than twice that 
of EMU's (see Table 4.1). 
5 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report, 2005. 
8 As was mentioned in chapter 1 and 2 of this thesis, the GCC states are compared throughout with 
those of the EMU countries which have successfully formed a CU. 
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Table 4.1: GCC Countries GOP* Growth Rates 
Average Standard Coefficient of 
1980·2004 deviation Variation 
Bahrain 4.0% 0.05 1.23 
Kuwait 2.7% 0.13 4.59 
Oman 6.3% 0.05 0.85 
Qatar 6.5% 0.15 2.34 
SA 1.7% 0.05 2.95 
UAE 4.2% 0.09 2.10 
EMU 2.2% 0.01 0.54 
Source: World Development Indicators (June 2006). 
* Annual percentage growth rate of GOP based on constant US$ 2000 prices. Qatar data based on 
current US$. 
In general, inflationary pressures have been contained in the GCC states during 
the period under study. Following the monetary policy of the US Federal Reserve 
Bank provided GCC Central Banks with credibility which helped to create a low 
inflation environment overall. The highest average inflation rate over the period of 
analysis was in the UAE at 3.6 percent, followed by Qatar at 3.4 percent (see 
Table 4.2). While Oman and Saudi Arabia recorded the lowest inflation rates in the 
group at just 0.43 percent and 0.51 percent during the period of analysis. 
Average inflation rates of below 3.6 percent over the last two and a half decades 
reflect a stable price environment albeit on diverging paths. Since 1991 the UAE 
has had the highest average inflation rates at almost 3.6 percent while Oman's 
inflation has been negligible at close to zero on average. 7 The standard deviation 
among GCC inflation rates in 2005 was 3. 1, and the range was above 8 percent. 
7 Omani economists have expressed concern that Omani inflation rates have been far below the 
global rate of inflation for too long and have suggested that Omani CPI doesn't properly reflect 
prices in the economy (Interview with Dr. Hatem AI Shanfari at Sultan Qaboos University, Muscat, 
Oman, 14 May 2005}. 
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raD:Jie 4.2:.~CG ln~~tio"- Averages ,ndJf_ol~tilitv 
Average Median Standard Coefficient 1980-2005 Deviation of Variation 
Bahrain 1.33 0.79 3.12 2.35 
Kuwait 3.01 2.00 2:91 0.96 
Oman 0.43 0.36 1.52 3.55 
Qatar 3.39 2.83 2.53 0.74 
... .. 
SA 0.51 0.45 2.06 4.02 
UAE 3.61 3.00 1.70 0.46 
Source: IMF International Fmanc1al Statistics, May 2006 and AMF data for the UAE. 
Note: Data for Oman and the UAE begins 1991. 
For most years during the 1990s the average GCC inflation rate was below 3 
percent. In general inflation has moved in tandem across the GCC states coming 
down substantially in the late nineties when oil prices were low and growth levels 
were weak. However, there have been periods when inflation rates have peaked 
and often such periods coincided with depreciations in the US dollar. One such 
period was in 1991, the dollar fell and average inflation was significantly higher at 
almost 5 percent, but this was a temporary phenomenon and following this peak 
inflation rates eased considerably. In 2004 when the dollar declined substantially 
against the euro and the yen and oil prices soared inflation rates also grew rapidly 
in several GCC states, with money supply growing on average by 29 percent in 
2003 and 21 percent in 2004 across the GCC.8 Oil price booms have also led to 
inflation peaks in some GCC states, for example inflation rates reached 8.8 percent 
and 6 percent in Qatar and the UAE in 2005 respectively. 
Non-hydrocarbon GOP growth is strongly correlated with oil sector growth in these 
economies. Government spending is highly cyclical and when oil prices are high 
government current and capital spending increases generate increased demand in 
the whole economy.9 As a result the non-oil sectors of the economy also benefit 
from increased aggregate demand during times of high oil prices and are therefore, 
in part, determined by the growth of the oil sector.10 
8 1nternational Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, November 2005. 
9 Fasano, U. and Wang, Q. "Testing the Relationship Between Government Spending and 
Revenue: Evidence from GCC Countries" IMF Working Paper, November 2002. 
10 AI-Faris, A. F. "Public expenditure and economic growth in the Gulf Cooperation Council 
Countries" Applied Economics, 34, pp. 1187-1193, 2002. 
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With the exception of the UAE and Oman, in most GCC states during the 1990s, 
non-hydrocarbon GOP growth lagged behind growth in the wider economy which 
included that of the hydrocarbon sector. Between 1990 and 2003 the pace of 
economic growth in the non-hydrocarbon sectors of the UAE's economy 
outstripped that of the wider economy by 1.8 percent (see Figure 4.1). Oman's 
non-oil growth also surpassed that of the wider economy, by 0.6 percent. This 
might indicate a dynamic process of diversification occurring in the UAE, and to a 
lesser extent in Oman, which has not yet been met by the other GCC economies. 
In comparison in both Qatar and Kuwait non-hydrocarbon economic growth was 
only about half that of the growth in the wider economy. In the 1980s non-
hydrocarbon growth in all of the GCC states outstripped that of the wider economy 
(see Figure 4.1) due in large part to the fact that oil revenues had fallen 
considerably. 
Fi ure 4.1: GOP and Non Oil and Gas GOP Growth, Avera e 1980-2003 
Average 1980s 
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Source: At.tf, AI Taqrlr allqtlsadl al Arabi al Muwahhad, 2004 and previous editions. 
The 1980s were characterized by falling oil prices (see Figure 4.2) and consecutive 
years of negative growth in the hydrocarbon sector. In contrast, during the 1990s 
oil prices were stagnant and growth in oil revenues were marginally positive, it is 
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perhaps surprising therefore that during this period the UAE's and Oman's non-
hydrocarbon sectors still managed to outpace the growth of the oil sector. 
Fi ure 4.2: Price of Dubai Li ht Oil 
Source: lEA, Energy Prices and Taxes, 2006. 
There are strong similarities between the structures of all the GCC economies, with 
the sector contribution to GOP ranking roughly the same (see Table 4.3). Oil and 
gas production, has been the largest contributing sector to GDP since 1980. Over 
the period of analysis government services has ranked high in most of the GCC 
states indicating the heavy involvement of the public sector in these economies. 
The available data shows that the rank position of this sector changed little over 
the period, ranking second and third in all the GCC states in 2003 with the 
exception of the UAE where it ranked fourth. The manufacturing sector has 
increased its contribution to GDP in all GCC states over the period with the 
exception of Bahrain. In 2003 this sector ranked the highest in the UAE which was 
the only GCC state where it ranked second. 
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Table 4.3: Rank of Sector Contribution to GCC GOP 
ECONOMIC BAHRAIN KUWAIT SECTOR 
1980 1990 12003 1980 1990 2003 1980 
AGRICULTURE, 
FISHING & 
FORESTRY 10 I 11 11 8 8 9 6 
MINING, 
QUARRYING& 
FUEL 1 : 1 1 1 1 1 1 
MANUFACTURING : I 
INDUSTRIES 2! 4 . 3 5 3 3 9 
ELECTRICITY, ' 
WATER&GAS 11 . 1·0 10 9 9 7 9 
CONSTRUCTION 7. 8 9 6 7 8 4 
COMMERCE, 
REST. & HOTELS 3 3 6 3 4 5 3 
TRANSPORT, l 
COMM. & I 
STORAGE 6i 7: 7 7 5 6 7 
A NANCE, 
INSURANCE& 
BANKING 4 6 4 4 6 3 11 
HOUSING 8, 5 5 .. .. .. 5 
GOVERNMENT I 
SERVICES • s! 2• 2 .. .. 2 2 
OTHER i 
_ __ _§ERVICE§_ 
- 91 ~ '--·-· 8 2 -~ L__ .. 8 
Source: Calculated from the Arab Monetary Fund, National Accounts data 
OMAN QATAR SA UAE 
1990 2003 1980 1990 2003 . 1980 1990 2003 1980 1990 2003 
' 
8 9 8 10 9 9 6 7 10 10 9 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
7 4 6 3 4· 5 4 3 6 4 2 
10 10 9 9 a. 11 11 1.1 8 9 11 
9 8 4 6 6 2 3 5 2 5 7 
3 2 5 5 5' 4 5 4 3 3 3 
6 6 7 7 7! 6 7 8 7 7 5 
11 11 3 4 3 8 8 9 5 8 8 
4 7 .. . .. . . I 7 10 6 .. 6 6 
2 3 . . 2 2 3 2 2 4 2 4 
5 5 2 8 10 : 9 9 9 9 11 10 
The finance, insurance and banking sector is important in Bahrain, where it now 
ranks fourth, and in also in Kuwait and Qatar, it is less important in Oman, where it 
ranks eleventh, and in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Finance is an area where many 
GCC states are now attempting to diversify, in fact Qatar and Dubai as well as 
Bahrain are all establishing new financial centres. 
T bl 44 A GCCP lti G wthRte a e . verage opu a on ro a s . . 
1980s 1990s 2000-2004 
Bahrain 4.4 3.0 2.0 
Kuwait 4.7 3.9 3.1 
Oman 4.2 4.1 2.5 
Qatar 8.2 2.0 2.4 
SA 5.5 2.9 2.8 
UAE 5.9 6.1 7.2 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2005. 
Note: Data for Kuwait omits years 1991-1995 
A combination of modest and sometime stagnant economic growth rates in the 
period of analysis combined with relatively high rates of population growth, above 
an average of 4 percent during the 1980s (see Table 4.4) has meant that GOP per 
capita fell in several GCC states between 1980 and 1985 and then stagnated for 
the most part between 1990 and 2003 (see Figure 4.3). In comparison GOP per 
capita in the 14 EMU countries has risen gradually over the period of analysis. On 
average GOP per capita in the GCC in 2004 stood at $20,570, but significant 
differences between the GCC states exist with GOP per capita in the UAE and 
Qatar higher than the average and GOP per capita in Saudi Arabia 30 percent 
below the average, at just $14,280.11 
11 The IMF WEO data for GCC GOP per capita adjusted for PPP is presented in figure 4.3. It shows 
that Kuwait's GOP per capita is less than that of Bahrain's and equal to Oman's. This however, is 
somewhat surprising and counter intuitive considering Kuwait's huge oil wealth and relatively small 
population. In fact, compared to figures from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (April 
2008) Kuwaifs GOP per capita in constant prices (2000) is $17,674 in 2004 whereas Bahrain's Is 
$13,852 and Oman's is $8,961. This raises questions over the methods used to calculate the IMF 
WEO statistics and perhaps the validity of the underlying assumptions of PPP theory in the case of 
Kuwait. However, the IMF WEO ·data is used here instead of that of the World Bank because the 
latter does not provide data for Qatar's GOP per capita In constant prices. 
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Fi ure 4.3: GOP Per Ca 
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Note: Data for Kuwait between 1990 and 1994 is omitted due to the Gulf war, data for 
these years is therefore extrapolated. 
Source: IMF World Economic Report, 2006, data for EMU 14 from WOI, 2006. 
As well as the negative implications of stagnant per capita income for the welfare 
of GCC citizens, unemployment has also become an issue in several GCC states. 
In Bahrain, Oman and Saudi Arabia indigenous population pressure has 
outstripped the government's ability to create public sector employment. Presently 
official unemployment figures are unreliable and independent estimates of 
unemployment are likely to be more accurate. According to the UN, in Oman and 
Saudi Arabia for example, unemployment rates are estimated at 17.2 percent and 
15 percent respectively. 12 
4.2.2 Hydrocarbon Dependence 
Despite longstanding and concerted efforts to diversify economic structures to 
varying degrees, all GCC states remain heavily dependent on their hydrocarbon 
resources. This dependency has led to a host of economic problems including a 
high degree of exposure to energy price trends, a capital intensive economy and 
import dependency. On average in 1994 close to a third of the GCC's GOP was 
generated from hydrocarbons, more than three quarters of exports and 
government revenues also come from oil and gas sales (see Table 4.5). By 2004 
12 United Nations, Arab Human Development Report 2002, United Nations Development 
Programme, New York, 2002. 
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the contribution of oil and gas to GOP had risen to two fifths and its share of 
government revenues remained broadly the same, only the share of hydrocarbon 
exports had fallen somewhat to 69 percent of total exports. 
These ratios are however, dependent on oil prices and therefore during times of 
high oil prices the GCC states will appear to be more dependent on hydrocarbons. 
For example, in 1998 when oil prices fell to extremely low levels and Dubai Light 
reached a nadir of $12.17 (see Figure 4.2), oil and gas exports as a proportion of 
total exports fell to 67 percent, the lowest in the period examined. 
T bl 4 5 GCC 0 d 011 d G 2004C ed ith 1994 a e . _ep•m J~~c,on an as, __ __ ompar w 
-· 
. . 
-· -
1994 2004 
Oil Oil Oil Oil 
Exports Revenues Exports Revenues 
Oil as% as% of as% Oil as% as%of as% 
of Total Total Govt of Total Total Govt 
GOP Exports Revenues GOP Exports Revenues 
Bahrain 14.2 62.0 54.1 23.3 73.8 72.6 
Kuwait 38.4 93.4 89.8 47.6 92.8 91.4 
Oman 37.0 76.3 77.6 43.8 81.3 66.2 
Qatar 32.0 81.2 n.a. 62.2 83.7 55.3 
SA 33.0 89.5 74.0 45.3 46.9 84. 1 
UAE 32.0 48.0 76.6 32.2 35.8 77.7 
GCC 31.1 75.1 74.8 42.4 69.05 74.55 
Source: Calculated from GCC Central Bank data and the Arab Monetary Fund, Nat1onal Accounts 
and Commodity Structure of Trade data. 
It could be argued that the presence of 'Dutch Disease' in these economies has 
limited the competitiveness of non-hydrocarbon exports but this is also because of 
the structure and comparative advantage of their economies. The GCC states have 
a comparative advantage in exporting energy intensive products, such as 
petrochemicals and aluminium and therefore they are somewhat limited as to how 
much they can diversify their exports and still remain competitive. 
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At current production rates and using data for 'proven' reserves Kuwait's oil 
reserves have the highest 'life time' among the GCC states at 112 years, followed 
by the UAE (100 years), Saudi Arabia (68 years) and Qatar (42 years). Bahrain 
has the lowest reserve life expectancy at just 1.3 years, followed by Oman with 20 
years (see Table 4.6).13 Bahrain's oil reserves are now almost exhausted, it has 
therefore faced much greater imperative to diversify than any other GCC state. 14 
Bahrain also has the lowest oil and gas reserves per capita of the GCC states, at 
only 176 barrels of oil per capita and only 0.13 mn cubic meters of gas per capita in 
2004 (see Table 4.6). In contrast, Kuwait has the highest oil reserves per capita at 
36,000 barrels per head and Qatar has the greatest gas reserves per capita at 34.8 
mn cubic meters per head. 
Table 4.6: Oil and Gas Indicators, 2004 
Oil Reserves per Gas Expected Life Expected Life 
Capita ( 1, 000 Reserves per of Oil of Gas 
bbls) Capita (mcm) Reserves Reserves 
Bahrain 0.176 0.13 1.31 9.2 
Kuwait 36.00 0.57 111.89 161.9 
Oman 2.33 0.42 19.54 56.8 
Qatar 20.54 34.84 42.06 657.7 
SA 11.59 0.30 68.00 105.5 
UAE 22.64 1.40 100.47 132.3 
GCC 14.30 1.2 74.54 221.7 
. ,;; Source: BP Statistical Rev1ew 2005 and GCC Central Bank Reports. 
13 These figures for 2004, taken from the BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2005, are the most 
reliable data for comparing the reserve-production ratios (reserve 'life-times') of the World's oil-
producing nations. As an indication of relative reserve 'life-times' they are useful, but they should be 
treated with considerable caution with respect to their absolute values. This is because the data in 
question ('proven' reserves) only refer to reserves for which there is a greater than 90 percent 
probability of their being commercially recoverable. If the 'probable' category of reserves (50-90 
percent probability of recovery) and possible (greater than zero but less the 50 percent probability} 
are included, the total reserves picture for each country is much larger. 
14 Bahrain's situation has become more acute since Saudi Arabia ceased an oil grant of 50,000bpd 
in late 2004, a decision widely thought to reflect Saudi displeasure at Bahrain's US FT A agreement. 
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Economic dependence on oil, the price of which has tended to be volatile, is 
reflected in the extreme swings in GCC government revenues, witnessed over the 
period of study. As Saudi Arabia's Minister of Finance, Dr. Ibrahim AI-Assaf noted 
both "Oil prices and spending on development projects control the budget".15 
During times of low oil prices deficits have grown significantly and during the late 
1980s have breached 20 percent of GOP. GCC governments have faced periods 
of successive fiscal deficits during the period under study. During the 1990s all the 
GCC states on average faced budget deficits greater than 6.5 percent of GOP (see 
Table 4.7). As we shall see in chapter six, budget dependence on oil revenues 
which have been very volatile in the past may potentially have serious implications 
for meeting fiscal policy rules set as part of the convergence criteria for CU. 
T bl 4 7 GCC F' I S I /0 fi i p ta fGDP a e . ISCa urplus. e 1c ts as a ercen lge o . . 
Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi UAE Arabia 
1980s Average 1.1 -4.3 -8.0 -2.3 -8.3 -4.5 
Maximum 
-5.4 -21.7 -22.3 -30.5 -25.3 -14.7 Deficit 
1990s Average -2.6 -6.3 -7.3 -5.1 -5.9 -9.2 
Maximum 
-6.5 -27.0 -12.1 -10.7 -10.5 -16.5 Deficit 
2001- Average -0.1 17.9 1.0 8.0 3.3 -3.0 2005 
Maximum 
-10 5.7 -7.8 -4.8 -6.8 -15.4 Deficit 
Source: Economic Integration Department, Gulf Cooperation Council and GCC Central Bank 
reports. Note: Due to the Gulf war in 1991 data for Kuwait for the years 1990/91 are missing and for 
Saudi Arabia the year 1991 is also missing. 
GCC government spending has been shown to be highly pro-cyclical so that during 
times of low oil prices governments have not been able to offset this economic 
decline with fiscal policy. 16 As a result economic swings are much greater and the 
non-oil economy, which is in part determined by public sector spending, also 
suffers during times of low oil prices. 
15 Staff writer, "Saudi Arabia to increase infrastructure spending" Arab News, 20 February 2005. 
16 Fasano, U. and Wang, a. "Testing the Relationship Between Government Spending and 
Revenue: Evidence from GCC Countries" IMF Working Paper, November 2002. 
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As a result of successive periods of government deficits some GCC states built up 
considerable public debts. In particular, Saudi Arabia suffered from high levels of 
domestic public debt which by 1999 had reached 1 02 percent of GOP .17 Other 
GCC states, such as the UAE however, have avoided issuing long term sovereign 
debt and instead have relied on returns from considerable overseas assets to fund 
consecutive budget deficits. 
The ability of the hydrocarbon sector to drive the economic development of the 
GCC states ultimately depends upon the spending decisions and economic 
policies of the GCC leaders. In past decades the GCC leaders were characterized 
by their conspicuous consumption. On top of that, massive funds were laid out on 
military purchases that not only were unproductive but also often unnecessary.18 
However, as we will discuss in detail in chapter five, since oil prices began their 
upwards trajectory in 2002 the spending priorities of the GCC leaders have been to 
diversify their overseas assets into non-hydrocarbon fields and to build service 
sector industries domestically in order to diversify domestic national income. 
4.2.3 Private Sector Growth 
There are a number of perceived advantages from increasing the role of the private 
sector. Not only should it reduce the fiscal burden on the state but it should also be 
'job creating' and probably attract greater levels of FDI. As part of a wider process 
of increasing private sector growth, the GCC states have committed themselves to 
a program of privatization of state owned entities (see section 4.3.3). However, 
there are in-built limitations on the extent to which this can be carried out. Firstly, 
since the vast majority of state-owned assets fall within the hydrocarbon sector 
which is a strategic asset of vast importance to governments, there is naturally a 
17 Since then Saudi Arabia has used some of its oil windfalls from the oil price rise of 2003-2005 to 
pay back some of its debt which as of the end of 2005 was estimated to stand at 47 percent of its 
GOP. 
18 According to Looney, R.E. "Saudi Arabia: Measures of Transition from a Rentier State", in Iran, 
Iraq and the Arab Gulf States (eel. Kechichian, J.) pp.131-160, Palagrave, 2001., defense was the 
fastest growing sector of Saudi Arabia's major government expenditure categories between 1989 
and 1999. 
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reluctance to reduce state control over this sector. Secondly, state ownership of 
the oil and gas sector enables the governments to utilize it as a means of providing 
a range of subsidies and welfare benefits to the population - a major political 
economy consideration which could be prejudiced if the state lost control of the 
sector. 
Consequently, various policies aimed at reducing the role of the government vis-a-
vis the private sector, in most GCC states this has only taken place to a limited 
degree. In Saudi Arabia and the UAE the process has proceeded at a sluggish 
pace whilst in states like Bahrain, Oman and Qatar the selling off of state assets 
and establishment of joint public private ventures has been somewhat energetic. 
During the 1990s budgetary requirements were encouraging some GCC states to 
privatize state assets, but following the recent years of high oil prices there is little 
financial imperative for GCC governments to raise revenues through selling off 
their corporations. In 2005, an estimated $270bn 19 worth of oil revenues accrued to 
the GCC states, therefore largely removing one possible objective of privatization 
(i.e. the need to raise cash). In addition, many GCC state owned corporations are 
now being streamlined and are performing reasonably well without ownership 
being transferred to the private sector. In recent years some partial privatizations 
have taken place however these are more likely to have been motivated by a 
desire to allow GCC citizens to share in the enormous wealth earned by many 
state owned companies since the oil price boom began. 
Using the expenditure measure of GDP, GCC government consumption has 
fluctuated considerably with a small downward trend since 1980 (see Figure 4.4). 
In 1980 public consumption averaged 39 percent overall, ranging between 23 
percent in Bahrain and 56 percent in Qatar. In 2003 the average was only slightly 
lower at 37 percent, ranging from 27 percent in the UAE to 51 percent in Qatar. 
19 Rutledge, E. uGCC Economic Performance in 2005" in Gulf Yearbook 2005-2006, pp. 109 -129, 
Gulf Research Center, Dubai, 2006. 
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Fi ure 4.4: Public Consum tion as Share of Total Consum tion in GOP* 
70% ,---------------------------------------------------~ 
65% +-----------------------~~--------------------------~ 
M ~ ~ ~ ~ 00 ~ 0 O N ~ ~ m ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 2 2 2 ~ 2 
Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar - saudi Arabia - UAE 
Source: AMF, National Accounts, various years. •GOP by expenditure at current prices. 
Private sector growth can also be stimulated by improving the business climate 
and reducing bureaucratic hurdles and red tape for businesses. In addition, private 
household consumption can be promoted through providing a greater choice of 
goods and services. It appears that certain GCC states have been more successful 
at stimulating private sector consumption than others. In 2004, the private 
consumption to GOP ratio varied considerably across the GCC states, for example, 
in Qatar the ratio was lowest at just 18 percent of GOP, however the growth rate of 
private consumption in Qatar between 2000 and 2004 was the highest in the GCC 
at 14 percent (see Figure 4.5). The private consumption to GOP ratio was at its 
highest in the UAE at 51 percent of GOP in 2004. The UAE is therefore the only 
GCC state where private consumption currently forms the majority of expenditure 
on GOP. The growth of the private sector in certain states, such as Qatar, has 
been inhibited by the lack of business opportunities and the dominance of public 
sector monopolies in certain economic sectors. 
81 
Fi ure 4.5: GCC Private Consum tion to GOP Ratios, 2004 
UAE Oman Bahrain Kuwait Saudi Arabia Qatar 
Private consumption to GOP rat io Growth of private consumption 2000 - 2004 
Source: AMF, AI T aqrlr allqtlsadl al Arabi al Muwahhad, 2004. 
An important impetus behind the policy of increasing the role of the private sector 
and privatization in the GCC states has been to reduce dependence on the state 
as the main provider of employment for nationals. In light of the reality that it is 
unproductive and fiscally unsustainable for the GCC government's to continue 
creating more jobs in the public sector for nationals, they are looking to the private 
sector to provide employment for nationals. 
States such as Bahrain, Oman and Saudi Arabia have been more successful at 
increasing private sector employment of nationals than others. Only in Saudi 
Arabia and Bahrain do nationals make up a significant share of the private sector 
workforce at 45 percent and 28 percent respectively (see Figure 4.6). In these 
economies the reality has been that the government itself has not been able to 
create new jobs for nationals because of severe population and budgetary 
pressures so that nationals have had to compete with expatriates for jobs in the 
private sector. Nationals have also been helped to some degree by the policy of 
nationalizing the workforce in certain private sector areas. In contrast, in the UAE 
and Kuwait nationals represent only a very small share of the private sector 
workforce, at just 1 percent and 2 percent respectively. These GCC states still 
have the luxury of relatively small populations and very large oil and gas reserves. 
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Fi ure 4.6: Sector Em lo ment of GCC National and Ex atriate Labour 
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Source: Compiled by Author from Various Sources.20 
4.2.4 Balance of Payments Performance 
Overall, the average trade surpluses of the GCC states as a percentage of their 
GOP between 1980 and 2002 ranged from a minimum of 9.9 percent in the case of 
Bahrain to a maximum of 30.2 percent in Qatar (see Table 4.8). The balance of 
trade in all GCC states is heavily influenced by hydrocarbons and many have 
witnessed several negative trade balances over the last two decades. For instance, 
Bahrain stands out in this respect from the other GCC states and has experienced 
numerous negative trade balances. Between 1980 and 2004, Bahrain experienced 
eleven years of trade deficits, and a successive period of trade deficits from 1983 
to1989 as well as from 1991 to 1994. 
20 Data for Bahrain and Kuwait is for 2003, source EIU Country Profiles, Data for UAE is 1995 
census data. Ministry of Labour, Data source for Oman is Central Bank of Oman Annual Report 
2004, Data source for Qatar is Qatar Central Bank Annual Report 2004, for the year 2003 and 
Qatar's private sector includes Mixed Sector employees, Data for SA is SAMA Annual Report and 
Ministry of Labour, for the year 2002. 
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T bl 4 8 T d B I p ta fGDP a e . ra e a ance as a ercen age o . . 
Average Standard Coefficient of 
1980-2004 deviation Variation 
Bahrain 9.9 0.32 3.21 
Kuwait 16.9 0.14 0.85 
Oman 17.8 0.07 0.41 
SA 14.7 0.11 0.75 
UAE 17.5 0.13 0.72 
Qatar 30.2 0.14 0.48 
.. Source: International Monetary Fund, Dtrection of Trade StatiStics and World Bank World 
Development Indicators (April 2006). 
The GCC states are generally considered to be open trading economies. Trade, as 
a percentage of GOP, ranges from 64 percent of GOP in Saudi Arabia to 146 
percent of GOP for Bahrain. 21 The direction for trade in the GCC states over this 
period has moved away from the US and Europe towards Asia. The volume of 
GCC imports from Asia increased by a compound annual growth rate ( CAGR) of 
9.5 percent between 1980 and 2004, whilst the volume of imports from the US 
grew by only 1.7 percent (see Table 4.9). Currently most GCC imports originate in 
Europe and Asia, accounting for 33 percent and 30 percent of total imports 
respectively. lntra-GCC imports constituted only 6.6 percent of total GCC imports 
in 2004, yet their volume has grown by a CAGR of 5.1 percent over the period of 
analysis (in chapter five, intra-GCC trade is analysed in detail, see section 5.2). 
In terms of GCC exports, 36 percent were destined to Asia in 2004, but only 11 
percent to the EU and to the US. The share of GCC exports to the US has declined 
slightly since 1980, while the volume of exports has only grown by a CAGR of 1.5 
percent. The share of GCC exports to the European Union countries has fallen 
considerably over the same period and the volume of exports has fallen by a 
CAGR of 3 percent since 1980. In comparison the share and volume of GCC 
exports to Asia have increased substantially over the last 25 years (see Table 4.9). 
21 Calculated from World Bank, World Development Indicators, November 2004. 
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T bl 4 9 Ch 01 fGCCT a e . angmg rect1on o rade . . 
Share of GCC Imports by Origin 
Volume 
growth 
1980 1990 2000 2004 since 1980 
Asia 11.2% 15.0% 21.2% 30.0% 9.5% 
EU 37.2% 34.0% 32.1% 32.7% 4.5% 
us 16.7% 13.0% 13.1% 7.7% 1.7% 
GCC 6.6% 8.4% 8.7% 6.6% 5.1% 
RoW 28.3% 29.7% 25.0% 23.0% 5.1% 
Share of GCC Exports by Destination 
Volume 
growth 
1980 1990 2000 2004 since 1980 
Asia 14.8% 19.6% 33.9% 35.6% 5.7% 
EU 36.7% 14.8% 11.4% 11.4% -2.9% 
us 11.7% 14.4% 10.7% 10.6% 1.5% 
GCC 3.0% 8.0% 4.9% 4.6% 3.7% 
RoW 33.8% 43.2% 39.2% 37.8% 1.9% 
.. Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Stat1st1cs {July 2005) 
GCC exports, which as we have seen are dominated by oil exports are also 
predominantly destined for Asia. For the four GCC states who are members of 
OPEC, oil exports to Asia and the Pacific accounted for between 48 and 99 
percent of total oil exports on average between 1999 and 2003 (see Figure 4.7). 
Fi ure 4.7: Direction of GCC OPEC Members' Oil Ex orts, Avera e 1999-2004 
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Source: OPEC, annual statistical bulletins, 1999 - 2004. 
85 
The trade and current account surpluses of the GCC states are reflected in the 
capital account deficits that they have experienced as a result of their inability thus 
far to attract significant flows of foreign capital as portfolio or foreign direct 
investments. On average between 2001 and 2004 the GCC states received just 0.4 
percent of global FDI. 22 
Some GCC states have however, been more successful than others in terms of 
attracting FOI. It is not surprising to find that the two largest GCC economies 
attracted the greatest shares of FOI between 2001 and 2004 but perhaps 
unexpectedly the smallest GCC states Qatar and Bahrain also attracted significant 
shares of FDI, accounting for 19 percent and 13 percent of total FDI inflows 
between 2001 and 2004 respectively (see Figure 4.8). 
Fi ure 4.8: Pro ortion of GCC FDI b GCC state, Avera e 2001 to 2004 
Oman - 9% 
Saudi Arabia - 28o/o 
Source: UNCTD, World Investment Report 2005. 
Bahrain has been successful in terms of diversifying its economy particularly into 
service sector activities such as banking and finance while Qatar has recently 
attracted considerable FDI into developing its downstream natural gas sector. 
When FDI is measured as a percentage of GOP then Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE 
have attracted the most significant levels of FDI, amounting to 7.9, 2.4 and 0.8 
22 Aeeording to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World lnvtJ$tment 
Report 2005. 
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percent respectively. The UAE has also seen some success in its diversification 
into the service sector and, along with Bahrain, is generally considered to be 
among the most liberal of the GCC states, therefore they have been able to attract 
foreign companies and workers more easily. 
Despite being the largest economy of the group by far, in Saudi Arabia FDI as a 
percentage of its GOP amounted to just 0.7 percent. Furthermore, over the 2001 to 
2004 period Saudi Arabia attracted less FDI as a proportion of the region's total 
than the UAE did at 28 percent and 29 percent of the total FDI inflows respectively. 
It is hoped by the Kingdom's policy makers that Saudi Arabia's 2005 accession to 
the WTO may in time improve this (see section 4.3.4). 
Post 2004 however, Saudi Arabia has made substantial deals with foreign 
companies to invest in its downstream hydrocarbon sector. In a bid to increase the 
value-added of its oil exports Saudi Arabia has attracted FDI in large sums to its 
petrochemical and refining industries. In late 2004 the Kingdom signed a deal with 
Japan's Sumitomo Chemical to build, what is billed to be the world's largest, 
integrated refinery and petrochemicals complex; PetroRabigh. 23 Additionally, in 
May 2006 two major deals with international oil companies were signed, both for 
constructing multi-billion dollar refineries. One will be built on the Kingdom's east 
coast and one on its west coast. Total, France's major oil company, signed a deal 
with Aramco, estimated to be worth $6bn, to develop one of these refineries. 24 
23 Rutledge, E. "Value-added across the board" Gulf in the Media Business Bulletin May 27- June 
02 2006, Gulf Research Center, Dubai, 2 June 2006. 
24 Ibid. 
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Fi ure 4.9: FDI as a Percenta e of GOP, 2004 
8%-r-------,--------r-------~r------~------~r-~~~ 
7%~------_,--------+-------~-------+------~r; 
6%~------~--------+-------~-------+------~~ 
5%~------~--------+-------~-------+------~~ 
4%~------~--------+-------~-------+------~~ 
3%~------_,--------+-------~-------+------~~1 
2%~------_,--------+-------~-------+-, 
1% ~------~--------+-------~ 
0% 
Kuwait Oman Saudi Arabia UAE Qatar Bahrain 
Source: UNCTD, World Investment Report, 2005 and GCC central banks for GOP data. 
4.2.5 Exchange Rate Performance 
All the GCC have had de facto pegs against the US dollar in the period under study 
and the pegs have been very stable which has been beneficial for intra-GCC 
exchange rate stability (see Figure 4.10). Another advantage, as we have seen in 
section 4.2.1 is that this arrangement has provided the GCC with a low inflation 
environment. 25 The standard deviations of their exchange rates against the dollar 
over this period were negligible. The sustainability of the pegs against the dollar, or 
otherwise, have been supported by the large levels of international reserves which 
the GCC states hold. 
Despite this, during times of very low oil prices such as that in 1986 and 1998 there 
has been pressure on these pegs.26 In 1986 Oman adjusted its currency the riyal 
against the US dollar. As a result of falling oil prices it devalued its currency by 10 
25 Ghosh, A R., Guide, A M., Ostry, J. D. and Wolf, H. C., "Does the Nominal Exchange Rate 
Regime Matter?" NBER Working Paper Series, 5874, MA, January 1997, this paper finds that 
~egged exchange rate regimes experience lower inflation. 
According to Karam, Philippe D., "Exchange Rate Policies in Arab Countries: Assessment and 
Recommendations", Economic Policy Institute, Arab Monetary Fund, Abu Dhabi, December, 2001, 
during the 1997-1998 Asian crt Is risk premiums on th Saudi Riyal's exch nge rate one year 
forward hit 1000 basis points intra-day at one point. 
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percent against the dollar. 27 According to Stern Saudi Arabia was also forced to 
make an adjustment to its currency peg in 1986 and in 1997 a small adjustment to 
the UAE dirham took place. 28 
Fi ure 4.10: GCC Nominal Exchan 
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The GCC currencies are all freely convertible but speculative activity against the 
local currencies is often deterred by the GCC's huge international reserves. 
Research by the AMF considers the foreign reserve adequacy ratios29 of the GCC 
states to be very healthy compared with other Arab countries. 30 GCC Central 
Banks also reportedly keep some control over the sale of local currencies against 
the dollar by stipulating the requirement of import/export papers.31 
Real exchange rates over time have seen some divergence as inflation rates have 
varied among the members. As we have seen previously official inflation rates 
27 Central Bank of Oman, 25 Years of Central Bank of Oman- April 1975 to April 2000, Muscat 
2000 
28 Sturm, M. and Siegfried, N. "Regional Monetary Integration in the Member States of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council", European Central Bank, Occasional Paper Series, No. 31, June 2005. 
29 There are a number of Indicators used for determining the adequate level of reserves for an 
economy, the paper uses several ratios including reserves to imports, reserves to short term debt 
and reserves to broad money. 
30 Bolbol, All, A and Fatheldin, Ayten, M. "Analysis of Foreign Reserves in the Arab Countries, 
1980-2002", Arab Monetary Fund Economic Papers, Num~r 10, Abu Dhabi, Janu ry 2005. 
31 Interview with Manish Agrawal, Senior Dealer, Rates Markets, ABN AMRO, Dubal, 5 May 2005. 
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have been low and highly cyclical but on average there appear to be persistent 
price differentials among the GCC economies (see Table 4.2). As a result real 
exchange rates have correspondingly diverged. Econometric analysis by 
Hassanain32 has shown that there are persistent deviations from Purchasing Power 
Parity across the GCC economies. 
Real (and Nominal) Effective Exchange Rates33 (REERINEER) for the GCC states, 
which have closely tracked those of the US, have been volatile (see Figure 4.11 ). 
The REER indicates the level of competitiveness of the given country's exports. Oil 
and gas form a large proportion of GCC exports, on average 70 percent in 2004 
(see Table 4.5). The REER of the GCC will therefore have very little effect upon 
the competitiveness of the vast majority of GCC exports because oil prices are 
denominated in the US dollar and the price is determined in world oil markets. 
However, the volatility of the US REER (shown in Figure 4.11) may have 
hampered the growth of non-oil exports as econometric evidence has pointed to 
this in developing countries, it could also have been a causal factor in the low flows 
of FDI into the GCC states. 34 
During the 1980s the GCC states experienced a depreciation of the REER and a 
gradual appreciation over the 1990s. The appreciation of the dollar in the late 
nineties coincided with a decline in the oil price which had adverse economic 
repercussions for the GCC states.35 Between 2001 and 2003 there was a real 
depreciation of the GCC currencies this can be explained by the devaluation of the 
dollar against most international currencies including the euro and the yen and the 
increasing level of trade with the Eurozone and Asian countries. 36 However, since 
32 Hassanain, Khalifah "Purchasing power parity: further evidence and implications" Review of 
Middle East Economics and Finance, Vol. 2, No. 1, 63-77, April 2004 
33 The NEER is a weighted average of major bilateral nominal exchange rates, with weights based 
on the trade shares reflecting the relative importance of each currency in the effective exchange 
rate basket The REER is obtained by adjusting the NEER for inflation differentials with the 
countries whose currencies are included in the basket. 
34 Esquivel, Gerardo and Felipe Larraln B, "The Impact of G-3 Exchange Rate Volatility on 
Developing Countries" El Colegio de M~xico, Pontificia Universidad Cat61ica de Chile and Harvard 
University Revised, August 2001. 
35 The Economist "Oil producers' surpluses- Recycling the petrodollars", 10 November 2005. 
36 The calculation of the REER is weighted by the given country's bilateral volume of trade with 
other countries. 
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2003, high oil prices and increased liquidity combined with fixed nominal exchange 
rates in the GCC have led to a relative increase in domestic price levels compared 
with foreign ones and therefore a real appreciation in GCC exchange rates (see 
Figure 4.11). 
Fi ure 4.11: Annual Percenta 
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Domestic monetary policy tools, such as banking reserve ratios, Certificates of 
Deposit issuance and a few Open Market Operations, have to a limited degree 
helped to control the money supply and therefore inflation rates, during oil price 
booms. 37 But during times of dollar depreciation, such as in 1994, 2004 and 2006 
the GCC central banks have been unable to protect themselves against inflation 
arising from the increased cost of non-dollar denominated imports. Research by 
Mohammed and Sakka38 has shown that the GCC states have high import 
propensities and low price elasticities of demand for imports. Consequently a rise 
in import prices following a devaluation in their exchange rates has a significant 
impact on the general domestic price level in these countries. Using econometric 
37 For example, in 2005 the UAE Central Bank began issuing 5 year CDs in an attempt to soak up 
surplus liquidity from the economy, previously only 18 month CDS had been issues, see "Central 
Bank plans debt issue to control inflation", Reuters, 13 August 2005. 
38 Mohammad, Y.H.J and EI.Sakka, M.I.T. , ·Demand for Imports In the GCC Countries· Joumsl of 
the Gulf and Arabian Penninsula Studies, 27 (100}, 2001 . 
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analysis Ghars El-Din eta/. showed that a ten percent devaluation causes a 2.1-
7.4 percent rise in domestic prices. 39 The combination of low price elasticities of 
demand for imports and the absence of a well established import substitution 
sector implies that domestic prices in the GCC states are more sensitive to a 
change in import prices resulting from a devaluation of their currencies than they 
are to domestic economic conditions. 40 Therefore, exchange rate fixing has 
important implications for other economic policies and the ability of the domestic 
authorities to control their inflation environment. Furthermore, during oil price 
booms the fixed pegs have prevented a nominal appreciation of the GCC 
currencies which has then exacerbated inflationary pressures in these economies. 
Apart from causing inflation spikes during periods of dollar depreciations another 
major concern regarding the choice of the dollar exchange rate peg for the GCC 
single currency relates to the fact that whilst the dollar peg stabilizes the currency 
risk on their export income, on the other side of their trade balance - the cost of 
their imports remain highly volatile. GCC trade is increasingly being dominated by 
Asia and Europe and trade with the US is becoming less important. US imports 
constitute a significantly smaller proportion of the total than the other major trading 
blocs such as Asia and Europe, as was discussed in section 4.2.3 (see Table 4.9). 
In Kuwait, the switch from the trade weighted basket peg in 2003 to the dollar peg 
in order to synchronize GCC exchange rates prior to MU was lamented by several 
Kuwaiti economists and Central Bank officials. They considered the basket peg to 
have given them more stability in terms of their import costs and greater flexibility 
which allowed them to minimize import related inflationary pressures during times 
of dollar depreciations. For example, in mid-2005 one regional expert, interviewed 
for this research, in Kuwait said "(The peg to the dollar) is a disaster, we tried to 
convince the (other GCC states) to peg to a basket. It doesn't suit these economies 
and back then the euro wasn't really an option, but now we are really feeling the 
39 Ghars El-Din, Mohamed Abdul Hafez and Mohammad, Yousuf Hasan Jawad "Exchange Rate 
and Domestic Prices in the GCC Countries", Economic Research Forum, Working Paper 0105, 
January 2005. 
40 Ibid. 
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pain of the dollar peg." One Kuwaiti regional expert said "I still believe that a basket 
is more appropriate and related to the commercial balance." 
At times, when the US dollar has been weak there have been calls from concerned 
parties, particularly within the GCC business communities, to de-peg from the 
dollar. For example, the dollar's weakness in 1994, 2004 and 2006 led to calls to 
link the currencies to a trade-weighted basket. For example, Standard and 
Chartered bank in the UAE in 2005 commented that the most appropriate 
exchange rate policy was to remove the dirham - dollar peg and to switch to a 
trade weighted exchange rate band, which in their opinion "would help improve the 
region's resilience to external shocks, including oil prices swings (and) control 
inflationary pressures ..... these are a compelling set of reasons to abandon the 
status quo as soon as practicable. 1141 
4.3 GCC Economic Policies and Objectives 
Identifying GCC economic policies and objectives is complicated by the fact that 
decision making tends to be highly personalized in the Gulf States. Nevertheless, 
Saudi Arabia has been publishing detailed five year development plans since 1970 
and Oman began doing so from 1976 onwards. Kuwait launched a five year 
economic planning system in 1995 and Bahrain set up an Economic Development 
Board (EDB) in 2001. 
The formulation of economic policies has tended to be retrospective, as economic 
problems have emerged particularly during times of low oil prices, policies such as 
fiscal rationalization through diversification and privatization only then take priority. 
Conversely when oil prices are high the imperative to implement economic reforms 
is reduced. Similarities and contrasts between the GCC state's economic policies 
are discussed in this section and particular attention is given to their choice of 
monetary policy. 
41 Brice, Steve "The Case for Currency Flexibility" Emerging Markets: Dubal, Oxford Business 
Group, 2005. 
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As Saudi Arabia and Oman have been publishing economic development plans 
throughout the period of analysis it is worth briefly looking at these. In Saudi 
Arabia's Third Plan (1980-1985), spending on education, health, and social 
services increased. During these years oil production declined and the envisaged 
real GOP growth rate of 1.3 percent per annum was not achieved.42 Oman's 
second Five-Year Plan (1981-1985) focused on completing basic infrastructural 
projects that were already underway. 
Oman's third Five-Year Plan (1986-1990) was intended to augment the 
achievements of the previous plan, but the steep decline in oil prices forced the 
government to tighten its fiscal budget at the expense of some investment and 
development projects. In Saudi Arabia's Fourth Plan (1985-1990), the focus was 
again on education and training but also emphasized stimulating private sector 
investment and increasing economic integration with members of the GCC. Over 
this period oil revenues declined markedly which once again meant the envisaged 
GOP growth rate was not met. 
Oman's Fourth Five-Year Plan (1991-1995) concentrated primarily on broadening 
and diversifying the production base of the economy, increasing private sector 
involvement and developing human resources. Saudi Arabia's plan for the same 
period emphasized improved and more efficient government social services; and 
creating greater private-sector employment opportunities for Saudis by reducing 
the number of foreign workers. 43 
Saudi Arabia's Sixth Plan (1995-2000) focused on lowering fiscal commitments 
(without actually cutting government services) and expanding educational training 
programs. The plan called for reducing its dependence on the petroleum sector by 
diversifying economic activity. Saudization policies also featured prominently. Its 
42Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Economy and Planning, online: available 
http://www.planning.gov.sa/indexe.htm 
43 Ibid. 
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Seventh Plan (2000-2005) again focused on economic diversification and 
measures to give the private sector a more prominent role.44 
In June 1995, Oman launched "Oman 2020", which intended to diversify its 
economy completely away from dependence on oil (at the time Oman's oil 
reserves were forecast to be commercially exhausted by 2020). The Fifth Plan 
( 1996-2000) called for wider private sector participation and the use of 
sophisticated macro-economic modeling techniques in the planning process. 
The key priority of the Sixth Plan (2001-2005) was to raise the rate of enrolment in 
higher education institutions and upgrade basic education. The plan also aimed at 
improving the provision of suitable employment opportunities for Omani's through 
economically feasible, labour intensive production projects. The privatization 
programme was also prioritized in order to reduce the national economy's 
dependence on public spending. 45 
Between 2002 and 2005 the price of oil increased by approximately 207 percent46 
and preliminary analysis indicates that most GCC states are using these windfalls 
more prudently and proactively than in the past.47 A broad range of economic 
diversification measures are taking place in tandem with an increased emphasis on 
nationalizing labor markets, and diversifying overseas assets; which can to an 
extent be seen as oil stabilization funds. 
4.3.1 Economic Diversification and Stabilisation Funds 
A broad, and long standing goal that is essentially common to all GCC economic 
policies has been to diversify the GCC economic bases away from dependence on 
hydrocarbons. The volatile nature of commodity prices and overdependence on 
44 Ibid. 
45Sultanate of Oman, Ministry of National Economy online: available 
h~://www.moneoman.gov.om/english.htm 
46 For Dubai Light blend between 2002 and 2005, according to the International Energy Agency, 
Energy Prices and Taxes, 2006. 
47 Khalaf, Roula "Gulf states have learnt investment lessons" Financial Times, 9 December 2005. 
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them has been reflected in the instability of the region's macroeconomic 
fundamentals. In addition to the complications such over reliance creates when 
drafting forward looking spending plans, the hydrocarbon sector is also highly 
capital intensive. It is therefore unable to provide many employment opportunities 
for nationals. This in turn has resulted in large public sectors and welfare 
associated spending commitments. 
Economic diversification has been pursued most diligently in Bahrain, Oman and 
the Emirate of Dubai, all of which happen to have low oil reserves.48 Qatar was 
also faced with dwindling oil reserves but its economic diversification has been a 
vertical one, from oil and natural gas extraction to downstream activities, primarily 
liquefied natural gas and petrochemicals. In the oil abundant emirate of Abu Dhabi, 
there has been little immediate urgency to diversify its economic base. Instead, its 
priority has been to encourage private sector activities and investment in the 
economy in order to minimize the downturn when oil prices are low and 
government investment and expenditure is cut back. While Saudi Arabia has ample 
oil reserves its main problem is its large national population and dwindling per 
capita incomes. Saudi's diversification is essential primarily to create sufficient jobs 
for its young population. 
In order to insulate themselves from external oil price shocks and the volatile 
impact on their budgets and spending plans as well as to ensure intergenerational 
equity, a few GCC governments have established oil stabilization funds. Kuwait 
and Oman have both introduced such funds which have, to a degree, helped in 
stabilizing and diversifying government revenues and thus securing spending 
plans. The Kuwaiti government established a Reserve Fund for Future Generations 
(RFFG) in 1976, into which 10 percent of government revenues are deposited 
annually. The RFFG accumulated sizable assets reaching an estimated $100 bn 
before the 1991 Gulf war, during which the government had to borrow back around 
$40 bn to finance the coalition partners who fought against Iraq. The funds were 
also used to cover the gap in government income lost from oil production during 
48 For a historical examination of Bahrain's diversification process see Rutledge, E. The Experience 
of Economic Diversification in Bahrain, 1987-1997, The Bahrain-British Foundation, London, 1999. 
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the crisis and for reconstruction after the war ended.49 Kuwait's fund has been 
successful in diversifying government income. The investment income from the 
fund's assets held mainly in overseas capital markets has become the second 
largest source of government revenues after oil, contributing roughly a third of total 
revenues. 50 
In Oman, where the implementation of several economic plans had suffered as a 
result of low oil prices, the State General Resetve Fund (SGRF) was established in 
1980 to act as a reserve for future generations, and also to act as a stabilization 
fund for government spending when necessary.51 Initially, government allocations 
to the fund were substantial but as with most spending targets, these have ebbed 
and flowed with world oil prices. In 1991, following successive budget deficits and 
net outflows from the SGRF, a second fund called the Contingency Fund, was set 
up specifically to act as a stabilization fund for the budget. A number of different 
allocation mechanisms have been used for the funds usually determined by price 
of oil.52 Reserves have thus been hard to build following years of consecutive 
budget deficits as a consequence of low oil prices throughout the 1980s and 1990s 
limiting the efficacy of the fund in achieving its stabilizing objectives. 
Investment funds, such as the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority and the Kuwait 
Investment Authority, also act to a degree as oil stabilization funds. They invest 
windfall oil revenues during times of high oil prices in overseas assets which can 
be relied upon for income streams during times of low oil prices. During the 2002-
2005 oil price boom GCC states were increasingly investing their oil funds into 
diversified projects overseas and in mergers and acquisitions. For example, the 
UAE, which is the GCC's top overseas investor, having made double the value of 
acquisitions compared to the second largest investor, Saudi Arabia53, acquired a 
$1bn stake in DaimlerChrysler, the German-US car manufacturer as well as 
49 Fasano, Ugo "Review of the experience with oil stabiliZation and savings funds in selected 
countries", International Monetary Fund Working Paper, June 2000. 
50 Ibid. 
51 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Oman Country Profile 1997/1998, London. 
52 /bid. 
53 Staff Writer "Private Investigations" The Banker, 2 May 2006. Accessed at 5 May 2006. 
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purchasing a 5 percent stake in Ferrari, for $137mn, and successfully bid $6.8bn to 
take over P&O, Britain's largest ports and ferries group in February 2006.54 Such 
investments are an important part of their diversification plan. 
4.3.2 Labour Force Nationalisation Measures 
A paradoxical situation has emerged in the GCC states where large numbers of 
expatriates are employed despite the presence of an increasing number of 
unemployed nationals. This is in part a result of the highly segmented labour 
markets where the public sector more or less guaranteed employment for nationals 
while the private sector predominantly employed expatriates. 55 This segmentation 
is attributable to several factors including shorter working hours, longer holidays, 
job security and a host of other benefits in public sector employment. Indeed not 
only do GCC nationals prefer to work in the public sector they also expect to 
receive a government job. 56 With high population growth rates since the 1980s 
(see Table 4.4) most governments however will not be able to continue creating 
employment for all nationals not only because it will make public sector services 
highly inefficient, but because it will substantially increase their fiscal burdens. 
Each GCC government has attempted to address this challenge by introducing a 
policy of nationalizing the workforce that has generally replaced most expatriates in 
the public sector and has in some cases set quotas for the employment of 
nationals in areas of the private sector. With the exception of the UAE, the majority 
of GCC public sector jobs are done by nationals. The proportion of public sector 
jobs held by nationals ranges from 53 percent in Qatar to 91 percent in Bahrain 
(see Figure 4.6). After successfully nationalizing the public sector labour force the 
focus is increasingly turning to the private sector. Employment of nationals in the 
54 Sharif, Arif "P&O's link with parent hinders DP World move" Gulf News, 14 June 2006. 
55 In the first oil price boom of the seventies much of the expatriate labour in the GCC states were 
from other Arab countries, however these labor flows are increasingly being displaced by cheaper 
labour from developing countries in Asia. In Kuwait for example data shows that approximately 50 
&ercent of expatriate labor is Asian. 
Bosbalt, Mohammed and Wilson, Rodney, "Education, school to work transitions and 
unemployment in Saudi ArabiaD Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 41, No. 4, pp. 533-545, July 2005. 
98 
GCC's private sector is much lower, for example, it currently only employs between 
1 percent of nationals in the UAE to 45 percent in Saudi Arabia (see Figure 4.6). 
In states such as Bahrain, Oman and Saudi Arabia where unemployment has 
become somewhat of a political issue, the respective governments have introduced 
quotas for the private sector. This first formal labour market policy introduced in the 
region was in Bahrain in 1988.57 The policy of Bahrainisation of the workforce was 
introduced in an effort to replace expatriate workers, who have continuously 
constituted more than 50 percent of its work force. In 1994 the Human Resource 
Development Support Programme was initiated and in 1996 the Government of 
Bahrain opened the country's first job centre, which was later followed by training 
and business financing funds for Bahraini job seekers. In 2001 some occupations 
were made exclusive for Bahrainis. 
The UAE is attempting to address its emerging national unemployment, which is 
likely to become more of an issue in the coming years, by setting quotas for certain 
service sector activities such as in banking and insurance, where companies 
employing more than fifty people must meet Emiratisation targets. In addition, in 
recent years the UAE has passed legislation that will require all Public Relations 
Officers, Human Resources Officers and Secretaries to be Emiratis. 58 
In Oman the policy of Omanisation was introduced in the mid 1990s. In 1995 a 
large expatriate workforce existed in Oman, amounting to 82 percent of the total 
labour force and quotas for national employees were introduced into several 
economic sectors including transport, insurance and trade. 59 In the UAE such 
quotas exist in the banking, insurance and trade sectors. 
In Saudi Arabia, the problems involved in relying on expatriate labour were first 
mentioned in the third five-year plan (1980-85) which warned against the 
57 IMF, Middle Eastern Department, "Financial Systems and Labor markets in the Gulf Cooperation 
Council Countries" 1997, Washington D.C. 
68Staff writer "Emiratisation is top priority for UAE Government, says UAE Labour Minister" AMEinfo 
24 July 2006. 
59 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Oman Country Profile, 1997-1998, London. 
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unhindered growth of the expatriate labour force.60 Yet in 2003 the issue of national 
unemployment remained and was a growing concern, according to Minister of 
Petroleum and Mineral Resources, Ali AI-Naimi, "The underlying goal of these 
reforms is to . . . expand and diversify the Kingdom's economy while creating job 
opportunities for a rapidly growing population. "61 The Saudi Arabian Ministry of 
Planning's Seventh Development Plan (2000-2005) stated that ''The Plan adopts a 
set of economic policies ... designed to develop human resources, raise the 
efficiency of manpower, and increase employment through both generation of new 
jobs and replacement of non-Saudi manpower". 62 
During the 1990s various Saudisation laws were passed, which required private 
businesses employing more than 20 people to increase the number of Saudi 
nationals by five percent annually, prevented the hiring of foreigners in 
administrative positions and increased the fees involved in recruiting expatriates. 63 
The policy of such private sector quotas has however, been criticized for potentially 
harming the efficiency and competition of private sector businesses.64 So far it has 
failed to adequately address the issue of unrealistic employment expectations of 
nationals and the perceived mismatch between the skills of national university 
graduates and private sector needs. Having said this, in a similar vein most GCC 
states are now channeling government resources into a more market orientated 
strategy of providing training and education for nationals in order to equip them 
with the skills required by the private sector. For example, Tanmia the UAE's 
national human resource development agency, helps national job seekers improve 
their skills by providing specialized training. While Saudi Arabia's Eighth Plan 
(2005-201 0), according to Saudi Arabia's Minister of Economy and Planning, 
Ahmed AI-Hekami, allocated funding for "the establishment of seven new 
60 Economist Intelligence Unit, Saudi Arabia Country Profile, 1997-1998, London. 
61 Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, Political and Economic Reform in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
Washington D.C., December 2003. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Looney, R.E. "Saudization and Sound Economic Reforms: Are the Two Compatible?" Strategic 
Insights, Volume Ill, Issue 2, February 2004. 
64 See for example, staff writer "Emirati companies struggling under strict labour laws· Khaleej 
Times, 24 October 2005. 
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universities and 50 technical colleges with specializations required by the job 
market and the private sector."65 In chapter five of this thesis, GCC labour market 
challenges and policies are examined in further detail. 
4.3.3 Promoting the Private Sector 
Building the private sector has been a long standing key policy objective of the 
GCC states for reasons discussed earlier in section 4.2.4. Saudi Arabia's Sixth five 
year Development Plan ( 1995-2000) stated that one of its aims was "To rationalize 
government expenditure and make the national economy more dependent on 
private sector activities. ·o661n addition to the narrow policy of selling off state assets 
to the private sector, a number of other policies aimed at increasing private sector 
activities have been adopted. 
Several GCC states have improved the business environment for the private sector 
by investing in infrastructure and creating Free Trade Zones (FTZs) where local 
private sector businesses, as well as foreign companies, can locate. FTZs provide 
businesses with benefits such as minimal red tape and quick approval of 
procedures. FTZs are usually established as business clusters and therefore 
associated business services are also readily at hand.67 The UAE is the regional 
leader in terms of establishing FTZs with more than twenty established or planned, 
Qatar and Bahrain also have FTZs on the drawing board. Increasingly in the region 
public sector contracts are offered to private sector companies and joint public-
private partnerships are taking place. More and more sectors where state owned 
monopolies have held dominance are being gradually opened up to competition. 
Several GCC governments are targeting the growth of small and medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs) in order to promote private sector growth and domestic 
65 Staff Writer "Seven New Universities To Be Established Under 8th Plan", Arab News 24 
November 2005. 
66 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Planning, "Socio-Economic Developments During the Sixth 
Plan" Chapter Two of The Seventh Development Plan, Available from: 
h~:/lwww.planning.gov.sa/PLANNING/INTROe.HTM (accessed at 20 March 2006). 
67 For example, Dubai Media, Healthcare and Internet Cities. 
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entrepreneurialism. Small businesses in Saudi Arabia for example, are the main 
source of private-sector investment and they form more than 90 percent of private 
enterprises across the country.68 Consequently the Saudi Commerce and Industry 
Minister, Hashim Yamani, in 2006, emphasized the importance of policies to 
support the growth and financing of SMEs, through mechanisms such as 
franchising.69 Qatar's first Industrial Area for SMEs is expected to become 
operational by 2008, according to Qatar's Ministry of Energy and Industry, "The 
project is part of the authorities' efforts to provide suitable investment opportunities 
to local and foreign investors, as well as encouraging the local private sector."70 
Privatization - or the selling off of state owned assets - has been taken up as a 
policy objective throughout the GCC, but despite a commitment to the privatization 
in principal, the process has encountered a number of obstacles as was discussed 
in section 4.2.3. In some GCC states, such as Kuwait, there has been political 
opposition to the process. Concerns over increasing national unemployment are 
likely to hinder the transfer of state owned companies to the private sector which 
may well result in cost cutting and job losses. 
In Kuwait the policy of privatization has faced social and political obstacles and 
continuous objections from members of the National Assembly who fear that 
selling off state assets could eventually erode Kuwait's generous welfare state. 
Privatization has so far been limited to the Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) 
selling small stakes in companies listed on the Kuwait Stock Exchange. Its $12 bn 
divestment programme began in 1994, following consultations with the World 
Bank, 71 but was suspended between 1997 and 2000 due to low levels of liquidity 
on the Kuwaiti Stock Exchange. It resumed in 2001 with the sale of KIA shares in 
the Mobile Telecommunications Company, and by 2002 KIA's divestiture program 
had sold holdings in 31 companies. 
68 Staff Writer "Remove Obstacles to SMEs: Yamani- KSA" Arab News, 18 June 2006. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Bibbo, Barbara "Qatar to build 1 b-riyal-facility for small and medium units" Gulf News, 6 May 
2005. 
71 Robins, Philip "Can Gulf Monarchies Survive the Oil Bust?" The Middle East Quarterly, Volume 1, 
Number 4, December 1994. 
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In Bahrain, in 2003, the decision was taken by the Cabinet to privatize the power 
sector in full. The Government has commissioned a study to investigate options for 
privatizing the power sector over the next five years. The government has also 
approved a plan to create a new company, worth $663mn, to acquire its stakes in a 
number of major tourism projects. The plan calls for a 60 percent equity stake of 
the new company to be sold to private investors in an IP0.72 
In Oman there has been little privatisation to note. In July 2005 Oman sold a 30 
percent stake in its national telecommunications company, the shares were initially 
sold only to Omani citizens but once listed on the Muscat Securities Market, were 
available for anyone to purchase. 
In Qatar, the privatisation process has seen relatively more progress. The first 
major sale of Qatari state assets took place in December 1998, when the 
government sold 45 percent of its shares in Qatar Public Telecommunications 
Corporation. In 2001 port services were also privatized. The Government of Qatar 
considers privatization as one of the key ways of reducing pressure on the state's 
fiscal budget. In February 1998 the Ministry of Electricity and Water transferred 
some of its responsibilities to the majority privately owned Qatar Electricity and 
Water Company (QEWC). 
As well as partial privatisations of public companies, some GCC states have 
created quasi-private corporations to take over control of certain services. In early 
2002 the Qatari government established Qatar Fuel Company (QFC), which took 
over the operation and maintenance of multi-product pipelines, storage facilities 
and liquefied petroleum gas filling stations from state-owned Qatar Petroleum.73 A 
new regulatory body, the Qatar General Electricity and Water Corporation, was 
created in April 2000 to replace the Electricity and Water Ministry. The corporation 
is planning to reduce the ministry's workforce by two-thirds as part of a strategy to 
become more efficient. It is also tasked with privatizing the generation, 
72 Ibid. 
73 UNDP Programme on Governance in the Arab Region, online available: http://www.pogar.org 
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transmission and distribution of utilities, which will gradually lead to the abolition of 
subsidies for expatriates and commercial establishments over time. 74 
The Supreme Economic Council in Saudi Arabia initially approved a set of 
objectives for a privatiz:ation plan in 1997 and the strategy was approved again in 
2002.75 During its Seventh Plan (2000-2005) there have been only a few significant 
privatisations such as the $4bn floatation of Saudi Telecom Company (STC) in 
January 2003 and the National Company for Cooperative Insurance was floated at 
the end of 2004. But there are plans for a number of privatisations in the pipeline. 
The Supreme Economic Council has legislated for the partial privatization of the 
National Saudi Arabian Mining Company, Maaden. Plans were announced to sell 
off 50 percent of the company in an IPO at the end of 2006?6 Additionally at the 
end of 2005 it was announced that an IPO of a 35 percent equity stake of Yanbu 
National Petrochemicals Company (YANSAB), a subsidiary of Saudi Basic 
Industries (SABIC), was being planned. In 2006 the Saudi government announced 
that its Tadawul stock market would be turned into a share holding company, of 
which some shares would be offered to the private sector. 77 The Supreme 
Economic Council has also identified a further twenty sectors for possible 
privatization. 78 
The UAE's federal government has encouraged privatization of the economy. Few 
privatization plans have emerged in Dubai which is focusing instead on 
encouraging foreign investment, while Abu Dhabi is concentrating on the 
privatization of some of its utilities and other industries, apparently to bring in 
modern technology and management techniques and reduce costs. The Abu Dhabi 
government has established a public joint stock company, the General Holding 
74 Ibid. 
75 Luciani, Giacomo "The Pace and Problems with GCC Privatizations" in Gulf Yearbook 2005-
2006, pp. 147-155, Gulf Research Center, Oubai, 2006. 
76 Ibid. 
17 Staff writer "Saudi to privatise bourse" Gulf Daily News, 10 May 2006. 
78 The list identified 20 sectors, including: postal services; water desalination; air transport, airport 
and seaport services; municipal construction; and educational, health and social services. The plan 
also proposed private management of highways, railways, oil refineries, grain silos, flour mills, 
state-owned hotels and sports clubs. (20 May 2004- Saudi Embassy, Washing D.C.) 
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Company, which will be charged with privatizing a number of state-owned factories 
including fodder, cement, steel and pipe plants and flour mills. 79 
Abu Dhabi's most ambitious privatization plans concern water desalination and 
producing and distributing electricity. Eleven companies have been created in Abu 
Dhabi to manage the different aspects of producing, operating, scheduling, 
dispatching and distributing of water and electricity. But considerations such as the 
elimination of government subsidies of water and electricity as well as a plan to 
trim the 14,000 strong staff in the industry in order to lower costs and increase 
profitability may well delay implementation. 
4.3.4 Attracting FDI 
FDI brings with it technical and managerial expertise which is transferred to 
associated indigenous companies. According to endogenous growth models such 
technology transfer can be extremely important in fostering growth. A paradox 
exists in the GCC economies, where despite the high level of GCC investment 
abroad (estimated at around $740 bn80) the region has in the past suffered from a 
lack of inward investment itself. In section 4.2.4 it was established that the GCC 
states have been mostly marginalized from such FDI flows, receiving only 0. 7 
percent of global FDI flows in 2004.81 FDI has been restricted by a number of 
factors. A survey of the obstacles to the inflow of FDI into the UAE found that the 
most significant barriers were the limits on foreign ownership of companies, real 
estate laws, the Agency law and government red tape. 82 
Despite this, the UAE in particular, has been proactive in implementing policies to 
attract foreign investors, enacting laws to allow foreign investment in real estate for 
example and running successful marketing campaigns advertising themselves as 
an ideal location for business. In 2003 Saudi Arabia also began to make serious 
79 Luciani, op.cit. 
80Staff writer, "Gulf offering limited investment avenues for high oil revenue", Khaleej Times, 20 
December 2004 
81 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2004. 
82 Qasrawi, Sophia, "Foreign Direct Investment in the UAE: Determinants and Recommendations" 
Emirates Occasional Papers, 2004. 
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efforts to attract increased investment and in 2003 cut taxes on foreign investors 
from 45 percent to 20 percent. 83 Mobilising investment is considered a priority and 
as being key to the GCC's economic growth. Bahrain and Oman have allowed for 
the complete foreign ownership of companies operating domestically and opened 
up their banking sectors to foreign competition. The UAE, in particular Dubai, has 
been active in establishing several Free Trade Zones (FTZs) which also provide 
incentives for foreign companies to establish themselves, such as allowing 1 00 
percent foreign ownership and profit repatriation, this policy has attracted many 
multinational companies to Dubai and has spurred FDI. 
Membership of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) has also been an important 
policy for the GCC states, as well as providing greater access to international 
markets it is generally accepted that membership of the WTO encourages foreign 
investment. 54 All the GCC states are now members of the WTO. Oman joined in 
2002 and the other four GCC states were contracting parties to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAIT) and became members of the WTO from 
its launch in January 1995, with the exception of Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom 
gained entry in 2005, after twelve years of negotiations. The sticking point for 
Saudi Arabia's membership has been the subsidies it provides on certain goods 
and the slow pace of economic liberalization in the Kingdom. Following its 
accession Saudi Arabia announced that is would give licenses to ten foreign banks 
to operate in its domestic market. 
Several GCC states have also signed or are negotiating Free Trade Agreements 
(FTAs) with the US, which is seen by national policy makers as a key instrument 
for increasing FDI from US companies. The FTA being negotiated multilaterally 
between the GCC states and the EU is also expected to increase FDI flows 
between the two economic blocs. 
There are few opportunities for FDI in the GCC upstream hydrocarbon sector at 
present, as it remains firmly in the hands of the State in most GCC economies due 
83Staff Writer "S. Arabia cuts tax rates on foreign investors" Arab News, Jeddah. January 13 2004. 
84 Baghat, Gawdat, Middle East Economic Survey, Vol. XLVII, No. 34, 23 August 2004. 
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to political considerations but also the inherent need to control the rate of resource 
depletion as well as to adhere to OPEC quotas (of which four of the GCC states 
are members). Saudi Aramco is the state oil company responsible for investing in 
the Saudi upstream oil industry and in Kuwait a decision on 'Project Kuwait' a 
proposal put to parliament to allow foreign involvement in the upstream oil sector 
has been continuously deferred since 1998. The prospects for International Oil 
Companies (IOCs) are unlikely to improve in the region any time soon with high oil 
prices there is little need for GCC countries to ramp up oil field production to 
increase their revenues and there is ample domestic capital available for 
investment in the hydrocarbon sector. 
However, FDI in the downstream hydrocarbon sector is being actively encouraged. 
For example, Oman's current Five-year Plan (2001-2006) makes clear that private 
investment in a number of gas-based projects is essential if its objectives are to be 
met. The plan hopes to attract a total of $11.4bn in private sector investment 
compared to the estimated $4.9bn it received between 1996 and 2000.85 With 
increasing population pressures, the utilities sector, in particular water and 
electricity, is also a key sector where FDI has been sought. For example, as part of 
the plan to privatize the electricity and water sector, Qatar established in November 
2004 the first private electricity and water company in the industrial town of Ras 
Lafan and AEC, of the US, owns a 55 percent stake in this project.86 Furthermore, 
recent legislative developments in some GCC states87, allowing foreigners to 
purchase property, are also improving the business climate for FDI. 
4.3.5 Monetary Policies 
The GCC states all have very similar exchange rate policies, and have all officially 
pegged their currencies since the early 1980s. As a result their monetary policies 
are directed towards exchange rate targeting. The Omani Riyal has been officially 
85 United Nations Development Programme, Programme on Governance in the Arab Region, 
Financial Management: Qatar, (Accessed at http://www.pogar.org/countrieslfinances.asp?cid=15) 
88 /bid. 
87 In terms of purchasing property some GCC states, with the exception of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, 
allow foreigners to purchase property in designated areas. 
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pegged to the US dollar since the 1970s, the other GCC states were pegged to the 
IMF's Special Drawing Rights (SDR) with the exception of the Kuwaiti Dinar which 
was pegged (with an adjustable relationship) to an undisclosed weighted basket of 
currencies of its main trading partners. 88 The basket was made up of five 
currencies and was heavily dollar weighted. 
In 2003 all the GCC states officially pegged their currencies to the US dollar which 
was chosen as the common interim peg prior to CU. Because the Kuwaiti dinar peg 
is the only currency previously pegged to a basket of currencies it was allowed a 
band of adjustment at +/-3.5 percent until the scheduled monetary unification. The 
value of the pegs was based on historical currency rates against the dollar. The 
choice of the dollar peg was perhaps a natural one for most GCC states early on in 
their economic development considering the price of oil has been denominated in 
dollars since the early 1970s. 
Following the monetary decisions of the Federal Reserve bank has provided the 
GCC's monetary institutions with instant credibility and furthermore it has simplified 
monetary policy making. However, the peg to the dollar has meant that interest 
rate setting as a monetary policy tool has not been available for use. As a 
consequence, nominal interest rates have had to track US interest rates and 
therefore interest rates have been similar across the GCC. However, the GCC 
central banks have at times chosen to allow a gap to emerge between their interest 
rates and those of the US depending on their domestic economic circumstances. 
Therefore they can exert control over monetary policy in the short term. For 
example, in the first half of 2006 Saudi Arabia chose not to follow two US interest 
rate rises due to concerns over falls in the Tadawul stock market.89 In fact, since 
1996 the maximum interest rate differential between GCC interest rates and those 
of the US ranged from of -91 and 205 basis points90 (see Figure 4.12). 
88 Saudi Arabia pegged its currency to the SDR in 1986, the UAE in 1980, Qatar since 1979. Oman 
&egged to the dollar in 1986 and Kuwait to a trade weighted basket of currencies in 1990. 
Staff writer "Saudi has no plan to revalue riyal: Official" The Peninsular, Qatar,26 June, 2006. 
90 Data could only be obtained from 1996 onwards. 
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Fi ure 4.12: GCC and US Three Month Interest Rates 
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The monetary policies and Central Bank mandates in the GCC countries have 
been directed primarily towards maintaining a stable international value for their 
respective currencies, as well as issuing currency, providing financial assistance to 
the government and supervising the financial system. 91 
GCC Central Banks monitor banking and monetary variables in the economy and 
use a variety of monetary instruments, other than interest rate setting, to manage 
domestic liquidity. Bahrain, for example, uses relatively sophisticated techniques 
like Open Market Operations for the sale of Government paper and secondary 
markets to manage its money supply, other states such as the UAE use simple 
reserve requirements, loan to deposit ratios and Certificates of Deposit (COs) to 
control money growth in the economy. As well as bills and repos, Saudi Arabia also 
uses the sale of bonds to control domestic liquidity and inflation. However, the use 
of Open Market Operations in Saudi Arabia to control the supply of money in the 
economy has been exercised merely as a means for government borrowing. Saudi 
Arabia has a relatively high level of domestic debt, owed to local banks, as it has 
borrowed to finance budgets during times of low oil prices. While these monetary 
policy tools are undoubtedly less effective than having the ability to set 
91 GCC Central Bank websites 
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independent interest rates to manage economic cycles they do provide the GCC 
states with some ability to manage liquidity in their economies in the short term. 
For example, in 2005 the UAE central bank increased the maturity of its COs to five 
years in order to help absorb the increase in liquidity in the domestic economy 
caused by high oil prices.92 
As GCC Central Banks lack experience of interest rate setting and utilizing 
sophisticated money market tools it has been argued that delegating monetary 
policy to the Federal Reserve in the GCC's early stages of institutional 
development was prudent. This may have been the case in the past but it is 
becoming increasingly apparent that the GCC states would undoubtedly now 
benefit from building their own independent institutional capabilities to participate 
fully in their future economic development. 
4.3.6 GCC Economic Integration Policies 
The GCC's 'Unified Economic Agreement' was ratified and came into force in 
January of 1982 and was effective up until 2001. The Unified Economic Agreement 
set out was far reaching and set out policies for the free movement of GCC citizens 
within the bloc along with recommendations for the coordination of banking, 
financial and monetary policies. In terms of GCC-wide economic integration the 
members established a Free Trade Area in 1983, under which tariffs on goods of 
national origins are eliminated. 
However, for much of the 1980's and 1990's concrete progress on many of the 
integration objectives stagnated. In 1986 the first service sectors were opened up 
to GCC citizens. By 2000, and after a sustained period characterised by low 
economic growth rates, the GCC integration as a means to economic 
diversification was again on the agenda. In 2001 a revised Economic Agreement 
was agreed upon by GCC leaders at the annual GCC Summit held in Muscat, 
92 Staff writer "Central Bank plans debt issue to control inflationR Reuters, 13 August 2005. 
110 
Oman. It set out a detailed and ambitious plan for a fully integrated common 
market as a precursor to MU. 
In 2001 the GCC's Supreme Council agreed on a timetable for implementing the 
various stages of integration. This called for the creation of a Customs Union in 
2003, the establishment of convergence criteria for monetary union to be set out by 
200593 and the completion of a Common Market by 2007. 
With regard to the movement of capital the GCC leaders have agreed in principal 
to completely integrate financial markets and harmonize all financial regulations. 
GCC citizens will have the same rights and investment opportunities in all GCC 
States and be able to own businesses and properties throughout the bloc. The 
GCC Pensions and Social Security authorities recommended in 200394 that full 
social security coverage should be extended to all GCC citizens working within 
member countries. Sultan AI Ghaith, head of the UAE delegation, said that "as of 
January 2006 implementation for the complete coverage of all GCC citizens will 
become compulsory."95 
Central Bank cooperation in the GCC takes place within the Central Bank 
Governors Committee, which meets twice a year and reports to various GCC 
subcommittees including the Committee for Financial and Economic Cooperation. 
In 2002 the GCC Supreme Council, Meeting in Doha, Qatar, set up a Monetary 
Union Unit which would focus solely on issues pertaining to CU. 
In January 2003, the GCC Customs Union came into effect with the enactment of a 
single external tariff at five percent, a unified customs code and the single point of 
entry principle. Given that national tariff levels differed substantially, in 1999 Saudi 
93 The publication of GCC CU convergence criteria has been postponed until 2006, GCC Central 
Bankers had apparently agreed on the criteria amongst themselves but differences amongst 
Finance Ministers resulted in no decision being announced at the 2005 GCC Summit. 
94 GCC Pensions and Social Security Meeting Manama, Bahrain 10 December 2005. 
95 AMEinfo, aGulf Pensions and Social Security authorities recommend full coverage of GCC 
expatriate workers" 14 December, 2003, available at http://www.ameinfo.com/32307.html 
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Arabia's average tariff was 12.6 percent while Oman's was only 4.8 percent, the 
agreement was a notable and encouraging development. 
The GCC are also negotiating as a single economic bloc with the EU for the 
establishment of a EU-GCC Free Trade Agreement. Unlike $Orne of the bilateral 
agreements signed between various GCC States and the US, it is widely felt that 
collectively the GCC will be able to strike a better deal. 
4.4 Conclusion 
All the GCC states faced similar economic challenges over the 1980 to 2005 
period, namely a need to diversify their economies away from an overdependence 
on hydrocarbons, increasing the role of the private sector, attracting more FDI and 
reforming labour markets in order to create more jobs opportunities. These 
challenges are made harder by the pro-cyclical nature of these economies 
resulting from a disproportionate reliance on income from oil - an inherently volatile 
commodity. 
There are of course differences, Bahrain and Oman face a greater imperative to 
diversify away from oil in the short term as their commercial reserves are close to 
depletion, Saudi Arabia has by far the largest population but has the second lowest 
GCC per capita income; job creation is the Kingdom's primary challenge. Qatar, 
Kuwait and the UAE have small populations compared to their hydrocarbon 
reserves and thus have less need to diversify but are in a better financial position 
to do so. 
Despite the various economic policies introduced over this period, many of the 
same challenges remain today. Qatar's main economic objectives for example in 
2005 were: diversifying the economy, creating the right investment climate and 
strengthening the private sector and increasing its overall role in the economy.96 
96 World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Review, Report by Qatar, 24 January 2005, online 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/g144_e.doc 
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The assumed economic benefrts of a Common Market and the CU in promoting 
intra-regional trade and thus economic diversification may well explain why GCC 
leaders recently renewed their commitment to their Unified Economic Agreement 
and embarked on a Customs Union. 
The degree to which the GCC's choice of monetary policy has influenced their 
ability to overcome their economic challenges is difficult to determine. But while the 
de facto peg to the US dollar may have helped create a low inflationary 
environment it has arguably been at the expense of being able to use monetary 
tools, such as independent interest rate setting to encourage growth, especially 
during periods of low oil prices. 
Being tied to US interest rates is not an optimal policy choice for the GCC states as 
monetary policy set by the US Federal Reserve is tailored for the needs of the US 
economy, not those of the GCC. Furthermore, by outsourcing monetary policy the 
GCC has to rely much more on fiscal policy to control the economy. Thus there are 
problems in projecting and managing fiscal budgets arising from the fact that GCC 
government revenues remain intimately linked with the price of oil. 
The GCC's monetary policy choices between 1980 and 2005 have effectively 
sacrificed flexibility for 'credibility' yet the US dollar peg has not discernibly helped 
the region in terms of attracting significant FDI inflows. The peg has also become 
less appropriate as trade with Eurozone and Asian countries has become 
increasingly important over the period of analysis. During periods of dollar 
depreciation GCC states suffer from import price inflation which adversely affects 
import-export businesses as well as consumers. Many of the issues addressed in 
this chapter will have a direct bearing on the appropriateness of the GCC 
economies for CU, therefore many of these issues are returned to in subsequent 
chapters of this thesis and discussed in greater detail. 
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Chapter 5 : Assessing the Suitability of the GCC 
States for Currency Union 
5.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to assess the GCC states against various OCA criteria. 
By doing this we should be able to highlight areas where transitional 'costs' will be 
higher and reform more difficult. More generally it will help to determine the 
economic costs and benefits that will be incurred from fonning the CU, which will 
be examined in more detail in chapter seven of this thesis. 
This chapter first discusses the economic criteria established as the benchmark for 
fonning a successful CU using the OCA theory. It then looks at the degree to which 
the GCC economies meet the following criteria: the level and importance of intra-
GCC trade, factor market mobility - including labour and capital, economic 
structures and diversification and finally, economic synchronicity. The degree to 
which the GCC states meet each of the core criteria is assessed, in part by, 
employing the primary research undertaken in the GCC states. 
This primary research provides first hand evidence and insights into the unique 
economic and political circumstances of the GCC. The findings of a GCC wide 
business survey and semi-structured interviews with regional experts are drawn 
upon, in order to make a comprehensive assessment of the appropriateness of CU 
for the GCC economies. Empirical analysis using regional and international data 
sources throughout compliments this primary research. In order to assess the 
degree of economic synchronicity econometric analysis is also employed. 
It should be noted from the outset that even if the GCC states do not meet some of 
the aforementioned criteria adequately, this alone will not necessarily prevent them 
from fonning a viable CU. The case of EMU is illustrative of circumstances where 
political will overrides economic concerns. It is conceivable and indeed quite 
possible that if there is adequate political will among Gulf leaders then a joint 
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currency may well be entered into, regardless of whether or not all OCA criteria are 
met. 
However, the credibility of the new single currency and sustainability of the CU will 
be considerably influenced by both the suitability of the GCC economies vis-a-vis 
the OCA criteria and the degree to which the necessary preparations are dealt with 
in the lead up to 2010. An assessment of the range of prerequisite policies, 
generally considered necessary in forming a successful CU, will be covered in the 
following chapter. 
5.1.1 The Main OCA Criteria 
The main economic criteria employed to assess the appropriateness of CU for any 
given region originates from the OCA theory. 1 According to the OCA theory the 
presence of certain economic conditions among a group of countries will help to 
minimise certain 'costs' that are incurred when forming a CU. The key economic 
one being the loss of national autonomy over monetary policy setting (for a more 
detailed assessment of OCA criteria refer to chapter two). 
In order for full economic integration and a single monetary policy to be appropriate 
for a given economic region, they must have significant levels of intra-regional 
trade; flexible labour markets and mobile intra-regional capital flows; diversified 
economies and synchronised economic cycles.2 
This section proceeds as follows; firstly it examines the level and significance of 
intra-GCC trade. CU is considered optimal for countries with strong trading links, in 
this case the benefits from reduced transaction costs and exchange rate risks will 
be highest. Next, we examine the flexibility of GCC labour and capital markets. 
OCA theory asserts that if labour and capital are sufficiently mobile between the 
1 Mundell, R. A. "A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas" The American Economic Review, Vol. 51, 
No.4, pp. 657-665, September 1961. 
2 Kenen, P. B. "The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas: An Eclectic View'', in Monetary Problems 
of the lntemationa/Economy, (eds. R.A. Mundell and A.K. Swoboda) pp.41-60, University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1969. 
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member states it will be possible to adjust to an economic shock in one member 
state without facing any major difficulties or having to employ a bespoke monetary 
policy. 
The chapter then moves on to look at two other areas: the degree of diversification 
prevalent in the Gee economies and the level of synchronisation between them. 
Firstly, the theory suggests that if a group of countries are diversified and not highly 
dependent on specific industries or commodities they will be less likely to 
experience asymmetric shocks which would require the use of the national 
exchange rate or monetary policy to mitigate the effects. Secondly, the greater the 
similarity of economic structures and synchronisation between the member 
economies, the less likely the possibility of them experiencing asymmetric 
economic shocks. In the final section of this chapter we assess quantitatively the 
level of economic synchronisation between the Gee economies. When member 
economies are synchronised and suffer from, and react to, the same economic 
shocks then a single monetary policy for the entire region will not cause problems 
for any one national economy and a common monetary policy will be appropriate 
for the group. 
5.2. Intra-Regional Trade 
The conventional analysis of intra-Gee trade levels and ratios shows that intra-
Gee trade is weak, particularly when compared with the Eurozone countries prior 
to forming a monetary union. However, evidence from an empirical analysis of non 
crude oil intra-regional trade data and trade intensity ratios, as well as new 
evidence provided by the Gee wide business survey, suggest that Gee trade 
linkages are somewhat stronger than may have previously been considered. 
Indeed, the survey findings indicate that intra-Gee trade is important for a 
significant proportion of the Gee business community. 
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5.2.1 Conventional Trade Analysis 
Most literature on GCC economic integration refers to levels of intra-GCC trade as 
being low, for example Laabas and Limam note that despite signing a FTA, intra-
GCC exports in 1999 amounted to only 6.8 percent of total GCC exports, much 
lower than other regional blocs such as the EU where intra-EU exports amounted 
to 63 percent of total EU exports.3 In 1981 GCC intra-regional exports constituted 
only 3.4 percent of their total exports and 7.8 percent of their total imports. In 2004 
this figure had risen only marginally on the export side to 5 percent of total exports 
and had remained stagnant on the import side forming 7.8 percent of total imports. 
Between 1980 and 2004 the average share of regional trade as a proportion of 
their total trade was 6.2 percent but during times of low oil prices intra-regional 
trade has risen higher than this average and vice versa (see Figure 5.1 ). 
Figure 5.1: lntra-GCC Trade as a Percentage of Total GCC Trade 
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Compared with the Eurozone countries prior to them forming a CU, the share of 
intra-GCC trade is also relatively low as a proportion of the region's GDP. The ratio 
of intra-regional exports to GDP in the Eurozone countries in 1998 was 
approximately 13 percent whereas in the GCC in 2004 the ratio was just 2.6 
percent (see Table 5.1 ). 
3 Laabas, B. and Umam, I. Are GCC Countries Ready for Currency Union? Arab Planning Institute, 
Kuwait, Apri12002. 
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Table 5.1: GCC and Eurozone Trade as a Percentage of Regional GOP 
GCC Eurozone 
1980 Exports 1.9 1980 Exports 11.4 
Imports 1.4 Imports 11.3 
1985 Exports 1.8 1985 Exports 12.5 
Imports 1.9 Imports 12.3 
1990 Exports 3.6 1990 Exports 12.6 
Imports 2.1 Imports 12.4 
1995 Exports 2.8 1995 Exports 12.4 
Imports 2.4 Imports 11.4 
2004 Exports 2.6 1998 Exports 12.8 
Imports 2.5 Imports 12.0 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database and IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. Eurozone 
data from Bayoumi, Tamim and Mauro, Paulo "The suitability of ASEAN for a regional currency 
arrangement", International Monetary Fund Working Paper 162, December 1999. 
Most of the GCC states are large oil exporters, with adequate supplies for domestic 
needs and therefore little of their intra-regional trade is crude oil. Their similar trade 
structures has meant that there are few trading complementarities between them 
and consequently absolute trade flows between GCC states have not been 
significant. 
Having said this, the share of intra-GCC trade as a proportion of total trade is very 
much dependent on the price of oil and during times of high oil prices the 
proportion of intra-GCC trade (which is predominantly non-crude oil trade) will 
inevitably fall and visa-versa. The strong inverse relationship between intra-GCC 
trade and the oil price is illustrated in Figure 5.2. 
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Figure 5.2: lntra-GCC Exports and Crude Oil Price (Inverted) 
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Therefore, we must be careful in drawing conclusions from the intra-Gee trade 
data as a share of total trade (including crude oil) which can be misleading 
because of the distorting effect of oil prices. It is therefore much more meaningful, 
to examine the share of intra-Gee non-crude oil trade as a proportion of the Gee's 
total non-crude oil trade. 
5.2.2 Analysis of Non-Crude Oil Trade 
In fact, intra-Gee non-crude exports calculated as a share of Gee total non-crude 
exports, is triple the intra-Gee share of total exports including crude oil. In 2002 
intra-Gee non-crude oil exports as a share of total non-crude oil exports 
constituted 18.1 percent (see Table 5.2). Intra-Gee non-crude oil exports therefore 
form a significant proportion at close to a fifth of their total non-crude oil trade. 
Furthermore, Jadresic calculates intra-Gee exports as a share of the Gee's total 
exports excluding crude oil and refined oil products, in this case intra-Gee share 
increases even further to reach more than a third of their total exports.4 
4 lntra-GCC exports stood at 34.1 percent of total non-crude oil and non-crude oil product exports in 
1998, see Jadresic, E. "On a Common Currency for the GCC Countries", IMF Policy Discussion 
Paper, December 2002, p.1 0. 
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Table 5.2: Oil and Non-Oil lntra-GCC Trade, 2002 
Non-Crude Oil Non-Crude Oil 
All Exports Exports All Imports Imports 
USDMn % USDMn % USDMn % USDMn % 
Within 
Bahrain GCC 489.97 5.8 545.10 29.7 1,395.60 34.5 498.30 15.0 
Total 
Exports 8,481.60 1,838.00 4,045.53 3,331.00 
Within 
Kuwait GCC 251.73 1.6 393.90 5.4 974.46 11.1 989.50 11.0 
Total 
Exports 16,005.10 7,234.30 8,767.28 9,007.40 
Within 
Oman GCC 1,290.55 11.6 1,271.90 49.5 1,992.96 33.2 1,991.70 33.2 
Total 
Exports 11 '126.70 2,570.30 6,005.26 6,002.50 
Within 
Qatar GCC 699.15 6.4% 699.00 13.1 625.42 15.4 625.20 15.4 
Total 
Exports 10,976.50 5,349.50 4,050.87 4,052.10 
Within 
SA GCC 3,542.87 5.3 3,029.30 17.4 1,239.87 2.6 1,484.20 4.6 
Total 
Exports 67,002.10 17,422.8 48,282.10 32,333.0 
Within 
UAE GCC 2,624.96 6.7 2,738.80 20.2 1,458.50 4.8 1,815.80 5.4 
Total 
Exports 39,281.10 13,552.9 30,352.60 33,377.6 
Within 
GCC GCC 8,899.23 5.8 8,678.00 18.1 7,686.80 7.6 7,404.70 8.4 
Total 
Exports 152,873.1 47,967.8 101,503.6 88,103.6 
Source: Non-crude 011 trade data from External Trade Bulletin of the ESCWA Reg1on, Umted 
Nations, 13th Issue, Total trade data from IMF Direction of Trade database (February 2006) 
Notes: UAE 2002 data includes re-exports. 
Turning to the trend in intra-Gee trade, since 1990, non-crude intra-Gee exports 
as a share of the total have fluctuated between a peak of 22.3 percent in 1991 and 
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a low of 10.3 percent in 1996 (see Table 5.3). The intra-Gee share of non-crude 
oil imports has been much lower however than intra-Gee exports varying between 
a low of 4.8 percent in 1991 and high of 8.4 percent in 2002. In absolute terms, 
intra-GCC non-crude oil exports grew strongly between 1990 and 2002, by a 
Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 10.4 percent. However as a proportion 
of total non-crude oil exports, in 2002 the figure (18.1 percent) was only slightly 
higher than in 1990 (16.9 percent) (see Table 5.3). 
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Table 5.3: Share of fntra-GCC Non-Crude Oil Trade, 1990-2002 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 20021 
Bahrain A 28.8% 28.0% 30.8% 27.8% 29.2% 21.4% 25.0% 23.5% 27.4% 33.5% 25.0% 27.5% 29.7% I 
B 9.5% 8.8% 8.8% 9.8% 11.6% 13.3% 12.1% 12.4% 11.6% 14.5% 14.7% 14.4% 15.o% 1 
Kuwait A 28.3% 28.7% 9.2% 8.1% 5.3% 3.8% 3.9% 4.2% 5.6% 4.6% 3.7% 5.5% 5.4% ~ 
B 6.8% 7.4% 8.9% 8.0% 9.1% 9.7% 9.6% 10.4% 9.4% 10.4% 11.5% 11.2% 11.0%1 
Oman A 56.SOAI 58.4% 57.0% 49.6% 48.2% 50.4% 48.8% 47.0% 49.8% 51.8% 51.7% 47.0% 49.5%. 
B 27.0% 29.0% 31.0% 32.3% 32.3% 28.7% 28.0% 29.0% 28.9% 32.7% 33.2% 33.2% 33.2%1 
Qatar A 29.6% 24.5% 21.7% 25.9% 25.3% 18.1% 28.3% 22.7% 12.7% 19.5% 13.2% 8.3% 13.1% I 
B 8.6% 10.0% 10.7% 14.4% 14.4% 10.2% 12.5% 13.2% 15.4% 17.1% 14.9% 12.2% 15.4%1 
Saudi Arabia A 11.6% 17.4% 11.8% 15.3% 16.1% 25.5% 9.5% 33.3% 29.0% 25.5% 16.5% 15.0% 17.4% 
B 1.8% 1.4% 1.2% 2.2% 2.8% 2.7% 3.2% 3.1% 3.4% 3.9% 3.6% 3.9% 4.6% 
UAEA 34.7% 39.2% 38.8% 39.8% 39.2% 32.2% 25.2% 17.2% 12.7% 16.0% 21.9% 19.9% 20.2% 
B 6.3% 4.4% 6.5% 4.1% 4.4% 5.0% 4.7% 5.0% 5.1% 5.1% 4.5% 4.8% 5.4% 
GCCA 16.9% 22.3% 17.6% 19.8% 15.0% 17.9% 10.3% 19.8% 18.3% 17.7% 16.8% 16.1% 18.1% 
B 5.4% 4.8% 5.5% 6.1% 6.8% 6.6% 6.8% 7.2% 7.4% 7.8% 7.5% 7.7% 8.4% 
-- ---- - ------
~-
---- --- ----- ----
Source: Calculated from Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, External Trade Bulletin of the ESCWA Region, 4th, 6th, 8th, 
9th, 11th and 13th issues. 
A: lntra-GCC non crude exports as share of total GCC non crude exports 
B: lntra-GCC non crude imports as share of total GCC non crude imports 
5.2.3 Trade Intensity Ratios 
Another way to assess the levels of trade amongst the Gee states is to look at 
Trade Intensity Ratios (TIRs). The trade intensity ratio measures the strength of 
bilateral trade and helps to determine whether the value of trade between two 
countries is larger, or smaller, than would be expected given each country's share 
of world trade.5 Table 5.4 shows the trade intensity ratios for the Gee states for 
four periods. A trade intensity ratio greater than one implies a bilateral trade flow 
greater than what would be expected. 
While it is hard to discern any trends over the periods examined, the data reveals 
the relative strengths and weaknesses of intra-Gee trading relationships. The data 
in Table 5.4 show that the trade relationship between Oman and the UAE is 
particularly strong with Oman's UAE-TIR the highest among the other Gee states 
in every period of analysis since 1980. This is consistent with the following analysis 
of the survey results which found that Oman and the UAE had strong intra-Gee 
trade linkages. 
An analysis of the TIRs indicates that Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain are 
significant exporters within the region and therefore often have the highest TIR. As 
is consistent with the previous analysis of non-crude oil exports Qatar and to a 
lesser extent Kuwait have relatively weak intra-Gee trade linkages and frequently 
have the lowest TIRs in the grouping. However, it is interesting to note that the TIR 
between the Gee's largest economies, Saudi Arabia and the UAE is often the 
weakest for both partners compared to that with other Gee states. Given the 
undoubted importance to the Gee of these two economies this is potentially a 
rather troubling finding. 
5 The TIR is defined as the share of one country's exports going to a partner divided by the share of 
world exports going to the partner. It is calculated as: Tij = (xij/Xit)/(xwj/Xwt) Where xij and xwj are 
the values of country i's exports and of world exports to country j and where Xit and Xwt are country 
i's total exports and total world exports respectively. 
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Table 5.4: GCC Trade Intensity Ratios, 1980-2004 
1980-1989 
Exporter Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar SA UAE 
Bahrain .. 3.67 15.64 20.29 2.72 35.29 
Kuwait 0.65 .. 0.56 2.04 1.88 3.02 
Oman 3.41 2.06 .. 7.21 1.76 11.88 
Qatar 0.33 3.25 0.65 .. 1.22 1.00 
SA 21.84 0.99 0.33 1.21 .. 0.83 
UAE 1.90 1.52 11.83 9.25 3.19 .. 
1990-1999 
Exporter Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar SA UAE 
Bahrain .. 4.46 13.40 11.06 2.68 3.01 
Kuwait 1.15 .. 1.00 1.95 0.99 1.18 
Oman 3.33 2.18 .. 4.43 2.16 22.74 
Qatar 2.18 2.00 2.66 .. 2.27 5.33 
SA 38.33 6.54 2.41 5.67 .. 4.71 
UAE 3.76 2.84 44.98 9.70 1.80 .. 
2000-2004 
Exporter Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar SA UAE 
Bahrain .. 5.21 15.10 8.68 3.70 2.38 
Kuwait 1.45 .. 1.98 1.52 1.01 0.77 
Oman 2.76 2.63 .. 3.79 3.34 11.88 
Qatar 3.77 1.67 1.06 .. 2.63 4.54 
SA 35.15 5.72 2.92 4.25 .. 1.81 
UAE 4.40 5.07 38.72 8.24 1.72 .. 
2004 
Exporter Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar SA UAE 
Bahrain ... 4.93 15.30 6.67 3.94 2.12 
Kuwait 1.47 ... 1.86 0.99 0.93 0.64 
Oman 3.27 3.17 ... 3.17 3.73 9.80 
Qatar 3.85 1.66 1.17 ... 2.64 3.18 
SA 34.89 4.60 2.74 3.19 ... 1.46 
UAE 4.30 4.01 29.63 6.12 2.00 ... 
Source: Calculated from IMF, D1rect1on of Trade Stat1st1cs, July 2005. 
Note: Exporters are in left hand column in the table, importers across the top of each table. 
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5.2.4 Evidence from the GCC Business Survey 
The responses to the business survey confirms the picture presented by the 
previous analysis of non-crude oil trade that intra-GCC trade is perhaps more 
important that often thought.6 Of our respondents, 59 percent stated that they had 
some involvement in foreign trade. When asked about the extent of their 
involvement in intra-GCC trade, two thirds said that the region they exported to 
most was the GCC, followed by Asia (see Figure 5.3). 
Figure 5.3: Business Responses to Survey Question Four 
Which region do you export most to? 
USA - 6% 
GCC · 67% Asia - 16% 
Source: GCC Business Survey on Currency Union, June-Septembar 2005. 
One would expect that those GCC states that are least economically diversified, 
such as Qatar and Kuwait, would also be least integrated into regional trade. The 
results however revealed a slightly more complex picture. Those businesses that 
said the GCC was the region they exported to most were most frequently based in 
the UAE and Saudi Arabia, and to a lesser extent, in Oman (see Table 5.5). A 
sizable 56 percent of Omani business respondents saw the GCC as their most 
important export market again indicating that Oman has strong regional trade links. 
This finding was also strongly supported by the previous analysis of trade data 
(see Table 5.2). However, a large proportion (48 percent) of Kuwaiti businesses 
6 Our survey questions did not distinguish between non-crude trade and total trade (including crude) 
however since only 8 percent of respondents were in the oil, gas or petrochemical sectors we can 
assume that virtually all survey references to intra-GCC trade signify non-crude trade. 
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also said that the GCC was the region they exported most to. This is somewhat 
surprising considering the fact that the majority of Kuwait's exports are crude oil 
and oil products which other GCC states, with the exception of Bahrain, do not 
import.7 In fact, as is consistent with our findings from the empirical trade analysis, 
the survey indicates that it is only Qatar which is currently not particularly well 
integrated in regional trade, with the lowest proportion of business respondents 
saying that they exported mainly to the GCC. However, as we shall discuss later in 
the thesis (in chapter eight), developments are taking place in the economy of 
Qatar which may substantially change this pattern and facilitate a much greater 
participation in intra-GCC trade for Qatari enterprises.8 
The cross tabulation of the characteristics of those businesses that said they 
exported most to the GCC also shows that the majority were SMEs, with 84 
percent of those businesses having less than 250 employees and 81 percent less 
than $50mn annual turnover (see Table 5.5). There is no common definition for 
SMEs in the Gulf or the wider Middle East for that matter. As a reference point, 
SMEs in Europe are defined as businesses with up to 250 employees and an 
annual turnover of less than 50mn euros.9 It is generally considered to be the case 
that SMEs form the greatest part of the GCC community and therefore it is 
important that these businesses, which contribute significantly to private sector 
activities in the region, are also significantly involved in intra-regional trade. 10 
7 1n 2004 93 percent of Kuwait's exports were crude oil, (see table 4.5, chapter 4) 
8 It should be noted that Qatar may soon be exporting considerable amounts of its natural gas to 
Oman and Dubai via the Dolphin Project. Dubai alone will be supplied up to 700mn standard cubic 
feet of gas per day of Qatari natural gas for 25 years. 
9 Calculated to be equivalent to approximately $64mn on 17 May 2006. 
10 According to one estimate, Small businesses in Saudi Arabia represented almost 93 percent of 
the total enterprises, and accounted for: about 25 percent of total employment. See Sajini, Ismail 1. 
"Effects ofWTO on Small & Medium Enterprises" Arab News, 19 January 2004. 
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Table 5.5: Characteristics of Business Respondents Who Said They Exported 
Most to the GCC States 
In which GCC state are you based? 
Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar SA UAE 
6.8% 11.4% 15.2% 1.5% 31 .8% 33.3% 
Approximately how many people does your company employ? 
Less than More 
10 11-50 51 -100 101-250 251-500 501-1000 than 1000 
6.1% 39.4% 12.9% 25.8% 6.8% 3.0% 6.1% 
Approximately what is the annual turnover of your business? 
Less than More than US$ Unable to 
US$ 1 mn US$1-10 mn US$ 11-50 mn 50mn disclose 
9.1% 52.3% 19.7% 11.4% 7.6% 
Source: GCC Busmess Survey on Currency Un1on, June-September 2005. 
When asked what proportion of their total exports were to other GCC states, 63 
percent of respondents stated that this was greater than 1 0 percent and 34 percent 
stated that it was greater than 40 percent (see Figure 5.4). 
Figure 5.4: Business Responses to Survey Question Five 
What proportion of your exports Is to other GCC states? 
0-10% of total exports 
D 11-40% of total ~xpor ls 
More than 40% of total exports 
37% 
29% 
Sourer. GCC Business Survey on Currency Union, June-September 2005. 
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The business respondents who said they exported most to other GCC states, (i.e. 
more than 40 percent of their total exports) were located most frequently in Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE (see Table 5.6). The proportion of business respondents that 
said they exported more than 1 0 percent to the GCC states was the lowest in 
Qatar. This was the case in the previous question and further indicates that 
businesses in Qatar are currently the least involved in intra-GCC trade. 
Cross tabulating the responses to the question with the number of company 
employees showed that the companies with intra-GCC exports greater than 40 
percent of total fell predominantly in the 101-250 employees size group (44 percent 
of respondents) (see Table 5.6). i.e. at the top end of the SME category. On the 
other hand, of the largest companies (more than 500 employees) only 13 percent 
sold more than 40 percent of their exports to other GCC countries. Similarly, 
examining those companies which exported between 11 and 40 percent to the 
GCC, here again, it is the 'larger' SMEs which are most likely to fall into this 
category (39 percent). 
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Table 5.6: Characteristics of Business Respondents to Survey Question Five 
In which GCC State are you based? 
Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar SA UAE 
0-
0 14% 14% 11% 3% 32% 26% 
"0 Q) 
c:: .r:. 10% 
-0 0 :.e 
-
C'-· 11%-0 t: (.) 6% 12% 13% 1% 39% 29% a. 0 (.) e a. 40% X (!) a. Q) 
- :J > cu ~ 0 5% 14% 12% 2% 42% 25% >. 40% 
Approximately how many people does you company employ? 
less 101- 251- 501-
11-50 51-100 > 1000 
than 10 250 500 1000 
0 0-
"0 Q) 11% 52% 17% 6% 8% 3% 3% 
c:: .r:. 10% 
0 
-:.e .9 C'-· 11%-0 t: (.) 4% 22% 11% 39% 12% 6% 6% a. 0 0 a. (.) 40% .._ X (!) a. Q) 
-cu :J > ~ 0 5% 17% 5% 44% 15% 5% 8% >. 40% 
Approximately what is the annual turnover of your business? 
Less than US$1-10 US$ 11-50 >US$ Unable to 
US$ 1 mn mn mn 50 mn disclose 
0 0-
"0 Q) 15.4% 64.6% 7.7% 9.2% 3.1% 
c:: .r:. 10% 
0 -:.e 0 
-
C'-· 11%-0 t: a. 0 (.) 4.6% 35.8% 40.4% 11.0% 8.3% 0 a. (.) 40% .._ X (!) a. Q) 
-cu :J > ~ 0 3.4% 22.0% 52.5% 13.6% 8.5% >. 40% 
Source: GCC Business Survey on Currency Umon, June-September 2005. 
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This analysis of intra-regional trade, combining the responses to a Gee-wide 
business survey with empirical analysis of intra-regional trade data has revealed 
that intra-Gee trade is perhaps more significant and important for the Gee 
business community than originally thought. The survey results also indicate that 
for the Gee as a whole intra-Gee trade is particularly important for the larger 
SMEs in the region. 
The balance of evidence presented above indicates that Intra-Gee trade is, 
however, more important for some Gee states e.g. Oman, UAE, and Bahrain, than 
for others, which will have implications for the distribution of costs and benefits 
arising from the scheduled eu. It is perhaps not surprising that trade linkages are 
particularly intense between two of the more diversified Gee states (UAE and 
Oman) because this is where complementarities for trade have arisen. However, 
the weakness of trade linkages between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the two largest 
Gee economies, is an issue of concern which we will return to later on in this 
chapter (see section 5.6). 
5.3 Labour Market Mobility 
In a step towards creating a common Gee market, the Gee governments have 
enacted legislative reforms to facilitate the free movement of national labour 
regionally. But despite this, the degree of intra-Gee labour mobility is not 
particularly high. This is due to a combination of factors including structural, 
institutional and socio-economic constraints inhibiting the national labour force. 
The Gee labour market is unusual in that 60 percent of the labour force are 
expatriates. Expatriate labour is highly elastic responding to economic shocks 
through inter-regional flows. However, the national labour force is much less 
mobile, not only within the region but within sectors of the Gee national 
economies, with nationals preferring public sector employment. As a result of 
rigidities in the national labour market, unemployment has emerged and is a 
serious concern for Gee leaders because of its political implications. However, 
policy measures introduced to address emerging national unemployment, such as 
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mandatory quotas for nationals in the private sector might potentially inhibit labour 
market mobility if they are enforced without concomitant improvements in the 
competitiveness of the national labour force. 
In this section we will begin by examining the characteristics of the GCC labour 
force and its segmented nature. We will then discuss the socio-economic and 
institutional factors that are impeding the flexibility and mobility of the national 
labour force and have led to the emergence of national unemployment in most 
GCC states. Following this we will consider the legislative framework of the GCC 
labour market and the policy of nationalizing the workforce which is present in most 
GCC states. Finally we will attempt to assess the degree of intra-GCC labour 
mobility using the limited available data. 
5.3.1 Characteristics of the GCC Labour Market 
The GCC labour market is characterized by its segmented nature. The majority of 
workers in the GCC states are expatriates; non-nationals form the largest 
proportion of the total GCC labour force. Expatriates currently comprise between 
approximately 50 to 64 percent of the total labour force in Saudi Arabia, Qatar and 
Bahrain and between 70 and 90 percent in Oman, Kuwait and the UAE (see Table 
5. 7). Expatriate labour began to flow into the GCC states following the oil price 
boom in the seventies when national labour was scarce. Substantial low cost 
inflows of labour from the wider Middle East and Asia supported the GCC's rapid 
economic growth and transformation. 11 
11 For further details see Yousef, Tarik , "The Changing Role of Labor Migration in Arab Economic 
Integration" Georgetown University, February 2005, (Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn .com/abstract=793804) 
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Table 5.7: Segmentation of GCC Labour Force 
National Workforce ('000) Expatriate Workforce ('000) Total 
Labour 
Public Private Public Private Force 
Sector Sector Sub Total Sector Sector Sub Total ('000) 
Bahrain 32.24 63.27 95.52 3.3 166.14 169.43 264.94 
% 33.8% 66.2% 36.1% 1.9% 98.1% 63.9% 
Kuwait 246 17 263 85 1,053 1,138 1,401 
% 93.5% 6.5% 18.8% 7.5% 92.5% 81.2% 
Oman 104.14 87.1 191.2 22.89 424.32 447.21 638.41 
% 54.5% 45.5% 30.0% 5.1% 94.9% 70.0% 
Qatar 32.74 3.11 35.85 ,:k 29.3 14.9 44.19 80.04 
% 91.3% 8.7% 44.8% 66.3% 33.7% 55.2% 
SA 652.94 2,495.79 3,148.72 75.05 3,017.88 3,092.93 6,241.6 
% 20.7% 79.3% 50.4% 2.4% 97.6% 49.6% 
UAE 102 9.0 111 ~ 270 684 954 1,065. 
% 91.9% 8.1% 10.4% 28.3% 71.7% 89.6% 
GCC 1,170.1 2,675.24 3,845.29 485~5 5,360.25 5,845.76 9,691.1 
% 30.4% 69.6% 39.7% 8.3% 91.7% 60.3% 
Source. Complied by author from vanous sources '" 
The labour market is segmented in several ways, between national and expatriate 
workers, public and private sector employees and high-skilled and low skilled 
labour. The private sector employs the majority of expatriates in the economy, of 
the total expatriate labour force, 92 percent are employed in the private sector (see 
Table 5.7). Traditionally, the GCC public sector has been the principal employer of 
nationals and in some GCC states as much as 94 percent of the national labour 
force holds public sector jobs (see Table 5.7). There are, however, considerable 
differences between GCC states with three countries- Bahrain, Oman and Saudi 
12 Data for Bahrain and Kuwait is 2003, source EIU Country Profiles. Data for UAE is 1995 census 
data. Data source for Oman is Central Bank of Oman Annual Report 2004, data for 2004. Data 
source for Qatar is Qatar Central Bank Annual Report 2004, data for 2003 and data for Qatar's 
private sector includes Mixed Sector employees. Data for SA is SAMA Annual Report and Ministry 
of Labour, 2002. 
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Arabia - having a much larger participation of the national (i.e. indigenous) 
workforce in the private sector. 
The expatriate labour force is, in contrast to that of the national work force, 
inherently flexible. A pool of abundant labour exists in Asia, in particular from 
populous countries such as India, Pakistan and the Philippines from where at least 
55 percent of expatriate workers in the GCC arrive. 13 This migrant labour is 
relatively cheap as it is available at international prices and forms a highly elastic 
supply of labour. Work in the private sector is characterised by less secure 
employment, fixed term contracts, longer working hours, and is relatively easy for 
businesses to hire and fire. Therefore, following an economic shock, such as an oil 
price collapse, immigrant labour flows respond quickly and therefore cyclical 
unemployment in the private sector has not been a problem for the GCC states. 
During the ongoing oil price boom (2002 to present) wages in the private sector 
have not risen at anywhere near the rate of inflation in the goods and asset 
markets. This is particularly the case in Dubai and Qatar, and indicates that labour 
is very flexible in that an influx of expatriates - seeking new job openings resulting 
from the economic boom - has resulted in downward wage pressure.14 
It is generally considered that the public sector provides salaries and other benefits 
at a premium to that on offer in the private sector.15 As 'rentier' states the 
distribution of oil wealth through the provision of inflated public sector salaries 
unrelated to productivity for all nationals came to be expected as a basic right by 
GCC citizens. In several GCC states the right to employment was enshrined in 
legislation and translated into guaranteed public sector jobs for nationals.16 In fact, 
extensive under-employment of nationals in the economy, particularly in the public 
sector, has caused labour productivity growth by some calculations to be negative 
13 Girgis, M. "National Versus Migrant Workers in the GCC: Coping with Change" Mediterranean 
Development Forum Labor Workshop, Cairo, 5-8 March 2000. 
14 In fact, in Dubai, there have been some concerns that the cost of living is outpacing wages and 
may make the UAE less attractive for expatriate labour, see Constantine, Zoi, "Dubai ranks 25th 
among world's expensive metros" Gulf News, 27 June 2006. 
15 Sassanpour, op. cit. 
16 Ibid. p.33 
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in the GCC economies.17 The dominance of the public sector in these economies 
has previously created strong preferences among nationals for public sector work 
but expectations about obtaining a public sector position have become unrealistic. 
During the 1990s the public sector wage bill was consuming more than 50 percent 
of annual oil revenues in some GCC countries. 18 Today the share of the public 
sector wage bill in total government expenditure is likely to be much less due to the 
rise in the oil price, however it still constitutes a significant share and there remain 
serious doubts as to whether the large number of nationals 'employed' in the public 
sector is sustainable. 
The high levels of GCC national population growth 19 have generated a population 
pyramid profile with a high proportion of the GCC population, an estimated average 
of 29 percent, currently under the age of fifteen compared with just 17 percent in 
the EMU countries (see Figure 5.5). In Saudi Arabia and Oman the proportion is 
higher than the average, with 38 percent and 35 percent respectively. In recent 
years new entrants to the labour market have been estimated at 210,000 
annually. 2° Fiscal consolidation throughout the late nineties led to efforts to 
streamline public sector employment and improve efficiency which eventually 
translated into reduced employment opportunities for nationals. With nationals 
unable to compete successfully with expatriate labour however unemployment 
among GCC nationals has become a major concern in most GCC states and is 
estimated to have reached an aggregate 17.8 percent of the GCC national labour 
force.21 
17 Dasgupta, D., Keller, J. and Srinivasan!, T.G. "Reform and Elusive Growth in the Middle-East-
What Has Happened in the 1990s." Paper for MEEA Conference on Global Change and Regional 
Integration: The Redrawing of the Economic Boundaries in the Middle East and North Africa, 
London, 20-22 July 2001. 
18 Girgis, Maurice "National Versus Migrant Workers in the GCC: Coping with Change" 
Mediterranean Development Forum Labor Workshop, Cairo, Egypt, p.4, 5-8 March 2000, 
19 With each GCC state's annual population growth averaging above 3 percent between 1980 and 
1999, see chapter 4, table 4.4. 
20 Girgis, Maurice "The GCC Factor in Future Arab Labour Migration" Fourth Mediterranean 
Development Forum, Amman, p.35, October 2002. 
21 Girgis, Maurice "National Versus Migrant Workers in the GCC:Coping with Change" 
Mediterranean Development Forum Labor Workshop, Cairo, Egypt, 5-8 March, 2000. 
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Figure 5.5: Share of GCC Populations below Age of Fifteen, 2003 
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National unemployment data for the GCC states is scarce and due to its political 
nature official estimates cannot be relied upon.22 In Saudi Arabia for example, the 
level of unemployment varies considerably depending on the source.23 The extent 
of national unemployment undoubtedly varies across the GCC states. For 
example, it is highest in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Oman where population 
pressures have outpaced the growth of national income until recently. Independent 
estimates put unemployment at 17.2 percent in Oman, 15.2 percent in Saudi 
Arabia24 and between 12-15 percent in Bahrain.25 In Qatar however, there is very 
little, if any, open employmenr and in Kuwait and the UAE the problem is still an 
emerging one. 
221n 2005 there were demonstrations in Bahrain about unemployment where citizens and police 
clashed. See Staff Writer "Bahrain king warns against politicising unemploymenr, Reuters, 4 July 
2005. 
23 Estimates of unemployment in Saudi Arabia for example have ranged from 10 percent to 30 
percent of the national working age population, see staff Writer "Tackling Unemployment In Saudi 
Arabia Is National Priority, Says Qusaibi" Middle East Economic Survey, Volume 46, Issue 5, 31 
January 2005. 
24Unlted Nations, 2002, Arab Human Development Report 2002, United Nations Development 
Programme, New York. 
25Sassanpour, Op. Cit. 
261bid. 
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5.3.2 Socio-Economic and Institutional Factors 
A number of socio-economic and institutional factors have created rigidities in the 
national workforce that cannot be easily changed in the short term. As a result of 
the incentives biasing nationals towards work in the public sector, great esteem is 
placed on these jobs which are now in short supply. The attractiveness of public 
sector jobs was illustrated when, in April 2006, more than ten thousand Saudi 
nationals from all across the Kingdom descended on Riyadh to apply for the five 
hundred job vacancies in the Passport Department in Riyadh, and caused riots 
when they became frustrated with the application process. 27 
In addition to the general unwillingness to work in the private sector on the part of 
nationals, they are also less attractive for private sector businesses to employ. For 
example, the Emiratization process set quotas for the minimum level of nationals a 
banking institution must employ. However, according to a Tanmia report in 2005, 
the UAE's National Human Resource Development and Employment Authority, 
almost three quarters of all banks had not met the quotas; and the insurance sector 
was doing even worse in this regard. However, as yet the Government has not 
penalized any private companies for non-compliance. 28 
Tanmia also found that 27 percent of nationals that were given a job in a private 
bank left within six months and on average Emiratis spent only 19 months with the 
bank compared to more than 60 months for the average expatriate.29 Banks 
reported a range of problems including their policy of a six day week, escalating 
salary demands and insufficiently qualified and motivated applicants. The absence 
of quota enforcement and lack of incentives for private sector businesses to hire 
nationals has meant so far that labour force nationalization policies are not meeting 
their targets. 30 
27Staff Writer "10,000 Turn Up for 500 Job Vacancies" Arab News, 21 April2006. 
28Rutledge, E. "Are the GCC's labor nationalisation policies working?" Araa Magazine, Gulf 
Research Center, Dubai, July 2005. 
~anmia, UAE Human Resources Report 2005, Dubai, UAE. 
30Staff Writer "80,000 companies flouting emiratisation laws" Gulf News, 21 August 2005 
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Expatriate labour has tended to fill both the unskilled and highly skilled jobs in the 
GCC economies, with GCC nationals often filling administrative and clerical 
positions. Unless nationalization policies are to substantially downgrade the 
economic welfare of nationals, replacement of expatriates will need to take place at 
higher skill levels. However, GCC educational institutions have often produced 
graduates with knowledge and skills unable to meet private sector needs and 
consequently there is a mismatch between the demand and supply of skills. 
Educational institutions have also neglected to provide sufficient technical and 
vocational training courses. The number of university students studying business 
and science degrees is only 5 and 10 percent of total GCC students respectively, 
while the proportion studying Art subjects, including Islamic Studies, is substantially 
higher at 49 percent of total students.31 Therefore, most graduates lack the 
educational and vocational skills needed to compete for jobs in the private sector. 
Saudi Arabia will need more than 20,000 engineers and 300,000 technical and 
trades people by the year 2010, according to Mohammad A-Ba'thi, Vice-President 
of Corporate Human Resources at the Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC). 
According to the SABIC Vice-President, students graduating in engineering in the 
Kingdom account for less than 10 percent of the annual university crop. AI-Ba'thi 
went on to say that of the total 100,000 national students graduating from colleges 
and universities in the country and abroad, only about 20,000 graduate from 
technical and vocational institutes. 32 
A suitable supply of appropriately skilled labour is essential to raise private sector 
income relative to the public sector and achieve the common GCC policy objective 
of increasing the role of the private sector. In addition, only with, a significant 
improvement in the national skill levels will many private sector economic activities 
become viable and further the policy aim of economic diversification. With the 
policy of quotas in place across the GCC the national workforce will have to obtain 
relevant transferable skills that are matched to the demand of the private sector. In 
31 Figures are for 1998/1999, ESCWA "Responding to Globalization: Skill Formation and 
Unemployment Reduction Policies" United Nations, New York, p. 47, 2003. 
32 Staff writer "Saudi needs professionals" Khaleej Times, 24 May 2006 
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fact, when the views of GCC businesses were surveyed as to the main obstacle to 
the future growth of their business, the second largest proportion, 16 percent, 
considered a 'Lack of skilled labour' to be most important (see Figure 5.6). 
Figure 5.6: Business Views on the Obstacles to the Growth of their Business 
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Having identified skills accumulation as a potential obstacle to increasing national 
employment in the private sector, the GCC governments are in the process of 
reforming their educational curricula. Technical and vocational colleges are also 
being established providing courses with a practical approach suited to service 
sector economy where an average of 7 4 percent of the GCC labour force is 
employed.33 For example, in Saudi Arabia's 2006 budget plan funds were allocated 
for the establishment of three new technical colleges and 15 vocational training 
centres. 34 But it will take at least a generation for the appropriately skilled nationals 
to replace high-skilled expatriates and in the short term there will be little 
alternative but continued reliance upon expatriate labour in certain fields and 
professions. 
33 AMF, AI-Taqrir al-lqtisadi at-Arabi a/-Muwahhad, The Unified Arab Economic Report, September 
2003. 
34 SAMBA, Saudi Arabia's 2006 Budget, 2005 Economic Performance, 16 December 2005 
(Accessed at: http://www. saudi-us-relations. org/articles/2005/ioi/051216-budget-samba. html) 
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5.3.3 legislative Framework 
The Gee leaders have already gone a long way to removing barriers to intra-Gee 
labour mobility and have enacted legislation to facilitate this. In the Gee Economic 
Agreement of 1981, Articles Eight and Nine allowed for the equal treatment of Gee 
citizens with regard to freedom of work, residence, ownership, inheritance and 
undertaking economic activities across the member states.35 The 2001 Economic 
Agreement went much further and Article 3 stipulated that equal treatment of GCC 
citizens would be allowed across the GCe states in both the private and public 
sectors as well as in terms of pensions, social security, and health and education 
provision. 36 
Several steps have been taken to implement these policies. At its 24th summit in 
2004 the GCC leaders agreed to extend social security and civil service retirement 
to those Gee nationals working in other GCC states, irrespective of whether they 
work in the public sector or the private sector. A deadline for 2010 was set for 
completing a unified system which would guarantee all GCe nationals their 
pension and social security. 37 At present there is no social security or pension 
provision for GCe nationals working in the private sector and no legislation to 
ensure private sector employers provide pensions. 
In time GCC citizens will be able to move and work in other Gee states without 
foregoing important benefits such as social security and pensions, which will 
remove a significant disincentive to labour mobility. However, there are currently no 
plans to extend benefits such as land grants, subsidized building loans and 
marriage grants which are only available to nationals residing in their own 
country.38 Other efforts to increase intra-GCC mobility include allowing the use of 
35GCC Secretariat General "Unified Economic Agreemenr, (Available at: www.gcc-sg.org), GCC, 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Riyadh, 1981. 
36GCC Secretariat General "The Economic Agreemenr, (Available at: www.gcc-sg.org), GCC, 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Riyadh, 2001. 
37Badr-EI-Din A. Ibrahim "Intra-National Labor Mobility Between Arab Gulf Cooperation Council 
(AGCC) States -Towards Activating AGCC Economic Integration Process and Optimizing Human 
Resources Exploitation." Economic Research Forum, 12th Annual Conference, Cairo, December 
2005. P.16. 
361nterview with Dr. Belkacem Laabas, Economist, Arab Planning Institute, Kuwait, 19/06/05. 
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civil identification (10) cards for movement between GCC states rather than 
passports. Adopting the use of ID cards has been agreed in principal but 
implementation of the system in some GCC states has been delayed due to failure 
to complete the technical requirements. 39 
5.3.4 Labour Nationalisation Policies 
GCC leaders have adopted a mixture of policies to deal with unemployment. But 
the main approach has been to implement a mandatory policy of nationalising the 
workforce which, having been applied to the public sector, is now focused on the 
private sector. At the 21st GCC summit, all the GCC leaders agreed to a policy of 
reducing foreign workers gradually and setting quotas for national employment in 
the private sector as well as increase taxes on expatriate recruitment. 40 At a GCC 
Labour and Social Affairs Ministers Council meeting in 2005, the Bahraini labour 
minister Dr. Majeed AI Alawi stressed the need for the GCC states to work 
collectively on reducing national unemployment, he said "There is also an urgent 
need for a unified approach to solving unemployment and other labour issues 
facing the region" and went on to say that "we will discuss ways of making it easier 
for GCC nationals to find jobs in other countries in the region".41 
In chapter four (section 4.3.2) the labour nationalization policies in place in 
Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the UAE were discussed. In these GCC states 
nationalization quotas are imposed on private sector establishments and 
expatriates are banned from working in certain professions and sectors. For 
example, in Saudi Arabia the 2006 Labour Law raised the rate of Saudization of 
jobs in certain companies to 75 percent,42 employment of expatriates in 25 sectors 
and professions, for example in gold and jewelry shops, grocery stores and the 
travel industry has also been banned.43 In Oman, Omanisation quotas are imposed 
39Staff Writer "GCC smart card deadline looms" Khaleej Times, 13 July, 2005 
40ESCWA "Responding to Globalization: Skill Formation and Unemployment Reduction Policies" 
United Nations, New York, 2003. 
41Staff Writer "GCC labour reforms call" Gulf Daily News, 23 November 2005. 
42Abdul Ghafour P.K. "Saudization Quotas Eased for Some Job Categories" Arab News, 2 April 
2006. 
43Staff Writer "Saudiisation begins to pinch expats" Reuters, 12 March 2004. 
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across six sectors and also in several occupations such as cashiers, drivers, and 
security officers.44 
In the UAE, quotas are in place in the banking and insurance sectors, in addition 
expatriates are banned from working in certain administrative positions including 
Public Representative Officers, Human Resource Officers and Secretaries.45 In 
Kuwait, a ceiling of 35 percent of expatriates is in place in the public sector and 
several professions are closed to expatriates.46 In Qatar there are currently no 
labour quotas in place, although priority is given to nationals in public sector 
employment. 
In addition to the mandatory policy of setting quotas across the GCC states other 
market based measures are being implemented, such as increasing the 
recruitment fees for expatriates to addressing attitudes to work and productivity 
through public media campaigns. 
However, through replacing expatriate labour in the private sector with nationals, 
the GCC governments have been criticized for jeopardising the GCC's economic 
competitiveness.47 Furthermore, if the nationalisation policies achieve some 
success then the GCC labour markets are likely to become less flexible and 
mobile, unless considerable socio-economic transformations occur at the same 
time. 
Mandatory policies such as labour quotas create market distortions and inhibit the 
existing flexibility of the GCC labour force. The alternative is a market based 
approach which realigns the incentives for working in the public sector with that of 
the private sector. Such policies limit constraints on the labour market and are 
44 Staff Writer "Breathing space- Oman Economy", Middle East Economic Digest, 28 May 2004. 
45 Janardhan, Meena "UAE: Required hometown hiring knocks Expats out of key jobs" 9 March 
2008 (Accessed at http://www.globalinfo.org) 
46Shah, Nasra M. "Restrictive Labour Immigration Policies in the Oil-Rich Gulf: Effectiveness and 
Implications for Sending Asian Countries" United Nations Expert Group Meeting on International 
Migration and Development in the Arab Region, Beirut, p.10, 15-17 May 2006. 
47 looney, R.E. "Saudization and Sound Economic Reforms: Are the Two Compatible?" Strategic 
Insights, Volume Ill, Issue 2, February 2004. 
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likely to be more successful in dealing with long standing structural rigidities and 
institutional failures that to date have impeded the mobility of the GCC labour force. 
Measures such as the expansion of social security and pension coverage to 
nationals in the private sector should be beneficial in this respect, but will need to 
be implemented as soon as possible to begin to take effect. In addition, 
encouraging and supporting the growth of SMEs will create employment and can 
provide nationals with managerial and professional opportunities.48 Educational 
reforms will also be key to improving the competitiveness of GCC nationals but will 
take time to be felt.49 
5.3.5 Evidence on lntra-GCC Labour Mobility 
So far, however, it appears from the incomplete data that intra-GCC labour mobility 
has been very limited. Figures on intra-GCC labour flows have not been 
systematically collected in the past, possibly because of the limited movements. It 
appears though that a comprehensive process for collecting this data is now 
underway. The GCC Public Social Insurance Authorities have begun collecting 
information about all nationals working in the GCC states in preparation for the 
move towards extending social security and pension provision to those GCC 
nationals working in other member states. 50 
To collect reliable data however will, to a certain extent, depend on active 
engagement on the part of GCC nationals working in states other than their own. 
For instance, in 2005 the Public Authority of Social Insurance in Oman circulated 
notices to alert all non-Omanis to contact them as part of this process. The initial 
response was almost unbelievably low with only four people working in the private 
sector registering. 51 This lackluster response is likely to change once GCC citizens 
become aware of their pension rights and entitlements. Some GCC states have 
also set up employment offices in other member states to facilitate the employment 
48Girgis, Maurice "National Versus Migrant Workers in the GCC: Coping with Change" 
Mediterranean Development Forum Labor Workshop, Cairo, Egypt, 5-8 March, 2000. 
49 Rutledge, E. "Education, Not Quotas" in Emerging Dubai 2006, Oxford Business Group, 2006. 
60Badr-EI-Din Op. Cit. P.17. 
51 /bid. p. 17 
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of their nationals. For example, Oman has established a labour office in Qatar to 
facilitate the recruitment of Omani nationals there. 52 
In addition to this, figures on the number of licenses granted to GCC citizens for 
setting up economic enterprises in other member states are also currently 
negligible (see Table 5.8). Furthermore, since 1992 the number has grown only by 
a CAGR of 3 percent on average across all the GCC states. 
Table 5.8: licenses Granted to GCC Citizens to Practice Economic Activities 
in Other Member States 
1992 2003 %Change 
Bahrain 233 260 0.9% 
Kuwait 372 1157 9.9% 
Oman 107 159 3.4% 
Qatar 208 215 0.3% 
SA 740 936 2.0% 
UAE 2531 3384 2.4% 
GCC 4191 6111 3.2% 
Source: GCC Secretanat, GCC Achievements m figures 2003 (Available at: www.gcc-sg.org/) 
Overall, employment legislation in the GCC states is considered to be relaxed, in 
particular with regard to the expatriate work force. Trade Unions are illegal in most 
GCC states, 53 there is no minimum wage and the hiring and firing of expatriates is 
considered relatively easy.54 This is reflected in the World Bank Rigidity of 
Employment Index, which illustrates that the GCC states have an average 
employment rigidity index of 25 significantly less than that of the Eurozone 
countries at 48 (see Table 5.9). 
52 /bid. P.18 Bahrain has also inaugurated two employment units to help secure employment for 
Bahrainis in other GCC states. 
53 Although following pressure from the US Bahrain and the UAE have recently agreed to allow 
expatriate workers to set up trade unions as this was a key US condition for a bilateral FT A. See 
Staff Writer "UAE to allow unions for expats" Saudi Gazette, 23 January 2005. 
54 Except in Oman where there are minimum wages for Oman is with certain skills. Sassanpour, C., 
Joharhi, G. Kireyev, A. and Petri, M "Labour Market Ghallenges and Policies in the Gulf 
Cooperation Council Countries" IMF, Washington D.C, November 1997, p. 33. 
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Table 5.9: Labour Regulation Flexibility 
Hiring and firing workers Kuwait Oman SA UAE GCC EMU 
Difficulty of hiring index (0-100) 0 44 0 0 11 
Rigidity of hours index (0-100) 60 60 40 80 60 
Difficulty of firing index (0-1 00) 0 0 0 20 5 
Rigidity of employment index (0-100) 20 35 13 33 25.2 
Hiring cost (% of salary) 11 9 11 13 11 
Firing cost (weeks of salary) 42 13 79 96 57.5 
Ease of hiring and firing (rank) 26 33 28 73 40 
Source: World Bank, Domg Busmess m 2006: Creatmg Jobs, Country Data Profile 
Note: Data for Bahrain and Qatar are not available. Higher values in the table indicate more rigid 
regulations. 
Yet while the hiring and firing of expatriate labour is straightforward for businesses, 
there are many restrictions on the intra-GCC movement of non-nationals. For 
example, expatriate labour is often not allowed to transfer between employers even 
within the same state. In order to move between jobs expatriates, in some cases, 
have to return to their home country first and then re-enter the GCC state after a 
period of time, in others there are complete bans on job transfers. However, 
following reflection on these draconian labour restrictions, there have been some 
improvements by certain GCC states to facilitate expatriate mobility regionally. 55 
The UAE, Oman and Saudi Arabia have somewhat eased constraints on expatriate 
labour mobility by removing bans and allowing transfer of sponsorship either for a 
fee or after a period of time, and other mobility improvements for high-skilled 
expatriates.56 In 2004 Saudi Arabia passed a law allowing certain expatriates to 
become nationals.57 Reforms are also being considered involving the lifting of 
travel restrictions between GCC states for expatriates. This measure is however, 
55 In order to become more consistent with ILO standards, see staff writer "ILO concerned about 
Gulf working conditions" Arab Times, 6 November 2005. 
56 Saudi Arabia allows transfer of sponsorship subject to certain conditions, as does Oman subject 
to sponsor approval. In the UAE all categories of workers can transfer sponsorship, subject to 
original sponsor approval but only under certain conditions. 
57 Staff Writer "Expatriates Welcome New Citizenship Law" Arab News, 20 October 2004. 
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n.a. 
aimed at increasing intra-GCC tourism rather than any meaningful attempt to 
increase expatriate labour mobility within the region and is likely to apply only to 
professionals.58 
These rather weak moves towards intra-GCC labour mobility are despite the fact 
that following CU the GCC economies would benefit from a flexible regional pool of 
labour particularly in the face of asymmetric shocks. Furthermore, skilled labour 
may be more inclined to migrate to the region if they were allowed to move 
between jobs regionally and the issuance of a single GCC work permit would also 
streamline GCC bureaucracy.59 However, at present, the GCC states can source 
their labour directly from South Asia without any difficulty and this will be the case 
for the foreseeable future. 5° 
5.4 Capital Market Integration 
Initially OCA criteria did not specifically cover or consider the role of risk sharing, 
portfolio diversification or capital market integration, but a decade after the original 
theories were conceived they were broadened to factor in these considerations.61 
Mundell argued that a high degree of capital market integration would allow CU 
members to hold claims on each other's output62 and insure against asymmetric 
shocks. If one member was hit by an economic downturn the income from capital 
assets held in other member states not suffering from the negative shock, would 
offset the decline in domestic income, allowing for consumption smoothing and 
providing a form of insurance. Thus a pivotal role for financial market integration 
exists in adjusting to macroeconomic disturbances and the smooth functioning of 
an OCA. 
58 Staff Writer "GCC to facilitate travel of expatriate workers" Arab News, 26 June 2005. 
59 If and when this process was established it would mean that the same rules and procedures 
would apply across the GCC states, thus improving efficiency of the process. 
60 In the long term, with economic development in India and China the factor cost of labour will 
eventually increase and Asian labour may be less inclined to migrate, at such a time the GCC 
states may have to offer more attractive terms of employment for expatriate labour. 
61 Mundell, R. A., Uncommon Arguments for Common Currencies, In The Economics of Common 
Currencies, eds. H.G. Johnson andA.K. Swoboda, pp114-132, 1973. 
62 For instance equity shares, dividends, interest payments and rental revenues. 
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In this section we will discuss the degree of capital market integration within the 
GCC focusing in particular on the region's equity markets, corporate bond markets 
and intra-regional FDI. GCC stock markets have seen rapid growth over the past 
five years; which to no small degree has been correlated with the higher oil prices. 
At present, other asset markets in the GCC states, such as debt markets, are 
comparatively underdeveloped but the growing trend of sukuk (Islamic security) 
issuance and the trading of sukuks in secondary markets is a noteworthy 
development that we shall discuss in detail in the second part of this section. 
Finally in this section we will examine intra-GCC FDI which up until 2003 had been 
rather weak, but more recently, there has been an increasing number of large intra-
GCC FDI projects, a trend which is not yet reflected in available data. 
However, before we embark on this subject it will be useful to briefly outline the 
legislative background of intra-GCC capital market mobility. Article five of the GCC 
Economic Agreement of 2001 stipulated for the allowance of cross border 
investments without barriers. The GCC states agreed to: 
e Unify all their investment-related laws and regulations. 
• Accord national treatment to all investments owned by GCC natural and legal 
citizens. 
• Integrate financial markets in member states, and unify all related legislation and 
policies. 
• Adopt unified standards and specifications for all products, according to the 
Charter of the GCC Standardization and Metrology Organization.63 
At the 23rd GCC summit in Doha in 2002 the GCC leaders agreed to establish a 
GCC common market as soon as possible64, and ensure the equal treatment of 
GCC citizens in all economic activities, including investments. The Doha summit 
resolution has taken several years to be implemented in some GCC states and 
63 GCC Secretariat General, 2001, "The Economic Agreemenr (Available at: www.gcc-sg.org), 
GCC, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Riyadh. 
64 GCC leaders are reportedly committed to forming a Common Market by the end of 2007, see 
Staff writer "GCC delays approval for currency union plan" Saudi Gazette, 20 October 2005. 
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progress on fulfilling Article Five has been mixed. In particular, as we shall see, 
advancement in harmonising stock market rules and regulations across the GCC 
states has been rather limited. We examine the degree of integration between the 
region's stock markets by looking at legislative reforms governing GCC investors 
which have removed the legal barriers to regional portfolio diversification, as well 
as actual integration indicators such as the number and growth of cross listings. 
5.4.1 Stock Markets 
In the past the vast share of GCC capital had been held outside of the region, 
particularly in US assets and the region's markets were not seen as attractive to 
GCC nationals. For instance, throughout the nineties, the performance of the GCC 
markets was poor with the market capitalisation of Saudi Arabia's T adawul Index 
growing just 30 percent between 1989 and 1999.65 Apart from the preference of 
placing surplus capital outside of the region (in mature markets which 
conventionally were seen as safe havens) the experiences of Kuwait's Souk AI 
Manakh crash had also deterred locals from investing regionally. 
However, between 2000 and 2005 GCC stock market capitalisation increased ten 
fold66 fuelled mainly by excess liquidity due to high oil prices and a home bias for 
investments following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the freezing of some Arab 
investments in the US. The stock market boom has significantly increased the role 
of capital markets in the region and therefore the potential macroeconomic benefits 
of intra-regional portfolio diversification. Indeed the GCC represented the largest 
emerging market in 2005.67 The stellar performance of the GCC stock markets 
between 2004 and early 2006 encouraged wide spread participation of GCC 
citizens in stock trading and increased the number of partial floatations of 
previously family owned and public sector organisations. Regional investors have 
65 Neaime, Simon "Liberalization and Financial Integration of MENA Stock Markets" A paper 
prepared for presentation at the Economic Research Forum's 9th Annual Conference on "Finance & 
Banking" held in Sharjah, United Arab Emirates, 26-28 October 2002. 
66 Combined market capitalization was $119bn at the end of 2000 and $1.1 trillion at the end of 
2005, according to AMF, Kai'da Bayanat Aswaq AI-Awraq AI Malia AI Arabia AI Nasrat AI Faslia, Q4 
2005. 
67 1n terms of market capitalization. 
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developed a strong preference for equity based investments which have 
undoubtedly outperformed other asset classes such as bonds in the last few years. 
In 2005 each GCC stock market recorded excellent year on year growth, average 
stock market growth in the region was 79 percent and the best performers were the 
Dubai Financial Market (DFM) and the Saudi Tadawul Index (see Table 5.1 0). The 
increasing numbers of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) in 2005 also helped to attract 
wide spread interest from national investors.68 Participation in the gains of the 
stock market by small scale retail investors was readily encouraged and banks 
were allowed to leverage investors for the purpose of buying stocks. It was 
estimated that in Saudi Arabia more than 50 percent of the entire population were 
investing in the Tadawul market in 2005.69 In contrast to developed western stock 
markets, institutional investors play a very minor role in the GCC markets 
compared with small retail investors. 
68 In 2005 regionaiiPO's raised over $5.5bn compared to $3.9bn raised in 2004. 
69 Ahmad, Mahmoud "Stock Mania Adds to Delays in Government Office" Arab News, 11 May 2005. 
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Table 5.10: GCC Stock Market Indicators, End of 2005 
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Bahrain Stock Exchange 
(BSE) 24.9% 17.567 164% 458 45 0% 
Kuwait Stock Exchange 
(KSE) 78.3% 133.056 261% 52,201 159 27% 
Muscat Securities Market 
(MSM) 41.2% 10.786 48% 452 125 2% 
Doha Securities Market 
(DSM) 77.7% 89.643 298% 1,033 30 0% 
Tadawul Stock Market 
107.0% 653.157 246% 12,281 77 5% 
Dubai Financial Market 
(DFM) 149.4% 113.776 106% 25,541 60 71% 
Abu Dhabi Securities 
Market (ADSM) 71.0% 123.29 114% 8,316 30 67% 
GCC 78.5% 1,141.28 234% 100,283 526 17% 
Source: Kat'da Bayanat Aswaq AI-Awraq AI Maha AI Arabtya AI Nasrat AI Fasha, 04 2005, No. 44, 
Arab Monetary Fund, Abu Dhabi. 
In most GCC states up until very recently, GCC nationals were only allowed to 
trade and own shares in other member states in specified stocks. In 1985 the 
proportion of GCC shares permitted for GCC nationals to trade and own was only 
25 percent of the total number of GCC stock companies listed, however by 2003 
this had risen to almost two thirds of the total (see Table 5.11). Only in Kuwait, the 
longest established GCC stock market, and Bahrain, have GCC nationals been 
permitted to invest in any stock on the national bourse for several years. In 1999, 
the Bahraini government lifted restrictions on foreign ownership, allowing GCC 
nationals to own up to 100 percent of the shares of listed Bahraini companies (up 
from 49 percent previously), giving them full access to the Bahraini market1° In 
order to meet the Doha summit resolution, in 2005 Saudi Arabia granted equal 
treatment of GCC citizens in trading Saudi stocks, including those in banking, 
70 Information from Bahrain Stock Exchange (Accessed at http://www.bahrainstock.com) 
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insurance and real estate sectors?1 In late December 2005 the UAE's Financial 
Regulator, the Emirates Securities and Commodities Authority (ESCA}, also ratified 
a decision to treat GCC nationals as locals on Emirati stock markets. The advent of 
the Dubai International Financial Exchange (DIFX) has however allowed all 
nationalities to invest in any listed company. In Qatar and Oman GCC nationals are 
permitted to own and trade shares in approximately 36 percent and 62 percent of 
the total number of stocks listed respectively (see Table 5.11). 
Table 5.11: Stock Companies Permitted for GCC Nationals to Trade and Own 
1985 1995 2003 
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Bahrain 23 16 70% 34 34 100% 35 35 100% 
Kuwait 33 1 3% 41 41 100% 40* 40* 100% 
Oman 24 6 25% 75 66 88% 173 108** 62% 
Qatar 10 - - 29 3 10% 28 10 36% 
SA 43 3 7% 88 76 86% 105 94** 90% 
UAE 37 16 43% 76 34 45% 97** 19** 20% 
GCC 170 42 25% 343 254 74% 478 290 64% 
Source: Adapted from GCC Secretanat, Achievements 1n F1gures 2004, R1yadh (Available at 
http://www.gcc-sg.org/achievement_stat2004/start.html) 
Notes: *1998 **2001 
Despite legislating to permit nationals from other GCC states to invest in their 
secondary national markets, there are obstacles in the primary markets that 
currently reduce intra-regional capital market investments. To date, applications for 
IPOs have had to be processed in person which is hugely inefficient. This has 
meant that GCC nationals wishing to participate in an IPO in another GCC state 
have had to physically travel to that state in order to do so. There is clearly much 
regional investor interest in IPOs in other GCC states, for example, in 2005 
71 Abdul Ghafour, P.K."Saudi Arabia gives equal treatment for share tradingD Arab News, 5 April 
2005. 
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newspapers reported plane loads of Saudis descended on the UAE for the IPO of 
Dana Gas, "Tens of hundreds of investors continue to rush into the UAE from 
Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Bahrain mainly to apply for the shares, creating a virtual 
stampede in receiving banks. "72 Electronically linking the GCC bourses would 
allow for better accessibility for intra-regional investors and be much more efficient. 
In early 2006 the first electronic linkages in the region were expected, between the 
MSM and ADSM and between the ADSM and DFM. Such electronic link ups 
should increase liquidity on the markets involved as well as improve transparency 
and create a larger, more efficient and integrated market overall. 
By 2005 there were a number of warning signs that an equity bubble was emerging 
in the GCC markets. Market capitalisation as a proportion of GOP had reached 
more than 200 percent of GOP in several GCC states (see Table 5.1 0) and price to 
earnings ratios had been distorted in several GCC states, in Saudi Arabia the 2005 
average PIE ratio was 66.73 In the past few years a number of cases of insider 
trading have occurred on the GCC markets that were not sufficiently penalised?4 
Also excessive leveraging of investors by banks took place during the stock market 
boom that posed considerable potential risks to the financial system.75 A lack of 
market transparency and accurate company reporting has, for example, 
contributed towards creating an environment for speculative behaviour. It is not 
clear to what degree financial audits of many GCC companies comply with 
international standards. Subsequently, in the first half of 2006 severe market 
corrections took place that, by the end of the second quarter, had wiped 
approximately 30 percent, or a collective $349bn, off the value of GCC markets, 
with the Tadawul market being worse hit. Many small scale Saudi investors were 
left in financial ruin with social as well as economic implications for the Kingdom. 76 
72 Carvalho, S. "Dana Gas public offer heading for record oversubscription" Gulf News, 25 
September 2005. 
73 Fadlallah, Tarek "The GCC Bear Trap, Prospects for Diminishing Returns" Nomura Bank, 
Bahrain, 22 August 2005. 
74 GCC Market Review, Global Investment House, Kuwait, December 2004. 
75 Staff Writer "CMA, SAMA Act to Curb Stock Market Speculation" Arab News, 2 March 2006. 
76 Staff Writer "Stock crash shatters Saudi dreams" Reuters, 3 May 2006. 
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The GCC stock market corrections highlighted the necessity of a number of 
reforms in creating a stable investment climate that would enhance national as well 
as intra-GCC investment levels. There have been calls for urgent improvements in 
compliance and a strengthening of regulations in order to support confidence in the 
markets. Speaking at a conference on GCC stock markets, former Qatari Minister 
of Economy and Commerce, Sheikh Mohammed Bin Ahmed bin Jassim AI Thani 
said, "Co-operation among the Gulf stock markets is essential to overcoming the 
present and future challenges (to these markets)."77 Indeed common reforms are 
required in order to develop a stable and integrated regional equity market with 
sufficient depth and breadth of investment opportunities to be able to attract (and 
retain) regional capital, while also encouraging international capital. 
As well as opening up the markets to GCC nationals, allowing the large GCC 
expatriate populations to participate fully in the region's stock markets would also 
attract greater levels of capital and potentially improve market performance that 
would make regional portfolio diversification more attractive. Non-GCC foreign 
investment in the GCC bourses has however, been limited and the majority of 
investment turnover in these markets, an estimated 90 percent, is from locals. 
Dependence on local investors however has restricted the bourses' liquidity levels 
which potentially could be much deeper. Yet there is a trend in the region towards 
the gradual opening up of markets to foreign nationals that is likely to attract 
greater levels of capital to the markets. Opening up to foreign investors is generally 
considered to have improved the performance of other MENA markets78 and with 
this in mind, following the GCC stock market corrections in the first half of 2006 
more GCC leaders seemed willing to consider doing so. 
In early 2006 Saudi Arabia allowed non-GCC national participation in its market, for 
the first time, allowing foreign residents to purchase shares with no restrictions on 
companies or the number of shares they can own.79 Previously foreign residents in 
the Kingdom were only allowed to purchase shares through mutual funds which 
77 Staff Writer "GCC stock markets facing challenges, says minister" The Peninsula, 25 April 2005. 
78 Neaime, op. cit. 
79 Akeel, Maha and Saleh AI-Hamamy "Bourse Opened to Expats" Arab News, 21 March 2006. 
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remains the case in Kuwait. Qatar also opened its market partially to foreigners in 
April 2005 allowing them to trade shares and own up to 25 percent of the equity in 
listed firms.80 In Bahrain non-GCC nationals are now allowed to own up to 49 
percent of a listed company's capital (up from a previous 24 percent), with the 
exception of two companies which are subsidised by the government. There are 
also seven companies that are 100 percent open to foreign investors. In Oman and 
the UAE non-GCC nationals are only allowed to invest in certain stocks. In the 
UAE at present, only about a dozen or so of the listed companies currently allow 
foreigners to buy their shares and the share of foreign ownership permitted varies 
from 15 percent to 49 percent in different companies.81 However, foreign investor 
activity is currently estimated to account for 20-30 percent of the turnover on the 
DFM and just 10 percent on the ADSM.82 
Another indicator of capital market integration within the region is the number of 
cross listings on the markets. There are several incentives for a company to 
engage in a cross border listing on a second exchange, including access to a 
bigger pool of investors, increased regional visibility, and the opportunity to raise 
new capital.83 A substantial and increasing number of cross border listings within 
the GCC would be indicative of significant integration between the region's bourses 
and the regional orientation of GCC companies. However, cross border listings of 
companies on GCC stock markets remains relatively low at just four percent of the 
total companies listed on the GCC bourses. Only four GCC stock markets so far 
have permitted cross listings from other GCC markets (see Table 5.12). The 
Bahrain Stock Exchange (BSE) to date has eight GCC companies that are cross 
listed, Abu Dhabi Securities Market (ADSM) has six, Dubai Financial Market (DFM) 
has four and Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSE) has two. 84 Despite this, the number of 
cross listings has grown substantially. At the beginning of 2006, 20 companies had 
cross listings on four of the GCC bourses, compared to just two cross listings as of 
80 Staff Writer "Qatar opens DSM door to foreigners" The Peninsula, 4 April 2005. 
81 Staff Writer "Move to allow foreigners to buy shares 'will boost stock market'" Gulf News, 24 
October 2005. 
82 /bid. 
83 1ssa, Nadim "Integration of GCC Stock Markets: To Cross List or Not to Cross List?" Arab Press 
Digest, 18 January 2006 (Accessed at: www.zawya.com). 
84 /bid. 
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the beginning of 2000, a compound annual growth rate of 47 percent over the 
period. 
Table 5.12: GCC Stock Market Cross Listings 
Market 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
BSE 2 3 4 4 6 8 
KSE 0 0 0 1 1 2 
ADSM 0 0 1 3 3 6 
DFM 0 0 1 1 2 4 
Total 2 3 6 9 13 20 
Annual Growth 50% 100% 50% 44% 54% 
Source: Data adapted from lssa, op.ctt. 
Integration between the region's markets in the form of removing barriers to entry 
for GCC investors and harmonizing regulatory frameworks can be expected to 
increase the levels of regional portfolio diversification. However, too much 
integration between the returns of the markets will diminish their ability to diversify 
the risk-return profile of regional portfolios. Econometric research into the degree of 
stock market integration between the GCC states provides somewhat contradictory 
evidence. Using a Vector Error Correction Model for three of the GCC markets 
(Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia) in 2002 Neaime85 found evidence of a 
cointegrating relationship suggesting that the markets move together over the long 
run, but he did not go any further to explore its exact nature in the short run. 
A later paper by Hammoudeh and Choi86 found little correlation between the 
returns of the GCC markets and that country idiosyncrasies and oil price returns 
influence the stock returns. Using an autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity 
model the authors found only weak correlations between GCC stock market 
returns. The degree of correlation between the stock returns of the various markets 
and the oil price was also found to vary considerably, with Saudi Arabia 
85 Neaime, op.cit 
86 Hammoudeh, Shawkat and Kyongwook Choi "Volatility Regime-Switching and Linkage among 
GCC Stock Markets" Economic Research Forum, Cairo, 16-18 December, 2004. 
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experiencing the strongest correlation and the lowest correlation for the UAE, 
which is one of the most diversified of the GCC economies. Their research 
therefore suggests that there are potential gains from regional portfolio 
diversification that could be beneficial for the GCC economies following CU in 
terms of diversifying their income sources following an idiosyncratic country shock. 
One area where there has been little progress to date in terms of integrating the 
region's markets is in institutional and regulatory coordination. Stock exchange 
representatives themselves have criticized the lack of coordination and exchange 
of information between the region's markets.87 The head of the Dubai stock market 
Ezza Kazim reported that "In four years of working at DSM we have had one 
meeting with other GCC exchanges, so there is very little contact or coordination 
across GCC stock exchanges and it is very important to have GCC stock market 
consolidation and integration. "88 In addition to this the GCC states have different 
regulatory framework imposing transaction costs and hindering the flow of funds 
between markets. 
Harmonization of the regulatory and supervisory frameworks is essential for 
greater integration and would be most cost effective if undertaken by a regional 
regulatory authority. The establishment of a common supervisory and regulatory 
body to monitor and oversee the GCC markets would be a significant step in 
stabilising the GCC markets and retaining and attracting new regional investments. 
This is a major objective of building a GCC Common Market but as yet it appears 
few steps have been taken to achieve a harmonization of GCC financial market 
regulations and supervision. 
In summary it appears that capital market integration is beginning to take place in 
the GCC and the pace has accelerated in recent years. Individual investors and 
GCC corporations are increasingly exploring opportunities in other Gulf markets. 
87 Staff Writer "Gulf bourses seek independent monitor" Gulf News, 29 April 2005. 
88 Interview with Mr. Essa Kazim, Director General of Oubai Stock Exchange, World Trade Centre, 
Dubai, 14 February 2005. 
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However, even though some legislative steps have been taken by the individual 
GCC states to allow all GCC nationals to invest unhindered in their markets, actual 
linkages between the GCC stock markets are relatively low at present. Indicators 
such as cross listings and electronic linkages between the markets are few and far 
between. 
Furthermore there is no evidence of progress on coordination between the region's 
financial market institutions or in harmonizing regulatory and supervisory 
frameworks. Considerably more progress is required on this front if the GCC states 
are to achieve their desired objective of capital market integration as they set out 
back in 2001. 
5.4.2 Bonds and Sukuks 
Although the GCC bond market is arguably underdeveloped89 and there is ample 
room for expansion, the GCC debt market is quite well integrated. Interest in 
Islamic finance - in particular Islamic bonds, also know as sukuks - has increased 
markedly in the past few years and the GCC is becoming the global centre for 
issuance and also secondary trading. GCC companies and governments have 
issued over $11bn in Islamic bonds since 2001 and there is increasing integration 
and cooperation on issuance between institutions across the GCC states. 90 
High oil revenues mean that most GCC governments do not actually need to issue 
debt in order to finance their fiscal budgets at present (see chapter six, section 
6.2), and this may be one factor slowing this sector's growth, but it is a different 
story for corporate bonds (see Table 5.13). Some GCC states do however issue 
sovereign bonds that would be accessible to GCC investors most notably Bahrain 
and Qatar. 91 
89 Woertz, Eckart "Towards a GCC Bond Market: Lessons from Asia" Gulf in the Media, Dubai, 15 
Aprii2006· 
90 McSheehy, W. "Investors set up market to handle Islamic bonds" International Herald Tribune, 7 
June 2006. 
91 Most of Saudi Arabia's public debt is issued to domestic banks. 
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When issued in 2003 Qatar's $700mn sovereign sukuk was the largest of its kind in 
a civil law jurisdiction.92 Yet this was surpassed in 2004 by the Dubai Civil Aviation 
Authority sukuk of $1bn, and again by Dubai in 2006 with DP World's $3.5bn sukuk 
currently the world's largest sukuk issue (see Table 5.13).93 
Bahrain's central bank, the Bahrain Monetary Agency (BMA), is at the forefront of 
developing and issuing Islamic securities and has pioneered the short term, 
tradable sukuk Al-ljara.94 Bahrain also hosts the Liquidity Management Centre 
(LMC) which has created a secondary market for trading these securities. 
One sign of increasing GCC capital market integration is borne out by a consortium 
of GCC investors who plan to set up - in Bahrain - a marketplace for Islamic 
Bonds in late 2006. Ahmed Abdei-Rahman, vice president for investment at 
'Sokouk Holding Company', which is based in Kuwait, said it and its partners, 
including Kuwait Investment and Qatar Islamic Bank, planned to spend $200mn 
setting up a sukuk Exchange Centre in Bahrain.95 
92 Bennett, J. "The finance finder" Arabian Business, 6 June 2006. 
93 The world's largest sukuk - $3.5bn - was issued on behalf of Dubai-govemment owned Ports & 
Customs and Free Zones Corporation the holding company for Dubai Ports World and is listed on 
the Dubai International Financial Exchange. 
94 Bahrain Monetary Agency "Capital Markets Review" Issue 7, December 2005. 
95 McSheehy, Will "Investors set up market to handle Islamic bonds" International Herald Tribune, 7 
June 2006. 
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Table 5.13: A Selection of Recent GCC Sukuks 
Issue 
Issuer Issue date Type Country 
amount 
Saudi 
Solidarity (Islamic Bank) August 2003 Corporate US$400m 
Arabia 
Kingdom of Bahrain 
September 
Sovereign US$250 Bahrain 
2003 
State of Qatar October 2003 Sovereign US$700m Qatar 
National Cooling 
January 2004 Corporate US$ 100m UAE 
Company (Tabreed) 
November 
Kingdom of Bahrain Sovereign US$250m Bahrain 
2004 
Durrat ai-Bahrain January 2005 Corporate US$152.5m Bahrain 
Dubai Metals & 
April2005 Corporate US$200m UAE 
Commodities Centre 
Bahrain Financial Harbour May 2005 Sovereign US$ 134m Bahrain 
Emirates Airline June 2005 Corporate US$550m UAE 
Islamic Development Saudi 
Bank June 2005 Corporate US$500m Arabia 
Source: lslam1c Bankmg and Fmance, Issue 7, New M1llenmum Pubhsh1ng Ltd, Autumn 2005. 
(Available at www.islamicbankingandfinance.com) 
Even though, to a certain extent, opportunities for regional integration of the GCC's 
bond markets is limited by factors such as the lack of benchmarks, poor liquidity 
and a limited variety of bond issues this is changing. The recent oil price rises have 
coincided and possibly fuelled, an interest in Islamic finance and Islamic debt. As 
the region strives to become recognized as a financial centre it is likely that 
between now and 2010 the nascent GCC bond market will grow and deepen 
considerably. 
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5.4.3 Foreign Direct Investment 
Up until fairly recently, intra-Gee FDI flows have been weak. According to 
available estimates, between 1990 and 2003, total intra-Gee FDI amounted to 
$3.6bn, whereas aggregate Gee outflows reached approximately $125bn over the 
same period, thus intra-Gee FDI formed only 2.9 percent of total FDI attributable 
to Gee nationals.96 The region's two largest economies, the UAE and Saudi 
Arabia, received the major shares of intra-Gee FDI, at 54.2 percent and 23.4 
percent respectively, while Kuwait's share was negligible and Oman's only 
amounted to 1.7 percent of the total (see Table 5.14). The fact that the UAE 
attracted the majority of intra-regional FDI suggests that regional investors are 
confident in doing business in the Emirates and that significant business 
opportunities have emerged through relative economic diversification. 
Table 5.14: Intra-Gee FDI, 1990-2003* 
Source To 
Saudi 
Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE Total ($mn) 
Arabia 
Bahrain * 0.1 9.7 0.4 160.8 37.4 208.4 
Kuwait 336.8 * 1.2 107.4 153.8 756.5 1355.7 
Oman 0.3 0.2 * 0 0 98.5 99 
Qatar 1.9 0 3.1 * 65.1 245.9 316 
Saudi 
134.7 0.6 15 60.2 * 798.6 1009.1 
Arabia 
UAE 11.8 0 30.6 88.1 456.5 * 587 
Total ($mn) 485.5 0.9 59.6 256.1 836.2 1936.9 3575.2 
% 13.6% 0.0% 1.7% 7.2% 23.4% 54.2% 100.0% 
Source: All A. Bolbol and Ayten M. Fatheldm, "Fore1gn and Intra-Arab Cap1tal Flows m the Arab 
Countries, 1990-2003", Arab Monetary Fund. *Excluding data for 1994. 
Although large amounts of surplus oil revenues have been invested abroad, since 
2003 a far larger amount than previous has been retained and reinvested within 
the region. Not only has this resulted in high levels of GOP growth across the Gulf 
and boosted private sector confidence, but it has also led to increasing levels of 
96 Bolbol, Ali A. and Fatheldin, Ayten M. "Foreign and Intra-Arab Capital Flows in the Arab 
Countries, 1990-2003", The World Economy (Forthcoming). 
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intra-GCC FDI flows. Much of the evidence is anecdotal and has yet to feed into 
national or regional statistics but the phenomenon is wide spread and well 
documented in the regional press. For example, in 2004 the UAE's state-owned 
telecommunications company, Etisalat, was the lead member of a consortium -
'Ettihad Etisalat'- which won the license to operate Saudi Arabia's second GSM 
network, in a bid estimated to be worth $3.2bn.97 When the consortium later floated 
a $267mn stake on the Saudi stock exchange the issue was oversubscribed by a 
factor of fifty. 
More recently, and by far the most noteworthy instance of intra-regional investment 
to date, was Emaar's $26bn investment in the recently launched Saudi Arabian 
"King Abdullah Economic City". 98 As a result of investments by Etisalat and Emaar, 
the UAE has overtaken Japan and is now the main source of FDI into Saudi 
Arabia, according to statistics released by the Saudi Arabian General Investment 
Authority (SAGIA).99 
In mid 2006 SAGIA announced that another 'Economic City' was to be built, close 
to the Saudi city of Hail. Supervised by SAGIA and headed by the Saudi Rakisa 
Holding Company it is envisaged that the $8bn "Prince Abdul Aziz Bin Musaid 
Economic City" (PABMEC) will be fully funded by the region's private sector. Many 
GCC entities have already committed to invest in PABMEC, Including the UAE's 
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, Abu Dhabi Investment House, and the National 
Investment Co., Bahrain's Gulf Finance House and Kuwaiti firms: Kuwaiti 
Investment Co., and General Warehousing Company.100 
Saudi Arabia is reciprocating and investing considerable sums into the UAE. For 
instance, AI Hanoo Holding Company, is developing two major projects, the tourist-
orientated $4.9bn 'Nujoom Islands' and the $800mn 'Emirates Industrial City'; both 
97 Staff writer "Saudi mobile phone IPO 50 times oversubscribed" Reuters News Service, 31 
October 2004. 
98 Although Emaar is partially owned by the government of Dubai, it is a publicly listed company and 
is traded on the Dubai Financial Market. 
99 Staff writer "UAE becomes top investor in Saudi Arabia", Gulf News, 18 June 2006. 
100 Carvalho, Stanley,"GCC investors to pump 1.5b riyals into new Saudi economic city" Gulf News. 
4 July 2006. 
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in the Emirate of Sharjah,101 and Saudi Oger is funding a $500mn real estate 
project 'Saraya Islands' in the Emirate of Ras AI Khaimah. Yet another Saudi 
company, AI Rajhi Group, has a 38.5 percent stake in the $8.2bn 'AI Salam City' 
megaproject, taking shape in the Emirate of Umm AI Quwain.102 Saudi Arabia's 
Savoia Group plans to open six HyperPanda retail outlets in the UAE at an 
estimated cost of $82bn; the group's first foreign retail expansion.103 
There are many other examples of recent intra-GCC FDI including the $805mn 
tourist development, 'The Wave' in Oman which is a joint venture by the UAE's, 
Majid AI Futtaim Investments (MAFI) and the Omani Pension Fund. MAFI is also 
investing $531mn in a retail development in Bahrain; the 'Bahrain City Center'. The 
Kuwaiti property firm, Grand Real Estate, is investing $2bn in various 
developments across Dubai, and is in the process of establishing a regional bank 
(with a paid up capital of almost $1bn) specifically geared to financing hotel and 
tourism projects in the Gulf region.104 
5.5 Degree of Economic Diversification 
This section begins by discussing some of the conceptual issues regarding the 
type of economic diversification required for CU to be appropriate for a given group 
of countries. We make a conceptual distinction and argue that for CU to be 
appropriate for a given group of countries, 'within country' rather than 'within 
region' diversification is required. The second part of this section examines the 
degree of hydrocarbon dependence among the GCC economies and critically 
whether this makes them less than ideal candidates for forming a CU. Following 
this, we examine the extent to which diversification is occurring in the GCC and 
whether this is the type of diversification (i.e. 'within country' diversification) 
required for CU. Finally, this section analyses the views of expert interviewees on 
101 Nujoom Islands, http://www.nujoomislands.com/alhanoo.html 
102 AMEinfo, "UAQ, $8.2bn Tameer city project" 26 July 2005 (Accessed on 20 July, 2006 
http://www.ameinfo.com/64854. html) 
103 AMEinfo, "Six HyperPandas for UAE" 12 April 2006 (Accessed on 20 July, 2006 
http://www.ameinfo.com/82832.html) 
104 GoWealthy "Kuwaiti group set to invest $2bn in Dubai projects" 22 July, 2006 (accessed at 
http://www.gowealthy.com/) 
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the cohesion of the GCC economic structures, whether their economic structures 
are compatible for CU as well as the importance of economic diversification in 
forming a CU. 
5.5.1 Conceptual Issues 
The idea that the more economically diversified potential member economies are, 
the more suited they will be for CU, was developed by Kenen.105 He argued that if 
prospective members had diversified economic structures they would be less likely 
to suffer from asymmetric shocks. However, it is important to be clear about the 
meaning of 'diversification' when discussing its relationship to the formation of a 
CU. Kenen is referring to what we might call 'within country' diversification as 
opposed to 'within region' diversification. 'Within country' is where each country in 
a regional grouping contemplating CU becomes internally diversified (i.e. has a 
wide range of different industries and services). Clearly, where all the countries in 
the potential CU are diversified in this manner then the problem of an asymmetric 
shock - one which (by definition) impacts upon only one particular worldwide 
industrial or service sector- will not be particularly problematic for the CU. Each of 
the countries in the region with a diversified portfolio of industries will experience 
the specific shock in a similar manner and to a similar degree. Therefore a CU and 
a common monetary policy will be appropriate for all of them, or to put it the other 
way round, none of them will feel obliged to break away and adopt an independent 
monetary policy to deal with that particular asymmetric shock. 
It has been argued by Sturm106 that with greater economic diversification the GCC 
economies will become more heterogeneous and consequently an aggregate 
monetary policy based on the economic circumstances of the entire region will be 
less likely to be optimal for each member state. However this particular argument 
would only apply where the diversification in question is what we have called 
'within region' diversification i.e. where the different countries in the potential CU 
105 Kenen, P. B., "The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas: An Eclectic View'', in Monetary Problems 
of the International Economy (eds. R.A. Mundell and A.K. Swoboda) pp 41-60, University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1969. 
106 See Sturm, M. and Siegfried, N. 'Regional Monetary Integration in the Member States of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council', European Central Bank, Occasional Paper Series, No. 31, June 2005. 
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diversify away from a common, predominant industry (in the GCC case, oil), but do 
so by each country becoming specialised in a different industry. In other words if 
one country 'diversifies' by becoming specialised in e.g. aluminium production, 
another in tourism, another in financial services etc. then this kind of heterogeneity 
would certainly leave them vulnerable to asymmetric shocks and make a CU and 
common monetary policy inappropriate for them as a group. 
5.5.2 Does Oil Dependence Necessarily Matter for CU? 
The GCC states have a fundamental common economic dependency on 
hydrocarbon resources. On average, oil and gas sector activities constitute 42 
percent of GDP, oil and gas exports account for 69 percent of exports and oil and 
gas revenues constitute almost 75 percent of government revenues. 107 Few, if any 
other, regional grouping of countries shares such a common fundamental 
economic character. In chapter four (section 4.2.2) the GCC's economic 
dependency on hydrocarbons and its associated drawbacks were discussed in 
some detail. It was shown that the composition of the GCC economies has 
remained relatively unchanged over the last decade with oil and gas continuing to 
form the largest share of economic activity. 
There are however, varying degrees of oil dependency among the GCC states. In 
the case of GDP the share of oil and gas ranges from 23 percent in Bahrain to 62 
percent in Qatar, in the case of exports, from 36 percent in the UAE to 93 percent 
in Kuwait and in terms of government revenues the range is from 55 percent in 
Qatar to 91 percent in Kuwait (see chapter four, section 4.2.2, table 4.5). 
Nevertheless, even those countries with relatively lower oil dependency indices 
remain unquestionably dominated the hydrocarbon sector compared with any other 
grouping of World countries (see Figure 5.7). 
107 See chapter four, table 4.5. 
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Figure 5.7: GCC Hydrocarbon Dependence 
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However this failure to significantly diversify away from oil and gas does not in itself 
mean that CU would be inappropriate. Diversification away from oil and gas may 
be desirable for a number of reasons, in particular employment creation, but it is 
not necessarily an obstacle to CU. This is because an oil price shock affects a// the 
GCC states, albeit to varying degrees. This similarity of economic structures and 
shared oil dependence implies that the GCC economies are likely to suffer from the 
same exogenous shock and as such, it could be addressed with a common 
monetary policy without causing problems for any individual member state. In 
short, as long as the GCC states remain undiversified - but undiversified in the 
same manner- this does not necessarily mean they are unsuitable for a CU. What 
is really important is that, as they diversify away from oil and gas they do so 
without becoming overly specialised in any one particular industry into which they 
diversify. 
Using the conceptual distinction made above, CU requires that they move towards 
greater 'within country' diversification rather than just 'within region' diversification'. 
This also means that some of those regional commentators who have expressed 
concern about the different GCC countries diversifying into the same industries and 
services and therefore competing with each other, may be failing to realise that a 
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diversification strategy which involves some replication of new industries and 
services around the Gulf is probably beneficial to the CU project.108 
5.5.3 The Extent of 'Within Country' Diversification 
It remains to examine empirically (a) the extent to which the GCC states are 
diversifying away from oil and gas and (b) the extent to which they are moving 
towards the desired ('within country') type of diversification. 
Clearly, from the evidence provided above and in chapter four, the GCC 
economies have not been able to achieve significant economic diversification away 
from oil and gas and remain heavily dependent on these commodities. Despite 
professing a policy of economic diversification, in the past, during times of high oil 
prices, many of the GCC states have been unwilling to invest surplus pet~odollars 
into an economic diversification. Only a few GCC states have seen some"~~success 
in this respect. Bahrain has been motivated to diversify by the limited life 
expectancy of its meager oil reserves as has the resource poor Emirate of Dubai in 
the UAE.109 However until very recently other states, for example, Kuwait and 
Qatar have shown little progress in this respect. 
There are some signs of change however. Kuwait and Qatar have plans'to invest 
substantial amounts in real estate and non-oil associated projects. Kuwait's 
ambitious 'Silk City' project could cost as much as $86bn and includes a 1001 
meter high tower bloc, which if built will be by far the world's tallest structure.110 
Qatar is not only investing heavily in its natural gas industry and its downstream 
value added liquefied natural gas production, but also in a range of service sectors. 
The $2.5bn 'Doha Pearl' real estate project, is one example of such diversification 
108 For example, the issue of regional competition was considered to be of such importance that it 
was the topic of a Bahrain Economic Society conference, entitled "GCC 2010: From Competition to 
Integration", held in Bahrain on 23-24 November 2004. In addition, a number of regional experts 
also felt that increasing intra-regional competition might be detrimental to the region's integration 
efforts. 
109 For an early study of the process of diversification in Bahrain, see Rutledge, E. The Experience 
of Economic Diversification in Bahrain, 1987-1997, The Bahrain-British Foundation, 1999. 
110 Evans-Pritchard, Ambrose "Trillion dollar gamble on future of Gulf', The Daily Telegraph, 9 May, 
2006. 
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(future owners of property on the island will automatically receive Qatari residency 
visas) as is its ambitious 'Energy City'111 and the Qatar Financial Centre.112 
As was mentioned earlier, events in the past few years (since the start of the 
current oil boom), particularly substantial current account surpluses, have radically 
altered the pattern of lackluster economic performance that has characterized 
much of the period of analysis. The GCC saw its highest ever current account 
surplus in 2004 at $105.7bn but this was surpassed in 2005 when it climbed to 
$152bn. 113 In 2006, the surplus is projected by the World Bank to come in at 
$172.7bn. 114 The situation is in sharp contrast to the late 1980s and most of the 
1990s when many GCC states experienced successive fiscal deficits and saw 
declining or stagnant GOP per capita incomes. Yet the extent to which these extra 
financial resources will be spent in such a way to foster economic diversification is 
still too early to assess. 
Research by MEED Projects 115 indicates that the total value of projects within the 
Gulf Region had risen by $250bn in the first three months of 2006 and that the 
project market in the region is now the biggest globally on a per capita basis. The 
total value of projects in the GCC - at the time of writing - was $881bn. While 
more than half of these projects are construction related, there are also $228bn 
worth of upstream oil and gas projects and $106bn worth of petrochemical 
projects.116 Clearly there is no intention to move away from hydrocarbons and 
given the anticipated growth in World demand for these commodities it would be 
foolish for the GCC to neglect investment in this sector. 
111 Energy City Qatar (ECQ) is billed as a pioneering development that will be the Gulfs first 
hydrocarbon industry business centre. ECQ forms part of the $5bn Qatari construction megapoject; 
'Lusail'. 
112 The Qatar Financial Center was set up by the Government of Qatar and aims to establish Qatar 
as a hub for project finance and by providing an attractive environment (tax-free) for a wide range of 
financial services activities in the Gulf region. 
113 The World Bank, 2006 Economic Developments and Prospects: Financial Markets in a New Age 
of Oil, 2006. 
114 Ibid. 
115 AEC lnfo"Projects in the Gulf region have now reached more than $1 trillion." 25 April 2006, 
~available at http://www.aecinfo.com/1/pdcnewsitem/00/65/45/Index_1. html) 
16 MEED projects tracks all projects worth more than $50mn in the GCC. 
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However, where diversification away from hydrocarbons is occurring there are 
some hopeful signs that the dangers of specialisation i.e. 'within region' 
diversification, are being avoided and that 'within country' diversification is, indeed, 
beginning to take place. The fact that the GCC states have similar comparative 
advantages means that economic diversification is taking place in the same 
sectors and industries which should lessen the potential for them to be hit by 
asymmetric shocks. 
Bahrain has a well established banking and finance industry that forms a major 
part of its economic activity, according to the IMF's latest Bahrain Country Report 
in 2004 the total contribution to GOP from all financial corporations in the Bahrain 
was 24.2 percent.117 Offshore banking took off in Bahrain in the early 1980s118 and 
since then the Bahrain Monetary Agency (BMA) has provided a well regulated 
financial environment which is now fostering a growing Islamic banking market. 
The BMA has been at the forefront of the government of Bahrain's efforts to 
establish Manama as the GCC's hub for Islamic finance. In particular, the BMA has 
been instrumental in deepening the Islamic financing market through the 
development of its short term sukuk issuance programme and through the 
introduction of standardised contracts for its dealings with Islamic banks. In an 
effort to keep ahead of increasing regional competition from Dubai and Qatar's 
emerging financial centres Bahrain is constructing a new $1.3bn financial centre-
the 'Bahrain Financial Harbor'. 
The UAE, in particular Dubai, has also diversified into service sector activities such 
as banking and finance, the re-export trade and tourism and Abu Dhabi has 
established itself as the manufacturing hub of the UAE. As of 2004, Dubai had 272 
hotels, 30 shopping malls and almost 5 million foreign visitors. 119 Since then more 
hotels have been built and many more are under construction. The $19bn 
117 IMF, Kingdom of Bahrain: Financial System Stability Assessment, March 2006, Country Report 
No. 06/91. 
118 When Israel invaded Lebanon in the early 1980's Bahrain assumed Beirut's role as the Middle 
East's off-shore banking centre. 
119 Staff writer "Arabia's field of dreams", The Economist, 27 May 2004. 
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Dubailand theme park, once completed will be twice the size of Disneyworld in 
Florida, and by 2015, Dubai alone hopes to attract 15 million tourists annually.120 
Oman is also focusing on tourism (see Figure 5.8), but in a different niche of the 
market, optimising its comparative advantage in a great variety of ecological zones, 
wildlife and scenery. The $15bn Blue City megaproject is one such initiative being 
promoted by Oman's Ministry of Tourism - which itself was only established in 
2004 and it aims to provide a 'first class tourism facility' over an area of 34 square 
kilometres. Other tourist related projects include the $805mn 'The Wave' 
development, which has successfully attracted significant levels of FDI. 
Figure 5.8: Composition of Economic Structure, Average 1991-2003 
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In both Saudi Arabia and the UAE the manufacturing sector has also been 
prioritized. Saudi Arabia is understandably concentrating on the petrochemicals 
sector (a significant diversification away from traditional upstream oil and gas 
activities) with multibillion dollar projects currently underway in Jubail and Yanbu. 
The planned 'Jubaillndustrial City-11' is expected to see as much as $56bn worth of 
investment and authorities hope it will create as many as 55,000 jobs. Industrial 
development is also being pursued within the UAE by Abu Dhabi. The government 
120 Wallis, William "Tourism: Growing appeal leaves observers baffledn Financial Times, 12 July 
2005. 
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of Abu Dhabi's Higher Corporation for Specialized Economic Zones is currently 
developing the Industrial City of Abu Dhabi which is expected to attract $4.62bn in 
investments. Similarly, Dubai is also developing an industrial zone, the 'Dubai 
Industrial City'. 
In summary, although the movement away from oil and gas dependence has been 
sluggish, it should first be recognised that there may be sensible reasons why this 
should be so - most oil experts do not expect any return to low oil prices in the 
foreseeable future. 121 Where diversification away from hydrocarbons is taking 
place there are small, but encouraging signs that those states which are 
diversifying are avoiding simply becoming dependent on some alternative 'mono-
industry' but are developing a number of sectors in conjunction- even where this 
involves some competition with other GCC states (e.g. Dubai and Oman competing 
in the tourist industry, or Bahrain, Dubai and Qatar competing in financial services, 
or Saudi Arabia and the Abu Dhabi competing in manufacturing) As such this 
trend must be regarded as a positive one from the perspective of the CU project. 
5.5.4 View of Regional Experts on GCC Economic Diversification 
Currently, regional experts appear to be split in their views as to whether the GCC 
economic structures are suited to monetary union and will be able to form a 
cohesive bloc. Whilst many experts thought that the GCC economic structures 
were very similar and thus suited to monetary union, several felt that there was not 
sufficient diversification or complementarities among the GCC economies in order 
to have a high level of integration. 
Several interviewees felt that the GCC economies weren't diversified enough to be 
able to form a cohesive economic bloc. One Emirati government official said "The 
prerequisites for forming monetary union aren't present as the economies are too 
similar and lack of diversification is the problem. The production bases are too 
121 For instance, according to Goldman Sachs, "this is the second year of a five year spike, and 
during this time, baring any geopolitical events that may send prices even higher, the average will 
be $68", see Gulf Research Center, GCC Economic Report, Issue 12, Dubai, July 2006. ' 
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narrow and the chance of success is slim without diversification." One Om ani 
academic felt that whilst the GCC states had similar structures there were few 
complementarities to make them a cohesive bloc "A cohesive economic bloc is 
different to that suited to monetary union. There are no complementarities unlike in 
the EU and so there is no capacity to exchange and this is a problem." 
A few interviewees felt that there were important differences between the GCC 
economies; an AMF official said "All GCC states look the same from outside but 
there are various degrees of difference." One Saudi government official agreed and 
thought that greater economic diversification in the future would allow the GCC 
economies to integrate further through trade, he said "Yes in terms of potential and 
not as the GCC economies stand now. The rationale of monetary union is to 
reduce transactions costs associated with intra-regional trade among members 
which is already negligible but the reason trade is low is not because of the 
transactions costs but because of the similarities of economic structures and other 
institutional impediments to trade." 
Finally, a number of experts felt that it was not the current GCC economic 
structures that mattered as much as their cohesion in the future. One Saudi 
government official felt "It is not what we have today that matters, but what we want 
to have in the future". 
5.6 Economic Synchronization 
The synchronisation of the GCC economies and the economic shocks facing them 
is an important issue in establishing the appropriateness of CU for these 
economies. According to OCA theory, if the shocks affecting the prospective 
members of the CU are asymmetric then they are less likely to be suited to CU 
because the member economies will be on diverging economic paths that would be 
best dealt with by independent monetary policies rather than a common approach. 
The similar structure of the GCC economies has led many experts to assume that 
their economies are synchronised and experience symmetric economic shocks, 
mainly stemming from changes in the oil price. As we have seen from our previous 
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analysis in chapter four however, the GCC economies are not homogenous and 
have achieved various degrees of diversification depending on their diverging 
resource allocations. Another factor that will have a bearing on the degree of 
economic synchronisation is the degree to which the countries are integrated 
through trade and capital markets, issues which we have examined previously in 
this chapter. 
To date, there are two notable papers which have undertaken econometric 
analysis in order to assess the synchronicity of the GCC economies. Laabas and 
Limam 122 analyse the synchronicity of the GCC economies by examining their real 
exchange rates which are considered to reflect underlying macroeconomic 
variables as per the Generalised Purchasing Power theory developed by Enders 
and Hurn.123 They employ a cointegration model and conclude that the GCC real 
exchange rates share the same stochastic trend. However, it may be revealing that 
they find that the results for Oman and the UAE indicate a slower pace of 
adjustment towards the long run relationship; furthermore, they find that "UAE 
growth correlation with other GCC (states) is very weak". 124 In conclusion, Laabas 
and Limam argue that "there does not seem to be evidence of convergence in (the 
GCC's) main macroeconomic fundamentals nor synchronisation of their business 
cycles". 125 
An econometric study by Oarrat and AI-Shamsi finds evidence of integration 
between the GCC's GOP and financial and monetary indicators.126 Oarrat and AI-
Shamsi used cointegration techniques to explore the long term relationships 
between five economic variables in the GCC states, including real GOP, inflation 
rates, exchange rates, money stock and the money base. The authors established 
the presence of a cointegrating relationship between each of the five variables 
122 Laabas, B. and Limam, I. Are GCC Countries Ready for Currency Union? Arab Planning 
Institute, Kuwait, Apri12002. 
123 Enders, W. and S. Hum "Theory and Tests of Generalised Purchasing-Power Parity: Common 
Trends and Real Exchange Rates in the Pacific Rim" Review of International Economics, Vol.2, 
No.2, pp. 179-190, 1994. 
124 Laabas, B. and Limam, I, op.cit. p.30 
125 Ibid. p.32 
126 Darrat. A F and AI-Shamsi, F.,"On the Path of Integration in the Gulf Region" Applied 
Economics, 37, pp. 1055-1062, 2005. 
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across the GCC states. They conclude that there are no economic obstacles to 
further GCC economic integration and that the impediments that have stalled the 
process in the past must be socio-economic factors. 
However, Oarrat and AJ-Shamsi acknowledge that their analysis is limited in that it 
does not examine the role of regional players in driving the process of integration 
and whether Saudi Arabia is the main driving force behind the process. Neither do 
the authors examine the underlying Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) 
processes of the cointegrating relationships nor the impulse response functions, 
which are frequently used to provide further information on cointegrating series. 
In this section we employ these techniques to shed light on the appropriateness of 
the GCC economies for CU both collectively and individually. In testing for GCC 
cointegration on a collective basis more than one cointegrating equation can often 
be present however this makes it very difficult to identify the long term 
cointegrating equation and the dynamics of the relationship. We address this issue 
by investigating further the long run relationship between each of the GCC 
economies and the regional economic powerhouse, Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia 
accounts for 54 percent of the region's GOP, has 67 percent of the population and 
its stock market capitalization accounts for 52 percent of the total GCC bourses. 
The relationship with Saudi Arabia is examined on a country by country basis and 
the results of each GCC economy are contrasted. The underlying cointegrating 
equations are examined as are the impulse response functions which indicate the 
adjustment time in returning to the long term relationship following an economic 
shock. 
5.6.1 Estimating the Model 
In order to carry out our investigation we employ annual GCC real GOP data based 
on 2000 prices from between 1981 and 2004. 127 The start date is chosen because 
it is the year the GCC as a regional bloc came into existence. However, the data 
127 Sourced from IMF IFS database. Data for Kuwait during the Iraq invasion is omitted from the 
data set therefore the series was extrapolated for the missing two years. 
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for Qatar is limited to a much shorter period between 1992 and 2001 and is 
therefore too short to use in our cointegration analysis. While the number of 
observations in each series is relatively small, previous research 128 suggests that it 
is the time span of the data rather than the frequency which is of importance when 
modeling cointegrated series. 
The following econometric model was used for testing cointegration and Granger 
Causality between Saudi real GOP and the other respective GCC economies. The 
Johansen cointegration test was carried out and involved setting up a Vector Auto 
Regression. The VAR model is shown in equation 5.1 where Yt = (yt9• Yt5}' , where 
Yt5 is real GOP in Saudi Arabia and Yt9 is real GOP in one of the other respective 
GCC states, Yt is a 2 by 1 vector, as is Ao. r is a 2 by i matrix, where i is the 
number of lagged variables and ll is a matrix of the form ll = ap '. 
. p-1 
Equatton 5. 1. !!.. y t = Ao - [I y t-1 + L . r i !!.. y t-i + & t 
1 = 1 
The rank ('r') of the matrix ll will be less than full rank if the variables Yt5 and Yt9 are 
integrated of order one (i.e. have unit roots) and are cointegrated. In this case 
there will be 'r' cointegrating vectors/relationships. ll = ap' where a is an m (the 
number of variables) by r matrix of 'adjustment coefficients' and measures the 
feedback on the changes in the variables of divergence from the equilibrium 
relationship. If there is cointegration, some of the a must be non-zero. The 
Johansen test allows us to determine r and estimates the cointegrating vector, 
which, normalising the respective GCC economies real GOP to unity, is (1, - f3 ). 
This restriction is based on the assumption that the smaller GCC economies are 
unlikely to affect the Saudi economy, although this does not prevent the possibility 
of feedback in the system. The Johansen-Juselius 129 tests are used to reject or 
accept the number of cointegrating equations. This leads to the VECM 
representation of this model. 
128 Hakkio, C.S. and Rush, M. "Cointegration: How Short is the Long Run?" Journal of International 
Money and Finance, 10, pp.571-582, 1991. 
129 Johansen, S. and Juselius, K. "Maximum likelihood estimation and inferences on cointegration 
with an application to the demand for money" Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 52, 
pp.169-209, 1990. 
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The Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) is used to model the effect of 'short-
term' dynamics on the 'long-term' relationship between the two variables and to 
assess the feedback on the relationship. Imposing the cointegration restriction (1, -
p) the VECM in this case is: 
Equation 5.2. 1:!. Y9t = a 1 (Y9t-1 - P t t-1 ) + U1t 
Equation 5.3. 1:!. 'It = a 2 (y9 t-1 - P y5 t-1) + U2t 
For there to be cointegration and Granger Causality from the Saudi economy to the 
other respective GCC economies, a 1 should be non-zero, significant and 
negative, and if the results are in line with the economic reasoning that the smaller 
GCC economies cannot drive Saudi Arabia's economy, a 2 is not expected to be 
statistically different from zero. 
In order to avoid spurious regression results from our model, as demonstrated by 
Granger and Newbold130, we must establish that the series employed are 
stationary. If a non stationary variable, i.e. one with mean, variance and covariance 
that varies over time, is included in the regression it could produce incorrect test 
statistics. Both the Adjusted Dickey Fuller131 and Phillips Perron 132 unit root tests 
were carried out on the natural logs of the data and each series, as expected, was 
found to be non-stationary. However, when the data was differenced once the 
series became stationary, and the null hypothesis of a unit root was rejected in 
both of the two tests, indicating that the series are all integrated of order one (see 
Table 5.15). 
130 Granger, C. W. J. and Newbold, P. "Spurious Regressions in Econometrics", Journal of 
Econometrics, 2, pp. 111-120, 197 4. 
131 Dickey, D.A. and Fuller, W.A. "Distribution of the Estimators of Autoregressive Time Series with 
a Unit Root" Journal of the American Statistical Association, 74, pp. 427-431, 1979. 
132 Phillips, P.C.B. and Peron, P. "Testing for a Unit Root in Time Series Regression" Biometrica, 
75, pp.335-346, 1988. 
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Table 5.15: Unit Root Tests for GCC Real GOP 
First 
Country Sample Test 
Log-Levelsff 
Differences/ 
Stat 
T Stat 
Bahrain 1981-2003 ADF 1.191348 -3.9793* 
pp 1.20509 -4.44632* 
Kuwait 1981-2003 ADF -1.04527 -5.1305* 
pp 
-0.83352 -5.80218* 
Oman 1981-2003 ADF 1.820872 -4.8661* 
pp 4.087027 -3.48431 *** 
SA 1981-2004 ADF 0.44851 -3.65835** 
pp 0.07649 -3.72062** 
UAE 1981-2002 ADF 0.209516 -4.42161* 
pp 0.039046 -4.42171* 
*Rejects Null at 1%, **Rejects Null at 5%, ***Rejects Null at 10% 
In order to examine the nature of the relationship between the variables we test for 
cointegration. The Johansen 133 cointegration test was carried out and the group as 
a whole was tested first. Two tests were used, the Trace test as proposed by 
Johansen 134 and the Maximum Eigenvalue test as established by Johansen and 
Juselius.135 The results of the cointegration tests supported the evidence by Darrat 
and AI-Shamsi that the GCC real GOP series are in fact cointegrated. The test 
results also show the presence of more than one cointegrating equation (see Table 
5.16). The Trace test finds at least two cointegrating equations at the 99 percent 
significance level and a total of four at the 95 percent significance level. While the 
Maximum Eigen Value test confirms that there are at least two cointegrating 
equations at the 99 percent significance level. 
133 Johansen, S. Likelihood-Based Inference in Cointegrated Vector Autoregressive Models Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1995. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Johansen, S. and Juselius, K. "Maximum likelihood estimation and inferences on cointegration 
with an application to the demand for money" Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 52, 
pp.169-209, 1990. 
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Table 5.16: Joint GCC Cointegration Test Results 
Hypothesized Trace 5 Percent 1 Percent 
No. of CE(s) Statistic Critical Value Critical Value 
None** 130.2836 76.07 84.45 
At most 1 ** 81.20594 53.12 60.16 
At most 2 ** 44.86678 34.91 41.07 
At most 3 * 21.87859 19.96 24.6 
At most4 8.389271 9.24 12.97 
Hypothesized Max-Eigen 5 Percent 1 Percent 
No. of CE(s) Statistic Critical Value Critical Value 
None** 49.07765 34.4 39.79 
At most 1 ** 36.33916 28.14 33.24 
At most 2 * 22.98819 22 26.81 
At most 3 13.48932 15.67 20.2 
At most4 8.389271 9.24 12.97 
*(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5%( 1%) level. 
The cointegration tests were then carried out for each of the four respective GCC 
states with that of Saudi Arabia. A lag length of two was used because of the rather 
limited length of the data. The results show that the real GOP of both Oman and 
Bahrain are cointegrated with that of Saudi Arabia (see Table 5.17). At least one 
cointegrating equation is identified at the 99 percent significance level in Oman and 
at the 95 percent significance level in Bahrain. In the case of the UAE and Kuwait, 
however the results are quite different. The test statistics indicate that neither the 
UAE economy nor the Kuwaiti economy is cointegrated with the Saudi economy. 
While in the short run it is possible that the economies share a short term cyclical 
relationship in the long run there is no evidence of a trending relationship (see 
Table 5.17). 
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Table 5.17: Results of Pair-Wise Cointegration Tests 
Series: Oman SA 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Trace Statistic 5 Percent CV 1 Percent CV 
None** 21.94788 12.53 16.31 
At most 1 ** 6.625375 3.84 6.51 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Max-Eigen Statistic 5 Percent CV 1 Percent CV 
None* 15.32251 11.44 15.69 
At most 1 ** 6.625375 3.84 6.51 
Series: Bahrain SA 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Trace Statistic 5 Percent CV 1 Percent CV 
None* 14.14285 12.53 16.31 
At most 1 * 4.04115 3.84 6.51 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Max-Eigen Statistic 5 Percent CV 1 Percent CV 
None 10.1017 11.44 15.69 
At most 1 * 4.04115 3.84 6.51 
Series: UAE SA 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Trace Statistic 5 Percent CV 1 Percent CV 
None 4.28402 12.53 16.31 
At most 1 0.74626 3.84 6.51 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Max-Eigen Statistic 5 Percent CV 1 Percent CV 
None 3.537759 11.44 15.69 
At most 1 0.74626 3.84 6.51 
Series: Kuwait SA 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Trace Statistic 5 Percent CV 1 Percent CV 
None* 18.85833 15.41 20.04 
At most 1 0.039524 3.76 6.65 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Max-Eigen Statistic 5 Percent CV 1 Percent CV 
None** 18.81881 14.07 18.63 
At most 1 0.039524 3.76 6.65 
.. CV: Cnt1cal Value. *(**)denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5% (1%) level 
As we have been able to establish a long run cointegrating relationship between 
the pairs, Oman and Saudi Arabia and Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, we can now 
model the dynamics of the relationship in a VECM, as set out in equations 5.2 and 
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5.3 above.136 This allows us to examine the speed of adjustment to the long run 
relationship, test for the direction of causality and examine the response of the 
respective economies to an economic shock in Saudi Arabia. 
The estimated cointegrating equation from the VECM for Bahrain and Saudi Arabia 
is: 
/). Y9t = -0.01 (y9 t-1 - 1.07t t-1 ) + U1t 
(-6.38) (-33.2) 
ll. tt = -0.0007 (y9 t-1 - 1.07t t-1 ) + U2t 
(-0.26) (-33.2) 
The results confirm our expectations, the adjustment coefficient a 1 is negative (-
0.01) and statistically significant (the t statistic in brackets was -6.38). As expected 
the adjustment coefficient a 2 was close to zero (-0.0007) and not statistically 
significant (the t statistic was only -0.26). This suggests that over the cointegrated 
period since 1981 there was feedback from the Saudi economy in the previous 
period onto the current changes in the Bahraini economy that kept it from diverging 
significantly from its 'long-run' equilibrium relationship with the Saudi economy. The 
results also show a rather slow adjustment path, as only 1 percent of the deviation 
of Bahrain's real GDP from the long-term relationship with Saudi real GDP was 
adjusted back in any year. The results however, provide strong empirical evidence 
that Saudi real GDP Granger causes changes in Bahrain's real GDP and not vice 
versa, over the cointegrated period. These findings support the economic theory 
about the relationship between these economies discussed earlier. 
136 It must be mentioned that the number of observations is rather small for a VECM, nevertheless 
by examining and interpreting the results of the VECM we can add to our understanding of these 
economic relationships. 
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The estimated cointegrating equation from the VECM for Oman and Saudi Arabia 
is expressed as follows: 
!1 Y9t = -0.06(y9 t-1 - 0.94t t-1) + U1t 
(-4.01) (-95.5) 
!1 tt = -0.03 (y9 t-1 - 0.94y5 t-1 ) + U2t 
(-1.44) (-95.5) 
Again the adjustment coefficient a 1 is negative (-0.06) and statistically significant 
(the t statistic was -4.01 ). This time the adjustment time is quicker as 6 percent of 
the deviation of Oman's real GOP from the long term relationship with Saudi real 
GOP is adjusted back in any year. The results also provide evidence that Saudi 
real GOP Granger Causes changes Oman's real GOP and not vice versa, over the 
co integrated period. 
Using the VECM system that has been estimated, we extend the analysis and 
generate impulse response functions to examine the effect of a potential 
exogenous shock to the system. A shock to the ith variable not only directly affects 
the ith variable but is also transmitted to the other endogenous variables through 
the dynamic (lag) structure of the VECM. An impulse response function traces the 
effect of a one-time shock to one of the innovations on current and future values of 
the endogenous variables. If the innovations &t are contemporaneously 
uncorrelated, the interpretation of the impulse response is straightforward. The ith 
innovation &;,tis simply a shock to the ith endogenous variable Yit· Figures 5.8 and 
5.9 illustrate the response of the Bahraini and Omani real GOPs when we 
introduce a positive shock to Saudi real GOP. In the case of Bahrain, the response 
to the shock is positive and lasts for approximately eight years. Whereas in Oman, 
the response is overall neutral, it is initially negative but becomes positive and the 
affect of the shock dies out more quickly than in Bahrain, after just four years. 
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Figure 5.9: Impulse Response Function for Bahrain and Saudi Arabia 
Response of Bahrain to Cholesky, One S.D. Saudi Arabia Innovation 
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Figure 5.10: Impulse Response Function for Oman and Saudi Arabia 
Response of Oman to Generalised One S.D. Saudi Arabia Innovation 
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5.6.2 Interpreting the Findings 
In summary, it appears from this econometric analysis that whilst there is evidence 
that the GCC economies have moved together in a long term relationship since the 
formation of the GCC, there are some interesting disparities in the long run 
relationships between the individual GCC economies and Saudi Arabia, the 
dominant economy in the region. The findings presented here indicate that the 
180 
UAE and Kuwait do not follow the same long term growth trend as that of the Saudi 
economy. In contrast the real GOP of Bahrain and Oman do exhibit long term 
relationships with the Saudi economy, and changes in the Saudi economy Granger 
cause adjustments in the Omani or Bahraini economies that eventually bring them 
back to a long term relationship. 
One possible explanation for the lack of cointegration between Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia is that Kuwait has had a more independent exchange rate arrangement 
than the other GCC states for several decades, pegging to an undisclosed basket 
of currencies. While Kuwaiti interest rates have broadly followed those of the other 
GCC economies, it has had a greater degree of freedom in terms of its monetary 
policy which may well have allowed it to mitigate regional and domestic shocks to a 
greater extent than any other GCC economies. 
In the case of the UAE, the results might be rationalized by considering the 
concerted efforts made by the UAE to integrate into the global economy. It has 
developed an extensive re-export industry and is known as the region's re-export 
hub. It therefore has extensive global trading links which might suggest that the 
economy is more exposed to global economic trends than regional ones. In recent 
years, more than any other GCC economy, the UAE has also liberalized its 
economy and opened up considerably to international tourism and foreign 
investment. 137 
In section 5.2 of this chapter "Intra-Regional Trade" our analysis revealed that the 
trade intensity ratios (TIR) between Saudi Arabia and the UAE were particularly 
weak and Kuwait's TIR were generally weak with all its GCC neighbours. Weak 
trade linkages may in part explain why these two GCC economies are not well 
integrated with that of Saudi Arabia. In fact research by Frankel and Rose found a 
positive correlation between bilateral trade intensity and business cycles indicating 
137 For example, allowing foreigners to invest in both certain stocks and in property in designated 
areas. 
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that the level of trade between two economies cannot be considered independently 
from the business cycle and that they are jointly determined. 138 
The importance of being cointegrated with the largest economy in the prospective 
CU should not be understated and may well have implications for the distribution of 
costs and benefits of CU to its members. We cannot assume however, that Saudi 
Arabia will be able to dominate monetary policy decision making in the future GCC 
central bank. The direction of GCC monetary policy will eventually depend on the 
set up of the central bank and the votes allotted to each GCC country. In the ECB 
the largest economy, Germany was given the same voting power on the Governing 
Council as the smallest economy because of a one country one vote rule. 139 
Indeed some observers have commented that EMU monetary policy has been less 
appropriate for Germany than it has for the smaller EU economies. The result, it 
has been argued, is that European monetary policy does not take into account the 
different effects in terms of GOP or the impact on welfare levels in the union 
overall. 140 Therefore the structure and voting set up of the future common central 
bank will have important ramifications. Nevertheless, it seems that in the absence 
of a long term integration between the UAE, the second largest GCC economy, 
and Saudi Arabia could be costly for either economy and may lead to friction in 
future monetary policy decision making. 
In concluding, one of the limitations of this type of econometric model is however, 
that it is backward looking, based on past values of the variables. In the future, it 
may be the case that if the GCC economies work towards meeting convergence 
criteria, as did the EMU economies, and with deepening trade integration, the 
significance of long run regional integration may well grow. Furthermore, as we 
have discussed in previous sections of this chapter, in recent years there has been 
increasing capital integration, and an increasing number of examples of large FDI 
projects between the UAE and Saudi Arabia which will also tighten economic 
138 Frankel, J.A. and Rose, A. K., "Is EMU more Justifiable ex post than ex ante?" European 
Economic Review 41, pp 753-760, 1997. 
139 Brueckner, Matthias "Voting Power in the European Central Bank" in Manfred J. Holler, and 
Guillermo Owen (eds.}, Power Indices and Coalition Formation, published by Kluwe, 2001. 
140 Ibid. 
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integration. In addition, as was argued in section 5.5 of this chapter, if the Gee 
economies continue to implement 'within country' diversification strategies then 
they will also be less likely to face idiosyncratic domestic shocks in the future. 
5.7 Conclusion 
Of the five OeA criteria we have considered in this chapter (intra-regional trade, 
labour market mobility, capital market mobility, the degree of economic 
diversification and level of economic synchronization) it can be said that at the 
present time, while the Gee economies have traveled a considerable way towards 
meeting the criteria for an oeA, they have not yet done so to a sufficient degree. 
Intra-regional trade is one criterion where the Gee states could do better. While 
we should be wary of measuring the extent of intra-Gee trade solely by reference 
to its share of total trade (including oil) and it is true that intra-Gee non-oil trade 
shows a considerably higher level of regional trade integration, nevertheless we 
must conclude that so far this criterion for an OeA remains insufficiently satisfied. 
However, as the Gee states pursue greater economic diversification it is likely that 
intra-Gee trade will continue to expand and will be further bolstered by a eu as a 
positive feed-back develops. Furthermore, the findings of the Gee wide business 
survey indicate that intra-regional trade is particularly important for the region's 
larger SMEs, which form the greatest part of the Gee business community and 
contribute significantly to private sector growth. 
The Gee scores well in terms of labour market mobility firstly because legislation 
permits nationals to cross borders easily and secondly because the region's 
significant expatriate labour force is highly malleable. In the medium term, the Gee 
economies will have to continue to rely on expatriate labour for the growth of the 
private sector as nationals adjust to the realities of working in the private sector. In 
view of this, increasing the mobility of the regional labour pool through allowing 
intra-Gee transfers of expatriate labour would be advantageous once eu is 
established in terms of adjusting to potential asymmetric shocks. In the long run, 
educational improvements and the gradual adjustment of expectations should 
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ensure that the national labour force becomes more flexible considering that, as we 
have established, there are few remaining legal barriers to their mobility. 
In terms of capital market mobility it is clear that the GCC is moving in the right 
direction, not only are Gulf nationals keen to cross borders to invest in one 
another's stocks but GCC businesses are also increasingly opting to cross-list. The 
region's leading role in the development and issuance of sukuk (Islamic debt} is 
also carried out intra-regionally with significant cross border cooperation on 
issuance between financial institutions and corporations. Up until recently, the 
majority of GCC FDI has flown out of the region, but there are increasing recent 
examples of intra-GCC FDI which may suggest a turnabout in the previous trend. 
The GCC states are not well economically diversified. After decades of following 
economic diversification policies they remain to a large degree dependent on 
hydrocarbons. However there are pronounced intra-regional variations with regard 
to this criterion with Bahrain and the UAE achieving a measure of success. Since 
2002 when oil prices began their upward trajectory, significant non-oil and gas 
related investments have been made both regionally and internationally which will 
also help to diversify future income streams. It is important however, that 
diversification takes place 'within country' rather than simply 'within region'. The 
idea that GCC countries should specialise to 'avoid competition' when they 
diversify away from oil and gas is mistaken and would leave the GCC economies 
more vulnerable to asymmetric shocks, Fortunately there are some indications that 
'within country' diversification is indeed taking place. 
We have established that there is a significant level of economic synchronicity 
between the GCC economies on the whole. Using econometric cointegration tests 
it can be inferred that the GCC economies follow a long term integrating 
relationship. However, analysis of the relationship on a state by state basis 
revealed that economic integration between the two largest GCC economies the 
UAE and Saudi Arabia, as well as between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia is weak. 
Consequently a monetary policy predicated on the economic conditions of the most 
populous and economically dominant GCC state may not necessarily be optimal 
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for the UAE, nor for that matter for Kuwait. This result may have implications for the 
regional distribution of costs and benefits (which we discuss later in chapter eight). 
Failing to meet all of the economic criteria discussed above might mean that CU is 
not 'optimal' yet it does not prevent CU for the GCC bloc from being feasible. As 
we have seen, the experience of EMU has proved that not all economic criteria 
need to be met in order to form CU. In fact, previous research 141 has argued that 
certain OCA criteria, such as the level of economic synchronisation and intra-
regional trade, may in fact be endogenous and therefore failing to meet these 
criteria might not be as costly as expected. Indeed, the process of forming a CU 
itself may lead to economic convergence among the members and the 
establishment of a single currency might substantially boost intra-regional levels of 
trade. 
In this chapter we have assessed the appropriateness of CU for the GCC as an 
economic bloc but throughout our analysis we have compared and contrasted the 
individual economies. Those areas where respective GCC economies do not 
adequately meet the OCA criteria gives a strong impression as to where the 
potential costs of CU might lie (see chapter eight). 
Ultimately whether the GCC states are able to successfully form a CU will depend 
on their political commitment to the process and the preparations that are made in 
advance. In the following chapter we will discuss whether establishing a common 
currency is a shared political goal of the GCC leaders and whether other 
prerequisite policies are in place for forming a feasible CU. 
141 For example, Frankel, J.A. and Rose, A. K., "Is EMU more Justifiable ex post than ex ante?" 
European Economic Review41, pp 753-760, 1997. 
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Chapter 6 : Policy Prerequisites for a Successful 
Currency Union 
6.1 Introduction 
Having covered, in some detail, the suitability of the GCC economies for CU 
against the various OCA criteria specified in the economic literature, we now turn 
our attention to additional policy prerequisites which are either deemed essential 
or highly desirable in order to establish a viable CU. Whereas the OCA criteria fall 
largely into the field of longer term, structural characteristics, the criteria which we 
discuss in this chapter relate to economic policy variables - the objects of 
decisions which will have to be made by Governments and Monetary Authorities 
and which, at least in principle, can be taken immediately (although - as we 
discuss in the next two chapters - there may be economic and social costs 
involved which might deter them from doing so). These additional, policy 
prerequisites have emerged primarily out of the European CU project and include: 
fiscal and monetary convergence criteria; effective institutional preparations; 
completing the Customs Union and Common Market; preparing the private sector 
and sufficient political determination to pursue the CU project. 
As in the previous chapter, we will combine evidence from published sources with 
the primary research collected whilst based in the region. Fiscal and monetary 
convergence is critical to guarantee price stability within the monetary union and 
this is covered at some length in section 6.2. Mechanisms will also need to be in 
place to ensure that post 2010 the whole union is not jeopardized by any one 
state's undisciplined fiscal budgets. In particular we focus on convergence in 
exchange rates, inflation, interest rates, government deficit and public debt to GOP 
ratios as well as foreign reserve ratios. 
Institutional preparations are critical to ensure the cohesion of the union. The 
establishment of a central monetary authority is necessary to determine and 
conduct policy for the bloc and improvements must be made in regional data 
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provision which will underpin monetary policy decisions; these issues are covered 
in section 6.3. In section 6.4 the obstacles to completing the Customs Union and 
Common Market are discussed. Completing the Customs Union and esta~lishing 
the Common Market are essential prerequisites to the CU, without which many of 
the benefits of a single currency will not be realized. The views of regional experts 
are useful to this analysis and provide contextual evidence with which to assess 
the actual degree of monetary and institutional preparations taking place and the 
obstacles to completing the Common Market. 
The attitudes and opinions of the GCC businesses community are pivotal in 
assessing whether the region can achieve a smooth transition to CU and are dealt 
with in section 6.5. The findings of the GCC business survey, conducted for this 
thesis, provide an insight into business sentiment and also on the degree to which 
the business community is prepared for the switch to a single currency. 
The degree of political commitment and political motivation among GCC leaders 
with regard to the process of economic integration and monetary union is 
considered in section 6.6. As the experience of other CUs has shown, in particular 
that of EMU, a sustainable CU cannot be achieved without a high level of political 
commitment to the process. We use qualitative evidence to assess whether the 
GCC states meet this criterion; in particular we draw upon the opinions of high 
level GCC experts from interviews conducted throughout the GCC. 
6.2 Fiscal and Monetary Convergence 
Fiscal and monetary convergence will probably be - if it is not already - the most 
contentious and complicated prerequisite facing the GCC. Although in one sense 
the GCC has already cleared one major hurdle in terms of having more or less 
identical exchange rate policies, agreeing on maximum government debt and 
inflation targets will be harder to achieve. With the possible exception of 
establishing supranational institutions such as a central monetary authority and 
statistical agency, the issue of fiscal convergence will be the hardest to agree upon 
and achieve. 
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The GCC convergence criteria are widely anticipated to mirror those of the 
European Maastricht criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) the 
objectives of which were to achieve important conditions for any prospective CU 
members - a high degree of price stability, a sustainable government budgetary 
position and the durability of convergence once CU had been established. GCC 
central bankers have informally agreed upon working towards fiscal and monetary 
convergence criteria, yet GCC leaders have yet to publicly endorse them let alone 
announce when they will set about meeting them.1 
At a meeting of GCC Central Bank Governors in September 2005, it was agreed 
that the council would adopt Maastricht-style convergence criteria which included 
inflation convergence targets, capping budget deficits at 3 percent of GOP and 
keeping gross government debt to below 60 percent of GOP (see Table 6.1)_2 At 
the time, the governors said that they hoped to put these convergence criteria 
before the annual GCC summit which was held later in the year in Abu Dhabi? 
Nevertheless, shortly before the summit was convened, GCC Finance Ministers 
discussed, but failed to approve, the targets arguing that they needed more time to 
agree on some of the issues.4 
1 Staff Writer "Criteria for Gulf Economic Union okayed" Saudi Gazette, 20 December 2005. 
2 According to the IMF in its 2005 Article IV Consultations with the UAE ("United Arab Emirates: 
2005 Article IV Consultation-Staff Report'' IMF Country Report No. 05/269), five convergence 
criteria were discussed by the governors including targets on inflation rates, short-term interest 
rates, foreign exchange reserves, as well as fiscal deficit and public debt ratios. But that 
deliberations were continuing on: identifying issues that would need to be addressed in establishing 
a common central bank; establishing a common data standard and a common fiscal accounting 
framework and identifying other areas that would need further harmonization. 
3 Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report United Arab Emirates, December 2005 Updater. 
4 Gulf Research Center "GCC Economic Report", Dubai, Issue 5, December 2005. 
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Table 6.1: Comparing the Maastricht and GCC Convergence Criteria 
Maastricht Criteria GCC Convergence Criteria 
1. Exchange rate fluctuation within the Long term stability of GCC 
normal margins for at least 2 years exchange rates has meant that 
without any devaluation against any so far this criterion has been 
other member states currency omitted 
2. Inflation rates must fluctuate within As Maastricht 
1.5% of the average of the three best 
performing countries 
3. Long term interest rates must fluctuate As Maastricht 
within 2% of bond yields of the three 
best performing countries.) 
4. Government deficits must not exceed As Maastricht 
3% ofGDP5 
5. Government debt must not exceed 60% As Maastricht 
of GOP 
6. No foreign reserve criteria Foreign reserves must cover 4 
months of imports6 
Regardless of whether the GCC economies meet these convergence criteria, there 
is the issue of the appropriateness of these particular criteria for the GCC 
economies. The GCC economies are very different to those of the European Union 
and their high degree of resource dependence means that their ability to meet 
fiscal deficit and debt criteria is subject to the vagaries of the international oil 
market. 
Prior to the provisional agreement on the nature of the GCC convergence criteria, 
a senior GCC Secretariat official, Dr. Abdel Aziz ai-Uwaisheq, director of the 
5 This rule however, was not binding under certain economic circumstances, see Eichengreen, B. 
and Wyplosz, C. "Stability Pact: More than a Minor Nuisance?" Economic Policy, No. 26, pp. 65-
113, April 1998. 
6 This is not technically a convergence criteria but has been set as part of the preparations to create 
a single monetary authority. 
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GCC's economic integration department, commented on the difficultly of meeting 
and sticking to the criteria, "We looked at the historical experience and we found 
sometimes that (the GCC economies) had to run a deficit of 15 or 20 percent of 
GOP because the price of oil is unpredictable. So it will be difficult to have a hard 
and fast rule and say your budget may not have a deficit of more than 3 percent."7 
Nevertheless, the GCC states will need to improve their fiscal discipline in order to 
be able to sustain the cohesion of the future CU. The presence of large disparities 
in the fiscal positions of the GCC states could well create tensions that threaten the 
unity of the currency bloc. 
Unlike the EMU convergence criteria which were actually firm and unconditional 
requirements, the GCC's convergence criteria appear to be more in the nature of 
targets (nothing has been said with regard to the consequences of a given GCC 
state not having met one or a number of the criteria). In the case of EMU those 
states that were not able to meet the criteria were in fact prevented from joining: 
such was the case with Greece initially. The question that arises in the case of the 
GCC convergence criteria therefore is - what will be the incentives for these 
economies to meet the criteria and how will they be enforced? 
These questions remain to be addressed by either the GCC Secretariat or the 
GCC Finance Ministers. One incentive to meet the criteria might be the loss of 
economic credibility should they fail to do so. However, several of the economic 
criteria impinge on national sovereign issues such as government spending and at 
times of low oil prices the will to comply with regional convergence criteria may be 
weak in the face of overriding national interests such as paying public sector wage 
bills.8 
An accurate analysis of the degree of convergence in the fiscal and monetary 
indicators of the GCC states ultimately depends to a large degree on the 
7 Staff Writer "Volatile oil is a headache for Gulf monetary union" Gulf Times, 30 October 2004. 
8 Later in this section we discuss the views of GCC experts on the CU, several of whom commented 
that meeting such fiscal convergence criteria might be a sticking point or the monetary union 
project. 
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availability and reliability of GCC national data. It remains the case that GCC 
national data is often incomplete and untimely and there are a number of statistical 
discrepancies in particular with data relevant to convergence criteria.9 This then 
inevitably affects any evaluation of convergence. 
Overall, in order for the convergence criteria to be assessed accurately and for the 
GCC states to monitor each other's convergence there needs to be much more 
transparency and standardization of GCC data otherwise the convergence criteria 
become rather meaningless and simply rhetorical. Without improved statistical 
provision progress towards convergence cannot be garnered and meeting them 
might simply be fudged (this issue is discussed in more depth in section 6.3.2 of 
this chapter). Indeed, the results of our own analysis can only be tentative due to 
the quality of existing GCC data. 
This sub-section will be broken down into the following areas: exchange rate 
convergence; inflation levels; interest rates, levels of government deficit and debt 
and finally the issue of foreign exchange rate reserves. It concludes by assessing 
how well the GCC states have been able to meet these provisional criteria over the 
historical period of study (1980-2005). 
6.2.1 Exchange Rates 
Considering that the GCC sovereign currencies are currently all pegged to the 
dollar, a high degree of exchange rate convergence has already been attained with 
little effort. In chapter four "Economic Performance and Policy 1980 - 2005", the 
exchange rate performance of the GCC states was discussed at some length. It 
was established that GCC exchange rates had experienced high levels of stability 
against the dollar, and against each others' currencies (see chapter four, section 
4.2.5). 
9 Six months after the end of the year the statistical data for that year is still not officially available. 
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Whilst there is agreement on the need to peg the GCC currencies to the US dollar 
prior to the establishment of the CU, what will need to be decided however, is what 
to do with the single currency once it is launched. Thus far, it has not been formally 
stated whether the future common currency will be pegged to an external anchor, 
the US dollar or a basket of currencies, or whether it will operate under a floating 
exchange rate system. 
All indications are that the GCC will, at least in the early stages of its new single 
currency, opt to stick with the dollar peg. However, it may, in time, modify this 
policy position though, as there are a number of perceived benefits to be gained 
from a more flexible exchange rate regime, which we discuss in the chapter 7 (see 
section 7 .3.2), and which have stimulated other oil exporting nations, such as 
Norway, to choose a floating exchange-rate arrangement. 
6.2.2 Inflation Rates 
Inflation in the GCC states has generally been low, only infrequently reaching 
double digits and averaging less than 4 percent on aggregate between 1980 and 
2005. A caveat must be made however with regard to the consistency of inflation 
statistics across the GCC states. For instance, the individual GCC states do not 
use the same base year for their published CPI series, neither are the 'weighted 
basket of goods' consistent, with differences in the share of goods, services and 
administered prices in the CPl. 
In previous analysis in chapter four (section 4.2.1) inflation rates across the GCC 
states were examined and compared. It was discovered that despite the common 
policy of pegged exchange rates and a shared preference for low inflation rates, 
price levels across the GCC have varied considerably. For example, average 
inflation in the UAE between 1980 and 2005 was 3.6 percent but in Oman it was 
only 0.43 percent and in Saudi Arabia 0.51 percent. The median inflation rate in the 
UAE was 3 percent but only 0.36 percent in Oman and in Saudi Arabia 0.45 
percent (see chapter four, Table 4.2). 
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Upon examination it appears that the inflation rates of several GCC states since 
1980 have breached the convergence criteria rule, which stipulates that inflation 
levels must fluctuate within 1.5 percent of the average of the three best performing 
members. Figure 6.1 illustrates that GCC inflation rates have frequently been 
outside of the 3 percent band of convergence. With the exception of Oman, all the 
GCC States have breached the inflation rule in the past on several occasions. 
Qatar, the UAE and Kuwait have breached the rule the most and on considerably 
more occasions than both Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. During the period of analysis 
only once, in 1989, did all the GCC states meet the inflation convergence criteria 
rule. 10 
Figure 6.1 : GCC Inflation Rates and the Convergence Criteria Rule 
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Source: IMF International Financial Statistics, May 2006 and AMF data for the UAE. 
From an analysis of the available data, two inflationary groups emerge, one - the 
low inflation bloc including Oman, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, while the second 
group - the high inflation bloc, includes the UAE, Qatar and Kuwait. In fact there 
continues to be considerable divergence between the highest and lowest inflation 
rates in the GCC economies (see Figure 6.2). This divergence has widened once 
again during the current oil price boom, where states such as the UAE and Qatar 
have experienced high levels of liquidity and inflationary pressures. In the UAE and 
1
° CPI data for Oman and the UAE is only available from the IMF and AMF beginning in 1991 . 
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Qatar, where prices and labour costs are relatively flexible, these price pressures 
have been particularly noticeable in property markets, and have led to rising rents, 
which form a large proportion of the CPI index in these countries. 11 
Figure 6.2: GCC Inflation Rate Differential 
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Source: IMF International Financial Statistics, May 2006 and AMF data for the UAE. 
Inflation differentials were also a cause for concern in the run up to EMU. However, 
as the date for MU approached the EU countries adjusted their fiscal and monetary 
policies in order to be able to meet the rules of the Maastricht Treaty and inflation 
rates began to converge. The inflation rate spread between the Eurozone countries 
decreased dramatically from as much as to 20 percent in the beginning of the 
1990s to around only 1 percent by mid 1999. However, following the launch of the 
Euro the spread then widened again and since has remained within a range of 
between 3 percent and 4 percent. 12 
11 Housing and housing related costs make up 36 percent of the CPI in the UAE according to Staff 
Writer "Central Bank plans debt issue to control inflation" Reuters, Dubai, 11 August 2005. 
12 Egert, B., Ritzberger-Gruenwald, D. and Silgoner, M.A. "Inflation Differentials in Europe: Past 
Experience and Future Prospects" in Monetary Policy and the Economy, Austrian Central Bank, 
May 2004. 
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6.2.3 Interest Rates 
In contrast to GCC inflation rates, interest rates have shown a considerable degree 
of convergence over the period of study. 13 The de facto dollar pegs in the region 
have meant that GCC interest rates have moved in line with interest rates in the 
US and concomitantly with each other. There have however, been a few occasions 
in the past when a GCC state would have broken the interest rate convergence 
rule. One such occasion was following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait when interest 
rates were raised in an attempt to prevent capital flight (see Figure 6.3) and 
another instance was due to Oman's interest rate regulations in the late 1990s.14 
Figure 6.3: GCC Interest Rates and the Convergence Criteria Rule 
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Source: IMF' International Rnandal Statistics and SAMA. 
Excluding the peak after the Gulf war the interest rate spread was at its highest in 
1980 at 4.9 percent, between Bahrain with the lowest interest rate and Kuwait with 
the highest. However, the interest rate spread has narrowed over time, coming 
down to its lowest spread at 0.7 percent in 2005 (see Figure 6.4). 
13 Three month interest rates are used rather than long term interest rates as was the case in EMU 
because several GCC money markets do not have long term interest rate products, such as ten 
r,ear bonds, therefore for comparative purposes we use short term interest rates. 
4 Sturm, M. and Siegfried, N. "Regional Monetary Integration in the Member States of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council", European Central Bank, Occasional Paper Series, No. 31, June 2005. 
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Figure 6.4: GCC Interest Rate Spread 
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Source: IMF International Financial Statistics and SAMA. 
6.2.4 Government Deficits 
A high level of fiscal discipline is an important requirement for the members of any 
CU. Undisciplined fiscal spending can undermine the monetary stability of a CU 
and allow big spenders to free ride on the credibility of fiscally restrained member 
countries. Rules to restrict the level of government budget deficits and debt are 
therefore critical to the sustainability of a CU. Having said this, the optimal level of 
deficits and debt is debatable, fiscal rules that are too tight might possibly make it 
hard for the authorities to use expansionary fiscal policy in the event of an 
economic downturn. 
A few regional experts felt that fiscal policy issues would play an important part in 
whether or not the CU went ahead as scheduled. One Emirati government official 
said "Budgets are the most important part of economic and political reform and at 
the moment we have fabricated budgets. Any monetary authority will not be able to 
look at managing finances and reserves if there is no transparency or discipline." 
While one Omani academic said "In 2010 economic issues will have an impact, if 
oil prices are low there will have to be tough fiscal discipline and small states will 
be in difficult position." 
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Figures on the level of domestic public debt are, in certain cases, not readily 
available and there can be large disparities between figures depending on the data 
source (for example between a national data source and the AMF or IMF). Figures 
for the UAE's government budget also have to be interpreted with caution as the 
budget at the federal level does not take into account income returns on 
investments abroad which would often have offset the value of a deficit. 
Presumably, this is why, after years of deficits, the UAE has not needed to issue 
much public debt. 15 In its 2005 Article IV Consultations with the UAE, the IMF said 
that there was a need for it to adopt a consistent and comprehensive set of public 
sector fiscal accounts.16 The IMF recommended that the Emirates adopt a common 
methodology across the individual Emirates and the Federal government budget 
systems, "consolidated fiscal accounts for the seven Emirates and the Federal 
government based on harmonized classifications and methodologies will need to 
be developed and be available without significant delay."17 
GCC fiscal policy management has been problematic in the past, particularly 
because the income base of regional governments is narrow and depends largely 
on income derived from oil and gas export revenues. In 1994 75 percent of GCC 
government revenues were derived from oil and gas and this share had only fallen 
marginally to 70 percent by 2004. 18 
During the 1970s, huge oil revenues accrued to the GCC economies and spending 
rose dramatically, part of which went on recurrent expenditure such as public 
sector wage bills. Large infrastructure projects and massive development of public 
utilities also absorbed substantial revenues over a prolonged period. Consequently 
when oil prices fell during the 1980s and then stagnated for much of the 1990s it 
proved very difficult for the governments to cut back their recurring expenditures 
when revenues declined and as a result large deficits appeared. 
15 Alexander's Gas and Oil Connections "UAE puts up tough fight against global economic storm" 
~Accessed at http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/ntm15154.htm) 20 November 2001. 
6 
"United Arab Emirates: 2005 Article IV Consultation-Staff Report'' IMF Country Report No. 
05/269, 2005. 
17 Ibid. 
18 See chapter four, table 4.5. 
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During the second half of the 1980s and for a large part of the 1990s GCC 
governments recorded budget deficits exceeding the 3 percent deficit rule due to a 
prolonged period of low oil prices (Figure 6.5). Repeated budget deficit offenders, 
according to GCC Secretariat figures, have been the UAE, Oman and Saudi 
Arabia. The UAE has breached this criteria a record twenty-one times since 1980, 
Oman eighteen times and Saudi Arabia by no less than sixteen times (see Table 
6.3). In addition, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar and Kuwait all experienced budget 
deficits of more than 20 percent since 1980. 
Figure 6.5: GCC Government Deficits to GOP and the Three Percent Rule 
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Econometric tests carried out by Fasano and Wang in 2002, revealed that GCC 
fiscal policies are highly procyclical and therefore that GCC government spending 
is correlated with oil prices. 19 During times of low oil prices GCC government 
spending has been cut back rather than expanded as one might expect if an active 
fiscal policy were being pursued. Such pro-cyclical fiscal policies were identified in 
many Eurozone countries prior to MU and the fiscal prudence ru les contained in 
the Stability and Growth Pact were designed in order to limit this practice.20 It is 
19 The findings of this paper were discussed in some detail in chapter 2, section 2.5, Fasano, U. and 
Wang, Q. "Testing the Relationship between Government Spending and Revenue: Evidence from 
GCC Countries" IMF Working Paper, November 2002. 
20 Jaeger, A. "Cyclical Fiscal Policy Behavior in the EU Countries, " IMF Country Report No. 01/201 , 
2001 . 
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worth noting however that during the current oil price boom (2002-2006) GCC 
governments have held back on spending and saved a considerable proportion of 
their surplus income which might suggest that a longer term policy perspective is 
being adopted. 
By 2004, when the oil price boom had set in, almost all of the GCC states had 
moved back into a surplus budget position. Of the additional oil revenues earned 
by the GCC states between 2003 and 2005 Saudi Arabia used the largest share of 
its surplus to repay its public debt, Bahrain, Oman and Kuwait used their surpluses 
to cover non-oil fiscal deficits and the UAE and Qatar saved virtually all their 
additional revenue?1 In several GCC states public sector wages were raised, but in 
Saudi Arabia for example, the pay rise of 15 percent for public sector employees 
was the first salary increase across the sector for more than twenty years. The 
UAE also increased public sector wages, by 35 percent for nationals and 15 
percent for foreigners increasing its future wage bill. 22 
In 2005 significant investments were made by GCC oil stabilization funds and 
government investment bodies, which will provide diversified streams of income in 
the future and help to reduce oil income dependence. The primary function of such 
investment funds is to maintain fiscal discipline through separating public 
expenditure from oil price volatility. Most GCC states have oil stabilization funds 
either in name or kind. State controlled investment bodies, although not mandated 
as 'stabilization funds' can implicitly be viewed as such, and have invested 
hundreds of billions of dollars in diversified assets (see Table 6.2). 23 
21 IMF, World Economic and Financial Surveys, Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and 
Central Asia, May 2006. p.22. 
22 Ibid. p.21 
23 Rutledge, E. "Overseas Acquisitions Vital For Tomorrow's Stability" Business Bulletin 8-14 April 
2006, Gulf in the Media, Gulf Research Center, Dubai. 
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Table 6.2: GCC Oil Stabilisation and Investment Funds 
Name of Institution Estimated Size of Fund 
Bahrain Reserve Fund for Strategic $936mn (end of 2004) 
Projects 
Kuwait General Reserve Fund $100bn (at least) 
Reserve Fund for Future 
Generations 
Kuwait Investment Authority 
Oman State General Reserve Fund & $2bn 
Oil Fund 
Qatar Stabilisation Fund & Oil Fund $4.26bn (end of 2004) 
Saudi Arabia No official fund $700bn 
(Figure for estimated overseas 
assets) 
UAE Abu Dhabi Investment Authority $250 - $300bn 
Dubai International Capital 
International Petroleum 
Investment Company 
lstithmar 
Mubadala Development 
Company 
Source: Adapted from IMF Reg1onal Economic Outlook, op.ctt. p.24, september.2006 and data from 
State Street Global Advisors Limited (Accessed at http://www.ssga.com) 
During any future oil price decline GCC governments can therefore, if necessary, 
utilize the returns made from their foreign holdings as well as even selling off 
valuable assets if oil prices were to fall significantly for a protracted period of 
time. 24 GCC governments are using conservative estimates for oil prices in their 
coming budgets which should also enhance fiscal discipline. 25 The prudent 
behaviour of GCC governments during this oil price boom may mean that during 
future periods of low oil prices, large fiscal deficits may be avoided and there is a 
greater chance that fiscal rules might be met. 
24 Return on investments made by the UAE's Abu Dhabi Investment Authority meant that whilst oil 
prices were particularly low in 1998 and early 1999, the UAE had more than enough income to 
balance the books. In addition, the investment income from assets held by Kuwait's Reserve Fund 
for Future Generations, which are mainly in overseas capital markets has become the second 
largest source of government revenues after oil, contributing roughly a third of total revenues. 
25 1MF, World Economic and Financial Surveys, Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and 
Central Asia, May 2006, p.22. 
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6.2.5 Government Debt 
In assessing the degree to which the GCC economies have met the debt to GOP 
criteria, a number of questions relating to the reliability of debt to GOP ratios are 
raised. For example, the GCC Secretariat has doubts about what should be the 
definition of debt and whether debt to quasi-public institutions should be included 
or not. There is also discussion about whether external debt should be monitored 
and should total government liabilities be subject to the debt rules. 
According to the available data, which could only be obtained going back to 1997, 
most GCC states have been within the limit of the 60 percent debt to GOP ratio, 
with the exception of Saudi Arabia (see Figure 6.6). Up until 2005 Saudi Arabia's 
debt to GOP ratio had been above the limit, in 1998 Saudi's debt reached a high of 
1 02 percent of its GOP as a result of persistent budget deficits. The Kingdom has 
however, recently made concerted efforts to reduce its domestic debt burden and 
has reduced the debt to GOP ratio substantially, by more than half to below the 60 
percent limit (Saudi Arabia's debt to GOP in 2005 stood at 46.5 percent). The UAE, 
by comparison, displays the lowest debt to GOP ratio of the group, which stood at 
just 8.4 percent of its GOP in 2005. The UAE has been able to avoid accumulating 
public debt because the returns on its investment assets have covered budget 
deficits. In 2005 all the GCC states were able to meet the 60 percent debt to GOP 
convergence criteria. 
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Figure 6.6: GCC Domestic Debt to GOP and the Sixty Percent Rule 
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Source: GCC Economic lnteoratlon Departnwnt and IMF' ReQional Economic Outlook, May 2006. 26 
Qatar is the only other GCC state where its domestic debt to GOP ratio has 
recently been close to the 60 percent limit, in 2003 its debt to GOP ratio rose to 55 
percent. Qatar also has considerable external debt, at about 62 percent of GOP in 
2001,27 but Qatar has issued this debt in order to invest heavily in its upstream and 
downstream natural gas industry which is the central pillar of Qatar's economic 
development strategy. In fact, a high level of public debt may not necessarily be a 
bad thing for a transitional economy if the funds are being invested in developing 
key industries targeted for long term growth, as has been the case in Qatar. But 
borrowing to cover recurrent expenditures, as was the case with Saudi Arabia, will 
ultimately lead to an unsustainable fiscal position. 
6.2.6 Foreign Reserve Requirements 
The GCC leaders have provisionally agreed to holding reserves equal to cover four 
months of imports as a preparatory step towards establishing a central monetary 
authority. According to AMF data, over the past two decades, all the GCC states 
have broken this criterion at some point, although Kuwait only broke the criterion 
once in 1988 and surprisingly it did not break the criterion after the Gulf war in 
26 1MF, World Economic and Financial Surveys, Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and 
Central Asia, May 2006. 
27 According to data from the GCC Secretariat Economic Integration Unit. 
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1991. In fact, Kuwait has had extremely large foreign reserves in some years, 
which in 2001 for example, covered nearly 17 months of imports (see Figure 6.7). 
Although, the lowest level of reserve cover recorded was 1.9 months of imports in 
Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom only broke the criterion in two years in 1992 and 1993. 
The UAE has a high import propensity28 and has consequently breached this 
criterion most frequently over the past two and a half decades. Both the UAE and 
Bahrain breached this criterion as recently as 2005, when their reserves fell to 2.8 
and 2.9 months of import cover. For Bahrain it was a second consecutive year of 
not meeting the criterion as in 2004 reserves cover only amounted to 3.8 months of 
imports. 
Figure 6.7: Reserve Cover to Months of Imports and the Convergence Criteria 
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6.2.7 Historical Record Vis-a-vis Convergence Criteria 
This analysis has indicated that the GCC economies may not find it an easy task to 
meet the Maastricht style convergence criteria that they are reportedly considering 
setting themselves. Based on past performance the GCC economies would have 
28 Mohammad,Y.H.J. and EI-Sakka, M.I.T "Demand for Imports in the GCC Countries," Journal of 
the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies, 27(100): pp. 43-84, 2001 . 
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repeatedly broken several convergence criteria. Although it must be borne in mind 
that the past is not always the best guide to future performance, these findings can 
act as a warning signal indicating areas of convergence that may continue to be 
problematic for the GCC economies. For example, the UAE, Qatar and Kuwait 
have frequently breached the inflation limit rule in the period examined, while Saudi 
Arabia would also have breached the debt to GDP ratio on several occasions (see 
Table 6.3). The UAE, Saudi Arabia and Oman would have had trouble in meeting 
the 3 percent fiscal deficit as a proportion of GDP limit. However, the UAE's 
continuous budget deficits are more likely to be due to poor statistical reporting on 
the part of the UAE rather than repeated fiscal imprudence. 
Despite problems with the data, it is worth considering the degree to which these 
economic constraints will be binding for the GCC economies in the future. Saudi 
Arabia's debt burden has been greatly relieved in recent years and if this trend 
continues the limit on debt should not be exceeded. The 3 percent fiscal deficit to 
GDP rule may also be problematic for the GCC economies should oil prices fall 
unless the trend towards diversifying income streams through oil stabilization funds 
and investment arms continues to build pace. The experience of the Eurozone 
countries in failing to meet the deficit to GDP ratio is also a warning sign of the 
challenges associated with this convergence criteria limit. Furthermore, inflation 
differentials among the GCC economies have continued to persist over time and 
therefore both the UAE, Qatar and to a lesser extent Kuwait, will struggle to remain 
with the inflation rule limit. 
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Table 6.3: Number of Years Convergence Criteria Rules Breached 
Period Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar SA UAE 
Inflation 
1980-2005 6 14 0 16 8 15 
limit* 
Interest 
1980-2005 0 5 4 3 1 0 
rates** 
Foreign 
1980-2005 7 1 8 8 2 9 
reserves 
Fiscal 
deficit as 1980-2005 8 12 18 13 16 21 
%GOP*** 
Fiscal 
debt as % 1997-2005 0 0 0 0 8 0 
GOP 
Total 21 32 30 40 35 45 
. 
Source: Author's calculations 
Notes: *Inflation data for the UAE and Oman only begins in 1991. **Interest rate data began in 1984 
for Oman, in 1987 for SA and in 1993 for the UAE. 
***Fiscal Data during Gulf war omitted, years 1990 and 1991 for Kuwait and 1991 for SA. 
Overall, the UAE and Qatar would have had the greatest difficulty meeting the 
convergence criteria during the period of analysis. Consequently these two states 
have spent 50.6 percent and 35.4 percent respectively of the period under analysis 
breaching the convergence criteria (see Figure 6.8). 
Once the exact convergence criteria have been officially announced and the GCC 
leaders disclose that they are working towards meeting them, it will be important 
for the GCC's economic credibility that they are achieved. Otherwise their ability to 
form a cohesive and sustainable CU may well be brought into question. 
Consequently, there will be hard bargaining over the exact limits of the 
convergence criteria and it is therefore likely that eventually the GCC finance 
ministers will only agree to much 'looser' convergence targets. 
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Figure 6.8: Proportion of Time Period Examined that Convergence Criteria 
were Breached 
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Source: Calculated uslnQ vears converoence criteria were breached as a proportion of years when 
data was available. 
6.3 Institutional Preparations 
The coordination of economic and monetary institutions across the GCC states is 
important to the overall cohesion of the economic bloc. Indeed, the institutional set 
up of the monetary union will affect the credibility of the whole process and should 
serve to strengthen the ties between the member states. The creation of a GCC 
central bank and the provision of regional data upon which to base the monetary 
policy decisions of the bloc, are essential prerequisite conditions for the functioning 
of the CU. 
However, a significant proportion of those experts interviewed, 45 percent, felt that 
the monetary and institutional preparations for GCC CU that were in place by late 
2005 were insufficient. A much smaller proportion of interviewees - 18 percent -
felt that they were sufficient. One independent researcher in the UAE who felt that 
the preparations were inadequate said that there was little institutional coordination 
in his opinion and this made him skeptical saying "without the institutional setup 
how can it happen by 2010?" An official at the UAE's central bank said that the 
pace of reforms related to and necessary for CU were insufficient; "adoption of the 
accompanying regulatory and institutional reforms is slow". 
206 
The coordination among GCC institutions, particularly central banks to date has 
been insufficient, according to a large proportion of regional experts, including a 
number of Central Bank officials themselves. GCC experts believe that 
supranational institutions require strengthening in terms of both independence and 
capacity if they are to adequately support the CU. In particular experts felt that 
harmonizing regional data sets and establishing supranational monetary 
institutions such as a GCC central bank should be priorities. These issues are 
discussed in detail in the sub-sections below. 
6.3.1 Establishing a GCC Central Bank 
It is generally accepted that to have a viable CU there needs to be a single 
supranational central bank so that decision making on the single monetary and 
exchange rate policy is centralized.29 Despite initially preferring to retain their 
national central banks the GCC leaders subsequently agreed to establish a single 
central bank. 30 The transfer of monetary policy decision making to a supranational 
monetary authority will inevitably involve the transfer of some national sovereignty 
to the regional institution. It is probably for this reason that the decisions as to the 
mandate of the bank, its organizational structure and its location, have yet to be 
agreed upon. Eventually decisions will also have to be taken on the distribution of 
seigniorage revenues and management of foreign exchange reserves. 
Furthermore, the critical political-economy decision of the voting structure of the 
monetary policy committee also remains to be determined. 
A few regional experts commented that the decision to establish a single 
supranational monetary authority itself had not been an easy one. One Kuwaiti 
central bank official said, "Some countries had second thoughts in particular over 
the issue of the GCC central bank." A Kuwaiti government official said, "I don't 
29 Sturm, M. and Siegfried, N. "Regional Monetary Integration in the Member States of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council", European Central Bank, Occasional Paper Series, No. 31, June 2005, p.63. 
30 Rutledge, E. "Establishing a Successful GCC Currency Union: Preparations and Future Policy 
Choices" Gulf Research Center, Policy Analysis, December 2004. 
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know that they can have a unified central policy and still have individual central 
banks, so this could be a major obstacle." 
In late 2004, the UAE offered to host the new GCC central bank, and according to 
some sources will indeed be the chosen location. 31 The location of the central bank 
will hold some symbolic value for the GCC states and therefore enthusiasm for 
hosting the region's central bank is perhaps understandable. However, one Emirati 
government official berated the GCC leaders for focusing on what he considered to 
be a trivial issue, "In terms of a central bank they are more interested in deciding 
where it will be located rather than the internal mechanisms of operating a single 
policy and other major issues." 
Indeed, the experience of EMU has shown that substantial preparation time is 
needed to establish a regional central bank. The European Monetary Institute was 
set up as a precursor to the European Central Bank in order to carry out technical 
research and make monetary preparations, four years prior to the electronic launch 
of the single currency and six years before notes and coins were introduced. 
However, several experts felt that the GCC's supranational monetary authority 
need not follow the example of the EMU, because of the unique socio-economic 
context of the GCC states. One AMF expert said, "In terms of the institutions the 
GCC does not need to copy the European Central Bank exactly." Another AMF 
official commented along similar lines, "Institutional requirements may not be that 
relevant for the GCC but they must fit the GCC economies, they may not need a 
central bank because there are only six GCC countries so the coordination issue is 
easier." Such regional views are in contrast to those of the European Central Bank, 
one ECB economist interviewed said "They must have a single central bank 
because they need a single exchange rate policy. They cannot conduct this 
through a committee of governors - it would be too difficult to conduct a single 
exchange rate policy. You need single currency area analysis and staff to do this." 
31 Staff writer "UAE to host GCC central bank" Arab News, 25 October 2004. 
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At present, cooperation between GCC monetary institutions takes place through 
biannual meetings of the Central Bank Governors' Committee. 32 In addition to this, 
according to information obtained from first-hand interviews, a technical committee 
meets several times during the year and reports to the Central Bank Governors. 
The GCC Secretariat is the main supranational organization in operation, and in 
2002 a Monetary Union unit was established at the Secretariat at the decision of 
the Supreme Council. 33 However, the weakness of the GCC Secretariat was 
commented upon by one Emirati government official who said "Another obstacle 
(to CU) is the weakness of GCC institutions such as the Secretariat. It has no 
leverage or power to implement decisions and this is an institutional problem." The 
economic characteristics of the GCC countries as rentier states34 has historically 
impeded the development of their institutions and this may inhibit the building of 
strong institutions to support the single monetary policy. 
The mandate of the GCC central bank is another key decision that must be agreed 
upon by all the GCC leaders and must be compatible with the mandates of the 
existing GCC national central banks. In the case of the ECB, its single overriding 
objective is to maintain price stability in the Eurozone, but other central banks, 
such as that of the US, also attempt to stabilise economic growth. 
It is clear that since the inception of the GCC, the monetary policies of its six 
Central Banks (or mandated Monetary Authorities) have been broadly similar. The 
objective has been to achieve stable nominal exchange rates through exchange 
rate targeting (see chapter four, section 4.3.5, for a discussion of GCC monetary 
policy). In terms of monetary policy objectives it seems as though there is a strong 
consensus among GCC central bankers in favour of maintaining a low inflation 
environment. Therefore, reaching agreement on the mandate of the new central 
bank may not prove to be too difficult. 
32 Sturm, M. and Siegfried, N. 'Regional Monetary Integration in the Member States of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council', European Central Bank, Occasional Paper Series, No. 31, June 2005. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Luciani, Giacomo (ed.) The Arab State, University of California Press, 1990. 
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While there is an apparent convergence in terms of monetary preferences there 
are however existing disparities with regard to money markets and monetary policy 
instruments which must be standardised prior to CU if a single monetary policy is 
to be implemented effectively.35 Saudi Arabia for example is the only GCC state 
which issues debt instruments with a maturity of ten years while most other GCC 
money markets are much shallower and bond maturities much shorter; typical 
maturities range between three and five years. 
A single monetary policy will however require that a common set of monetary 
policy tools to be in operation across the GCC states. Several GCC experts 
commented on the fragmented nature of the GCC's money markets. One UAE-
based commercial banker said, 'We can't see any new instruments coming in to 
follow the SAMA. Following a single central bank there will have to be a level 
playing field for all banks and for the markets if they want the CU to be cohesive." 
Finally, within the sphere of political-economy considerations will be the decision 
on the voting structure of the monetary policy committee. In the case of EMU, each 
member state was given equal voting powers, disregarding economic size. 
However, Saudi Arabia's position within the GCC is even more significant than that 
of Germany within EMU; its economy and population is greater than the aggregate 
sum of all the other five members. In a regional interview Mundell remarked "I hope 
that the Gulf countries will not make the same blunders committed by the EU. 
Certainly, the EU failed to grant Germany its true weight".36 Therefore there may be 
an economic and political case for giving Saudi Arabia, by far the most populous 
state, greater voting powers than the smaller GCC states, as the ramifications of 
the single monetary policy on Saudi Arabia will therefore affect the welfare of the 
vast majority of the union's citizens. While such a voting structure may not be 
particularly appealing to the smaller GCC states, anything else is unlikely to be 
acceptable to Saudi Arabia. In this respect therefore, a certain amount of political 
35 Fasano, Ugo and Staff Team, Monetary Union among Member Countries of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council, IMF, p.23, 2003. 
36 AI-Halii. A. F., "A Special Interview with Robert Mundell- Nobel Laureate in Economics" AI 
Watan, (translated from Arabic) 1999. 
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realism may be required by the smaller states in order to elicit the participation of 
Saudi Arabia in the CU project. 
6.3.2 Regional Data Provision 
Common statistical standards are particularly important for members of a CU to be 
able to monitor a nation's adherence to fiscal and monetary rules, and for a 
regional monetary policy committee to be able to make informed decisions based 
on sound economic data for the region. Yet the standardization, consistency and 
disclosure of the GCC's national statistics remain a major challenge to the process 
of regional economic integration. 
As was discussed in section 6.2 national data is often inconsistent and incomplete 
across the GCC region, furthermore, regional data collected by the AMF may also 
contradict national data.37 For example, Qatar does not currently publish constant 
GOP figures, Qatar Central Bank (QCB) and Qatar's Planning Council only publish 
nominal GOP (without price adjustments). The measure of inflation is also not 
consistent across the GCC states for example Qatar currently uses the base year 
for CPI as 2001 whereas the UAE uses 2000. 
GCC experts felt strongly that institutional coordination and better preparation is 
required in producing harmonized and consistent GCC statistics in advance of the 
CU.38 One Omani central bank official felt "much more has to be done on a 
statistical front we need to be able to compare these economies and this is only 
happening slowly." Another central bank official, this time in Bahrain, complained 
about the slow pace of standardizing economic data, he said "They need to unify 
the methodology of collecting the data". He went on to say that "The technical 
37 In the case of Bahrain, this was found to be the case, see Rutledge, E. The Experience of 
Economic Diversification in Bahrain, 1987-1997, The Bahrain-British Foundation, London, 1999. 
38 Research papers by the IMF and ECB have also pointed out that work needs to be done in terms 
of harmonizing and improving GCC statistics. See Abed, G.T., Erbas, S. N. and Guerami, B. ''The 
GCC Monetary Union: Some Considerations for the Exchange Rate Regime", IMF Working Paper, 
April2003. 
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committee agreed upon using international standardized systems but 
implementation needs to be speeded up." 
The provision of sound and credible data for the region has assumed a new level 
of urgency since CU was scheduled. New regional statistics will need to be 
calculated upon which appropriate monetary policy for the whole region can be 
predicated. According to the IMF the provision of such regional data is of overriding 
importance and the institute has recommended the building of a GCC statistical 
organization, a Gulf version of 'Eurostat'.39 However, the GCC leaders have yet to 
agree on the policy of establishing a supranational statistical agency. 
In the case of the EMU, several bodies and institutions were involved in the 
collation of comparable regional statistics several years prior to the launch of the 
euro. In 1992, a Working Group on Statistics was set up, this body also liaised with 
the Statistics Division at the European Monetary Institute, established in 1994 and 
eventually replaced by the ECB, in order to establish a solid statistical base for the 
EMU.40 Eurostat itself was originally established prior to the process of EMU in 
1953, but in producing comparable statistics for Europe it also fulfilled an important 
role in providing monetary and fiscal statistics in the process of EMU and today it 
also provides Eurozone data to the ECB. 
6.4 Creating the Common Market 
Establishing a Common Market is an essential policy step towards CU, without it 
many of the benefits of the single currency will not be realized (as we will discuss 
in chapter seven). The Common Market includes establishing a Customs Union 
along with allowing complete factor market mobility. Article Three of the GCC 
Economic Agreement of 2001 specifically dealt with the "GCC Common Market" 
and stipulated that: 
39 AI-Mansouri, A.K.L. and Dziobek, C. "Providing Official Statistics for the Common Market and 
Monetary Union in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Countries-A Case for "Gulfstat"" IMF 
Working PaperWP/06138, p.27, February 2006. 
40 Ibid. 
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"GCC natural and legal citizens shall be accorded, in any Member State, the same 
treatment accorded to its own citizens, without differentiation or discrimination, in 
all economic activities, especially the following: 
1. Movement and residence 
2. Work in private and government jobs 
3. Pension and social security. 
4. Engagement in all professions and crafts 
5. Engagement in all economic, investment and service activities 
6. Real estate ownership 
7. Capital movement 
8. Tax treatment 
9. Stock ownership and formation of corporations 
10. Education, health and social services 
Member States shall agree to complete implementation rules sufficient to carry this 
out and bring into being the Gulf Common Market." 
The GCC states agreed to establish the Common Market by 2007. Despite the fact 
that the GCC leaders are taking steps to implement it, (see chapter 5, section 5.3 
and 5.4) through enacting legislation to facilitate the free movement of labour and 
capital across the bloc, it is unlikely to be established by 2007. For instance, at the 
24th GCC summit in 2004 it was agreed by the GCC leaders that the deadline for 
completing a unified pension and social security system could be as late as 2010.41 
In addition, complications over the signing of bilateral FTAs have delayed the 
finalization of the Customs Union, an essential prerequisite of the Common Market. 
41 Badr-EI-Din A. I. "Intra-National Labor Mobility Between Arab Gulf Cooperation Council (AGCC) 
States-Towards Activating AGCC Economic Integration Process and Optimizing Human 
Resources Exploitation." Economic Research Forum, 12th Annual Conference, Cairo, December 
2005. 
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Details on establishing the Customs Union were also included in the 2001 
Economic Agreement. It was said that the Customs Union will be implemented no 
later than January 2003. The Customs Union included: 
1. A common external customs tariff (CET). 
2. Common customs regulations and procedures. 
3. Single entry point where customs duties are collected. 
4. Elimination of all tariff and non-tariff barriers, while taking into consideration 
laws of agricultural and veterinarian quarantine, as well as rules regarding 
prohibited and restricted goods. 
5. Goods produced in any Member State shall be accorded the same 
treatment as national products. 
In fact, the Customs Union was launched in 2003 and this was seen as a major 
achievement. According to a Qatari central bank official "The biggest obstacle (to 
CU) was to reach an agreement about the Customs Union and that was approved 
in 2003." But when Bahrain chose to negotiate a FTA bilaterally with the US in 
2004 and give the US preferential treatment equal to its GCC neighbours the 
completion of the Customs Union was put at risk. 
With regard to international trade agreements the 2001 Economic Agreement 
stated that member states would "Negotiate collectively in a manner that serves 
the negotiating position of the Member States." Therefore, bi-lateral trade 
agreements clearly contravene the agreement. Saudi Arabia unusually made 
public its displeasure at what it saw as Bahrain flouting GCC trade policy. Saudi 
Arabia's Foreign Minister Prince Saud AI-Faisal said of the bilateral FTAs, "the 
(Free Trade) agreements entered into are in clear violation of the GCC's economic 
accords and decisions. What is more important, these agreements impede the 
progressive steps needed to achieve full GCC economic integration.'t42 
42 Staff Writer, 'Saud slams neighbors for undermining GCC solidarity' Arab News, 6 December 
2004. 
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Other GCC states have however, since followed suit. In October 2005, Oman also 
signed up to a bilateral FT A with the US43 while Qatar and the UAE began 
negotiations. However, Qatar's FTA negotiations were frozen after what it called as 
unreasonable conditions being imposed upon it by Washington44 and the UAE's 
negotiations are taking longer than expected.45 Unfortunately, the issue has set a 
precedent indicating that the GCC states are willing to flout GCC integration 
principals and charters if they believe it is in their national interests to do so. 
Without each GCC state negotiating a similar FT A with the US the third and final 
stage of the Customs Union, which involved abolishing the customs functions of 
the intra-GCC border offices, cannot be completed.46 This is because GCC states 
without US FT As will have to be levy tariffs on US goods arriving as intra-GCC 
imports from GCC states with US FTAs, which will also be in conflict with the 
principle of the single point of entry. In fact, in late 2004, Saudi Arabia's Finance 
Minister, Dr. Ebrahim AI Assaf, announced plans to impose unilateral tariffs on US 
goods coming into Saudi Arabia from Bahrain.47 
In addition, in the absence of a harmonized trade policy it will be much harder for 
the GCC states to act as a regional economic bloc in international dealings and 
negotiations. One Emirati government official believed that bi-lateral FTAs had 
gone ahead because some GCC states were frustrated with multilateral 
negotiations, which in the case of the European Union had taken more than ten 
years to negotiate, "the EU FTA has taken at least 1 0 years and the GCC states 
need to reach agreements sooner. We want a liberal open policy to attract FDI and 
we can't wait for Saudi Arabia as it is not in our national interests." Yet one 
commercial banker in the UAE felt that the EU FT A negotiations had had a positive 
effect on the GCC, "The EU has acted as a catalyst (for GCC integration) because 
43 Negotiations took just seven months and were completed on 3 October 2005, GCC Economic 
Report, Issue 3, Gulf Research Center, Dubai, October 2005. 
44Staff Writer "Doha puts freeze on free-trade talks with Washington 'There are issues that need to 
be resolved"' Agence France Presse, 1 May 2006. 
45 Ameen, Ahmad "We do not want to harm our interests" Gulf News, 24 June 2006. 
46 GCC Secretariat General, Implementation Procedures for the Customs Union of the Cooperation 
Council for the Arab States of the .Gulf (The GCC Customs Union), 2003. 
47 AMEinfo, "Saudi/Bahrain trade dispute intensifies" 9 January 2005 
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they have said come to us as a region and not individually and the GCC have 
realized that they need to act as a region to boost trade and investment and this 
has been important." 
The disharmony in trade policy across the GCC states was thought by a large 
proportion of GCC experts to represent a significant stumbling block to the 
economic integration of the GCC states. According to an expert on GCC CU at the 
European Central Bank "Bilateral FTAs put in jeopardy the whole Customs Union 
and illustrates that you must have a common trade policy, but they haven't 
understood this." One Em irati government official said "US FTAs are an obstacle 
(to the integration process) and this is a political issue that must be dealt with." 
According to one GCC official, the impact of the bilateral FT As with the US could 
be serious for the region's full integration, "The Bahrain-US FTA is a crisis, it goes 
against the economic agreement and will be a test of the strength of the GCC and 
its viability, the problem has to be solved. The Customs Union started in 2003 and 
the transition stage should be over at the end of 2005 but the end could be delayed 
if the Bahrain problem isn't solved." In fact, rather ominously, implementing the final 
stage of the Customs Union has been postponed by two years. 
6.5 Preparing the Private Sector 
Private sector expectations about price stability and monetary credibility are crucial 
in determining future investment decisions and consequently economic growth. 
Expectations are influenced by the provision of information and therefore, 
preparing businesses and households for the CU adequately will be critical in 
reducing uncertainty and supporting economic confidence. 
The transition to CU is likely to produce important indirect effects which materialize 
through adjustments in the behaviour of economic agents to the change in 
economic system.48 GCC policy makers will therefore need to take action, to 
48 Commission of the European Communities, One Market, One Money An Evaluation of the 
Potential Benefits and Costs of Forming and Economic and Monetary Union, European Economy 
No. 44, October 1990. 
216 
inform, educate and prepare in order to smooth the transition to the single 
currency. 
Regional experts, interviewed for this thesis, were asked how they thought GCC 
citizens perceived the CU and whether they thought they were prepared for it or 
not. The majority of interviewees, 51 percent, thought that GCC citizens were not 
at all prepared for the CU. 
One AMF official commented "I'm not sure that they are sufficiently prepared and I 
would advise more promotion as happened before EMU they need to do more, I 
don't think it is too early as this is an ambitious project and needs much time." One 
Omani academic felt strongly about this issue, "The process does not have any 
credibility, getting citizens on board is important but that is not happening now. 
They are not prepared and this is a problem because there is a lack of trust and 
confidence." Several experts concurred with this sentiment. One independent 
researcher in the UAE said "There is a lack of education on this and more 
information is needed. They are not being prepared at all. We need more than a 
couple of years to educate people and bring them round and promote monetary 
union, I don't think it is too early to start to do this." 
The findings of the GCC wide business survey certainly underlined the fact that 
GCC businesses are not at all prepared for the CU, (see Table 6.4) and that this is 
a concern for them. Furthermore, there was a recognition that business uncertainty 
about the transition to the new monetary system may be costly for the private 
sector. 
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Table 6.4: Business Responses to Survey Question Thirteen 
Is your business making preparations for the CU in 201 0? 
Planning to 
Response Yes do so at a No Total 
later stage 
Percent 0% 26.2% 73.8% 100.0% 
In the business sample not a single GCC business said they were currently making 
preparations for the single currency although just over a quarter of respondents 
said that they would do so closer to 2010. Little specific information has been 
disseminated from the GCC Secretariat with regard to preparing for the CU thus far 
and even central bank officials have admitted a lack of preparedness for CU.49 
In the EMU countries concerted publicity campaigns informing businesses and the 
general public began at least three years before the launch of the euro and 
therefore there will soon be pressure on the GCC states to do the same from 
international institutions if they are to credibly meet the CU target of 2010. 
It should be of concern to GCC policymakers that most businesses said that they 
desired assistance in beginning to prepare for CU now and yet they are not 
receiving any help. The majority of business respondents- 59 percent- felt that 
GCC governments should be assisting and providing information for businesses to 
prepare for the CU at this time (see Table 6.5). The statistical significance of this 
majority was confirmed at the 95 percent confidence level (53-64 percent). Slightly 
more than one third of business respondents, 35 percent, felt that the GCC 
governments should provide assistance but closer to 2010. Only in Qatar, did the 
majority of businesses surveyed feel that GCC governments need not help 
businesses prepare until a later date. 
49 It should be noted that both the interviews and the survey took place during 2005. At that point in 
time there were still four full years prior to the launch of CU. 
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Table 6.5: Business Responses to Survey Question Sixteen 
Should the Government be providing assistance in preparing for the currency 
union? 
Yes, but 
Response Yes closer to No Total 
2010 
Percent 59.0% 34.9% 6.2% 100.0% 
The experience of EMU also shows that businesses can expect to incur some 
initial costs from the launch of the single currency. Businesses will be required to 
adapt their information technology, accounting, marketing, pricing and payroll 
systems in advance of the launch of the single currency and they must be made 
aware that this will only be a one off cost if they are to continue to see the process 
in a favourable light. 
However, GCC business survey respondents were uncertain as to whether the 
introduction of the single currency would temporarily increase their costs or not. 
The majority of business respondents, 52 percent, were unsure as to whether it 
would or not, whereas 37 percent thought it would not increase their costs and only 
12 percent thought it would (see Table 6.6). More than any other size of company it 
was SMEs that felt the CU would temporarily increase their costs, with 47 percent 
believing so. Unlike larger companies, SMEs may find it harder to absorb any 
increase in their costs resulting from the CU and therefore are more likely to be 
concerned by this. As several GCC states are developing and enacting policies to 
foster the growth of SMEs (see chapter four, section 4.3.3) it would be wise for 
them to provide assistance to these businesses on preparing for CU as soon as 
possible. 
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Table 6.6: Business Responses to Survey Question Nineteen 
Do you expect the introduction of the single currency to increase your costs? 
Response Yes No Not Sure Total 
Percent 11.7% 36.5% 51.8% 100.0% 
The urgency of providing this assistance is all the more acute given that the 
majority of business respondents, 57 percent, felt that some harm to their 
businesses would be caused by the introduction of the CU (for more details see 
chapter seven, section 7 .2.3). 
6.6 Political Commitment and Motivation 
Previous research has suggested that the traditional economic OCA criteria may 
be endogenous, i.e. that the political decision and clear commitment to establishing 
a CU itself has a positive feedback facilitating those economic adjustments 
required for the satisfaction of the OCA criteria. 50 In this respect it could be said 
that the political commitment to CU itself becomes a major policy prerequisite. In 
this section we aim to establish the degree of political commitment of the GCC 
leaders to the process of CU. This is not necessarily a straight forward task, due to 
the lack of transparency in the decision making process at the highest level in the 
GCC states. However, in addition to discussing the degree of political commitment 
to CU as evidenced by the pace of the process to date, we also attempt an 
analysis of the motivations of the GCC leaders behind the plan to establish a CU. 
As we shall argue, there may be an important relationship between the type of 
motivation which drives the decision making process for CU on the one hand, and 
on the other, the intensity of the political commitment to reaching that objective. 
50 Frankel, J.A and Rose, A.K. "The Endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area Criteria", NBER 
Working Paper 5700, August 1996. 
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6.6.1 Political Commitment to GCC CU 
The formation of the GCC and the signing of the Economic Agreement in 1981 
can be seen as the starting point for GCC economic integration and ultimately the 
creation of a Customs Union and a Common Market along European lines. 
However, the pace of progress faltered in the years following the ratification of the 
initial Economic Agreement. 
It was not until the 2001 summit that the GCC leaders agreed to spur on the 
economic integration process and signed a new Economic Agreement leading to 
the establishment of the Customs Union which still did not come into force until 
2003.51 An Em irati government official commented "They were supposed to have 
Customs Union in 1985-87 so it will probably be the same for the common 
currency, although they will never admit it." One Saudi government official 
remarked "It does not seem there is sufficient preparation towards the monetary 
union other than the meetings and the expression of interest or willingness". 
Another Saudi official said in a similar vein that few concrete decisions had been 
made and most meetings ended with little more than an "expression of willingness" 
to consider things further. 
One Emirati academic who doubted the commitment behind the CU project said "It 
is a common thing, and many groups of countries are trying to achieve it. But over 
the last twenty years progress towards integration has been very slow and this 
suggests that it isn't being taken seriously". An Em irati government official 
remarked, "It is an appealing concept for many and is taken as a fashion. 
Developing countries often try to emulate the developed countries but without 
looking seriously into the impact." While one Kuwaiti central bank official felt "They 
are trying to show unification but there is no incentive or drive for it." 
Crown Prince Abdullah himself admitted frustration over the slow pace of progress 
in his address to the 22nd GCC summit in 2001 "For over twenty years, the 
progress of the GCC (towards CU) has been very slow when compared with the 
51 Forming a Customs Union had been a GCC objective since the nineties. 
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pace of the modern age." Not surprisingly, the slow pace of regional economic 
integration in the past has raised concerns over the level of political commitment to 
the process. In 2001 Crown Prince Abdullah admitted that part of the problem was 
"our adherence to an exaggerated concept of sovereignty."52 
When regional experts were asked whether or not they thought the GCC CU would 
be established as scheduled in 2010, the largest proportion of experts thought that 
it would be delayed. Approximately 38 percent did not expect the CU to be 
established as scheduled, while 28 percent said they 'hoped so' or 'maybe' leaving 
only 26 percent who said they did think it would be established on schedule (see 
Figure 6.9). 
Figure 6.9: Interviewee Responses to Question Thirteen 
Do you believe the CU will be established as scheduled In 2010? 
Maybe I Hope so - 28% 
No I Delayed - 38% 
Source: GCC Expert Interviewees carried out between Oct. 2004 and Oct. 2005. 
Of those experts that felt the CU would not be established by 2010 most said that 
they thought it would be delayed by a period of between two to five years. 
However, two interviewees felt more pessimistic, one Saudi government official 
said ominously "I am inclined to say that it might not be established in the 
foreseeable future." 
52 AI-Saud, Abdullah bin Abdulaziz "Address to the Gulf Cooperation Council" Middle East Policy, 
Vol. IX, No. 1, March 2002. 
222 
Several experts based their responses on their perception of the political will of the 
GCC leaders. Others anticipated delays simply because past experience had 
shown frequent delays in the implementation of other important GCC policies and 
some said that they did not think the GCC states would be adequately prepared in 
time. One Emirati government official commented "Monetary union was first 
mentioned in 1982; until today we have still not achieved this. From past 
experience it will not happen on schedule, unless something extraordinary 
happens." While one commercial banker in Kuwait said "they won't be ready on 
time, everything in the region takes so long it will be indefinitely delayed." 
However, one Emirati government official considered that external as much as 
internal factors had weakened the political will for CU. He said "It will not be on 
time because the political will is not there, and the Americans won't allow it. The 
bilateral FTAs have shown that they (the US) prefer to see division among the 
GCC states." As we have already noted bilateral FT As with the US are inherently 
inconsistent with the achievement of GCC CU and it may be that future 
relationships with the US, more than political lethargy on the part of the regional 
elites, will determine the speed with which the GCC CU project now advances. 
This important observation leads us directly to the question of motivation. What 
were (and are today) the primary causal factors pushing the ruling elites in the Gulf 
states towards a CU. 
6.6.2 The Motivations behind GCC CU 
GCC experts were asked what they thought was the primary motivation behind the 
GCC leaders' decision to commit themselves to CU. The question was deliberately 
open ended in order to allow interviewees to express their own views and opinions 
on the factors influencing the process. However, while interviews were carried out 
in complete confidence, it must be admitted, that interviewees in some GCC states 
may have been inhibited from answering this question in a frank and open manner. 
With this caveat, it emerges that the largest proportion of regional expert 
interviewees, 33 percent, felt that the motivation behind establishing a GCC CU 
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was based on economic considerations, However, a quarter of respondents said 
that they thought the key rationale was political, 19 percent, thought that the 
decision was as much political as economic and 22 percent believed that emulating 
the success of the EMU was the main source of motivation (see Figure 6.1 0) 
Figure 6.10: Interviewee Responses to Question One 
What Is the main motivation behind the GCC leaders' decision to establish CU? 
Political- 25% 
Both polttlcal 
and economic • 19% 
Economic · 34% 
Source: GCC Expert Interviewees carried out between Oct. 2004 and Oct. 2005. 
Among those who cited economic reasons only, one Omani academic thought, 
"The Intention is to advance economic integration in trade and to exploit economies 
of scale". An independent researcher in Kuwait said emphatically "There is an 
economic rationale, they realize there are efficiency gains to be had, especially 
considering that they have many similarities, they feel it would be easy. I have no 
doubt it is driven by economic considerations." One commercial banker in Kuwait 
said "It is because of economic reasons, they are very small countries and it is the 
only way for them to compete and create economies of scale, without economies 
of scale it makes developing manufacturing industries difficult for them." While one 
Emirati central bank official felt that monetary union would act as an important 
catalyst for future economic reforms, he commented "the adoption of the common 
currency will trigger much needed reforms that will improve dramatically growth 
prospects and diversification away from oil for all member countries." 
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Of those respondents who thought that political motives were the most important 
driving force, one Bahraini central bank official felt this way, "The objective is to be 
unified from a political point of view. Following this they have tried to develop the 
relationship in economic terms." Another central bank official, this time in the UAE, 
remarked "In our view, one of the main motivations is political: the commitment of 
the leadership to the unification of the Gulf region" While one AMF official 
commented "The forming of the GCC was a political issue and now they want to 
give an economic layer to their political club. But the economic motivation is 
secondary." While one Saudi GCC Secretariat official commented "Political 
integration is key. The GCC was established in 1981 and the Economic Agreement 
was signed as a means to strengthen the bloc". 
In addition to the comments of interviewees, the Director General of the AMF, Dr. 
Jassim AI Mannai, in a keynote address at the Gulf Euro summit in 2000 
expressed his view that "Economic and monetary union is above all a political 
project. The main purpose is not only to raise economic efficiency, but essentially 
to change and improve the way the region is managed and governed."53 
A number of interviewees felt that the motivation was both economic and political. 
One independent researcher in the UAE said "Politics and economics are 
inseparable." Another independent researcher on the GCC said "There will be 
some economic gains in fostering integration and diversification. But as with 
Europe it is ultimately a political decision". 
Some 22 percent of interviewees felt that the GCC states were simply following a 
trend inspired by the example of EMU. Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia 
himself alluded to this in 2001, saying "The example of the European Union is a 
model to follow". 54 One Saudi government official also thought this was a factor 
and remarked, "Having agreed to the Customs Union the GCC, following the 
53 Keynote Address by Dr. Jassim AI Mannai, Director General of the Board, Arab Monetary Fund, 
on The Euro Impact on the GCC Economic and Finance, Gulf Euro Summit, Dubai, 8-9 October, 
2000. 
54 AI-Saud, Abdullah bin Abdulaziz. op.cit. 
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traditional EU inspired integration process, has moved to establish a monetary 
union." One Emirati central bank official remarked, "After the formation of the GCC 
in 1981 the aim was to emulate what the EU has achieved." 
However, it should be noted that in the case of the European Union any reading of 
the relevant EU literature makes it clear that both the formation of a Common 
Market and the establishment of CU were driven primarily by a political imperative 
rather than being based on the economic merits of the project. 55 Despite some 
major economic disparities between its members, EMU succeeded because of the 
perceived political advantages of the project rather than its economic merits. 56 
Political commitment to EMU was itself driven by political motivations. For over a 
century Europe had been torn apart by internecine wars culminating in the horrors 
of \11M/ II. The politicians who drove the CU and Common Market agenda were 
haunted by the disaster of earlier years in which millions had died and they were 
determined that this should never happen again. In particular they were obsessed 
with the idea that the perennial struggle between Germany and France, which had 
lasted from the Franco Prussian War of 1870 until the collapse of the Nazis in 
1945, would never be repeated. The formation of the European Union was the 
outcome of these political and strategic decisions much more than any desire to 
e.g. establish economies of scale in production or free trade between the European 
nations per se. 
Returning to our panel of regional experts, while it is true that the largest proportion 
of experts, 34 percent, thought that the economic rationale was the main 
motivating force, the remaining 66 percent either explicitly or implicitly recognised 
the importance of political motivation in varying degrees. The second largest group 
(25 percent) thought politics the primary issue, 19 percent also recognised that 
politics played a part along with economic factors, and the 22 percent who thought 
55 Feldstein, M. 'The Political Economy of the European Economic and Monetary Union: Political 
Sources of an Economic Liability" The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp23-42, 
autumn 1997. 
56 Ibid. 
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that emulation of the European Union was the leading motivating factor seems to 
suggest that these interviewees recognised that the Union's success was, at least 
in part, a political, phenomenon. 
One could go further. The experience of the EU suggests that the stronger the role 
of political, as opposed to economic, considerations in motivating the participants 
in a potential CU, the stronger will be the political commitment to the process of 
implementing that CU. Admittedly the evidence for this proposition is scant since 
there have been so few CUs formed, but a priori it seems plausible and, as we 
have said, the experience of the European Union and EMU certainly supports it. In 
the following chapter, we will return to the issue of political motivation in discussing 
the political benefrts of forming a CU (see chapter seven, section 7.5.2) 
6.7 Conclusion 
It would appear in some ways that the GCC states fair better in terms of their 
suitability for CU vis-a-vis OCA criteria than they do in terms of their prospects for 
implementing appropriate economic and political policies prior to 2010. Even 
though they have a major advantage in comparison with the EU countries prior to 
MU in that they have stable fixed exchange rates as well as sharing cultural and 
linguistic traits, several key stumbling blocs remain. These challenges include; 
agreeing to, and meeting, the fiscal and monetary convergence criteria, deciding 
upon the mandate, set up and location of the central bank, improving regional 
statistics, completing the Customs Union and Common Market and preparing the 
private sector from scratch. But above all else the political commitment to the very 
concept of CU still appears to be less than wholehearted in the case of some of the 
GCC states. 
Nevertheless, that is not to say that this problem cannot be overcome and it may 
be that the current political turbulence in the Middle East may bring the GCC 
countries to a greater awareness of the overall gains that can be obtained from 
much greater economic (and political) integration, of which the formation of 
successful CU is but one part, albeit a very important one. In other words, as we 
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suggested in the previous section of this chapter, as the political and gao-strategic 
pay-off from CU becomes more apparent, so the political commitment to pushing 
ahead with the CU project will increase. 
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Chapter 7 : The Potential Costs and Benefits of a 
GCC Currency Union 
7.1 Introduction 
The potential costs and benefits of a GCC CU depend primarily on two factors. 
Firstly, the degree to which member states meet the OCA criteria (see chapter five) 
and secondly, whether the essential prerequisite policies are implemented (see 
chapter six). The main direct cost of joining a CU is the loss of an independent 
monetary policy setting. The potential cost of ceding monetary sovereignty 
depends on several factors including intra-regional labour and capital mobility and 
the degree to which the economic cycles of prospective members are 
synchronised. The direct benefits of CU arise from efficiency gains through a 
reduction in transaction costs and elimination of exchange rate uncertainty. The 
size of these direct gains is contingent on the level of intra-regional trade and 
investment. There will also be many other indirect potential costs and benefits 
arising from the integration and convergence process. Furthermore, policy 
decisions taken ex post will also have the potential to benefit the economic bloc. 
Indirect benefits of CU may also be enjoyed by both consumers and producers 
arising from the establishment of a single market. Access to an enlarged market 
will help businesses exploit economies of scale and at the same time increased 
competition will lead to pressure on prices. Greater integration of the Gulfs 
financial markets will offer more diversified investment and funding opportunities 
and help to allocate capital more efficiently. 
Several decades after formulating the OCA theory, Robert Mundell considered a 
wider range of associated costs and benefits of establishing a CU, many of these 
political economy considerations are of particular relevance to the GCC 
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economies. 1 One such indirect benefit may arise as a result of the GCC becoming 
a more powerful and cohesive entity with greater influence in economic and 
political discussions with the ability to act as a countervailing influence against the 
domination of neighbouring powers. 2 Mundell also proposes that the prospective 
members of a CU may consider the advantages from establishing an international 
currency, from which they could earn seigniorage revenues.3 While one possible 
reason why a potential member state may be reluctant to join a CU, suggests 
Mundell, could be that it wants to protect the secrecy of its national statistics. 
Indeed, rumours persist that some Gulf monarchies benefit from oil sales that are 
kept out of the given country's national accounts. 
The loss of some degree of national sovereignty over fiscal policy may therefore be 
considered a 'cost' by some prospective member states even though tighter fiscal 
discipline is likely to benefit the union as a whole. Where such 'loss of sovereignty' 
costs are felt particularly acutely by the rulers of a particular GCC state they may 
even constitute a serious obstacle to the very progress of CU itself. However, we 
must be aware that in a political context in which there may be a serious 
transparency deficit with respect to basic financial data on the state's incomes and 
expenditures, the costs incurred in the alleged 'loss of sovereignty' may be 'costs' 
to the ruling elite alone. 
That is not to say, that the enforcement of fiscal discipline rules by a supranational 
GCC body might not initially involve possibly painful adjustment costs for some 
member states if it means that spending plans have to be curtailed. This illustrates 
the point that some factors that may initially incur some short-term costs will 
eventually result in long-term benefits. Just as improved fiscal discipline in the 
GCC should, in time, lower borrowing costs for the region, improve business 
confidence and help to attract greater levels of FDI. 
1 Mundell, Robert A. "Updating the agenda for monetary union" in Optimum Currency Areas: New 
Analytical and Policy Developments, (Eds. Blejer, M.l., Frenkel, J.A., Leiderman, L., and Razin, A.) 
IMF, 1997. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
230 
Finally, we should be aware of the relevance of the 'Lucas Critique' to an analysis 
of the costs (and benefits) of GCC CU.4 Once CU is established some 
asymmetries between GCC states that may have made CU appear more costly for 
them, may simply become less acute, because the adoption of the union itself has 
changed the behaviour and expectations of economic agents. In such a situation, 
which is similar to the argument put forward by Frankel and Rose5 that many of the 
OCA criteria are 'endogenous' to the policy of CU, there will undoubtedly be much 
fewer costs of forming the CU. 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the potential costs and benefits of CU for the 
GCC as a whole. In doing so we make particular use of empirical evidence drawn 
from the GCC business survey and from opinions provided by regional experts, in 
interviews for this thesis. It will be left to the following chapter (chapter eight) to 
look at the costs and benefits of the envisaged CU on a country by country basis. 
The potential impact of CU on GCC business expectations and the potential micro 
economic efficiency gains which may over time translate into macroeconomic 
growth are considered in section 7.2. Within this section, we examine the following: 
the potential efficiency gains of CU, the impact of the CU on GCC wide prices, the 
expected effect on the business climate and investment decisions and finally the 
implications for the growth of GCC capital markets. 
Section 7.3 concentrates on how CU will influence the ability of the GCC 
economies to adjust to potential economic shocks. Despite employing interest 
rates primarily for exchange rate targeting, the GCC national central banks have 
some, albeit limited, monetary policy independence with which to steer their 
domestic economies. In this section we assess the potential cost of losing this 
monetary policy autonomy which will not be available to them once tied into CU.6 It 
4 Lucas, Robert, "Economic Policy Evaluation: A Critique", in The Phillips Curve and Labour 
Markets, (Eds.K.Brunner and A.Melzer}, Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 1: 
19-46, 1976. 
5 Frankel, J. A and Rose, A. K, "The Endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area Criteria," 
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(449), pages 1009-25, July 1998. 
6 See chapter 4 "GCC Economic Performance and Policy 1980-2005". 
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also discusses the choice of exchange rate arrangement and monetary policy for 
the single GCC currency once established. This policy remains to be determined 
and in light of differences in existing monetary policy preferences may prove to be 
a contentious issue for the GCC leaders. 
Section 7.4 considers the fiscal policy consequences of CU. Fiscal discipline is 
required for CU stability and inevitably translates into some loss of national 
sovereignty over fiscal policy decision making. Firstly, we discuss the importance 
of appropriately designed fiscal rules for the region that do not impinge on the 
economic development of these states. Following this, we assess the relevance of 
the alleged 'cost' to fiscal policy sovereignty and the extent to which it may be 
merely a cloak for a desire to hide the misappropriation of public funds by ruling 
elites, while at the same time recognising that the perception of such a potential 
'cost' may slow the process of CU. 
In the final section, section 7.5, the main political economy dimensions of CU are 
considered. The likelihood of the 'Gulf dinar' becoming a significant 'Islamic 
Currency' and the conditions required for such a scenario and whether or not such 
an outcome is perceived as desirable is first discussed. Finally this section focuses 
on one particular benefit of CU not usually considered by economists: that forming 
a successful CU may strengthen feelings of solidarity and socio-political unity 
among the members, sentiments which may enhance the region's self confidence 
and its international status. 
7.2 Business Expectations and Growth 
At the micro level and from the perspective of businesses, the direct gains from 
forming a CU comprise efficiency gains which are assumed to arise from the 
elimination of transaction costs and exchange rate uncertainty. The corresponding 
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improvements in micro level efficiencies are expected to lead to increases in 
macroeconomic output and welfare gains for consumers. 7 
In the case of the GCC economies, these gains are often expected to be rather 
limited because of the region's existing fixed exchange rates and relatively small 
levels of intra-regional trade. However, the removal of exchange rate costs erodes 
the non-tariff barriers to trade in goods and services that can hinder trade and 
therefore may promote its growth. Section 7.2.1 investigates the potential 
significance of micro economic efficiency gains as described above, using 
evidence from the GCC business survey as well as previous trade analysis carried 
out in chapter five. 
Building on the benefits of a Common Market, a single currency also allows for the 
direct comparison of the price of goods and services across member states and 
therefore is expected to reduce price discrimination and foster greater competition. 
The potential impact of the CU on region wide price levels and price transparency 
is discussed in section 7.2.2. 
The expectations of the GCC business community are important because they 
influence future investment decisions; which ultimately drive private sector growth. 
Therefore the expectations of the GCC business community regarding the effect of 
the CU on their businesses and the eventual success of the CU are examined 
using evidence from the business survey in section 7.2.3. 
Finally, the indirect effect of a single currency on the region's capital markets is 
examined in section 7.2.4. The experience of EMU has illustrated that the indirect 
effect of the single currency led to a significant increase in regional and 
international liquidity attracted to pan-regional investment vehicles and an 
expansion of issues particularly in the region's corporate bond markets. 
7 Commission of the European Communities, One Market, One Money An Evaluation of the 
Potential Benefits and Costs of Forming an Economic and Monetary Union, European Economy No. 
44, October 1990. 
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7 .2.1 Potential Efficiency Gains 
Analysis in chapter five revealed that intra-GCC trade, at less than 8 percent of 
total imports, was low in conventional terms and when trade as a proportion of 
regional GOP was compared with the EMU countries prior to establishing a CU.8 
However, as a proportion of non-crude oil trade, intra-GCC exports are more 
important amounting to 18 percent of total exports.9 Moreover, our business survey 
sample showed that a large proportion of GCC businesses, in particular for SMEs, 
have strong trading links with other GCC states. 10 SMEs constitute a large 
segment of the GCC business community11 as was reflected in the business 
sample,12 and the burden of currency-related transaction costs weighs heavier for 
them than for larger companies. This suggests therefore that the single currency, 
by eliminating albeit small exchange rate transaction costs for a significant number 
of SMEs should be beneficial for these businesses. 
Measuring the aggregate potential savings from the removal of these micro level 
costs is important, but in the absence of aggregate bank data on GCC exchange 
rate transactions, it is difficult to come to a precise estimate of their size. In the 
case of EMU the savings for businesses through the removal of exchange rate 
related transaction costs was estimated to be equal to 0.4 percent of the European 
Community's GDP.13 Therefore, in the case of the GCC economies such savings 
are clearly likely to be smaller than that of the European Community. 
Indeed, when GCC businesses were asked what they considered to be the main 
obstacles to the growth of their business within the GCC, exchange rate related 
costs were not considered to be very important. Respondents most frequently 
chose 'restrictive regulations' as being the main obstacle to their growth at 34 
8 Intra-regional trade formed only 2.6 percent of GCC GOP in 2004 compared with 12.8 percent of 
the Eurozone's GOP in 1998. 
9 ln 2002, see chapter 5, table 5.5. 
10 See Chapter 5, section 5.2. 
11 According to one report SMEs represent 93 per cent of Saudi Arabia's total business enterprises. 
See Ismail I. Sajini, 'Effects of WTO on Small & Medium Enterprises' Arab News, 19 January 2004 
12 See appendix F, for a detailed analysis of the economic characteristics of the GCC business 
survey sample. 
13 Commission of the European Communities, Ibid. 
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percent followed by 'Lack of skilled labour' at 16 percent, while only 6.6 percent of 
respondents chose 'Exchange Rate Related Costs' (see Table 7.1). 
Several other obstacles were therefore felt to be more important than exchange 
rate related costs which will be eliminated by the CU. This result indicates that 
businesses perceive other micro-level factors affecting the business environment in 
which they operate to be of greater importance to the growth of their businesses. 
The simplification of bureaucratic formalities and harmonisation of business 
regulations across the GCC are therefore important reforms that will improve the 
GCC's growth potential and foster greater intra-GCC trade. They should therefore 
be considered by GCC policy makers as complementary reforms in the process of 
achieving regional economic integration. 
Table 7.1: Business Views on the Obstacles to the Growth of their Business 
Potential Obstacle Frequency 
Restrictive Regulations 33.9% 
Lack of Skilled Labour 15.9% 
Lack of Clear Property Rights 14.1% 
Protective Tariffs and Quotas 14.1% 
Lack of Access to Credit 14.1% 
Exchange Rate Related Costs 6.6% 
Other Obstacles 1.3% 
Total 100% 
Source: GCC Busmess Survey on Currency Umon, June-September 2005 
Businesses were also asked explicitly whether CU would offer benefits to their 
company and in what ways. Overall, the majority of respondents, 84 percent,14 
thought that the CU would provide some micro level benefits. Businesses were 
prompted to consider what these benefits would be, and the removal of exchange 
rate risk and new business opportunities were thought to be of the greatest 
potential benefit. Businesses chose 'Reducing Exchange Rate Risk' and 'New 
14 When the 95 per cent confidence interval for this proportion was calculated, the confidence limits 
(84 +/- 4 per cent) confirmed that a comfortable majority of businesses held this view. 
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Business Opportunities' most frequently as the areas with the highest and second 
highest potential for benefiting their businesses. The remaining two areas of 
'Increasing Sales' and 'Reducing Transaction Costs' were more frequently chosen 
as having the least, or second least potential for benefiting businesses (see Table 
7.2). 
Table 7.2: Business Views on the Potential Benefits of GCC CU 
Some Benefit None 
2nd 3rd 
Highest Least 
Highest Highest None Total 
potential 
potential potential 
potential 
Reducing 
Exchange Rate 31% 21% 16% 16% 16% 100% 
Risk 
New Business 
29% 20% 20% 15% 16% 100% 
Opportunities 
Reducing 
Transaction 21% 20% 19% 24% 16% 100% 
Costs 
Increasing Sales 20% 19% 19% 26% 16% 100% 
Source: GCC Busmess Survey on Currency Umon, June-September 2005. 
So although GCC businesses did not consider currency and exchange rate issues 
to be very important when asked the unprompted question about factors limiting 
the growth of their businesses, they did acknowledge the importance of exchange 
rate risk when asked the prompted question about the benefits of GCC CU. This 
would seem to suggest that in spite of the fact that CU issues do not rank very 
highly for GCC businesses at present, there is nevertheless support for any 
measures which would reduce future exchange rate risks and clearly CU would 
achieve this objective. 
It should also be pointed out that as well as leading to some efficiency gains in the 
traded goods market, the GCC market for services should also benefit from CU. In 
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fact, a substantial proportion of the survey respondents were service sector 
companies.15 The introduction of the single currency is expected to increase the 
demand for services across the region as intra-GCC tourism and travel is 
facilitated. 
7 .2.2 The Single Market and Prices 
An indirect gain from the elimination of transaction costs is to reduce the potential 
for price discrimination between the GCC markets. Price discrimination occurs 
because of segmentation between markets brought about, at least in part, by the 
existence of different national currencies. 16 
A single GCC currency will allow for direct comparison between the price of goods 
and services across the GCC states thus making price discrimination much more 
difficult for producers. In light of extensive intra-GCC tourism and travel, price 
disparities will become increasingly obvious to consumers. The improved price 
transparency will benefit consumers and should have positive implications for both 
consumption and investment decisions. For reasons such as these, the majority of 
regional experts interviewed felt that CU will be in the best interest of GCC citizens. 
However, much will depend on the establishment of the Common Market in 
removing other non-exchange rate related transaction costs for businesses 
operating across the GCC. 
The business survey conducted for this thesis provides some information on the 
potential impact a single GCC currency will have on GCC wide prices and price 
discrimination within the GCC. Businesses were asked whether they expected to 
charge the same price for identical goods across the region after the introduction of 
the single currency. In fact, business respondents were split equally as to whether 
or not they would charge the same prices for identical products across the GCC, 
(see Figure 7.1).Those respondents that said they wouldn't charge the same price 
15 See appendix F. 
16 Engle, C. and Rogers, J. "How Wide is the Border?" International Finance Discussion Paper, no. 
498, Washington D.C.: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1995. 
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for their goods cited 'varying operating costs' most frequently such as differences 
in local taxes, fees and overhead costs; such factors can also be considered as a 
form of transaction costs. This result suggests that eliminating the cost of buying 
and selling foreign currencies across the GCC is not the only source of transaction 
costs for businesses. 
Figure 7.1: Impact of Currency Union on Price Discrimination 
Post CU, do you expect to charcJI! the same price for identical products across GCC states? 
Not applicable! - 6% 
Yes- 47% 
No - 47% 
Source: GCC Busln&ss Survey on Currency Union, June - September 2005. 
This finding has implications for purchasing power parity (PPP) across the GCC 
states following CU. Previous research by Hassanain 17 found evidence of PPP in 
the real exchange rates of the GCC states. However, past deviations from PPP 
have been persistent, due to years of fixed nominal exchange rates, periods of 
high dollar volatility and weak goods market arbitrage.18 Such persistent deviations 
in PPP distort efficient resource allocation across the region as well as penalizing 
customers in some GCC states. 
Therefore, without the establishment of a single GCC market, allowing for effective 
arbitrage between traded goods markets and the removal of non-exchange rate 
related transaction costs, differences in PPP following the launch of the CU are 
17 Hassanain, Khalifah "Purchasing power parity: further evidence and implications" Review of 
Middle East Economics and Finance, Vol. 2, No. 1, 63-77, April2004. 
16 Ibid. 
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likely to continue. 19 This finding was supported by several regional experts who felt 
that the assumed benefits to GCC consumers would be dependent on the full 
implementation of the GCC Common Market. In mid 2006, it was reported that the 
GCC Secretariat was expected to announce a proposal making the pricing of all 
consumer goods in all six GCC currencies mandatory, evidently an attempt to 
improve price transparency and goods market arbitrage.20 
The initial impact of introducing the GCC single currency may cause some 
temporary inflationary pressure, as was the case in the Eurozone c.ountries.21 
These post CU inflation increases stem from the conversion of prices in the old 
national currencies which are then rounded up to the nearest unit price in the new 
currency. While it will be important for GCC governments to provide rules 
instructing when prices should be rounded up or down, inevitably there will be 
some surreptitious price increases as businesses attempt to recoup some of their 
costs from adjusting their business systems to the new currency. 
Of those businesses in the survey sample that thought the introduction of the 
single currency would increase their costs, the overwhelming majority, 67 per cent, 
said that they would pass these on to customers. This finding suggests that 
inflation will rise initially following the introduction of the single currency, although it 
is uncertain to what degree. 
19 In the case of EMU, the bulk of price convergence across the members was found to occur 
following the completion of the single market, rather than after the launch of the common currency. 
See Rogers, J.A. "Monetary union, price level convergence, and inflation: How close is Europe to 
the United States?" International Finance Discussion Paper, No. 740, Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, October 2002. 
20 AI Hakeem, Mariam "GCC to require price tags in all Gulf currencies" Gulf News, 10 July 2006. 
21 The increase in eurozone inflation rates was not however, reflected in the official statistics of the 
Eurozone countries. Evidence suggests that the Eurozone inflation rate was underestimated and 
that there has been a downward bias in measuring inflation since 2002 of at least 6 percent. The 
economic rationale proposed by the authors for this phenomenon is that the currency changeover 
acted as a device that led firms with market power to increase their prices. See Marini, G., 
Piergallini, A. and Scaramozzino, P., "Inflation Bias after the Euro: Evidence from the UK and Italy", 
Centre for Financial and Management Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies, London, 
August 2004, 
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7 .2.3 Business Climate and Investment 
GCC businesses were also asked whether they expected the single currency had 
the potential to harm their businesses and in what way. The majority of 
respondents, 57 percent, believed that there would be some negative effects from 
the CU on their businesses (see Table 7.3). The statistical significance of this 
majority (i.e. > 50 per cent) is confirmed by the confidence interval at the 95 
percent level (57 +/- 5.5). 
Of the potentially negative effects of the CU for businesses, 44 percent of 
businesses ranked 'Increased Competition' as causing the 'Most Harm' or second 
most harm and 35 percent of businesses felt that 'Increased Economic 
Uncertainty', had the greatest or second greatest potential to harm their business. 
The responses to this question indicate that concerns over increasing regional 
competition are uppermost in the minds of GCC businesses. In particular, SMEs 
rather than larger companies were concerned about the initially harmful effect on 
their businesses of increased regional competition. However, although individual 
businesses may fear increasing competition and consider it to be a potential cost of 
the CU, in the long run increased competition should be beneficial for the 
economies in the region. 
Table 7.3: Business Views on the Potential Costs of GCC CU 
Some Harm None Total 
2nd 
Most Least 
Most 
Harm Harm 
Harm 
Increased Competition 30% 14% 13% 43% 100.0% 
Changing Payments System 12% 22% 23% 43% 100.0% 
Increased Economic Uncertainty 14% 21% 22% 43% 100.0% 
Source: GCC Busmess Survey on Currency Umon, June-September 2005. 
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Up until recently, intra-GCC competition in goods and services has been fairly 
limited. Therefore the emergence of stronger regional competition could potentially 
be beneficial in stimulating efficiency improvements and company restructuring 
which will eventually help to prepare GCC companies for competition in 
international markets, which they will face as all six GCC states are now members 
of the WTO. Increased intra-GCC competition may also potentially put pressure on 
prices which will be welfare enhancing for GCC consumers. 
In spite of the fact that GCC businesses expressed a number of concerns about 
the potential costs of CU (see Table 7.3) and the fact that unprompted they do not 
rank exchange rate costs very highly as an obstacle to the growth of their own 
individual businesses (see Table 7.1), it is nevertheless significant that the results 
of the GCC-wide business survey indicate a general optimism in the business 
community at the macro level regarding the future CU. 
When businesses were asked how they felt about the overall effect of a GCC 
single currency and its likely success, the results were very positive. The majority 
of businesses - 76 percent - felt 'very optimistic' or 'optimistic' about its likely 
success. The 95 percent confidence level for this 76 percent 'optimistic' reply was 
calculated at (76 +/- 5). Only 5 percent of the businesses sampled were 
'pessimistic' or 'very pessimistic' (see Figure 7 .2). 
Businesses were also optimistic about the CU when it came to their own prospects. 
When asked specifically how they thought the single currency would affect their 
businesses, the majority of businesses - again, 76 percent- said that they thought 
the effect would be 'good', or 'very good'. The strength of this result was also 
supported at the 95 confidence level (76+/- 5). Only two percent of the business 
respondents thought that the effect of the CU would be 'bad' or 'very bad' (see 
Figure 7.2). From this result it would be fair to say that overall GCC businesses 
appear to think that CU will be a 'good thing' but consider other factors (e.g. 
restrictive regulations) to be of greater priority for their businesses. 
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Figure 7.2: Business Expectations Regarding the CU 
Effect of CU on your business Likely success of CU 
80%-r------~r-------T-------~-------.--------r-------. 
70% 
60% 
50% 
40% 
30% 
20% 
10% 
0% 
Positive Neutral Positive Neutral 
Source: GCC Business Survey on Currency Union, June • Septeml»r 2005. 
Negative 
Overall, the responses of the survey sample indicate that GCC businesses are 
reasonably confident about the expected success of the GCC CU and are 
optimistic about the likely effect it will have on their businesses. This finding bodes 
well for investment trends and thus growth in the GCC economies during the 
transition period to currency union. 
Similarly, the majority of regional experts interviewed for this thesis, expect the CU 
to have some positive effect on the region's economic development. Generally, it is 
considered that many gains will result from the establishment of the Common 
Market but that the single currency will provide additional benefits through 
improving efficiency, competitiveness and promoting investment. The enlarged 
economic market will allow GCC businesses to exploit economies of scale that 
were not available to them previously, a theme to which we will return in chapter 
eight. 
7 .2.4 Capital Market Growth 
Despite being listed by Mundell, in the OCA literature, as an important adjustment 
mechanism compensating for the loss of flexible exchange rates resulting from CU, 
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capital market integration is in fact an endogenous criterion that is likely to be 
promoted by the policy of forming a CU. 
The experience of the euro has shown that the financial sector can gain 
substantially from the introduction of a unified currency. The impact of the euro on 
European financial markets and corporate bond markets in particular, has been 
significant. Euro denominated equity markets amounted to much more than the 
sum of aggregate national markets and corporate bond markets saw significant 
growth post EMU. Corporate debt issuance expanded substantially on the launch 
of the euro, ''with the combined issuance of the corporate and financial sectors 
more than quadrupling since 1998".22 The introduction of the euro, it is also 
thought, led to the lessening of other technical and regulatory constraints which 
had previously segmented European financial markets. 23 
Integration between the relatively segmented GCC financial markets is a process 
which has been occurring gradually over the period of study, but the pace has 
quickened in the past few years.24 GCC capital markets have expanded rapidly in 
recent years, with stock market capitalization to GOP reaching on average 177 
percent of GOP in 2005.25 However, the markets still suffer from limited breadth of 
investments and illiquidity as a large proportion of shares are held by government 
entities. For example, according to Luciani, two of the main Saudi companies by 
market capitalization, SABIC and Saudi Telecommunications Company, account 
for 45 percent or more of the total worth of the Tadawu/ bourse, yet only 30 percent 
of their shares are available for trading and of that 30 percent much is in the hands 
of long term institutional investors that hold onto it for the long run. 26 
The inauguration of the single currency and the Common Market will accelerate the 
process of GCC capital market integration and potentially benefit these markets 
22 Galati, G. and Tsatsaronis, K. 'The Impact of the Euro on Europe's Financial Markets', Bank for 
International Settlements Working Paper No. 100, July 2001. 
23 Ibid. 
24 See Chapter 5, section 5.4. 
25 Calculated using data from GCC stock exchanges and Central Banks. 
26 Luciani, Giacomo "The Pace and Problems with GCC Privatizations" in Gulf Yearbook 2005-
2006, pp. 147-155, Gulf Research Center, Dubai, 2006. 
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directly and indirectly. The direct effects of the single currency comprise of the 
removal of exchange rate risk and future uncertainty about exchange rates as well 
as increasing the transparency of asset prices and returns. Further indirect effects 
operate through the enlargement and deepening of GCC financial markets which 
reduces liquidity risk. In addition, the reduced risk of cross border transactions will 
generate increased diversification options for regional investors and allow for the 
rebalancing of portfolios towards assets that may have previously been considered 
too risky, thus increasing the breadth of GCC financial markets as well?7 
There is also much room for the development of GCC secondary bond markets 
which have remained relatively undeveloped with GCC bond issues amounting to 
less than an estimated 3 percent of GDP.28 GCC Islamic bonds, commonly referred 
to by their Arabic name, sukuks, have grown significantly in importance and have 
attracted significant investments in recent years. As was the case in EMU, new 
issues of sukuks in the single GCC currency will most likely attract greater regional 
funds, as well as international capital. As of the end of 2005, most GCC sukuks 
have been issued in dollars, only the First Islamic Investment Bank of Bahrain had 
issued a sukuk in euros. 29 With the launch of the unified GCC currency, the choice 
of issuing in the regional currency will be attractive for GCC governments and 
corporations in order to reduce their currency exposure. 
Furthermore, depending on the success of the Gulf 'dinar' and whether the 
currency remains pegged to the dollar or not, it could become the currency of 
choice in the issuance of non-GCC Islamic sukuks which so far have also been 
predominantly issued in dollars.30 Opening up further to international investors 
should also increase liquidity in these markets; as new pan-GCC investment 
vehicles are likely to attract additional GCC as well as international funds. 
27 Danthine, J.P.,Giavazzi, F. and Ludwig von-Thadden, E. "European Financial Markets after EMU: 
A First Assessment", NBER Working Paper 8044, December, 2000. 
28 Sturm, M. and Siegfried, N. "Regional Monetary Integration in the Member States of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council", European Central Bank, Occasional Paper Series, No. 31, June 2005. 
29 The Liquidity Management Centre, Global Sukuk Table, July 2006, (accessed at 
http://www.lmcbahrain .com/) 
30 Wilson, Rodney, "Exchange rate issues for Muslim economies" International Seminar on 
Macroeconomics in Islamic Perspective, International Islamic University Malaysia, September 2004. 
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Approximately two fifths of the GCC experts interviewed thought that the region's 
capital markets would benefit from a single currency. One independent researcher 
remarked "Monetary Union is a good vehicle for financial market integration. It will 
lead to more efficient allocation of resources with better returns." One AMF official 
commented "Capital markets, investment and FDI will benefit, capital movement 
will be much easier and GCC companies will thrive as a result." Indeed, the 
benefits that accrue to the GCC's capital markets are unlikely to be felt in the 
financial sector alone. There is a body of literature that argues that financial market 
development is an essential precursor for the development of the broader economy 
through the efficient allocation of capital.31 
Following the launch of the euro merger and acquisition (M&A) activity in Europe's 
banking sector grew at an unprecedented rate, having a major impact on bank 
restructuring and eventually leading to the emergence of international banking 
firms and networks. 32 M&A activity in the GCC banking sector has been very weak 
so far. National GCC banks have been protected from competition by strong legal 
constraints that have allowed them to earn huge economic rents. However, by 
2004 regional competition was emerging slowly as the National Bank of Kuwait, 
Emirates International Bank and the Bahrain based Gulf International Bank had all 
opened branches in Riyadh.33 By increasing the competitive pressures in the GCC 
banking industry GCC retail customers can be expected to benefit from improved 
services. 
The single currency should also result in increasing competition between the GCC 
stock markets. Following the significant stock market corrections in the first quarter 
of 2006, the Saudi authorities announced it would turn the Tadawul stock market 
into a share holding company open to private involvement, seemingly to "help the 
stock market operate on a more professional and transparent basis and introduce 
31 See for example, King, R. and Levine, R. "Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be Right" 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 108, pp.717-725, 1993. 
32 Danthine, op.cit. 
33 Wilson, op.cit. 
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new products and services". 34 Greater competition for regional capital following the 
launch of the single currency might also lead to pressure for further improvements 
in efficiency of other national stock markets. 
Ultimately a leading national financial market is likely to emerge, at the expense of 
other national stock markets. In this regard, the markets of Saudi Arabia (with the 
largest stock market capitalization in the region) and Kuwait (the longest standing 
and broadest market) would be best placed to take this position. Conversely, it 
seems unlikely that a single regional market will be established. In Europe 
domestic stock markets have survived in part due to remaining national legal and 
regulatory differences and this may well turn out to be the pattern in the GCC. 35 
In order for the GCC financial sector to reap the full benefits of the single currency 
however, a number of accompanying reforms will be necessary. The removal of 
existing barriers to market integration, such as differences in national financial 
market legislation and auditing standards as well as other legal and fiscal 
obstacles, are also required. Cooperation among the GCC financial authorities in 
creating a regional Financial Services Authority would also be beneficial in 
simplifying regulations for market participants and thus facilitating cross border 
investments. Furthermore, the increased risks of financial contagion brought about 
by tighter integration will require improved supervision and better regulation of the 
GCC financial system to ensure its stability overall. 
7.3 Adjusting to Economic Shocks 
Despite pegging their exchange rates to the US dollar and following the interest 
rates of the anchor currency, the GCC states still have some short term monetary 
policy independence which they utilize according to their national economic 
conditions.36 The loss of this marginal independence through the move to a 
34 Staff writer "Saudi to privatise bourse" Gulf Daily News, 10 May 2006. 
35 Wilson, op.cit. 
36 Jadresic, E. "On a Common Currency for the GCC Countries", IMF Policy Discussion Paper, 
December 2002, p.12. 
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common monetary policy could therefore prove to be a cost for some GCC 
economies. This issue is discussed in detail in the first half of this subsection. In 
the second half of this sub-section we discuss the choice of exchange rate regime 
following the launch of the single currency, which will have important implications 
for the role of monetary policy in the GCC economies. Ultimately, the policy choice 
will have to be agreed upon by the GCC leaders but in light of existing differences 
in policy preferences, national interests may have to be compromised in order to 
reach agreement on a common regional exchange rate regime that can provide net 
benefits for the bloc on aggregate. 
7 .3.1 loss of Monetary Policy Independence 
Many observers have concluded that there will be little cost to the GCC states from 
losing independent monetary policy because the fixed pegs to the US dollar 
already rules out their use of independent interest rate setting. However, the GCC 
central banks do have some, albeit limited, control over domestic monetary issues 
(see chapter four, section 4.3.5). GCC interest rates are required to broadly follow 
the US' monetary policy in order to maintain the domestic exchange rate pegs 
however, there is a margin that the GCC central bank's frequently utilise in 
controlling the domestic economic environment. However, following the 
introduction of the CU, interest rate differentials among the GCC states will not be 
permitted as it could jeopardize the stability of the CU and thus this degree of 
monetary policy flexibility will be lost. 
In 2005, GCC central banks responded to their own particular domestic inflationary 
concerns using their monetary policy independence. Kuwait retains more monetary 
policy independence than any of the other GCC states and has a band of 
adjustment around its dollar peg of plus and minus 3.5 percent up until 2010. In 
May 2006 Kuwait decided to utilize its flexible arrangement and allow its currency 
to appreciate against the dollar by 1 percent. The move was in response to the 
decline in the dollar which had fallen by 7 percent against the euro since the start 
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of the year and the increasing cost of Kuwaiti imports from the eurozone 
economies. 37 
Following the appreciation of the Kuwaiti dinar the Executive President of the 
Omani central bank, Hamood Sangour AI Zadjali, announced that in his view the 
Kuwaiti monetary policy was clearly at odds with that of Oman's, he said 
emphatically "no developing country aiming at diversification and export promotion, 
can afford a policy of exchange rate appreciation". Rather than being concerned by 
the effect of the declining dollar on rising import costs as was Kuwait, conversely 
Oman considered the nominal depreciation to be a bonus, AI Zadjali said "Oman's 
nominal exchange rate has been depreciating modestly since 2001, helping our 
non-oil exports". 38 
In early 2006 Saudi Arabia failed to immediately follow interest rate rises in the US 
on two occasions as it felt that domestic inflation did not require tightening of 
monetary policy and it was concerned about falls in the Tadawul stock market. 
According to the SAMA central bank governor, Hamad Saud AI Sayyari, 'We have 
our own considerations, policies, our own local developments. We don't have to 
move exactly to match the (US) move. It depends on the domestic situation."39 
However, at the end of June 2006, just prior to another US interest rate rise, SAMA 
was obliged to raise its interest rates after excessive bank arbitraging to exploit the 
interest rate differential between the dollar and the Saudi riyal threatened the 
stability of the peg. 
The symmetry of the GCC business cycles and their degree of economic 
convergence will affect the magnitude of any potential costs arising from the loss of 
monetary policy independence. It is perhaps significant therefore that diverging 
inflation rates continue to be a potential problem among the GCC states. In 1981 
the GCC inflation rate differential was 8.5 percent yet by 2005 there had been no 
37 Rutledge, E. "The dollar declines, while the euro shines" in Gulf Research Center's Business 
Bulletin, Dubai, 13-19 May 2006. 
38 Kumar, Palazhi Ashok "Central Bank of Oman defends fixed peg of rial to dollar" Times of Oman, 
16 May 2006: 
39 Staff writer "Saudi has no plan to revalue riyal: Official" The Peninsular, Qatar,26 June, 2006. 
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discernible convergence with the differential at 8.1 percent (see chapter six, figure 
6.2). Clearly the optimal monetary policy for low inflation states such as Bahrain, 
Oman and Saudi Arabia differs to that for the high inflation states, the UAE, Qatar 
and Kuwait (see chapter six, section 6.2.2). Therefore, the common monetary 
policy could lead to macroeconomic costs and the ability of the GCC economies to 
adjust through other mechanisms will be important. 
Furthermore, while econometric evidence presented in chapter five (see section 
5.6), indicated that the GCC economies collectively followed a long run 
cointegrating relationship, pair-wise cointegration analysis showed evidence of only 
a weak relationship between Saudi Arabia and the UAE and Kuwait. Again, this 
suggests that a common monetary policy based on the largest member state's 
economic circumstances may not be optimal for either the UAE or Kuwait. 
In the absence of any exchange rate flexibility the GCC economies will have to 
respond to economic shocks through factor market adjustments. At present the 
GCC labour markets and wages are very flexible due to the presence of a large 
expatriate work force (see chapter five, section 5.3). In response to national or 
regional shocks expatriate labour flows, particularly from South Asia, are highly 
elastic. The large pool of mixed skills labour in countries like India and Pakistan 
available at internationally competitive prices has also kept labour costs down and 
will continue to do so for at least the next decade or so. 
Recent reforms in capital market regulations are also allowing for increased intra-
regional capital flows which will help to mitigate potential national shocks. Intra-
Gee FDI has witnessed an upturn in recent years indicating that investors in 
respective GCC states are increasing their claims on their neighbour's economic 
output. For example, between 2000 and 2006 UAE investment in Saudi Arabia 
amounted to 41 percent of the Kingdom's total FDI.4° Furthermore, there is 
evidence that the GCC economies are moving towards greater 'within country' 
diversification as opposed to 'within region' diversification (as discussed in chapter 
40 Hassan, Javid "UAE Is Top Investor in Kingdom" Arab News, 19 June 2006. 
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five, section 5.5). Such trends could be evidence of the region's increasing 
economic integration. As the process of integration proceeds and deepens this in 
itself should lessen the occurrence of national economic shocks. 
7.3.2 Regional Exchange Rate Policy Post CU 
Leading up to the launch of the CU the GCC leaders have agreed to stick with the 
US dollar pegs, which will be the basis of determining the future conversion rates 
and is an appropriate interim currency regime. Post CU however, the choice of 
exchange rate regimes remains to be decided. The debate over future monetary 
policy will be whether they continue to delegate their monetary policy to the 
currency anchor country, the US, or whether they take control of their monetary 
policy tools by moving to a more flexible exchange rate arrangement. 
The UAE's Central Bank Governor, Sultan Nasser AI Suwaidi, said in July of 2006 
that there was no need to change the dollar peg at the moment. He argued that 
"The dollar peg serves (the GCC) economies very well", but significantly he went 
on to say "Of course in four years' time we'll move into a CU and a single currency 
that will be for a bigger geographical area that will have a bigger weight on the 
international arena, so it will have to be floated then.'141 Indeed, it is generally 
accepted that the currency of a monetary union would normally be free floating and 
would allow greater flexibility in responding to global economic shocks.42 
The debate regarding the choice of currency regime post CU intensified in the first 
half of 2006 as the US dollar declined against other major currencies, in particular 
the euro. Consequently, the GCC economies witnessed deterioration in their 
purchasing power, and their foreign reserves rapidly losing value. Inflationary 
pressures, already high from the oil price induced economic boom, were rising 
further as import costs grew (more than a third of GCC imports originate in the 
Eurozone economies) (see chapter four, table 4.9). 
41 Khalaf, Roula "UAE shifts 10% of its reserves into euros" Financial Times, London, 13 July 2006. 
42 Munchau, W., "Lessons from monetary union" Financial Times, London, 4 January 2004. 
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As we have already observed, the move by Kuwait to revalue it currency against 
the dollar illustrated its strong intolerance to increasing import costs and rising 
inflation and a preference for a stronger currency. While Oman signalled its policy 
preference for a weak riyal in order to promote non-oil export growth as part of its 
diversification strategy.43 For similar reasons, other low inflation states such as 
Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, are likely to prefer a weak exchange rate, while high 
inflation economies such as the UAE and Qatar will have similar preferences to 
Kuwait. 
As a consequence of the growing inflation concerns, the desire for greater 
monetary policy independence was voiced from regional institutions such as the 
AMF. Jassim AI Mannai, chairman of the AMF said 'We need to see interest rates 
free in our hands to use them in order to moderate the economic cycle. When we 
have a boom, we need to cool down the economy through the interest rate 
mechanism. We cannot do it now because of currency pegging."44 Moving away 
from the dollar peg towards a more flexible exchange rate regime, as promoted by 
the AMF Chairman and the UAE Central Banker among others, will allow the GCC 
economies greater domestic economic control and increased room to adjust to 
global shocks. 
While several regional experts felt that the dollar peg had served the GCC 
economies well, helping to keep inflation low and providing monetary policy 
credibility, many other experts considered it to have outlived its usefulness to the 
GCC economies and that there were now drawbacks from this policy. One GCC 
official commented "While pegging GCC currencies to the US dollar was beneficial 
in the 1980s and early 1990s, of late it has become a burden." Another Emirati 
government official said "The dollar peg has served them well so far in terms of 
price stability but the cost to foreign currency reserves has been substantial. The 
devaluing dollar has not been of benefit to them because of their increasing trade 
with Asia and EU." 
43 Kumar, op.cit. 
44 Staff writer "Arabs need free monetary policy to control inflation" Gulf Times, Qatar, 27 June, 
2006. 
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The majority of experts interviewed for this thesis felt therefore that there would be 
economic advantages from switching to a more flexible exchange rate regime. 
They cited factors such as the possibility of greater monetary policy independence 
and stabilising import costs rather than just export revenues. Several experts felt 
that a more diversified exchange rate regime would also promote economic 
diversification. A number of IMF reports have also concluded that a flexible and 
competitive exchange rate would be more conducive to economic diversification 
and the long anticipated expansion in non-oil trade.45 Furthermore, some experts 
thought that a flexible exchange rate regime would also give the GCC states more 
political, as well as economic independence. 
In light of the strong economic case for switching to a more flexible and 
independent arrangement many regional experts thought that post CU a switch 
would take place. Only a few regional experts thought that a change in the 
exchange rate regime would never take place based on external political factors. 
One Omani academic said "I don't think this will happen because they are tied to 
US policy and a move to show independence would not be well received by the 
US."46 
There are several potential exchange rate regime options open to the GCC once 
they have entered into a unified currency. The two main options, being considered 
(not including maintaining the status quo) are either a free floating currency or 
continuing to anchor the currency but to a diversified, possibly trade weighted 
basket of currencies. The future exchange rate policy of preference for the region, 
according to the IMF, depends on two considerations, stability and 
competitiveness. 47 
45 See Jbili, A. and Kramarenko, V. "Choosing Exchange Regimes in the Middle East and North 
Africa" International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C., 2003 and Abed, G.T., Erbas, S. N. and 
Guerami, B., "The GCC Monetary Union: Some Considerations for the Exchange Rate Regime" 
International Monetary Fund Working Paper, April 2003. 
46 In chapter 6, section 6.6.1, it was revealed that regional experts also felt that the involvement of 
the US in the region would lead to a delay, and possibly even deter, the establishment of the CU. 
47 Abed, ·G:T., Erbas, S. N. and Guerami, B. "The GCC Monetary Union: Some Considerations for 
the Exchange Rate Regime" IMF Working Paper, April 2003. 
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While a free float could provide greater flexibility and competitiveness than opting 
to peg to a trade weighted basket of currencies, the latter is likely to provide more 
continuity and stability. Yet, expert opinion in the region is split on the optimal 
exchange rate regime choice for the GCC CU and it therefore seems likely that 
there will also be divergence among the exchange rate policy preferences of the 
various GCC leaders and Central Bankers. If these differences persist, post CU, it 
is likely that the current dollar peg will be kept as a 'compromise solution'. 
The UAE Central Bank Governor clearly expressed his view on the future choice of 
exchange rate regime, saying "I would prefer a free floating regime by 2015, since 
firstly it is more consistent with market determined price systems, and secondly 
because it would relieve member countries from having to build the reserves 
needed to defend the currency pegs and the problem of countries' contributions to 
reserves that comes with it." 
However, there may well be diverging views on the future decision on the region's 
common exchange rate regime reflecting national economic policy objectives and 
interests. Indeed, one AMF official remarked "After CU they will be strong enough 
to decide but there will be many conflicting views between them and much will 
depend on the economic conditions at the time." In the future CU therefore, the 
loss of national monetary policy setting may become more of a controversial issue. 
It is likely that a free floating exchange rate would lead to a stronger exchange rate 
for the GCC economies; according to IMF estimates by as much as 15 percent.48 
Such an appreciation of the exchange rate may not be particularly helpful for those 
countries, such as Oman and Bahrain, which are seeking to diversify their exports. 
Research by the IMF49 examined the economic case for pegging to a basket of 
major international currencies vis-a-vis continuing to peg to the US dollar. The 
48 Staff writer "Saudi Arabia Drafting Regulations to Facilitate Issuance of Islamic Bonds" Arab 
News, 22 June 2006. 
49 Abed, eta/. op.cit. 
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authors of the report, Abed et a/, argued that as GCC oil exports were 
denominated in dollars and a large share of Asian imports were also invoiced in 
dollars continuing to peg to the dollar would be the best option for ensuring 
stability. However, the share of total GCC imports from the European Union in 
2004 constituted 33 percent of total GCC imports (see chapter four, table 4.9), 
while imports from dollar pegged Asian countries50 amounted to only 13 percent of 
total imports. 51 Of this proportion, imports from China constituted the largest share 
at 8 percent. However, China is under pressure from the US in particular, to move 
to a more market based floating exchange rate and as China's internal economic 
development and consumption growth gains pace it will relinquish the need for it to 
hold down the value of its currency against its major export market, the US. 
Furthermore, Abed eta/ contend that as the majority of GCC assets have been 
held in dollars, it is prudent to continue with the dollar peg for the time being. 
However, the currency allocation of GCC assets, is based not only on their 
exchange rate regime but also on the expected return on assets. As we have seen 
since the dollar's substantial decline in 2004 and more recently in 2006 GCC 
central banks are sensitive to the expected return on their assets52 and 
consequently are increasingly opting to hold their reserves in stronger currencies 
such as the euro.53 
In conclusion, the authors of the IMF report recommended that a basket peg with a 
heavy dollar component would be the best choice of exchange rate for the future 
common currency. Such a regime, they argue, would provide stability but at the 
same time a degree of flexibility to improve the competitive edge of non-oil exports. 
While there was no consensus among regional experts as to the optimal exchange 
rate policy for the GCC economies, with both advantages and disadvantages to a 
50 Of the five most significant Asian exporters to the GCC Japan, India, Korea and Singapore are 
not pegged to the dollar. Only China is pegged to the US dollar. 
51 According to IMF Direction of Trade data. 
52 Bank for International Settlements, International banking and financial market developments, BIS 
Q_u~arterly Review, December 2005. 
53 See for examp-le, Staffwriter "UAE committed to diversify forex reserves: Suwaidi" Khaleej Times, 
27 June 2006. 
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free float regime and a peg to a basket of currencies, the largest share of 
interviewees favoured the latter. One Emirati government official thought "It is best 
to link to a basket of currencies based on the direction of trade." One Kuwaiti 
government official felt that "They need to diversify in terms of what is the best 
anchor and look at trade and financial relations both would favour a basket with 
euro and dollar components." 
On the cost side it was thought that a peg to a basket of currencies would be less 
transparent and difficult for GCC institutional expertise to manage. One Omani 
academic thought "it is not easy to have a basket peg, costs of implementing it and 
switching are high." However, the Central Bank of Kuwait had managed its peg to 
an undisclosed basket of currencies for several years without any difficulty in the 
past. 
Of those experts that felt a floating exchange rate would be most beneficial, one 
commercial banker in the UAE said "As these economies mature they should move 
to a flexible exchange rate regime such as a float. Then they could have an active 
and independent monetary policy." However, a few experts felt that a free float 
would be too risky for the GCC economies at first. One Omani central bank official 
said "They need time for a float because they will be tested in the market." 
Other experts however, thought that the GCC's ample foreign reserves would 
provide a cushion against any speculative activity, for example one Kuwaiti 
academic said "Their exchange rates have been very resistant because of their 
large international reserves and they could have a managed float, because the 
unified central bank would have ample resources." Furthermore, the GCC leaders 
could opt for a managed float within a reference band that would provide a greater 
degree of stability, but at the same time allowing for exchange rate adjustments. 
While the choice of exchange rate policy post CU remains uncertain, experts agree 
that a more flexible exchange rate regime would be preferable in allowing both 
adjustments to global e_conomic shocks (such as a substantial decline in the US 
dollar) and independent monetary policy predicated on regional economic 
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conditions. The launch of the single currency provides an opportune moment for 
the GCC states to adjust their exchange rate policy to a regime that reflects the 
fact that these economies are maturing and seeking to diversify further. 
7.4 Fiscal Policy Implications 
One of the biggest challenges and one which, in the short term at least, may incur 
the most 'costs' is that of enforcing fiscal discipline on member states. While there 
are important reasons for adhering to some form of fiscal discipline, such as 
preventing the negative effects of excessive borrowing from spilling over to other 
members, the imposition of Maastricht style rules are likely to prove problematic for 
the highly cyclical GCC government budgets that remain dependent on volatile 
hydrocarbon revenues. 
Agreement on the exact nature of the fiscal discipline rules is therefore expected to 
prove to be difficult for the GCC leaders. In principle, the GCC leaders have agreed 
that there should be be a mechanism similar to the European Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP) but to date there has been no agreement on the precise metrics (e.g. 
the appropriate debt/GOP ratio). Moreover, in passing, it should be noted that not 
all experts agree on the appropriateness of SGP type approaches to fiscal 
discipline for the GCC. For example, in a recent IMF working paper, Krueger and 
Kovarich argued that "Each CU has a unique structure and possibly, the GCC CU 
might develop a loose arrangement very different from any other union."54 We 
discuss such matters in the first half of this subsection. 
Furthermore, in order to assess adherence to fiscal policy rules once set, there will 
need to be improved budget reporting and much greater fiscal transparency. In 
certain GCC states, where budget transparency is poor, this may be viewed as 
politically costly in the short run. However in the long run improvements in budget 
54 Krueger, R. and Kovarich, E. "Some Principles for Development of Statistics for a Gulf 
Cooperation Council Currency Union", IMF Working Paper, June 2006. 
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reporting will undoubtedly prove to be beneficial for the GCC economies. These 
issues are dealt with in the second half of this subsection. 
7 .4.1 Fiscal Policy Discipline 
Fiscal discipline among the member states of a CU is necessary for it to be not just 
stable but also sustainable. Increasing debt issuance by one member drives up 
interest rates in the CU's capital markets thus making new debt issuance more 
costly for other members and their existing debt repayments larger. In such a 
situation, if the other CU members opt to stabilize their debt to GOP ratios, they will 
be forced to cut back on expenditures and follow contracted fiscal policies 
themselves. 
Ultimately, countries issuing large amounts of debt and with high debt to GOP 
ratios, will find this position unsustainable particularly if the interest payment on the 
government's debt exceeds the growth rate of GOP. Unsustainable budgetary 
positions increase the risk of debt default or debt monetization (through printing 
money), both of which would jeopardize the monetary stability of the CU. 
Furthermore, highly indebted member states might be tempted to put pressure on 
the central monetary authority to soften interest rates, interfering with the conduct 
of monetary policy. 
Therefore, in order to avoid the type of negative externalities arising from fiscal 
indiscipline in CU, as described above, in Europe the 'Stability and Growth Pact' 
(SGP) set out specific fiscal prudence rules for EMU members. 55 These rules 
restrict fiscal deficits to 3 percent of GOP and public debt to 60 percent of GOP. 
However, in practice the SGP rules have been ignored by some European 
countries. 
Indeed, the fiscal restraints imposed on the EMU members by the SGP have been 
controversial. Following the adoption of the SGP, research indicated that it could 
55 These rules were initially laid out in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 but were later strengthened in 
the form of the SGP in 1997. 
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have potential macroeconomic costs that could condemn Europe to "a low - level 
equilibrium trap", furthermore it was concluded that the SGP would divert Europe's 
attention away from important structural reforms that were needed to improve 
growth prospects. 56 
The adoption of fiscal rules, such as those of the European Union's SGP designed 
for diversified and developed economies, cannot therefore be considered 
appropriate for the GCC's transitional economies and may potentially impede the 
economic development of the region and as indicated in the quotation from 
Krueger and Kovarich above, a more flexible arrangement may be more suitable 
for the GCC countries. 
Conversely, if fiscal rules are too loose there could potentially be disagreement and 
friction between member states. For example, while Saudi Arabia ran up 
considerable debt in the past, Kuwait has been relatively fiscally prudent and Qatar 
which has issued a large amount of external debt to develop its natural gas 
reserves, would be heavily penalized if excessive spending and borrowing by 
Saudi Arabia drove up interest rates on the region's sovereign debt market. It 
would be preferable for the GCC states to have 'intelligent' fiscal rules, that may be 
less transparent, but that work well in providing stability but also take into account 
their stage of economic development, rather than stringent rules that simply don't 
work because they aren't appropriate for the economies of the region.57 
In chapter six (section 6.2), the degree to which the GCC states had met certain 
fiscal rules over the last 25 years was assessed in detail. In brief, whilst, the UAE, 
Saudi Arabia and Oman have all suffered from successive periods of budget 
deficits throughout the 1980s and 1990s, according to available data, only Saudi 
Arabia had to resort to issuing substantial levels of public debt. In 1998 and 1999 
the Kingdom's public debt reached a maximum of 102 percent of GOP and 
between 1997 and 2004 the 60 percent deficit rule would have been breached 
56 Eichengreen, B. and Wyplosz, C. "Stability Pact: More than a Minor Nuisance?" Economic Policy, 
April1998. 
57 Munchau, op. cit. 
258 
continuously. However, since the oil price rises beginning in 2002 Saudi Arabia has 
used its large successive budget surpluses to pay down its debt to more 
sustainable levels, estimated at just 46.5 percent of GDP in 2005. 
This underlines the fact that, unlike the European economies, GCC budgets are 
highly dependent on hydrocarbon revenues and are therefore very vulnerable to oil 
and gas price changes. However, since 2002 oil and gas prices have been on an 
upward trend and many energy economists in 2006 were concluding that energy 
prices are unlikely to see a substantial correction in the near, or even medium 
term.58 Based on such oil price expectations, in practice, the GCC states may not 
face great difficulties in meeting fiscal policy discipline rules in the years leading up 
to the scheduled date of CU. Yet in the long run, post CU, the challenge to 
significantly diversify government revenues in order to improve budget stability will 
remain and intensify for some GCC states. 
In light of this, several GCC states are diversifying their official oil funds and other 
investment vehicles into non oil and gas investments which should provide 
substantial non-oil and gas related income streams in the future.59 The IMF has 
also recommended on several previous occasions that the GCC governments 
should introduce a Value Added Tax on luxury goods and harmful items such as 
tobacco. Some GCC states, such as the UAE, are reportedly considering the 
practicalities of introducing VAT however, there has been no official confirmation 
that the system will be implemented at all so far. 60 
Adhering to fiscal discipline rules can therefore provide benefits such as improving 
the coherence of the CU, ensuring a stable macroeconomic climate and at the 
same time encouraging FDI. However, questions over the effective enforcement of 
58 See Till, Hilary "Commodities at the Crossroads" Presentation to Chicago Chapter of 
QWAFAFEW, 31 May 2006, (available at www.premiacap.com.commodities) Till concludes that 'oil 
markets may be in a state of continual crisis ... resulting in a bull market that is sustainable for 
years.' Similarly 'bullish' conclusions about future oil prices have regularly been drawn by other 
commodity market analysts e.g. Paul Horsnell of Barclays Capital, Arjin Murti and Brian Singer of 
Goldman Sachs. 
59 See Chapter 6, section 6.2, "Government Deficits". 
60 Nambiar, Sana The GRC Gulf Business Weekly Report, Gulf Research Center, Dubai, 11-17 
March 2006. 
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fiscal rules and therefore their credibility have led to major criticisms of the value of 
this policy. Post EMU, several eurozone countries breached the fiscal rules, 61 
however the threat of imposing fines, amounting to as much as 0.5 percent of 
GOP, have never been enforced and consequently the credibility of the fiscal rules 
has been severely undermined.62 
At the time of writing, with less than four years to go before the scheduled launch 
of the single currency, the GCC secretariat have yet to announce the precise 
mechanisms by which fiscal prudence rules could, or would be enforced. As Saudi 
Arabia has been the main violator of the fiscal debt to GOP ratio in the past, 
enforcement of fiscal rules by the smaller GCC economies is likely to prove 
inherently difficult. 
7 .4.2 'Loss of fiscal Policy Sovereignty' 
Appropriately designed fiscal rules are critical in providing long term fiscal 
sustainability and should be a matter of concern for all GCC states. But agreement 
on them is however, proving to be difficult to achieve. According to one GCC 
Secretariat official who was interviewed, "The main obstacles to forming a 
successful CU include reaching agreement on fiscal policy limits. The 
implementation of fiscal limits has been achieved in principle during 2005. If the 
summit blesses the agreement in December, this would pass a major milestone." 
Ominously, in the 2005 GCC summit final communique there was no mention of 
the fiscal limits. 
Any adherence to fiscal policy rules will inevitably require improved fiscal data 
transparency and more accurate and standardized methods of budget accounting, 
as was discussed in the previous chapter (see section 6.3.2). Statistics have 
political resonance particularly for the autocratic regimes of the GCC states and 
can be subject to manipulation. Data transparency is often patchy as in some GCC 
states the legislative supervision of spending by the ruling families is insufficient. A 
61 France, Germany and Italy have all breached the 3 percent of GDP budget deficit rule. 
62 See The Economist "Europe and the Euro: The Death of the Stability Pacf', 29 November 2003. 
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senior GCC Secretariat official, Dr. AbdelAziz ai-Uwaisheq, director of the GCC's 
economic integration department, commented on the data issue saying "We have 
different levels in the GCC, Oman, Bahrain and Kuwait have high levels of 
transparency. The others are working on it."63 
Saudi Arabia's budget reporting, in particular, is considered to be opaque,64 and in 
the past its record of off-budget accounting has been heavily criticized.65 An article 
in the Financial Times66 in 2002 cited an IMF report which estimated that 20 
percent of Saudi Arabia's oil receipts were not acknowledged in the government 
budget of 2000, the missing oil revenues were accounted for by off-balance sheet 
expenses of the state oil company comprising of "generous stipends to the 7,000 
member royal family". Such opaque budget reporting could potentially be 
unacceptable to other more transparent CU members, such as Kuwait. One Emirati 
academic said that "The fiscal aspects of CU particularly worry me because apart 
from Kuwait, which is the only GCC country with transparent government 
procedures, government budget reporting is still a problem and it is a very 
important prerequisite for CU". 
This raises the critical issue of economic/fiscal sovereignty. Several GCC expert 
interviewees felt that the 'loss of fiscal policy sovereignty' would potentially be 
viewed as a considerable political economy cost to the GCC regimes. Indeed, this 
was also considered to be one of the main obstacles to the CU project. One Qatari 
academic believed that losing sovereignty over economic decision making would 
be a major sacrifice for the GCC states, "The biggest obstacle is the idea of losing 
63 Staff Writer "Volatile oil is a headache for Gulf monetary union" Gulf Times, 30 October 2004. 
64 According to the US Department of Commerce (http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/inimr-
ri.nsf/en/gr120123e.html) "The Saudi budget planning process is opaque. Little is known about the 
method of planning and the actual breakdown of anticipated revenues and expenditures. Some 
items are off budget." 
65 Giles Whittell, writing in The Times, argued that institutionalised corruption in Saudi Arabia was 
rumoured to "siphon the revenue from 600,000 barrels of oil a day to fund the louche lifestyles of 
the country's 15,000 princes", see Whittell, Giles, "The Last Oil Rush", The Times, 25 October 2001. 
Writing for the US' Foreign Policy in Focus, Terry Lynn proffered that Saudi budgeting is "murky" 
and at least "10,000 princes receive stipends of up to $270,000 per month, see Lynn Karl, Terry 
and Gary, lan "Oil & Development", US Foreign Policy in Focus, October 2004. 
66 Khalaf, Roula "Saudi Arabia urged to speed up economic reform" Financial Times, 23 October 
2002. 
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control over economic policies but they are still fighting over this, every time they 
talk about sovereignty over policy they fall out." 
However, 'fiscal sovereignty' arguments may be used as an excuse for the 
perpetuation of practices which are inimical to the transparency and honesty which 
are themselves a prerequisite of a successful CU. While increased budget 
transparency may not be welcomed by those with a vested interest in the status 
quo, economically speaking, improving fiscal budget reporting can be considered 
to be an essential adjustment cost, which will bring about many benefits in the 
longer term. 
Indeed, some expert interviewees felt that reduced government 'sovereignty' over 
fiscal and economic policies would eventually constitute a benefit to the region. 
One independent researcher in the Emirates commented "It will minimise the 
control of rulers over economic issues and limit their power to influence economic 
and fiscal policies so it will reduce their interference in these areas." While one 
Emirati academic remarked "In the short run there will be political costs but in the 
long run it is a step in the right direction." 
At the same time one must be realistic. An independent researcher in Kuwait said 
with regard to the issue of tighter fiscal discipline "the costs of CU include the loss 
of government authority and this is significant in most GCC states because they 
don't have strong institutions and decision making is highly centralized." In the 
experience of EMU, fiscal rules and coordination have proved to be a controversial 
and at times problematic area. On this basis, in the context of the existing GCC 
political regimes losing absolute fiscal sovereignty could prove to be prohibitively 
expensive and it is perhaps in relation to this particular 'cost' that there are grounds 
for some pessimism as to whether GCC CU will ever take place. 
7.5 Political Economy Dimensions 
The successful launch of the GCC single currency and a move towards an 
independent exchange rate regime offers the GCC states the potential to establish 
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the world's first significant Arab and 'Islamic' currency. Backed by two fifths of the 
world's oil reserves and massive financial assets a floating GCC currency could 
have significant strength and would be attractive to other Arab and Muslim 
countries that might choose to anchor their own currencies to the Gulf 'dinar' and to 
hold it as part of their foreign reserves. In the first half of this subsection we discuss 
such political benefits arising from a successful GCC CU which may be equal to, or 
even greater than the perceived economic benefits. 
The prospective CU also represents an opportunity for the GCC states to 
strengthen both their economic and political ties and to emerge as a more cohesive 
and unified regional bloc. These matters are discussed in the second half of this 
subsection; we argue that much will depend on the success of the CU and the 
degree to which it is accompanied by other reforms. First and foremost it will 
involve overcoming past political disharmony between the members. The role of 
Saudi Arabia in the region is also of question, if it is perceived as a domineering 
force it could set back integration but on the other hand it could act as a driving 
force in the regional integration process. 
7 .5.1 Creating an Anchorage and Reserve Currency 
Should the GCC leaders opt for an independent exchange rate regime and 
monetary policy then the GCC currency could be established as a regional 
currency to be used as an anchorage and reserve currency throughout the Arab 
and Muslim world. Depending on the strength and stability of the 'Gulf dinar', other 
Muslim and Arab countries might choose to peg their currencies to it and those 
countries with strong trade links to the region might also choose to hold it in their 
foreign reserves. Furthermore, if the GCC leaders chose to invoice their oil sales in 
the new currency this would generate increased demand for the currency and 
generate substantial seigniorage revenues. As well as the financial gains for the 
GCC states, the emergence of the 'Gulf Dinar' as a regional currency would, 
perhaps more importantly, give the GCC states substantial prestige in the Arab and 
Islamic world. 
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GCC experts were equally split on the prospect of the GCC single currency 
becoming a regional reserve and anchorage currency. It was felt that several 
economic and political factors would come to bear on whether the Gulf 'dinar' could 
emerge as a regional currency. Factors such as the development and 
diversification of these economies, economic growth prospects, accompanying 
economic reforms and the credibility of the new currency will all influence the 
strength and stability of the independent GCC single currency. Others mentioned 
that political risk would play an important part and that improved transparency and 
accountability in the region would be a necessary condition, as would the 
perception of the GCC monetary authority as a professional and effective 
institution, for a regional currency to emerge. 
The 'Gulf Dinar', if successful, could be presented as an alternative 'Islamic' 
currency, providing a religious motivation for holding the currency in addition to the 
economic rationale outlined above. Although the GCC single currency would not be 
strictly Islamic as monetary policy itself is contrary to Shariah law, all the GCC 
states are Muslim and there is an increasing amount of Islamic finance in the 
region. The central banks of Islamic countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Pakistan may be inclined to hold what they perceive to be a more acceptable 
'Islamic' currency in their reserves in light of the general sentiment in the Islamic 
world that holding currency reserves in US dollars has helped fund some of the 
current Administration's controversial policies in the Middle East.67 
While a few experts felt that the GCC economies were too insignificant for their 
currency to become an anchorage and reserve currency, several others disagreed. 
One government official in the UAE felt "It is conceivable, for example people hold 
Swiss francs in reserves. If you achieve a reputation for low inflation and stability 
and you have good policies it may be attractive for neighbouring countries, such as 
Iran and Pakistan, whom you trade with to hold your currency in reserve." Another 
expert, this time a Qatari central bank official said "The huge oil and gas reserves 
of the region, the big financial reserves of the Gulf States and their annual current 
67 Rutledge, E. "Establishing a Successful GCC Currency Union: Preparations and Future Policy 
Choices" Gulf Research Center, Policy Analysis, December 2004. 
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account surpluses are factors that will influence the single currency's ability to 
become a reserve currency." 
Indeed, an important consideration for the strength of a future independent GCC 
currency would be the large oil and gas reserves held by the GCC states. 
Approximately 40 percent of the world's proven oil reserves and 23 percent of 
global gas reserves belong to the GCC states (see Table 7.4). According to energy 
analysts the world will become more dependent on oil and gas from the Gulf as 
other producing areas, such as the UK North Sea and Indonesia, go into terminal 
decline. In addition to these energy reserves, the GCC states also have 
considerable mineral deposits. 
Table 7.4: GCC Energy Production and Reserves, 2005 
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Bahrain n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 9.9 0.4% 0.09 0.1% 
Kuwait 2,643 3.3% 101.5 8.5% 9.7 0.4% 1.57 0.9% 
Oman 780 1.0% 5.6 0.5% 17.5 0.6% 1 0.6% 
Qatar 1,097 1.4% 15.2 1.3% 43.5 1.6% 25.78 14.3% 
SA 11,035 13.6% 264.2 22.0% 69.5 2.5% 6.9 3.8% 
UAE 2,751 3.4% 97.8 8.1% 46.6 1.7% 6.04 3.4% 
GCC 18,306 22.6% 484.3 40.3% 196.7 7.1% 41.38 23.0% 
. . Source: BP Stat1st1cal Rev1ew of World Energy, 2006 . 
Notes: Gas Production and reserves in bn cubic metres (bern) and trillion cubic metres (tern). 
Of the GCC countries Saudi Arabia has considerable mineral reserves, including 
large deposits of Iron ore, Gold, Copper, Phosphate, Bauxite and Magnesite. Saudi 
Arabia is therefore investing substantial funds into its mineral sector. Moreover, the 
GCC, due to its oil and gas feedstock is competitively placed to produce Steel, Iron 
and Aluminium. Some GCC states are already major manufacturers of Aluminium 
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and in the coming five years it is likely that the Gulf will become firmly established 
as the global hub for this important commodity. In addition, several GCC states 
have recently established commodity exchanges, with two functioning in Dubai and 
two more in the pipeline in Dubai and Qatar.68 
For this reason, an independent GCC currency is likely to be characterized as a 
'commodity currency' where the currency reflects the price of a commodity and 
rises and falls in line with it. A switch to invoicing their oil sales in the new currency 
would create additional demand for it as central banks in other countries are likely 
to want to hold reserves in it in order to cover the costs of their oil purchases.69 
Increased overseas demand for the 'Gulf dinar' would provide seigniorage 
revenues; a welcome non-oil income for the region. It would also strengthen the 
currency and should make it an attractive anchorage currency for other countries to 
peg their exchange rates against1° One government official in the UAE said "It is 
very possible it could happen as it would be in their interests." 
Furthermore, another advantage might be that the market mechanism would tend 
to limit the extreme swings in the price of oil. When demand for oil is high the 
currency would appreciate thus making the commodity price more expensive and 
eventually putting downward pressure on demand thus limiting domestic 
inflationary pressures. During times when demand is weak, the currency would 
depreciate making the price of oil cheaper thus stimulating demand growth.71 
There are of course associated drawbacks to forming a 'commodity currency', as 
well as the advantages already discussed. As a 'commodity currency' the Gulf 
'dinar' would most likely be more volatile than previously, and potentially more 
68 The UAE has the Dubai Gold and Commodities Exchange and the Dubai Diamond Exchange set 
up by the Dubai Multi Commodities Centre. Furthermore, the Dubai Mercantile Exchange is being 
established in Dubai's International Financial Centre and Gulf Energy is setting up an energy 
focused commodities exchange in Qatar's Energy City to be called the International Mercantile 
Exchange. 
69 It is envisaged that oil invoicing in the single currency would be likely to take place in the GCC's 
long term oil contracts or on one of the region's energy bourses, rather than on international 
markets which would at least require that non-GCC OPEC producers agree to the arrangement. 
70 Rutledge, op.cit. 
71 Wilson, op.cit 
266 
vulnerable to speculative attacks. One Omani academic felt that "With no currency 
band it might prove to be too volatile." 
It could also be problematic for GCC export diversification as non-oil exports would 
be more likely to suffer from 'Dutch disease' when currency appreciations make 
non-commodity exports less competitive. In such a case, other Islamic countries 
may be less inclined to peg their currency to the 'Gulf dinar', however, they would 
still need to hold the currency as part of their reserves in order to purchase GCC 
oil. Nevertheless, despite these potential drawbacks several oil exporting countries 
have adopted floating exchange rate regimes, the most successful example 
perhaps being Norway. 
However, while several regional experts felt that there would be economic benefits 
from invoicing oil in the GCC currency, a few felt that the political costs would be 
too high. For this reason, the majority of regional experts felt that the likelihood of 
the GCC states switching to invoice oil in their own currency was currently rather 
small. One Kuwaiti academic commented "The US reaction would be a very 
important factor. US pressure has often had an influence on these economies, for 
example military contracts have often gone to US companies after pressure being 
exerted." Another expert, this time an independent researcher in the UAE said 
"Such a move would provoke hostility from the US and would be politically risky. 
The margin of economic benefit does not outweigh the political risk." 
On the other hand, in the light of America's disastrous policies in Iraq combined 
with its increasingly partisan support for Israel, some GCC states may now be 
questioning the utility of the traditional de facto alliance with the US and asking 
themselves precisely what is the advantage to them of maintaining this historical 
dependence at a time when important new strategic partners - in particular China 
-are offering them a variety of economic and security arrangements.72 
72 See Rutledge, lan, Addicted to Oil: America's Relentless Drive for Energy Security, I.B. Tauris, 
London, Chapter 12, 2005. 
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7.5.2 Strengthening the Regional Bloc 
The potential political economy gains from forming a single GCC currency are 
significant. At the very least it should solidify the GCC as the dominant regional 
economic bloc. It should also make the GCC function more cohesively as an 
economic bloc. If the Gulf Dinar is more than a loose currency arrangement then it 
is highly likely that it will strengthen the GCC both economically and politically. On 
aggregate the GCC states, many of which have very small economic mass, will 
enjoy much greater bargaining power in international forums and negotiations than 
they would have done individually, especially in light of the global strategic 
significance of the regional bloc, holding two fifths of global oil reserves (see Table 
7.4). 
The consensus among those regional experts interviewed on the subject, was that 
the CU will strengthen the GCC not just economically but also politically. For 
instance, one Saudi government official said "The CU means that there is no going 
back on the integration and unification process. It also means that GCC countries 
are willing to surrender a good part of their sovereignty to the group." Other experts 
feel it might make the region more stable and accountable. One independent 
researcher in the UAE felt that "It should enhance the power of democratic 
institutions as it will create a regulatory role with other states and involve the 
delegation of power to institutions and technocrats." A Saudi government official 
said "If you integrate more and promote the mutual interests of the citizens then the 
region will become more stable and the political environment less volatile." 
While the pace of GCC regional integration in the past has been criticized,73 it is 
often cited as the most successful and resilient sub-regional Arab organisation?4 
When compared to the Arab league for instance, the GCC as a regional bloc is 
considered to have achieved a meaningful level of integration. One Kuwaiti 
independent researcher said that the GCC had "The right ingredients, they all have 
73 Humayon Oar, A. and Presley, John R. 'The Gulf Co-operation Council: A Slow Path to 
Integration?' The World Economy 24:9, 2001, pp.1161-1178, Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2001. 
74 Legrenzi, Matteo "The Gulf Cooperation Council in Light of International Relations Theory" 
International Area Review, Vol. 5, No.2, pp. 21-37, Fall2002. 
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strong credible currencies and they also have political strength. The Arab league 
has been reduced to nothing and the GCC is the only Arab bloc that is working." 
The successful establishment of the GCC CU will therefore be considered as an 
important sign of the bloc's regional strength. Conversely if the GCC does not set 
up a Common Market by 2007, or establish the single currency by 2010, it will lose 
a great deal of credibility. 
While it is anticipated that the CU will provide political economy gains for the bloc 
as a whole, some smaller states may incur costs. One independent researcher 
said that 'What is crucial is whether they are prepared to relinquish national 
sovereignty - which has to be pooled at the supra-national level and the key point 
is do the political leaders realise this?" 
One particular challenge for the smaller GCC states and for the sustainability of the 
union is if Saudi Arabia attempts to use the project as a vehicle for exercising 
economic dominance and therefore political leverage, over its smaller neighbours. 
In the past, concerns over Saudi Arabia's dominance have led the smaller GCC 
states to resist a more pervasive integration.75 Yet conversely, Saudi Arabia's 
determination to drive forward the regional integration process could be a unifying 
influence on the other GCC states. 
Along with unresolved territorial disputes between Saudi Arabia and some of its 
neighbours,76 the issue of bilateral FTAs with the US illustrated the continuing 
power struggle between Saudi Arabia and some of the smaller GCC states. 
Despite Saudi Arabia's public disapproval both Bahrain and Oman have signed 
bilateral FTAs with the US putting their national interests before those of the 
region. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Such as the dispute between the UAE and Saudi Arabia over the waters of AI Adeed, in the mid-
1970s the UAE ceded a small piece of land to Saudi Arabia in a border agreement but retained 
sovereign rights over the waters; Saudi Arabia still disputes this. However, not all border disputes 
within the region have involved Saudi Arabia, with Bahrain and Qatar for example disputing the 
Hawar Island. 
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One Kuwaiti commercial banker commented "Bahrain couldn't wait for the FTA with 
the US and so it went ahead with it anyway, and this is revealing." Furthermore, 
these bilateral FTAs may reflect a diverging approach to economic reform between 
Saudi Arabia and the smaller GCC states. WTO membership is a precondition of 
these FTAs with the US, but Saudi Arabia only acceded to the WTO in 2005, 
whereas Oman joined in 2002 and Bahrain had been a member since its launch in 
1995. It is apparent that states such as Bahrain, Oman and also the UAE are keen 
to liberalise and open their economies at a much faster pace than Saudi Arabia 
(see chapter eight for more discussion on this). 
In fact, it is not the first time that the relationship between the smaller GCC states 
and the US has acted as a divisive factor in GCC economic and political unity. 
Following the events of 9/11, Qatar strengthened its relations with the US while 
Saudi Arabia was seemingly ostracized by the Americans creating regional 
tension, "there is political rivalry between some GCC states in particular between 
Qatar and Saudi Arabia." one AMF official remarked. In addition, Bahrain has 
opposed the building up of the region's unified military force Peninsular Shield, 
because it considers American protection to be a better guarantee of its domestic 
security, although as suggested above, this perception may now be changing. 77 
If the GCC states achieve their aim of forming a strong CU then a greater degree 
of political integration will also have been established. In this case the unified 
political strength of the GCC should be more effective in acting as a "countervailing 
influence against the domination of neighbouring powers"78 i.e. Iran. Concerns over 
Iran's influence in the region abound, particularly in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain 
where large Shia populations are controlled by ruling Sunni elites. Furthermore, the 
international dispute concerning Iran's nuclear programme, with the US and its 
allies insisting that Iran is attempting to build nuclear weapons, have raised alarm 
bells over future regional security. 
77 Legrenzi, op.cit. 
78 Mundell, Robert A "Updating the agenda for monetary union" in Optimum Currency Areas: New 
Analytical and Policy Developments, (Eds. Blejer, M.l., Frenkel, J.A., Leiderman, L., and Razin, A), 
International Monetary Fund, 1997. 
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Iran has in the past made several claims over GCC territories. In 1970 Iran laid 
claim to Bahrain which it considered part of its wider territory, since then it has also 
occupied three islands, the Greater and Lesser Tunb Islands and Abu Musa Island, 
which are also claimed by the UAE. Therefore, in the case of Bahrain and the UAE 
in particular, greater integration with their Arab Gulf neighbours may be in the 
interest of their national security. In fact, some Gulf analysts have attributed the 
formation of the GCC itself as a reaction to the 1981 Iran-Iraq war and fears that 
Iran's Shia revolution might eventually be exported to other Gulf states.79 Therefore 
Iran's increasing bellicose stance over its nuclear weapons programme might once 
again act as a politically motivating factor in greater GCC integration. 
One other consideration the GCC will need to take into account is the impact a CU 
will have on future enlargement of the economic bloc. Although no new members 
have been admitted to the GCC since its inception, several neighbouring countries 
are keen to join, Yemen being one such country. Yemen's accession to the GCC 
would almost certainly incur some short term economic costs. Significant funds 
would have to be invested in Yemen in order for its economic fundamentals to 
converge with the other GCC economies. 
The existing economic divergence between Yemen and the GCC is stark. The 
average Yemeni's income is some twenty eight times less than that of a GCC 
national (see Figure 7.3).80 Despite having a population of more than 20 million, 
Yemen's GOP is comparable with that of Bahrain which has a population of less 
than a million. Yemen's physical and human resources infrastructure is far less 
developed, with an estimated 51 percent of the adult Yemeni population illiterate.81 
79 Looney, R.E. "Economic Integration in the Gulf Region: Does the Future Hold More Promise than 
the Past?" Center for Contemporary Conflict, Strategic Insight, 1 March 2003. 
80 According to IMF, World Economic Outlook 2006, GOP per capita (PPP) in Yemen was $751 in 
2005, compared with the GCC average of $21,258. 
81 According to the UNDP Human Development Report, 2003. 
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Despite its position as a net oil exporter Yemen's proven oil reserves are limited 
and less than that of Oman, which along with Bahrain has the smallest oil reserves 
among the GCC states. 82 
Figure 7.3: Per Capita GOP (PPP Adjusted) in the GCC and Yemen, 200583 
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There are also political differences between the GCC states and Yemen, unlike the 
six Gulf monarchies Yemen is a republic. Political relations between Yemen and 
the GCC states have been tense in the past with Yemen supporting the side of Iraq 
in its 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Furthermore, when Oman and Qatar sponsored 
Yemen's application for GCC membership in 1999, Saudi Arabia vetoed it. Despite 
past political differences, recently Saudi-Yemeni bilateral relations have improved 
markedly with high level visits taking place between the two states in May and 
June of 2006 in which the economic ties between the two were given high 
priority. 84 
82 Yemen's proven oil reserves stood at 2.9 bn barrels at the end of 2005, according to BP 
Statistical Review of World Energy 2006. Oman's proven reserves stood at 5.6 bn barrels at the end 
of 2005. 
83 As was mentioned in chapter four, section 4.2.1, figure 4.3, the IMF World Economic Outlook 
data calculates Kuwaiti GOP per capita (adjusted for PPP) at below that of Bahrain and comparable 
to that of Oman. This is quite clearly counter intuitive to the economic prosperity in Kuwait 
compared with Bahrain and Oman and leaves questions about how the data has been calculated. 
84 Shirian, Daoud "Yemen is a Gulf State" AI-Hayat, 07 June 2006. 
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Notwithstanding the economic costs and political questions over Yemen's 
accession, the GCC could benefit from the improved security that allowing Yemen 
to join would bring. Through GCC grants and economic support the economic 
circumstances and living standards of Yemenis should dramatically improve 
following accession. As economic development takes place the likelihood of 
Yemen being a breeding ground for Islamic militants will be reduced 
considerably.85 Thus, according to some regional analysts the GCC should be 
willing to endure some temporary economic burdens from Yemen's membership of 
the GCC in order to "realize priceless political and strategic goals."86 
In many ways expanding the GCC would provide the existing members, often 
characterized as resource rich-labour poor, with many opportunities, but expanding 
the role of the single currency to encompass economies such as Yemen may not 
be optimal. The GCC could however adopt a two-tier strategy where - like the EU 
- some members are core (the Eurozone) and others are peripheral (EU members 
that still retain their sovereign currencies). 
7.6 Conclusion 
The launch of the GCC single currency will present a number of potential benefits, 
both direct and indirect; yet realizing many of the economic gains will ultimately 
depend on the implementation of complementary economic reforms and the full 
establishment of the GCC Common Market. The successful launch of the single 
currency will be a signal of regional strength and will present an opportune moment 
for the GCC leaders to move to a more flexible exchange rate regime that will give 
them regional autonomy over monetary policy tools with which to direct their 
economies. Furthermore, an independent GCC currency, backed by the economic 
strength of considerable resources and financial assets, has the potential to 
become a regional anchorage and reserve currency, particularly if it is perceived as 
an 'Islamic' currency and used as the invoice currency for the region's oil sales. 
85 Rutledge, E. "Is Yemen Ready To Join The GCC?" in Gulf Research Center Business Bulletin, 
Dubai, 24-30 June 2006. 
86 Shirian, op.cit. 
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The potential efficiency gains from the CU are likely to be marginal at first, as intra-
GCC trade (even as a proportion of non-oil trade) is currently relatively small 
compared to that of Europe prior to MU. The single currency is expected to 
promote intra-GCC trade but businesses see other micro level factors to be more 
important obstacles to the growth of their business rather than exchange rate 
related costs. The simplification of bureaucratic formalities and harmonisation of 
business regulations across the GCC are necessary reforms that must accompany 
the CU if the potential gain from the single currency in expanding intra-GCC trade 
is to be realised. In addition, the gains from increasing price transparency will only 
reduce future price discrimination across the region if there is increased arbitrage 
in the goods and services market brought about through a GCC Common Market. 
On balance however, the effect of the CU on private sector confidence and the 
business climate is expected to be positive. According to the results of the 
business survey, a majority of GCC businesses are confident about the potential 
success of the CU and its impact on their businesses. This bodes well for future 
investment decisions and potential growth of these economies in the lead up to, 
and following the establishment of the CU. GCC capital market expansion will also 
be promoted by the single currency, as new investment opportunities arise in pan-
GCC assets attracting a greater level of funds. With increased liquidity the region's 
Islamic bond market should benefit in particular, with increasing issuance and 
lower costs of borrowing for the region's companies. 
Despite the substantial prospective gains of a single currency, the potential costs 
of the CU are also considerable. However, as this chapter has shown, these costs 
are essentially manageable and their magnitude will very much depend on the 
political commitment to the process. If the political will is concerted the costs are 
likely to be significantly reduced. In the political context of the GCC states, the 
main sacrifice is the loss of some sovereign control over economic policy making. 
The loss of discretionary monetary policy will prove costly for some GCC states 
post CU in light of diverging inflation rates, monetary policy preferences and 
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economic development strategies. Agreement on the choice of monetary policy 
and exchange rate regime for the single currency will therefore require substantial 
compromises over national interests in favour of implementing the most 
appropriate exchange rate regime for the region as a whole. However, the potential 
macroeconomic costs of the common monetary policy should be ameliorated by 
the flexible adjustments of the GCC's labour market and increasing cross border 
capital flows. 
Post CU the choice of exchange rate regime is uncertain and is likely to depend on 
the prevailing economic circumstances. The consensus opinion considers the 
optimal policy for the region would involve an active monetary policy and thus the 
choice of a more flexible exchange rate regime. But whether or not the GCC 
leaders can agree on detaching the single currency from the dollar is questionable, 
as is whether a switch to a free float or a peg to a trade weighted basket of 
currencies would be more beneficial. 
In a CU the fiscal spending and borrowing of each nation will become a matter of 
common concern for all members and therefore the GCC states are expected to 
adopt fiscal discipline rules which will reduce the likelihood of future bail-outs of 
indebted members and strengthen investor confidence in the region. The 
experience of Europe's SGP has shown however, that if the fiscal rules are too 
rigid they are likely to be broken and consequently lose their credibility and 
effectiveness. The design of fiscal limits for the GCC must therefore take into 
consideration the region's hydrocarbon dependent economies in cyclically 
adjustable rules otherwise they are unlikely to work in ensuring fiscal discipline in 
the long run. 
The costs associated with accepting restraints on fiscal policy and scrutiny of 
budgets by other member states are politically significant and agreement on the 
exact nature of the fiscal rules for the GCC CU has consequently, so far been hard 
to reach. Eventually, the fiscal rules determined may well be of a 'looser' nature 
than those of the SGP and adherence to them possibly open to some 
interpretation. This might soften the political cost incurred by the GCC leaders of 
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losing absolute fiscal sovereignty but only with firm political commitment to the 
process will the leaders eventually find common ground on this sensitive issue. 
Once the constituent states are tied together in CU, the need for transparent and 
standardized budget reporting will be vital as all members will face the economic 
repercussions of any one government's excessive spending and borrowing. While 
in the long run this will undoubtedly prove to be beneficial for the GCC economies 
and their credibility, in the short run, this may be viewed as politically costly and 
could even act as a powerful deterrent to the CU project. 
Finally, the successful establishment of the GCC CU should strengthen the GCC 
economically and politically. On aggregate the GCC states will have a much 
stronger voice in international disputes and negotiations which should expand their 
sphere of influence on the global stage. A unified regional bloc acting with one 
voice will also improve international cooperation and give the views of the GCC 
states greater weight in terms of US and EU foreign policy towards the Middle 
East. 
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Chapter 8 : The National Distribution of Costs 
and Benefits 
8.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter examined the costs and benefits of a CU for the GCC as 
a bloc, this chapter will attempt to assess the relative costs and benefits for 
each of the six GCC states individually. Although all the GCC states will to 
some extent experience the same costs and benefits of forming a CU they will 
do so to different degrees: in other words the precise 'weight' of particular costs 
and benefits will be experienced differently in each GCC state. Although 
conventionally perceived as broadly similar in economic composition, there are 
important differences in economic circumstances between the GCC states (as 
discussed in chapter four). By identifying the most significant prospective costs 
and benefits for each state individually GCC policy makers should be in a better 
position to manage them and to make preparations so as to minimize these 
potential costs, at the same time as maximizing the potential benefits of CU. 
This chapter makes a first assessment of the prospective relative distribution of 
costs and benefits of CU across the GCC states based on the contemporary 
economic, political and institutional circumstances. The sources of costs and 
benefits for each respective member will depend upon the initial economic 
circumstances of each country, for example the degree to which they meet 
various OCA criteria and convergence criteria, as well as the other prerequisite 
conditions for CU. 
It should also be mentioned, that as the date of CU approaches, progress on 
economic convergence may take place as the policy of integration is advanced. 
Such convergence should reduce the economic costs involved and improve the 
prospects for each GCC state, but obviously at this stage such convergence 
cannot be fully taken into account and the analysis of costs and benefits is 
therefore based only on the existing economic conditions in each GCC state. 
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The assessment presented here is partly based on the perceptions of our panel 
of regional experts reflecting contemporary political and economic conditions 
within the GCC states. In addition, we again utilize the findings of the GCC 
business survey which provides evidence and information as to the potential 
distribution of economic related costs and benefits on a country by country 
basis. Some of the questions put to experts and regional businesses specifically 
dealt with comparative advantages of one country over another, which are 
drawn upon in this chapter. 
The arguments for and against joining a CU as set out by Mundell 1, in particular 
the political economy factors, are also highly relevant to the respective GCC 
economies. Several political economy factors will be considered by the leaders 
of each respective GCC state when weighing up the costs and benefits of CU 
accruing to them. Indeed, some of these political-economy factors may 
influence the decision of the GCC ruling elites as to whether they actually 
embark on CU. As we established in chapter seven, some of the potential costs 
of forming a CU will be costs to the existing ruling elites, such as the increased 
scrutiny of budget accounts and the reduced national autonomy over various 
aspects of economic policy making. Where appropriate, these political-economy 
considerations are therefore discussed in the country by country analysis which 
follows. 
At the end of this chapter we shall attempt to establish a provisional 'qualitative 
cost-benefit' analysis of CU for each GCC state with the intention of indicating 
which countries will be net beneficiaries of CU and which (if any) will be net 
losers. Such an analysis should then assist political decision makers in adopting 
transitional policies and mechanisms leading to CU which will sensitively take 
into consideration the particular difficulties (or advantages) which some 
countries might face. A realistic appreciation of these facts can greatly smooth 
the process of moving towards CU even if they highlight seemingly difficult 
obstacles. 
1 Mundell, Robert A. "Updating the agenda for monetary union" in Optimum Currency Areas: 
New Analytical and Policy Developments, (Eds. Blejer, M.l., Frenkel, J.A., Leiderman, L., and 
Razin, A.) International Monetary Fund, 1997. 
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However, in the analysis of the costs of CU it is important to distinguish 
between those costs (economic or political) which will be experienced if the 
GCC CU actually goes ahead and those which would be so powerful as to stop 
the actualisation of CU (or the participation of a particular state in the CU). The 
former category of costs can be entered into the qualitative cost-benefit analysis 
of CU of the kind which we shall attempt to produce, but the latter - on logical 
grounds - should be clearly identified, but not, in our opinion, included in the 
cost-benefit analysis. In other words, if it is believed that the ruling elite in a 
particular state stand to lose so much domestic power as a result of e.g. CU 
fiscal transparency rules, that they will refuse to take part in the whole exercise, 
then there is little point in trying 'balance' this CU 'cost' against putative benefits 
which the country would receive if it did actually participate in the proposed CU. 
Other potential economic and political gains from the future policy choice of de-
pegging the GCC single currency and having an independent monetary policy, 
which were discussed in chapter seven, are also not taken into account in this 
chapter. This is because such gains can be expected to accrue to all the GCC 
members as a whole. 
This chapter continues by reviewing the principal economic characteristics of 
the individual GCC states which constitute key parameters in assessing relative 
CU costs and benefits. Section 8.2 then goes on to address the question of 
whether the CU could be established without all six GCC member states 
participating. Following this, it examines in detail the cost- benefit case of each 
GCC state individually taking into account both economic and political economy 
considerations. Finally, in section 8.3 we attempt to measure the relative 
economic case for each GCC state for joining the CU. The specific economic 
benefits for each GCC state are weighed against the economic costs and the 
results are displayed graphically in a qualitative cost-benefit analysis. While this 
approach is necessarily somewhat subjective, given the impossibility of putting 
any meaningful quantitative weight on the items which enter into our politico-
economic balance sheet, we believe that the exercise should provide some 
initial guidance to GCC decision makers as to the best way forward in tackling 
the real world challenges facing what may turn out to be one of the most 
significant political and economic events of the early 21 81 century. 
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8.2 Comparative Costs and Benefits 
Certain key economic indicators are likely to be important parameters in 
assessing the likely costs and benefits of CU by GCC state. These include the 
relative size of the economy, natural resource wealth, competitive position, 
intra-regional trade and investment linkages as well as the degree to which 
each state meets various convergence criteria. Table 8.1 provides a snap shot 
of some of the economic characteristics of each of the GCC states. 
Table 8.1: GCC Comparative Economic Indicators 
Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar SA UAE 
GOP (US$bn nominal), 
11.01 48.50 24.82 28.45 250.56 104.20 
2004 
GOP Per Capita (US$ 
nominal) 2004 15,572 17,613 10,325 38,239 11,051 25,415 
Population (mn), 2004 0.71 2.75 2.4 0.74 22.67 4.1 
Proven Oil Reserves Per 
176 36,000 2,333 20,540 11,588 22,639 
Capita (bbls), 2004 
Life Expectancy of 
Proven Oil Reserves 1.3 111.9 19.5 42.1 68.0 100.5 
(years), 2004 
Inflation Rate%, 2005 2.6 4.1 1.2 8.8 0.7 6 
Reserve to Import Cover 
2.9 7.3 5.5 5.3 5.5 2.8 (months), 2005 
lntra-GCC Non-Oil 
Exports as % of Total 27.5 8.9 51.2 20.2 18.8 27.5 
(average 1990-2002) 
lntra-GCC Non-Oil 
Imports as % of Total 12 9.5 30.6 13 2.9 5 
(average 1990-2002) 
Share (%) of total Intra-
GCC Investment (1990- 13.6 0.03 1.7 7.2 23.4 54.4 
2003) 
Source. Complied by author from vanous sources . 
2 GOP, GOP per capita and population from national central bank sources, oil statistics 
calculated from BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2005, inflation rates from IMF IFS, 
reserve cover figures calculated from IMF Regional Economic Outlook and SAMBA, trade 
figures calculated from ESCWA External Trade Bulletins, Investment figures from Bolbol, Ali A. 
and Fatheldin, Ayten M. "Foreign and Intra-Arab Capital Flows In the Arab Countries, 1990-
2003", The World Economy (Forthcoming). 
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In the OCA literature it is usually assumed that small and open economies tend 
to benefit from forming a CU because their currencies and markets are marginal 
and the single currency enables them to take advantage of the full benefits of 
the larger, Common Market. 3 It is also generally agreed that when relatively 
poorer economies form a CU with richer ones then the process of economic 
convergence stands to benefit those poorer states by raising living standards 
and improving welfare in the catching up process. Prospective CU members 
with competitive business environments can also expect to benefit from access 
to an enlarged market without their businesses facing the adjustment costs of 
adapting to a more competitive business climate. Those GCC states with strong 
existing or potential intra-regional trade and investment links will stand to gain 
relatively more from the reduction in exchange rate related transaction costs 
and uncertainty. While those GCC states which have breached convergence 
criteria most frequently in the past will possibly face difficult adjustment costs 
from the CU. These relative economic costs and benefits are discussed on a 
country by country basis later in this chapter. 
In addition to the cross country economic considerations there are a host of 
other national institutional and political economy issues that will influence the 
balance of costs and benefits per GCC state. The national perception of the 
costs and benefits accruing from CU will influence the decision to join the CU 
and therefore whether the CU goes ahead with all six GCC members. Despite 
the shared commitment to the Economic Agreement of 2001, according to the 
GCC Charter the choice of opting out is feasible but only under certain strict 
conditions. In the case of EMU, several European Union countries decided not 
to join, such as the UK and Sweden.4 
The largest proportion of regional experts consulted felt that a GCC CU could 
not however, be established with less than the six GCC members. One Saudi 
Arabian government official commented "The decision has to be unanimous as 
we tried to go ahead with the customs union with only four or five states initially 
and the others later, but finally they agreed that they must move together. So 
3 See for example, McKinnon, R. 1., "Optimum Currency Areas" The American Economic 
Review, Vol. 53, No.4, pp 717-725, September 1963. 
4 In Sweden, the decision not to join was based on a public referendum. 
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based on past experience I don't think they will go ahead with less than six 
members." Another Saudi Arabian government official agreed with this 
sentiment, saying "Opting out will render the CU irrelevant. The strength of the 
CU and its potential benefits is in its comprehensive nature." Several experts 
felt that if the CU failed to include all the GCC states then it would be a dent to 
their credibility. 
Of those experts that thought it was potentially possible for CU to proceed 
without all six GCC members, a few felt that it would depend on which GCC 
states were left out. Most felt that it would not be feasible to have the CU 
without Saudi Arabia's participation, but that if small states such as Bahrain or 
Oman were not included this would not be an obstacle to the formation of the 
CU. Bahrain's small economic size certainly limits the benefits for other 
members from its inclusion in the CU while relative to the other GCC states 
(except Bahrain) Oman is a resource poor country and arguably its economic 
structure is more akin to that of another Gulf neighbour, Yemen. 
Nevertheless, the inclusion of Saudi Arabia in the prospective CU was not 
initially considered to be crucial by the other GCC states, nor for that matter by 
Robert Mundell, who was consulted on a plan for a Gulf CU several years 
before the formation of the GCC. In an interview with a regional newspaper in 
1999 Mundell commented "I put forth the plan for a Gulf unified currency back in 
1975 in response to a request from the Central Bank of Kuwait." Mundell went 
on to say "The idea then was to establish a unified currency between the small 
Gulf Emirates. The plan did not include Saudi Arabia nor the Sultanate of 
Oman."5 
The benefits to small economies joining together in CU are commonly accepted. 
In fact, previously Qatar and Dubai (now one of the seven Emirates of the UAE) 
had formed a CU between 1966 and 1973.6 But the inclusion of Saudi Arabia in 
the GCC CU, whilst significantly increasing the market size for the other GCC 
5 AI-Halii, A. F., "A Special Interview with Robert Mundell - Nobel Laureate in Economics" AI 
Watan, (translated from Arabic) 1999. 
6 The Qatar-Dubai Currency Agreement was signed on 21 March 1966 and introduced the 
Qatar and Dubai Riyal as the currency unit in both states, this arrangement lasted until 1973. 
See www.pjsymes.com/au/articles/QatarDubai.htm (accessed at 25/02/04). 
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members and therefore representing a significant gain to the union, also 
presents something of a challenge to its overall cohesion. Saudi Arabia's 
influential position in the future CU, as discussed in chapter seven (see section 
7.5), is likely to be of some concern to the smaller GCC members and may 
impose some political costs upon them. As Mundell pointed out in his interview, 
"Broadly speaking, Saudi Arabia will wield palpable influence because it cannot 
be expected that the other GCC states will put forward fiscal and monetary 
policies that would go utterly counter to Saudi Arabia's interests." 
Political instability in SA however, might be a potential problem for several other 
more stable GCC states and according to Mundell7, could influence those states 
against joining the CU. The emergence of militarised lslamist groups in Saudi 
Arabia in recent years has raised real concerns over the stability of the country. 
There have been a number of terrorist attacks on the country's infrastructure, in 
particular on oil installations, such an attack occurred early in 2006.8 Yet, 
subsequent raids by the Saudi security forces have captured or killed many of 
the perpetrators of these attacks. 9 However, the World Bank's Governance and 
Anti-Corruption Index rates Saudi Arabia's political stability as lowest in the 
GCC at just 30.6 percentile rank (see Figure 8.1) and this ranking has fallen 
since 1998 from 51.5. 10 
There are also doubts about political stability in Bahrain, with the World Bank 
ranking its politically stability second lowest in the region at just 50 percentile 
rank (see Figure 8.1 ). During the nineties there were periods of extreme civil 
unrest and the government heavily cracked down with political detentions and 
reports of human rights abuses. More recently, tensions between the ruling 
Sunni elite and the majority Shia population continue to run high. In 2006 calls 
for constitutional reforms from opposition groups were sidestepped by the ruling 
family who continue to dominate the political system. 11 
7 Mundell, op.cit. 
8 Staff writer "Saudis 'foil oil facility attack'" BBC News, 24 February 2006. 
9 Staff writer "Saudi shootout kills '5 militants' Saudi forces battled suspected militants in gun 
battle" CNN.com, 27 February 2006 
1
° Kaufmann; D., Kraay, A. and Mastruzzi, M., "Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators 
for 1996-2004", World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series No. 3630, May 2005. 
11 Economist Intelligence Report, Country Report, Bahrain, March 2005. 
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For countries such as Qatar and the UAE, where political stability is much 
higher than that of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, the potentially adverse political 
considerations of joining a CU dominated by Saudi Arabia might possibly 
outweigh the potential economic gains. Previous terrorist attacks in Saudi 
Arabia do not appear to have reduced confidence in the economic growth and 
stability of the UAE for example, or the attractiveness of Dubai as a tourist 
resort and ideal location for FDI in the region. However, once tied into monetary 
union, with common and jointly determined monetary and economic policies, 
the association between the members will be much closer and a crisis of 
confidence due to possible instability in one member state would be more likely 
to be contagious to others. 
Figure 8.1: World Bank Ranking of Political Stability across the GCC 
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There are also variations in the degrees of national data transparency and the 
professionalism of national monetary authorities which are also factors which 
will impact the balance of costs and benefits for each GCC state. There are 
different degrees of institutional integrity across the GCC states which may also 
influence the decision of GCC states with a higher degree of institutional 
efficiency as to whether they wish to join the CU. For example, the Bahrain 
Monetary Authority, which is regarded by many as the region's most 
professional financial regulator, has substantial regional and international 
kudos. The UAE has also achieved a high level of institutional credibility. The 
World Bank's Governance and Anti-Corruption Index rates the regulatory quality 
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of the UAE, despite being a federal state, to be highest among the GCC states, 
followed by Bahrain. 12 While Saudi Arabia and Qatar have the lowest ranking 
among the GCC economies (see Figure 8.2). 
Figure 8.2: World Bank Ranking of Regulatory Quality across the GCC 
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Therefore the institutional and regulatory credibility of the UAE and Bahrain 
could be jeopardised by joining the CU with members such as Qatar and Saudi 
Arabia. However, such potential costs could be mitigated in part by allowing the 
new GCC CU institutions to be established in these two states. Were Bahrain to 
host the newly established GCC central bank then the entire region could 
benefit from the BMA's excellent reputation. Yet as the GCC's second largest 
economy, not currently hosting any GCC institution, the UAE also has a good 
case to be the location of the future GCC central bank. 13 
We now turn to a country by country analysis of the anticipated costs and 
benefits of joining a future GCC CU. As stated in our introduction, to some 
extent all the GCC states will experience the same costs and benefits, but the 
different weights attached to each specific cost and benefit may vary 
considerably between one country and another. In what follows, we therefore 
12 In 2004, the UAE's percentile rank was 79.3, followed by Bahrain at 72.9, the ranking was 
based on 6-8 survey polls. See Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. and Mastruzzi, M., Governance 
Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996-2004, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 
Series No. 3630, May 2005. 
13 In chapter 6, section 6.3.1, it was established that some Gulf newspapers have reported that 
the UAE has already been chosen as the location of the GCC central bank, however there has 
not been any official confirmation of this as yet. 
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concentrate on highlighting those specific costs and benefits which have a 
particular salience for each country in question and although a broader range of 
cost-benefit criteria will be also referred to, at the end of each country-section 
we will underline what we consider to be the most crucial cost-benefit issues for 
that particular country. It is these specific factors which will later (in Section 8.3) 
be incorporated into our qualitative cost-benefit analysis, leaving on one side 
those other issues - still unquestionably important - but which are somewhat 
more peripheral for each of the countries. 
8.2.1 Bahrain 
Bahrain's small economy, which constitutes only 2.4 percent of the GCC's 
aggregate GDP, stands to benefit considerably from joining the CU. Bahrain 
has limited oil reserves, with an estimated life expectancy for its 'proven' 
category of only 1.3 years 14 (see Table 8.1). Bahrain's non-oil intra-GCC 
exports already constitute 27.5 percent of its total but joining the CU offers an 
important opportunity for Bahrain to diversify further through non-oil intra-GCC 
trade and investment. 
Bahrain's businesses will benefit from an expanded market of an extra 32.6 
million potential consumers providing considerable potential for new economies 
of scale to be exploited. As revealed by the GCC Business Survey, Bahrain's 
businesses are therefore understandably positive about CU. Although their 
approval rating (percent anticipating 'very good/good' consequences) is slightly 
lower than the GCC average it is still over 75 percent and it is also significant 
that no businesses considered CU would be 'very bad/bad' for the country (see 
Table 8.2). 
14 As was pointed out in chapter 4, section 4.2.2, this calculation is based on 'proven' reserves 
which only refers to reserves for which there Is a greater than 90 percent probability of their 
being commercially recoverable. 
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Table 8.2: National Business Expectations of Impact of CU 
What do you expect will be the overall effect of a 
GCC single currency in 201 0 on your business? 
In which GCC 
Very Good/ 
None 
Very Bad/ 
Total state are you 
Good Bad 
based? 
Bahrain 76% 24% 0% 100% 
Kuwait 71% 19% 10% 100% 
Oman 83% 14% 3% 100% 
Qatar 88% 13% 0% 100% 
Saudi Arabia 78% 22% 0% 100% 
UAE 72% 26% 2% 100% 
Source: GCC Busmess Survey on Currency Umon, June-September 2005 
Assuming that a GCC Common Market in goods and services is in place, 
Bahrain's successful banking and finance companies will be well placed to 
operate across the GCC and compete for business in the enlarged market. 
There is, of course, growing regional competition in this sector from Dubai and 
Qatar who are also establishing financial centres, but Bahrain was the first GCC 
state to establish itself as a financial hub and its off-shore banking sector is well 
developed. 15 In December 2005 Bahrain won The Banker magazine's 'Financial 
Centers of the Future Award'. The award was based on a number of criteria, 
including the rate of growth of the financial services sector; regulatory quality 
and supervisory standards. 
Bahrain's financial sector has also benefited from the regulatory supervision of 
the Bahrain Monetary Authority, which has gained substantial prestige as being 
efficient and professional. In 2005 for example, the BMA won the Emerging 
Markets Newspaper's award for Best Sovereign Deal in Local Currency. 16 
Bahrain is also a major issuer of Islamic bonds, or sukuks in the region, both 
corporate and sovereign, issuing 25 percent of the total GCC sukuk issuance in 
15 The first offshore banking license was issued by Bahrain in 1975 and the Bahrain Monetary 
Authority -which has had supervisory authority over the entire financial system since 2002, has 
licensed some 364 financial institutions. 
16 Rutledge, E. "GCC Economic Performance In 2005" in Gulf Yearbook 2005-2006, pp.109-
128, Gulf Research Center, Dubai, 2006. 
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2005.17 Bahrain is establishing a secondary market in sukuks trading which will 
improve liquidity in the market. However, the largest ever issue of a sukuk was 
in 2006 by Dubai Ports World, for $3.5bn, 18 and is a sign of the growing 
competition from the UAE in terms of sukuk issuance. Nevertheless, new sukuk 
issues in the single currency will reduce exchange rate risks for regional 
investors and are likely to attract increased regional and international funds 
lowering the cost of capital for issuing countries and their companies, such as 
Bahrain. 
Over the period of study, Bahrain would have had the least problem, of all the 
GCC states, in meeting the expected monetary and fiscal convergence criteria 
and therefore is unlikely to face significant costs from adjusting to CU (see 
chapter six, Table 6.4). However, one criterion which Bahrain would have 
broken on seven occasions and both in 2004 and 2005 was its foreign reserves 
cover to imports (see Table 8.1 ). Joining the CU will therefore benefit Bahrain in 
that other CU members, particularly Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have very large 
levels of foreign reserves which will provide much greater protection for 
Bahrain's future currency. 
However, Bahrain's decision to sign a bilateral FTA with the US in late 2004 
suggests that the Bahraini leadership may not be committed to placing regional 
interests above national ones. 19 Without such political commitment however, 
Bahrain's inclusion in the CU is likely to be unsustainable and may eventually 
undermine the credibility of Bahrain's economic policies. The signing of the FTA 
suggests that the loss of national control over economic and trade policy -
implicit in a CU - may be perceived as quite costly by the Bahraini leaders. 
Until the signing of the bilateral US FTA Bahrain's relationship with Saudi Arabia 
had been on positive terms. The construction of a causeway linking the two 
states was funded by Saudi Arabia and completed in 1986. The causeway 
17 Bahraini sukuk issue size was approximately $2.37bn in 2005, while total GCC sukuk issue 
size was $9.39bn in that year, according to The Liquidity Management Centre, July 2006, 
~accessed at http://www.lmcbahrain.com/) 
8 Bokhari, Farhan, Khalaf, Roula and Tett, Gillian "Booming Gulf gives fillip to Islamic bonds" 
Financial Times, 1 0 July 2006. 
19 Janardhan, J. and Rutledge, E., "U.S.-Bahrain trade deal exposes GCC chinks" The Daily 
Star, Beirut, 28 December 2004. 
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helped Bahrain's service sector benefit from Saudi visitors and strengthened 
ties between the two states. Furthermore, the ruling Sunni family in Bahrain has 
been given financial support from the Sunni leaders in Saudi Arabia, and to a 
lesser extent from Kuwait and the UAE, in part to avert any potential civil 
unresf0 (Bahrain has a substantial working class Shia population). Prior to July 
2004, Bahrain had also benefited from a 50,000 bpd oil grant from Saudi Arabia 
and the entire 143,000 bpd output from the Saudi Aramco run, but jointly 
owned, Abu Saafa oil field. 21 
However, following Bahrain's decision to sign FTA with the US, Saudi Arabia 
halted the oil grant and went back on plans to allow Bahrain to maintain a 1 00 
percent share of oil extracted from Abu Saafa, following a doubling of the field's 
output in late 2004.22 The move illustrated the economic vulnerability of Bahrain 
and its dependence on Saudi Arabian patronage. The signing of the bilateral 
FT A seems to indicate Bahrain's desire to move away from Saudi domination 
onto a more independent economic footing. 23 There may therefore be valid 
concerns among the Bahraini leadership regarding the potential dominance of 
Saudi Arabia within the framework of the CU. 
In summary, drawing on the material in this section as well as upon evidence in 
previous chapters, we can conclude that among the totality of benefits accruing 
from GCC CU, those which have the most weight for Bahrain are: savings of 
transaction costs in trade; the advantages of participation in a larger market and 
consequent scale economies; an existing sectoral comparative advantage in 
banking and finance which will be enhanced by CU; and the likelihood of 
additional foreign exchange reserves cover. The principal disadvantage from 
CU is the possibility of increased political domination over the country's 
economic decision making by the state which will inevitably play a dominant role 
in a future CU -the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
20 Economist Intelligence Unit, Bahrain Country Profile, 2006. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Staff writer "Drop FT A with US, GCC tells Bahrain" Reuters, 24 November 2004. 
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8.2.2 Kuwait 
Kuwait has substantial oil reserves, with current proven reserves per capita the 
highest among the GCC states at 36,000 barrels per citizen and a reserve life 
expectancy of 112 years (see Table 8.1). At present Kuwait, is fairly 
economically independent from its neighbours and does not face any strong 
imperative to diversify its economy through increasing its non-oil intra-GCC 
trade. Previous intra-GCC trade analysis in chapter five (see section 5.2) 
revealed that Kuwait has relatively weak intra-GCC trade and investment 
linkages and frequently had the lowest Trade Intensity Ratios of all the GCC 
states. On average, between 1990 and 2002 Kuwait's non-crude oil intra-GCC 
exports as a proportion of total non-crude oil exports only amounted to 8.9 
percent, less than any other GCC state (see Table 8.1). Also between 1990 and 
2003 Kuwait attracted a negligible share of intra-GCC FDI. The 1991 Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait is likely to have been a contributing factor in the low levels of 
inwards FDI during the early nineties but in recent years limited opportunities for 
private sector investment are more likely to be due to public sector crowding 
out. 
It appears therefore that Kuwait would initially have less to gain economically 
from joining the GCC CU than other GCC states. In fact, embarking on CU with 
Saudi Arabia may initially be economically costly for Kuwait, considering the 
lack of economic integration between the two that currently exists. In chapter 
five (see section 5.6), econometric evidence indicated that Kuwait's economy 
did not follow a long run relationship with that of Saudi Arabia's. Therefore 
Kuwait could suffer from asymmetric national shocks which a GCC common 
monetary policy - one which will inevitably be largely influenced by Saudi 
Arabia - will not be able to address. In this respect, one Kuwaiti commercial 
banker felt "There are different future demands on the GCC economies and I 
wonder if the Kuwaitis will trust their future to the Saudis who will undoubtedly 
dominate the union." 
Furthermore, the business survey findings suggest that Kuwaiti businesses are 
least optimistic about the expected effect of the single currency on their 
business compared to business respondents based in other GCC states. 
According to the survey results, 1 0 percent of Kuwaiti businesses felt that the 
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effect of the CU on their business would be bad or very bad and a further 19 per 
cent saw no advantages in CU. Although a clear majority (71 per cent) favoured 
CU (rated its results 'very good/good'), this was the lowest approval rating 
among the six GCC states, (see Table 8.2). This finding may be due to the fact 
that until 2003 Kuwait had had a more independent exchange rate regime -
compared to the other GCC states - where its currency was pegged to an 
undisclosed trade weighted basket of currencies which, it was felt, had served 
them relatively well. 
Kuwait has had a good track record of relative fiscal discipline over the historical 
period of analysis, compared to most of its Gulf neighbours. Kuwait is the only 
GCC state that has not recorded a budget deficit since 1998. It has also built up 
substantial foreign reserve cover, which amounted to 7.3 months of imports in 
2005 (see Table 8.1 ), and only in one year (1998) had less than the four months 
criterion (see chapter six, Table 6.4). Joining a CU with the other GCC states 
will not enhance Kuwait's fiscal position in fact it could be detrimental to its 
reputation for fiscal discipline. 
In forming a CU with other states with a worse fiscal record than itself, Kuwait 
may be the victim of 'free-riding' where other GCC states take advantage of 
Kuwait's fiscal discipline in order to spend more freely themselves. In CU there 
is less incentive for fiscally loose states to control their spending as their fiscal 
irresponsibility is borne by the group as a whole, represented by higher interest 
rates on national debts reflecting the increased risk of default. While Kuwait 
does not issue much sovereign debt at present, this could however, represent a 
serious future concern for Kuwait in joining the CU. This was stressed by one 
Kuwaiti expert who said "It will be difficult for more prudent states, like Kuwait, 
to tie themselves to countries like Saudi Arabia." 
In addition to the potential cost of fiscal 'free-riding' many of its neighbours' 
statistical data standards are also much more opaque and less reliable than that 
of Kuwait. Kuwait, along with Oman and Qata,-24, are the only GCC states 
currently participating in the IMF's General Data Dissemination System which 
24 Yet despite this Qatar's data provision is still seemingly very poor. 
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provides guidelines and principles for best international practice in compiling 
national statistics.25 According to local media reports, the GCC Secretariat 
considers Kuwait's fiscal reporting to be more transparent than that of Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar and the UAE.26 Unless all the GCC states agree to public scrutiny 
of their national budgets and accounts and to implement best practice statistical 
standards in order to create comparable statistics, then the potential for fiscal 
'free-riding' within the union will be much higher and represent an even greater 
potential cost for Kuwait. 
Kuwait will however face some adjustment costs in bringing inflation down to 
meet the monetary convergence criteria. Kuwait is characterized as a relatively 
high inflationary economy compared to its neighbours, Saudi Arabia, Oman and 
Bahrain, and would have broken the inflation rule on fourteen occasions over 
the past twenty five years (see chapter six, Table 6.4). Furthermore, the results 
of the business survey indicated that following the launch of the CU Kuwait will 
face additional inflation pressures. Of those Kuwaiti business respondents that 
thought the CU would increase their costs, 100 percent said that they would 
pass these costs onto customers in price rises (see Figure 8.3). 
Figure 8.3: Potential Impact of CU on National Inflation 
100% 
90% 
BO% 
70% 
60% 
50% 
40% 
30% 
20% 
10% 
0 
Do you Intend to pass on any Increase in your costs arising from CU to your 
customers? 
Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE 
Yes No 
Source: GCC Buslnttss Survey on Currency Union, Juntt - s.ptember, 2005. 
25 AI-Mansouri, Abdulrahman K.L. and Dziobek, Claudia "Providing Official Statistics for the 
Common Market and Monetary Union in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Countries-A 
Case for "Gulfstat" IMF Working Paper WP/06/38, February 2006. 
26 See Staff Writer "Volatile oil is a headache for Gulf monetary union· Gulf Times, 30 October 
2004. 
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Although the purely economic case for Kuwait joining a GCC CU is somewhat 
questionable, there are strong political factors favouring Kuwait's participation. 
Following the 1990 invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, Saudi Arabia played an important 
part in the coalition to liberate Kuwait, and bore a large proportion of the 
financial costs of the war reaching approximately $16bn.27 Considering the 
violent repercussions of the US led invasion of Iraq in 2003, Kuwait is likely to 
feel highly vulnerable until the security situation in Iraq is settled. In the mean 
time therefore, Kuwait will be keen to forge ahead with the economic and 
political integration process with its GCC neighbours in order to strengthen its 
regional political alliances for the purpose of national security. 28 
In summary, drawing on the material in this section as well as upon evidence in 
previous chapters, we can conclude that among the totality of benefits accruing 
from GCC CU, those which have the most weight for Kuwait are exclusively in 
the political field - the likelihood that GCC participation will lead to a greater 
political and security integration between the GCC states and hence improve 
Kuwait's own national security. 
Among the costs of joining the CU we would cite the possibility that the absence 
of cointegration between the economies of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia could imply 
that Kuwait will suffer asymmetric national shocks which cannot be ameliorated 
by a GCC monetary policy geared especially to the requirements of Saudi 
Arabia. Kuwait could also face painful adjustment costs in meeting inflation 
convergence criteria. In addition Kuwait, with an exceptionally sound fiscal 
position may become the victim of fiscal 'free-riding' by less prudent GCC 
member states. 
27 US Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, The Final Report to the US 
Congress; Appendix P, April 1992. 
28 In his 1997 paper, Mundell mentioned this as a factor influencing the decision to join a CU. 
See Mundell, Robert A. "Updating the agenda for monetary union" in Optimum Currency Areas: 
New Analytical and Policy Developments, {Eds. Blejer, M.l., Frenkel, J.A., Leiderman, L., and 
Razin, A.), International Monetary Fund, 1997. In addition, Willet alSo concludes that a primary 
motivation for the process of economic integration in Europe was to achieve national security 
goals, see Willett, T. D. "Some Political Economy Aspects of EMU" Journal of Policy Modeling 
22 {3), pp.379-389, 2000. 
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8.2.3 Oman 
Oman is the poorest Gee state with GOP per capita at just $10,325, 53 percent 
of the Gee average (see Table 8.1). It also has very limited oil and gas 
reserves. Oman's proven oil reserves have a life expectancy of just 19.5 years 
and its per capita oil reserves at 2, 333 barrels per citizen are the second lowest 
in the region after Bahrain, (see Table 8.1). Oman could therefore stand to 
benefit considerably from joining a much larger economic bloc with considerable 
resource wealth and financial assets. 
While convergence with the income per capita of Gee countries such as Qatar 
may be a very distant prospect, eventually poorer states such as Oman, can be 
expected to catch up with those better off Gee states. In the case of EMU for 
example, increased intra regional FDI as well as structural grants and subsidies 
stimulated the catch up process of lower income countries like the Republic of 
Ireland. For instance, if the Gee post eu were to provide structural grants to 
improve education standards Oman would benefit. It might be advisable for the 
Gee states to follow such a policy as in Europe although such issues have not 
yet been raised within the Gee and whether they would be economically 
acceptable to the richer GCe states such as Qatar and the UAE is open to 
question. 
Oman has relatively strong trading links with some of the other Gee states and 
therefore should gain more than other Gee states from the removal of 
exchange rate transaction costs. Between 1990 and 2002, approximately 51 
percent of Oman's non-crude oil exports were to other Gee states, higher than 
any other Gee state, and 31 percent of its non-crude oil imports were traded 
regionally (see Table 8.1). A large proportion of Oman's trade is with the UAE, 
which is reflected in the very high Trade Intensity Ratio of 29.6 in 2004. 29 As 
Oman's oil and gas reserves become depleted over the next two decades it 
faces the economic imperative to diversify into other economic activities. Non-
hydrocarbon intra-Gee trade is likely to become more important for Oman and 
this will be facilitated by the single currency. 
29 See chapter 5, table 5.4. 
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However, despite the importance of intra-GCC trade for Oman, Omani 
businesses are less likely to be able to compete with those of other GCC states, 
such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia, at least initially. The results of the business 
survey carried out for this thesis indicate that increasing regional competition 
was a concern for Oman's business respondents, with 39 percent of Omani 
businesses citing 'increased competition' as the most harmful effect of the CU 
(see Figure 8.4) . There may also be fear within the business community over 
the possibility that Oman's less competitive domestic firms might be taken-
over by companies from other GCC states. 
Figure 8.4: GCC Businesses Ranking Increased Competition as Most 
Harmful Effect of CU. 
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Source: GCC Buslnttss Surwy on Currency Union, June - September, 2005. 
UAE 
There is some evidence that certain sectors in Oman are somewhat vulnerable 
to greater GCC competition and/or foreign take-over, notably the banking 
sector. Compared to national banks in other GCC states the performance of 
Omani banks has recently been rather weak. For example, the National Bank of 
Oman has experienced problems with non-performing loans which resulted in 
the Commercial Bank of Qatar acquiring a 34.9 percent stake in The National 
Bank of Oman in 2005. 
Oman does however, have a comparative advantage in its developing tourism 
industry as it has outstanding natural beauty and a great variety of eco-systems 
compared to other GCC states. While Oman cannot compete with the shopping 
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malls of Dubai in the UAE, which attract a large number of regional and 
international tourists, it has a diverse natural environment which will attract a 
different niche of visitors. 'Commerce and Tourism' is already the second 
largest sector in the Omani economy and is likely to grow further as the single 
currency should stimulate intra-GCC tourism.30 The labour intensive tourism 
sector has been targeted for expansion by the Omani authorities as part of its 
'Vision 2020 plan'. In June 2005, Oman unveiled the $15bn 'Blue City' tourist 
development which will be built in the coastal region at AI Sawaidi. This massive 
economic development project will include hotels, apartments, leisure and 
healthcare facilities. The project is also expected to create 7,000 direct jobs and 
25,000 indirect jobs. 31 
Based on past evidence, Oman is unlikely to face any serious difficulty meeting 
potential monetary convergence criteria: official inflation rates are low and 
currently stand at only 1.2 percent (see Table 8.1). In fact, Oman is the only 
GCC state not to have breached the inflation convergence criteria rule during 
the period of analysis (see chapter six, Table 6.3). However, between 1980 and 
2005, Oman would have breached the fiscal deficit criteria in 18 of these years 
and its deficit reached a peak of 22.3 percent of GOP in 1986 when oil prices 
dropped dramatically32 (see chapter six, Figure 6.5). At that time Oman was 
heavily dependent on oil which formed 90 percent of total export receipts and 
the decline in oil prices also forced Oman to devalue its currency, the riyal, by 
some 1 0 percent against the US dollar. 33 Oman is somewhat less dependent on 
oil today, despite high oil prices, oil receipts accounted for 81 percent of total 
exports in 2004 (see chapter four, Table 4.5). However, Oman would have 
breached the reserves cover criteria in eight years during the period of analysis 
and would therefore benefit from the extra reserve cover for its future currency 
provided by other CU members (see chapter six, table 6.3). 
30 Tourism accounted for 12.5 percent of Oman's GOP in 2003, according to AMF National 
Accounts. 
31 Staff writer "Oman's Blue City: tourism and jobs" AMEinfo.com, 13 June 2005 
32 Despite the high levels of fiscal deficits to GOP Oman's public debt levels reached a high of 
only 16.4 percent of GOP in 2003, according to GCC Secretariat data. This is probably because 
Oman's official State General Reserve Fund & Oil Fund has been used to offset deficits in the 
past, rather than saving for future generations. It does however; raise the question of whether 
the revenues from such funds should be officially recorded as income in the government budget 
accounts. 
33 Central Bank of Oman, 25 Years of Central Bank of Oman- Apri/1975 to Apri/2000, Muscat 
2000. 
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Some evidence also suggests that Oman may have a more 'nationalistic' 
attachment to its own currency than other GCC states. Several interviewees 
mentioned that the Omanis have reservations about losing their national 
currency and were concerned about the erosion of their strong national identity 
as a result of entering into the CU. One Omani government official commented 
"The younger generations are happy about it but the older generation are less 
so because they are happy with the Omani riyal and see it as a national 
symbol." This view was echoed by one non-Omani expert. A government official 
in the UAE said "The loss of the currency as a national symbol could be a 
potential cost. For instance, the Omanis stress their currency as the Omani 
riyal, not just the riyal which is held by other GCC states." While another Em irati 
government official remarked "Oman had initially refused to enter CU because 
they wanted to protect their identity and culture." 
While it is easy to deprecate such 'nationalistic' attachment to a particular 
currency, it should be noted that in the UK- ostensibly a highly developed and 
sophisticated country - there has been an equally strong aversion to losing the 
pound sterling which is seen as a powerful affirmation of the country's national 
identity. 
The signing of a bilateral FT A with the US in late 2005 indicated Oman's desire 
to integrate further into the global economy and diversify its economic base. But 
the agreement revealed that Oman is unwilling to compromise what it perceives 
as its national commercial interests despite the potentially negative impact such 
bilateral FT As will have on the finalization of the GCC customs union and 
regardless of the displeasure of other GCC states (Oman witnessed Saudi 
Arabia's reaction to Bahrain's bilateral FTA with the US). The FTA with the US 
suggests that the inherent loss of national economic policy making involved in 
forming a CU may be perceived as unacceptable by the Omani leadership. 
In summary, drawing on the material in this section as well as upon evidence in 
previous chapters, we can conclude that among the totality of benefits accruing 
from GCC CU, those which have the most weight for Oman are similar to those 
of Bahrain. Oman will enjoy the benefits of transaction cost savings on trade, 
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the advantages of participating in a much larger market with associated 
economies of scale, and it will benefit from additional foreign exchange cover. In 
addition Oman enjoys a sectoral comparative advantage (in tourism) and, 
depending on the further negotiations on the final shape of the GCC CU and 
Common Market could benefit from the kind of internal income transfers which 
have been used in Europe to assist the 'catching-up' of the poorest members of 
the Community. On the cost side of the balance sheet, Omani companies do 
not consider themselves well prepared for the increasing regional competition 
that a single market and CU will bring about and there is evidence that ceding 
the national currency may be perceived as a weakening of Oman's national 
identity. 
8.2.4 Qatar 
Qatar's economy is unique. It has huge natural gas resources which amount to 
14.3 percent of the world's proven gas reserves34 , second only to those of 
Russia and Iran. Because of the small size of its population, at 0. 7 4 million 
citizens, Qatar has the highest nominal per capita income in the Gulf at $38,239 
in 2004 (see Table 8.1), almost double the GCC average per capita income and 
almost four times that of Oman. Moreover this advantage is likely to increase in 
future years as the country's major LNG projects continue to expand and new 
projects are brought on stream. 
As the second smallest GCC economy in terms of economic mass and 
population, joining the GCC CU will give Qatar access to a much larger market 
and therefore potential economies of scale for Qatari businesses. While 
providing new business opportunities for Qatari companies, they will 
nevertheless need to adjust to the increasing regional competition, which 
according to the GCC business survey findings is a concern for an estimated 50 
percent of Qatari businesses, higher than in any other GCC state (see Figure 
8.4). This concern is likely to be due to the small size of the Qatar economy and 
the inexperience of many Qatari companies in competing in a large market. 
34 BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2006. 
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Surprisingly, in spite of these concerns about the threat of competition, the 
business survey results provided evidence of strong optimism among Qatari 
businesses regarding the CU, with 88 percent of Qatari businesses expecting 
the CU to have a 'very good' or 'good' effect on their businesses, the highest 
approval rating in the survey, (see Table 8.2). Indeed, Qatari businesses are 
already making considerable progress in expanding their trading links with other 
GCC countries. 
Qatar's lntra-GCC trade accounted for 13 percent of its total imports and 20.2 
percent of its total exports between 1990 and 2002 (see Table 8.1). While the 
share of exports is not particularly high compared to other GCC states (such as 
Oman, the UAE and Bahrain), it must be said that Qatar has significant potential 
to increase its hydrocarbon exports to its neighbours. There is significant 
demand for Qatar's natural gas from Kuwait, the UAE and Bahrain for use in 
domestic electricity generation in order to free up valuable oil supplies for 
export. Qatar's hopes of establishing a trans-Gulf gas pipeline and supplying 
the domestic energy needs of its neighbours should be promoted by the 
region's full economic integration and from joining the GCC CU. The high level 
of Qatari optimism about the benefits of GCC CU - in spite of fears expressed 
about the threat of greater competition - may therefore be a reflection of the 
country's comparative advantage in gas production and its potential to establish 
a leading role in intra-GCC energy trading and supply. 
However, this issue of intra-GCC energy trade brings to the forefront the 
centrality of political considerations to the advancement of a GCC CU. In 
January 2002 Kuwait signed a commercial gas deal with Qatar which involved 
building a pipeline to supply 1.4bn cubic feet per day (cu. ft/d) of natural gas. In 
December 2003 the Dolphin Project between the UAE and Qatar was agreed 
and involved the export 3.2bn cu. ft/d of natural gas to the UAE for the next 25 
years. 35 A pipeline is also planned between Qatar and Bahrain in order to 
supply the latter with 300mn cu. ft/d initially, which will later rise to 500mn cu. 
ft/d.36 
35 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report for Qatar, 2006 
36 Ibid. 
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Unfortunately, political opposition from Saudi Arabia compromised the Kuwaiti 
pipeline plan which was abandoned in 2006 after the Kingdom refused to give 
its permission for the pipeline to go through Saudi territory. Then in mid 2006, 
after significant progress in the development of the Dolphin Project, Saudi 
Arabia also raised objections to the project saying that the pipeline would cross 
its territory throwing uncertainty over the finalization of the project. 37 
The frosty relations between Qatar and Saudi Arabia are costly for Qatar and 
for the development plans of the other smaller GCC states. Consequently, 
Qatar may be concerned about the political implications of joining a CU with 
Saudi Arabia which is likely to have significant influence in the decision making 
of the economic bloc. Saudi Arabia's repeated objections to Qatar's economic 
integration with its GCC neighbours bode ill for Qatar's future position within the 
more tightly knit framework of GCC CU unless there is a political 
rapprochement between Qatar and its much larger GCC neighbour. 
Qatar may also have fears about the degree of fiscal discipline in a future GCC 
CU since its economic development plans are heavily dependent on debt 
financing. Qatar's economic growth and diversification strategy is centred on 
developing its natural gas reserves and diversifying into downstream industries 
where value can be added, such as Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), Liquefied 
Petroleum Gas (LPG) and Gas to Liquids (GTL). Qatar is on track to become 
the world's largest supplier of LNG and GTL by 2012.38 In order to fund the 
massive investment needed to expand its LNG production capacity it has 
encouraged FDI but it has also issued large amounts of external sovereign 
debt, which amounted to an estimated 38 percent of GOP in 2004/5.39 In 2006, 
Moody's long term sovereign rating which reflects the risk of default was Aa2 for 
Qatar's external debt, only the UAE achieved such a high sovereign rating and 
Saudi Arabia was rated two ranks lower at A 1 and Bahrain 6 ranks lower than 
Qatar at Baa2 (see Table 8.3). 
37 Hoyos , Carola and Khalaf, Roula "Saudi Arabia upsets UAE pipeline plans" Financial Times, 
July 11 2006 
38 Economist Intelligence Unit, op.cit 
39 Amwal Finance, Presentation by Sheikha Hanadi Nasser Bin Khaled AL Thani, The 2nd 
Turkish - Arab Economic Forum, June 9th, 2006. 
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As a major issuer of sovereign bonds, the fiscal behaviour of other GCC states 
will have significant ramifications for Qatar and therefore the nature and 
implementation of the fiscal policy rules as part of CU will be in Qatar's interest. 
Excessive spending and debt accumulation by other GCC states such as Saudi 
Arabia could drive up the interest rates on the region's sovereign debt due to 
the increase in the perceived risk of debt default. Higher interest rates would 
then increase the cost of servicing debt at a high price to Qatar which relies 
heavily on foreign debt to invest in its industrial development. It will be in Qatar's 
interest therefore to push for the implementation of fiscal discipline rules within 
the framework of the CU and a mechanism for enforcement in order to avoid the 
negative spillover effects from the loose fiscal policies of some of its GCC 
neighbours. This may run counter to Saudi Arabia's own, much 'looser', fiscal 
objectives. 
Table 8.3: Sovereign Debt Rating of GCC States, 2005 
Moody's 
Position Investment GCC State Assessment of Risks 
Grade 
1 Aaa 
Obligations rated Aaa are judged to be of the 
highest quality, with minimal credit risk. 
2 Aa1 
3 Aa2 Qatar/UAE 
Obligations rated Aa are judged to be of high 
quality and are subject to very low credit risk. 
4 Aa3 Kuwait 
5 A1 Saudi Arabia 
6 A2 Oman 
Obligations rated A are considered upper-medium 
7 A3 
grade and are subject to low credit risk. 
8 Baa1 Obligations rated Baa are subject to moderate 
credit risk. They are considered medium-grade 
9 Baa2 Bahrain and as such may possess certain speculative 
characteristics. 
' Source: Middle East Economic D1gest and Moodys Investor Services 
The precise nature of the fiscal discipline rules in a future GCC CU will also be 
of crucial importance to Qatar's economy. If a European style SGP is imposed 
that does not distinguish between current and capital expenditure then Qatar's 
expansion of its downstream natural gas industries may well be restricted at 
great cost to Qatar's future economic development. A European style debt to 
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GOP limit is unlikely to be appropriate for an economy like Qatar in the midst of 
industrial development and structural reform. Therefore, there is a strong case 
for adopting a form of fiscal rules, similar to that recommended by the UK 
Treasury, which recognizes the importance of public investment and excludes 
net investment from the budget balance.40 However, to date, there appear to be 
diverging views among GCC leaders with regard to the adoption and nature of 
the appropriate fiscal discipline rules. 
Qatar has experienced cyclical periods of high inflation in the past coinciding 
with high oil prices and during the current oil price boom (2002 to the time of 
writing) annual inflation has reached a high of 8.8 percent in 2005 (see Table 
8.1 ). A large part of the rising inflation stems from the housing market, where 
rents have increased considerably. However, having introduced a law 
preventing landlords from increasing rents by more than 10 percent per annum 
the Qatari authorities expect that inflation will be at more manageable levels of 
around 4-5 percent by the time the CU is launched.41 But without implementing 
tighter monetary policies to reduce such inflationary pressures Qatar's 
competitive position and its ability to attract FDI may be eroded.42 
Qatar's inflation track record is an issue of concern which will increase Qatar's 
adjustment costs to CU especially if based on Maastricht-type criteria for price 
stability. During the period of analysis between 1980 and 2005 Qatar's inflation 
rate would have breached the convergence criteria limit in sixteen years - on 
more occasions that any other GCC state (see chapter six, Table 6.4). The 
country's inflation rate is diverging from other GCC states such as Saudi Arabia, 
Oman and Bahrain where inflation remains low. Therefore, once tied into CU, a 
common monetary policy with a bias towards Saudi Arabia would be costly for 
Qatar's economy because monetary policy would be too loose to ensure 
sufficient price stability. 
40 HM Treasury, The Stability and Growth Pact: A Discussion Paper, March 2004. 
41 Economist Intelligence Unit, op.cit. 
42 Although Qatar's monetary policy tools are somewhat limited, it could have recently done 
more to limit inflation by increasing bank reserve ratios and limiting credit growth. In January 
2006 for example, amid concerns over the sustainability of the GCC stock market boom, Qatar 
decided to allow banks to leverage investors for the purpose of buying stocks, a move that was 
likely to inflate asset prices even further. See Gulf Research Center, GCC Economic Report, 
Issue 6, Dubai, January 2006. 
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Finally, Qatar's statistical provision would be improved indirectly as a result of 
joining the CU. An important requirement of the CU is the provision of timely 
and reliable statistical data which is comparable across the GCC states. 
Compared to other GCC states, data for Qatar is often non-existent, for 
example Qatar does not publish official data on constant GOP, only for current 
GOP at market prices.43 The provision of such data is however, important in 
assessing the costs and benefits for Qatar from joining the CU and Qatar may 
therefore benefit from sharing the skills and practices of other GCC statistical 
institutions in improving the provision of such national and regional data. 
In summary, drawing on the material in this section as well as upon evidence in 
previous chapters, we can conclude that among the totality of benefits accruing 
from GCC CU, those which have the most weight for Qatar are transaction cost 
savings on trade, the benefits of participation in a larger market and 
accompanying economies of scale, a sectoral comparative advantage (gas 
supply) and improved statistical transparency and reporting. 
The costs which Qatar will face post-GCC CU include difficult adjustments to 
meet convergence criteria, the possible impact of greater competition upon 
some of Qatar's non-hydrocarbon industries and companies and the possibility 
that Qatar, like Kuwait, may become a victim of fiscal 'free-riding'. Finally, we 
note that the current state of relations between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, which 
is threatening the advancement of Qatar's key development projects to 
establish itself as regional gas supplier as well as a major gas exporter, also 
constitutes a major 'cost' for Qatar in joining the CU. 
8.2.5 Saudi Arabia 
The potential impact of the CU on Saudi Arabia - and Saudi Arabia upon the 
CU - is particularly important given the size of its GOP and population as a 
proportion of the future CU. Saudi Arabia's economy constitutes 54 percent of 
the GCC total and its population 68 percent of the total GCC market (calculated 
from Table 8.1). The prospective economic costs and benefits of CU for Saudi 
43 Consequently it was not possible in chapter 5 to carry out the cointegration analysis between 
Qatar and Saudi Arabia and assess the long term relationship between the two. 
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Arabia will therefore be the determining factor as to whether the CU project 
goes ahead or collapses. 
The GCC CU and full economic integration with the other GCC states is 
perceived as a positive step by the Saudi Arabian business community. The 
majority of Saudi businesses surveyed, more than three quarters (78 percent), 
thought that the single currency would have either a 'very good' or 'good' effect 
on their business (see Table 8.2). In addition, 81 percent of Saudi businesses 
felt 'very optimistic' or 'optimistic' about the expected success of the CU and 
only 3 percent were 'pessimistic' or 'very pessimistic' (see Table 8.4). 
Table 8.4: National Business Expectations about likely Success of CU 
How do you feel about the 201 0 currency union and its likely 
success? 
In which GCC Very Very 
state are you Optimistic/ Neutral Pessimistic/ Total 
based? Optimistic Pessimistic 
Bahrain 76% 24% 0% 100% 
Kuwait 68% 23% 10% 100% 
Oman 89% 11% 0% 100% 
Qatar 75% 13% 13% 100% 
Saudi Arabia 81% 16% 3% 100% 
UAE 67% 24% 8% 100% 
Source: GCC Bus1ness Survey on Currency Umon, June-September 2005 
As the largest and dominant economy in the region, Saudi Arabia has the 
advantage that it has well established large companies particularly in the 
petrochemical and manufacturing sectors. For example, SABIC is a large 
diversified manufacturing company with more than 16,000 employees and 
annual revenues of more than $18bn44 ; it is also one of the largest global 
suppliers of ethylene and polyethylene. Furthermore, businesses are likely to 
consider the regional integration process as part of the opening up of the Saudi 
44 See http://www.sabic.com/ 
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economy following on from the Kingdom's accession to the WTO in 2005 and 
therefore to look upon it favourably. 
As the largest market in the GCC, Saudi Arabia can expect to see increasing 
levels of investment from other GCC states following the launch of the CU. The 
survey asked businesses which GCC state had the greatest potential for new 
business opportunities following the launch of the CU and 30 percent chose 
Saudi Arabia, second only to the UAE (see Figure 8.5). Specifically, Bahraini 
and Kuwaiti businesses felt that Saudi Arabia would offer them the most new 
business opportunities. Between 1990 and 2003 Saudi Arabia received almost 
a quarter of the total intra-GCC investment (see Table 8.1 ). The single currency 
should enhance this trend as it is likely to facilitate cross border investments (as 
was discussed in chapter seven, section 7.2.4) which will undoubtedly benefit 
the Saudi economy. However, if the Saudisation policy of nationalising the 
workforce continues at its current pace, then Saudi Arabia may become a less 
competitive location for regional FDI compared to the UAE, where the 
Emiratisation process is slowing down and has been much less rigourous. 45 
Figure 8.5: Business Responses to Survey Question Eleven. 
Which GCC State offers your business the greatest potential to find new 
business opportunit ies? 
40%-r------~------~--------~------~------~----~ 
35%-r-------+-------4--------~------~------+-----~ 
30%-r-------+-------4--------~------~ 
25%-+-------4------~~------~------+-
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Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE 
Source: GCC Business Survey on Currency Union. June - S.ptember, 2005. 
Despite the potential gains to the Saudi economy from further regional 
integration, there may be political reservations which impede this process. 
Saudi Arabia is a highly conservative society and is the least liberal of the GCC 
45 Ezz AI Deen, Mohammad "No more emiratisation quotas soon" Gulf News, 12 July 2006. 
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states and therefore with greater economic integration between the GCC 
countries it may eventually come under increasing pressure to open up further 
and become more tolerant, particularly with regard to women's rights. This may 
prove to be controversial to certain sectors of society and be perceived as a 
threat to Saudi Arabia's cultural and religious identity. 
Over the period of analysis Saudi Arabia has experienced repeated budget 
deficits and subsequently it had accumulated high levels of domestic debt. 
Between 1980 and 2005 for example, Saudi Arabia experienced fiscal deficits in 
all but seven years. In those seven years, the average surplus was 10 percent 
of GOP, but of the eighteen deficit years, the deficits were often very large, 
sometimes reaching as high as 25 percent of GOP, as was the case in 1987 
(see chapter 6, Figure 6.5). Saudi Arabia would have breached the Maastricht 
style convergence criteria limit on the fiscal deficit to GOP ratio on sixteen 
occasions during the period of analysis and the debt to GOP criteria, on eight 
occasions between 1997 and 2005, more than any other GCC state (see 
chapter six, Table 6.4). 
Continued dependence on oil income, which forms approximately 75 percent of 
government revenues leaves Saudi Arabia particularly vulnerable to fluctuations 
in the oil price. In the current high oil price climate, fiscal surpluses amount to 
17.5 percent of GOP and fiscal debt is being repaid. Yet, in the future if Saudi 
Arabia does not diversify its income streams then it could face great difficulty in 
meeting fiscal discipline criteria should oil prices fall. Estimates of 
unemployment in Saudi Arabia start as high as ten percent;46 therefore the 
transition costs from cutting public expenditure to keep within fiscal discipline 
rules could be particularly high. 
Given the highly cyclical nature of Saudi Arabia's government budget, and to a 
lesser extent those of the other GCC states, the adoption of cyclically adjusted 
fiscal discipline rules, would make economic sense and reduce the potentially 
large adjustment costs of adhering to inappropriately designed fiscal rules. 
46 Estimates of unemployment in Saudi Arabia range from 10 percent to 30 percent of the 
national working age population, see staff Writer "Tackling Unemployment In Saudi Arabia Is 
National Priority, Says Qusaibi" Middle East Economic Survey, Volume 48, Issue 5, 31 January 
2005. 
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However, it is in Saudi Arabia's economic interest that fiscal discipline rules are 
not so loose as to be meaningless. What is important is to ensure that over the 
economic cycle the rules do not force the authorities to cut back on current 
spending when the economy is already in recession due to low oil prices. For 
example, fiscal rules based on the non-hydrocarbon budget balance would help 
to ensure the credibility and sustainability of public finance discipline over the 
entire economic cycle. 
According to Mundell one potential reason against joining a CU would be if the 
respective country wished to protect the secrecy of its statistics. 47 As was 
discussed in chapter seven (section 7.3.2) for Saudi Arabia the increased public 
scrutiny of its budget, which will undoubtedly be necessary in order to monitor 
adherence to fiscal policy rules, may be considered as an unacceptable 
intrusion. The lack of transparent budget reporting in Saudi Arabia and 
insufficient legislative supervision of spending by the ruling family has been 
described in a number of critical - and in some cases hostile - accounts of 
Saudi Arabia's recent history.48 However the IMF has also drawn attention to 
these problems and called upon the regime to speed up economic reform, in 
particular improving government accountability and transparency. 49 
It must be acknowledged that increasing budget transparency may well 
increase the political vulnerability of the Saudi regime and it could well be 
perceived by the House of Saud as too high a price for joining a CU. However, 
in the long run, if joining a CU encourages changes in behaviour and stimulates 
and empowers progressive elements in the ruling elite and the CU thereby acts 
as a catalyst to improved data transparency in the Kingdom, CU will 
undoubtedly be beneficial to Saudi Arabia's economy. 
Also, within the sphere of political considerations it may be necessary to offer 
Saudi Arabia a proportionately large role in determining the region's monetary 
policies, as was discussed in chapter six (see section 6.3.1). Unlike in the EMU 
47 Mundell, op.cit. 
48 See for example, Holden, D. and Johns, R. The House of Saud, Sidgwick and Jackson, 
London, 1981 and Aburish, Said, The Rise, Corruption and Coming Fall of the House of Saud, 
Bloomsbury Publishing, London, 1995. 
49 Khalaf, Roula "Saudi Arabia urged to speed up economic reform" Financial Times, 23 
October 2002. 
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where economic size did not determine the country's influence over monetary 
policy decision making, with Germany being granted a only a single vote on 
monetary policy, a different approach may be necessary if Saudi Arabia is to be 
encouraged to participate fully in the CU project. 
In summary, drawing on the material in this section as well as upon evidence in 
previous chapters, we can conclude that among the totality of benefits accruing 
from GCC CU. those which have the most weight for Saudi Arabia are 
transaction cost savings on investment, a sectoral comparative advantage in 
downstream hydrocarbon industries, and - provided this does not prove an 
obstacle to actually joining a CU - the benefits of greater transparency in all 
aspects of financial and economic reporting which, in the longer term, can only 
be of great assistance to the country's progress in economic and social 
development. 
On the other hand Saudi Arabia may face quite serious costs of joining a CU in 
terms of having to make difficulty adjustments to meet convergence criteria and, 
like Oman (but in a different form) the country may see its national political and 
religious identity compromised as it becomes further integrated with other, 
more liberal GCC countries. Whether this proves to be a cost which the country 
can bear, or whether it is too painful to warrant participation in a CU remains to 
be seen. 
8.2.6 United Arab Emirates 
The UAE is expected to benefit from the CU because of the dynamic nature of 
its economy, its progress in terms of economic diversification and its position as 
a re-export hub. The UAE central banker, Sultan bin Nasser AI Suwaidi, 
remarked "We believe that the UAE is in a very good position. Some activities 
like tourism, real-estate, and high quality education already attract a lot of GCC 
nationals. Our society has proved to be remarkably flexible in adopting reforms. 
We can seize on these advantages to be a main beneficiary of the CU." 
Furthermore, several expert interviewees perceived the UAE to be well placed 
to benefit from the single currency, one AMF official remarked "those GCC 
economies with a head start, such as the UAE, at openness and diversification 
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will have initial advantages that might make it more attractive for foreign and 
regional investors." 
The UAE is a re-export hub for the Gulf region and therefore has strong trading 
links with some of the GCC states. The UAE's non-oil intra-GCC exports have 
accounted for approximately 28 percent of its total non-oil exports (see Table 
8.1 ). In particular, the UAE has a strong trading relationship with its neighbour 
Oman, illustrated by the very high TIRs of up to 45 in the period of analysis. 50 In 
2004, the UAE's TIR with Oman reached 30, compared to an average of 3.2 
with its other GCC neighbours. 51 The close commercial relationship between 
Oman and the UAE was mentioned by a few regional experts, who felt that the 
single currency would enhance this relationship. 
However, while the UAE may have a strong relationship with Oman its links with 
Saudi Arabia, the largest GCC economy, appear to be much weaker. Our 
analysis in chapter five revealed the UAE - Saudi trade ties to be quite weak 
with a TIR of just 2 in 2004. 52 In addition, econometric evidence in chapter five 
(see section 5.6) indicated the absence of a long run integrating relationship 
between the two economies. Indeed, the two economies have been on 
diverging inflationary paths, with an average inflation differential over the period 
of analysis at 3.1 percent, spreading to 5.3 percent in 2005. 
In one area, however, there are signs of increasing integration with Saudi 
Arabia's economy. The UAE has substantially increased its capital investment 
in the Kingdom, so that it is now the major source of FDI in Saudi Arabia. This 
cross border investment if it continues could increase the economic 
interdependence between the two states and by holding claims on Saudi 
Arabia's economic output the UAE could mitigate the potential effects of future 
national shocks. This may initially prove to be a useful hedge against national 
shocks for the UAE that are unlikely to be corrected by the common monetary 
policy over which Saudi Arabia is likely to have considerable influence. In 
addition to this, it appears as though there is a significant movement of 
50 See chapter 5, section 5.2.3, table 5.4. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
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nationals from Saudi Arabia to the UAE for purposes of tourism and retail 
investments. 53 
Capital flows have also taken place in the opposite direction. The UAE has 
been a large importer of GCC capital in the past, receiving 54 percent of total 
intra-GCC investment between 1990 and 2003 (see Table 8.1 ). Regional capital 
inflows are likely to increase further following the introduction of the single 
currency and the elimination of exchange rate uncertainty for investors from the 
fixed arrangement. When businesses were asked which GCC state had the 
greatest potential for new business opportunities following the launch of the CU, 
the largest share of 34 percent chose the UAE (see Figure 8.5). This response 
indicates that the UAE will be most likely to benefit from new investments 
following the launch of the CU, with Omani businesses considering the UAE 
best placed in this respect. 
Despite the potential gains and opportunities for the UAE economy arising from 
the CU, the GCC business survey found that UAE businesses are most likely to 
be indifferent with regard to the effect of the impending CU on their business 
compared to other GCC businesses, with 26 percent expecting no effect from 
the single currency (see Table 8.2). Furthermore, 24 percent of Emirati 
business respondents were also apathetic with regard to the overall success of 
the CU (see Table 8.4). This may be attributed to the fact that UAE businesses 
are already operating in a fairly diversified and vibrant economy with numerous 
free trade zones (FTZs) where businesses can locate and benefit from a liberal 
business environment. Therefore, some UAE businesses may consider the 
returns from CU to be marginal for them at present. 
During the period of analysis the UAE's inflation rate has been higher on 
average than any other GCC state, with peaks in official inflation reaching 7.1 
percent in 1992 and 6 percent in 2005 (see chapter six, figure 6.1). There has 
been a notable divergence between relatively high inflation countries such as 
the UAE from those of low inflationary states, such as Oman, with the UAE's 
inflation rate averaging 3.6 percent but only 0.43 percent in Oman since 1991 
53 See for example, Carvalho, Stanley "Dana Gas public offer heading for record 
oversubscription" Gulf News, 25 September 2005. 
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(see chapter six, table 6.2). Inflation data is only available for the UAE from 
1991 onwards, but since then the country would have breached a Maastricht 
style inflation convergence criterion annually (see table 6.3, chapter 6). This 
evidence suggests that the UAE would face great difficulty in meeting the 
inflation convergence criterion and that there will be transition costs of bringing 
inflation down to converge with the lower inflationary states. 
Since the sustained oil price rises began in 2002, the fiscal policies of both 
Qatar and the UAE have remained fairly prudent: rather than spending the 
majority of their surplus oil revenues which would have pushed inflation they 
have saved the largest proportion, more than any other governments in the 
region. 54 Nevertheless, like Qatar, the UAE has recently experienced increased 
inflation as a result of rising oil prices. With flexible labour markets, much of the 
price rises have been felt in asset markets, with property prices and rents rising 
in particular. 
The IMF has recommended that the GCC states should adjust to permanently 
high oil prices either through nominal exchange rate appreciation or structural 
reforms. They advise that subsidies must be cut back in the goods market to 
restrain rising costs and improve efficiency including implementing structural 
reforms to boost the competitiveness of the non-oil sectors. Furthermore, the 
government could mop up surplus liquidity in the economy by issuing longer 
maturity fixed income securities or by restricting the growth of credit lending.55 
Without such measures inflation may become more entrenched in the high 
inflation economies of the region, like Qatar, the UAE and to a lesser extent 
Kuwait, at a cost to their future competitive position within the CU. However, an 
appreciation of the Emirati Dirham would leave non-oil exports much less 
competitive, which would be a setback for the country's efforts to diversify its 
export base away from hydrocarbons. According to one report the UAE central 
54 1MF, World Economic and Financial Surveys, Middle East and Central Asia, May 2006. 
55 For example, in 2005 the UAE Central Bank issued 5 year Certificates of Deposit in order to 
"drain liquidity from a booming economy" See staff writer "Central Bank plans debt issue to 
control inflation" Gulf News, 13 August 2005. 
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bank is said to be undertaking a cost-benefit analysis of revaluing its nominal 
exchange rate against the dollar peg. 56 
In addition to the existing inflation problems in the UAE, the results of the 
business survey indicate that businesses are likely to pass on the increase in 
their costs from the introduction of the single currency to their customers. This 
suggests that there will be price rises following the launch of the single 
currency, as occurred in several EMU member states. The majority of Emirati 
business respondents said they would pass on any increase in their costs, a 
greater proportion than in any other GCC state apart from Kuwait (see Figure 
8.3). However, in light of the existing inflationary pressures in the UAE 
economy, additional price rises, even if short lived, would further erode its 
competitiveness which the UAE can ill afford. 
Another convergence criterion which the UAE would have problems meeting is 
that of foreign reserve cover to imports. During the period of analysis, the four 
month cover criterion would have been broken nine times by the UAE, more 
than any other GCC state (see chapter six, Table 6.3) and as recently as 2005 
(see Table 8.1). Therefore the UAE can expect to benefit from the additional 
foreign reserve cover provided by the other GCC states once tied into in CU. 57 
An important prerequisite condition of the CU, which has been emphasised by 
the IMF, is the provision of timely and reliable national statistics partly in order 
to monitor fiscal policy rules. In its 2006 Article IV Consultation with the UAE, 
the IMF criticized the current state of statistics in the UAE, commenting that "the 
UAE's economic and social statistics continue to suffer from numerous 
structural weaknesses with respect to data quality, coverage, periodicity, 
timeliness and inter-sectoral consistency."58 As a result of joining the CU the 
UAE will be under even greater pressure to make improvements to its budget 
56 Staff writer "Should UAE Follow Kuwait Suit and Revaluate?" Zawya, 5 July 2006 (accessed 
at: http://www.zawya.com/) 
57 Agreement has yet to be reached about control over and management of foreign exchange 
reserves. According to Sturm and Siegfried op.cit, reserves could be transferred either totally or 
partially to the supranational monetary institution, or left in the hands of the national central 
banks depending on the desired degree of centralization/decentralization with regard to 
monetary. policy implementation. 
58 International Monetary Fund, United Arab Emirates: 2006 Article IV Consultation, No. 06/257, 
July 2006. 
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accounting which has been unreliable in the past, failing to record large 
revenues from overseas investment income. 
Over the past 25 years the official UAE budget has recorded successive budget 
deficits during times of low oil prices but in reality these would have been offset 
by revenues from investment income that were not included in the government's 
budget. The UAE is therefore unlikely to have breached the kind of fiscal 
discipline rules implicit in a CU as frequently as the historical data suggests and 
therefore stands a better chance of adhering to the actual fiscal discipline rules 
which a CU might impose. However, for comparative purposes and in order to 
avoid being penalized for fiscal indiscipline, the UAE authorities will be pressed 
into improving their data provision which will ultimately benefit them. 
In summary, drawing on the material in this section as well as upon evidence in 
previous chapters, we can conclude that among the totality of benefits accruing 
from GCC CU, those which have the most weight for the UAE are transaction 
cost savings in both trade and investment, a sectoral comparative advantage in 
a wide variety of service sector industries, the benefits of greater foreign 
exchange cover and the advantages which will accrue to the country from better 
financial reporting and data transparency. On the negative side of the cost-
benefit balance, the UAE may encounter difficult adjustments to meet 
convergence criteria and be somewhat vulnerable to asymmetric national 
shocks. 
8.3 Conclusion 
We shall now attempt to draw together this considerable array of evidence in 
presenting a qualitative cost-benefit analysis of joining a CU for each country -
qualitative because it is not possible to attach a meaningful numerical value with 
an appropriate weighting to each and every advantage and disadvantage some 
of which, as we have seen, are essentially political in nature. The best we can 
do is to simply enumerate the costs and benefits for each country, sum them 
and present a 'net' balance. As we acknowledged earlier there is bound to be 
an element of subjectivity in this exercise, but as far as possible, our judgments 
as to which particular costs/benefits are most salient for which particular country 
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have been based on the empirical evidence collected during our period of 
research in the Gulf and recorded in this and previous chapters of the thesis. 
The potential costs and benefits of the CU for each individual GCC state, which 
have already been discussed in detail in the sections above, are summarized in 
Table 8.5. The total costs and benefits per GCC state are summed in the table 
and this result is then presented graphically in Figure 8.6. 
Table 8.5: Summary of Potential Benefits and Costs of CU per GCC State 
c:: ;t: 
"iii Ill c:: .... 
.... ~ Ill Ill w .c: E -Ill ::J Ill <( <( 
Ill ~ 0 0 en :::> 
Transaction cost savings on trade o,l o,l o,l o,l 
Transaction cost savings on investment o,l o,l 
Larger MarkeUEconomies of Scale o,l o,l o,l 
Sector Comparative Advantage o,l o,l o,l o,l o,l 
Extra foreign reserve cover o,l o,l o,l 
Income transfers to aid poorest states o,l 
Improved statistical transparency and reporting o,l o,l o,l 
Greater national security o,l 
TOTAL BENEFITS 4 1 5 4 3 5 
Difficult adjustments to meet convergence 
o,l o,l o,l o,l 
criteria 
Asymmetric national shocks o,l o,l 
National companies not prepared for regional 
o,l o,l 
competition 
Potential victim of fiscal 'free-riding' o,l o,l 
Weakened 'national identity' o,l o,l 
Political domination by Saudi Arabia o,l o,l 
TOTAL COSTS 1 3 2 4 2 2 
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Figure 8.6: Contemporary Balance of Costs and Benefits per GCC State 
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According to our analysis four of the six GCC states potentially stand to gain net 
economic benefits from joining the CU. while one state, Qatar will breakeven. 
Kuwait is the only GCC state which is likely to face more costs than benefits 
from its membership of the CU based on its contemporary economic 
circumstances. 
Despite only breaking even, for Qatar the opportunity cost of staying out of the 
CU would be potentially high. Qatar has high hopes of establishing a trans-Gulf 
gas pipeline and supplying the domestic energy needs of its neighbours which 
would be greatly facilitated by the establishment of a Common Market and 
single currency. Furthermore, staying out of the CU would limit the potential for 
a diplomatic political rapprochement between Qatar and Saudi Arabia. 
Compared to the other GCC states, Kuwait stands to gain little in economic 
terms from its membership of the CU. Like Qatar, its unique economic 
circumstances driven by its vast hydrocarbon reserves indicate that these two 
states will face future economic challenges very different to those of their GCC 
neighbours. However, the importance of securing national security goals should 
not be underestimated in Kuwait's decision to join the CU. 
In contrast, based on the existence of significant net economic benefits, there is 
a strong case for Bahrain, Oman and the UAE to join the CU. These small , 
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open, diversified and regionally integrated economies will be well placed to 
enter into a CU and to capitalize on the potential benefits. 
This analysis has established that significantly, there will be net economic 
benefits accruing to Saudi Arabia from the CU. In addition, there will also be 
considerable political gains from its role in the CU. The Kingdom's influence 
over its smaller neighbours will undoubtedly increase once tied into the CU 
framework and it is likely that the Kingdom's role as the representative for the 
GCC in international negotiations and disputes will also be strengthened. There 
is also a political and economic case for Saudi to be given a dominant role in 
determining the monetary policy of the region. While such political factors may 
initially prove to be unpalatable to the smaller GCC states, if they are to gain 
many of the economic benefits of the CU (see Table 8.5) then they will have to 
be prepared to cede some of their monetary policy sovereignty to the region's 
economic powerhouse. 
The presence of net benefits for most GCC states, along with the importance of 
the national security issue in Kuwait and the significant opportunity cost that not 
joining represents for Qatar, provides strong reasoning that all six GCC states 
should endeavour to join the CU. In particular, the prospect of net benefits 
accruing to Saudi Arabia from CU membership provides a strong rationale for 
the Kingdom to drive forward the integration process and achieve the goal of 
CU as scheduled. 
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Chapter 9 : Conc~usion 
As of July 2006, the GCC has yet to enact many of the policies that this thesis 
considers necessary for it to be able to successfully adopt a CU. In recent 
years, and no doubt partly as a result of the current oil-price boom, the GCC's 
impetus to forge ahead with its economic integration agenda seems to have 
waned. A recurrent danger of oil-price booms is that economic reforms, often 
viewed as vital during times of low oil prices, are deferred. There is arguably still 
enough time, but if a concerted effort is not made in the coming few years a 
GCC CU is not likely to be in place by 2010. 
The objective of this research was not however, to speculate on the likelihood of 
a GCC CU coming into fruition by 2010 or to gauge the level of political 
commitment to the CU project per se, but to determine the appropriateness of 
CU for the GCC economic bloc and its implications. It has done this by 
assessing the GCC against OCA criteria, determining the extent to which 
associated prerequisite policies are in place and by analysing the potential 
costs and benefits. 
This thesis has shown that there are indeed economic and political-economy 
advantages from a GCC CU, both for the bloc and its constituent states. There 
is therefore, a cogent case for the GCC to continue through with their ambitious 
CU plan. Whilst the transition and future monetary arrangement will not be cost 
free, if there is sufficient political will and if all of the necessary prerequisite 
reforms are acted upon, these costs can be effectively managed and minimized. 
At the start of this thesis, five research questions were set out and have been 
addressed in subsequent chapters. We now return to these and summarize the 
findings; for convenience they are repeated here: 
1. To what extent have existing exchange rate regimes been appropriate 
for the GCC economies in enabling them to meet their economic policy 
objectives? 
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2. How appropriate is CU for the GCC economies and to what extent do 
they meet the OCA criteria? 
3. Are the GCC states taking adequate steps to adopt and implement the 
prerequisite policies for the establishment of a successful and 
sustainable CU? 
4. What are the potential costs and benefits, both direct and indirect, of a 
GCCCU? 
5. Will CU bring net benefits for each GCC member state or will there be 
losers as well as winners? 
The following sections of this conclusion will deal with each of these questions 
in turn. The final part of this chapter will recommend issues for further research 
and provide a summary of the prospects for GCC CU. 
9.1 Existing Exchange Rate Regimes and Economic Policy 
Objectives 
Research question one was addressed in chapter four. It was established that 
while the de facto pegs to the US dollar had assisted in facilitating a low 
inflationary environment for much of the period of study, it has meant that GCC 
central bank's have not been able to actively use independent monetary policy 
tools. Consequently during periods of low oil prices, (1986-1989 and 1994-
1999) economic growth stagnated and could not be stimulated by an 
expansionary monetary policy. During the current oil-price boom (2002 to 
present), some states have been experiencing high rates of inflation (for 
example reaching 8.8 percent and 6 percent in Qatar and the UAE respectively 
in 2005) and have not been able to use interest rate increases to control them. 
This thesis concludes that being tied to US interest rates is therefore a sub-
optimal policy choice for the GCC states as monetary policy set by the US 
Federal Reserve is tailored for the needs of the US economy, not those of the 
GCC. Moreover, a common view expressed by a panel of GCC experts 
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interviewed for this research was that the dollar peg had outlived its usefulness 
and that a switch to a more flexible exchange rate regime would now be the 
optimal choice. 
9.2 The Extent to which the GCC States meet the OCA 
Criteria 
Chapter five of this thesis focused on research question two. Using a 
combination of quantitative techniques and qualitative analysis it assessed the 
extent to which the GCC satisfy the five OCA criteria: a high level of intra-
regional trade, labour market mobility, capital market mobility, economic 
diversification and economic synchronization. 
Our analysis has revealed that while the GCC economies are moving towards 
satisfying the OCA criteria, they do at present sufficiently meet all of them, 
therefore they cannot strictly be considered an OCA. We will now turn briefly to 
look at each of the five criteria. 
In terms of intra-regional trade, this is one criterion where the GCC states could 
do better. Analysis of the trade data revealed that we should be wary of 
measuring the extent of intra-GCC trade solely by reference to its share of total 
trade (including oil) and that intra-GCC non-oil trade shows a considerably 
higher level of regional trade integration. In addition, primary evidence from the 
business survey indicates that intra-GCC trade is particularly significant for 
SMEs, which form a large part of the GCC business community. Nevertheless, 
we must conclude that, with intra-regional trade shares reaching only a fifth of 
total trade at most, so far this criterion for an OCA remains insufficiently 
satisfied. 
Despite the removal of legal barriers to the mobility of the GCC national labour 
force and gradual improvements in the national skills set, the GCC national 
labour market is not deemed to be particularly mobile. Nevertheless, in terms of 
meeting the OCA labour market mobility criterion the GCC currently scores well. 
This is due to the presence of a large and flexible expatriate workforce in the 
GCC states, which is highly responsive to national economic shocks and is 
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available at internationally competitive prices from populous South Asian 
countries. 
While the degree of capital market mobility and integration is presently rather 
limited and therefore this OCA criterion is not satisfied, there is however, 
evidence to suggest that the GCC are moving in the right direction. Our analysis 
of the empirical evidence indicates few cross-listings between GCC capital 
markets, and that up until 2003 intra-GCC investments had been weak. 
Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence suggests this is now changing. GCC citizens 
are increasingly willing to cross borders to invest in neighbouring IPOs, there is 
significant cross border cooperation on the issuance of sukuks between 
financial institutions and corporations and intra-GCC FDI fueled by high oil 
prices is expanding. 
Although it was established that the GCC states are not economically 
diversified, the fact that they are undiversified in the same manner, negates 
somewhat the importance of this criterion. This criterion is based on the concept 
that if prospective members of a CU had diversified economic structures they 
would be less likely to suffer from asymmetric shocks. In fact, the GCC's shared 
oil dependence implies that the GCC economies are likely to suffer from the 
same exogenous shock and as such, it could be addressed with a common 
monetary policy without causing problems for any one state in particular. 
However, the GCC constituent members need to diversify their economies for 
other reasons (e.g. employment creation). The CU project requires that in doing 
so, they should avoid specialization and adopt a broad range of industries and 
services even if this implies competition between GCC states. 
Using econometric techniques, the GCC economies were tested for long run 
synchronisation; the findings revealed some national disparities. On aggregate 
the region's economies appear to be synchronised, but testing for pair-wise 
cointegration between the largest regional economy, Saudi Arabia and the 
smaller GCC states showed that some countries are less suited to joining a CU 
in which Saudi Arabian economic conditions are likely to dominate monetary 
policy decisions. In particular, the econometric evidence revealed only a weak 
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cointegrating relationship between the two largest economies, Saudi Arabia and 
the UAE, and between the former and Kuwait. 
Failing to meet all of the OCA criteria might mean that CU is not 'optimal' but, as 
EMU demonstrates, it does not necessarily mean that the GCC states cannot 
form a viable CU. In fact, the process of forming a CU itself may lead to 
economic convergence among the members and the establishment of a single 
currency could substantially boost intra-regional levels of trade and promote 
further capital market integration. 
If the successful launch of the euro has provided any lessons for other region's 
establishing CU, not encompassed in the OCA theory, it is that several 
important preparations and prerequisite conditions must be in place in order to 
establish a stable and sustainable CU, not least of which are the institutional 
capabilities and the political will of the union. 
9.3 Policy Prerequisites and Preparations for CU 
Research question three was addressed in chapter six. It argued that in order to 
achieve many of the benefits of CU considerable policy prerequisites and 
preparations are required. To date, evidence presented in chapter six indicates 
that the GCC have some way to go in this regard. Our analysis not only 
considered the pace of preparations taking place and compared this with the 
experience of EMU, but it also took into account the views of a panel of regional 
experts interviewed for this thesis, a large proportion of which, in light of the 
limited policy progress so far, doubted whether CU was achievable by 2010. 
Outstanding preparations include: establishing a common market, agreeing to, 
and meeting, the fiscal and monetary convergence criteria, deciding upon the 
mandate, structure and location of a new GCC central bank, creating a 
supranational data organisation and preparing the private sector. 
Although regional central bankers are said to have broadly agreed upon 
convergence targets similar to those of the Maastricht Treaty, these have yet to 
be officially adopted. In terms of meeting the provisional convergence targets 
321 
and fiscal rules, table 6.4 in chapter six showed that each of the GCC states 
would have broken the criteria at some point, but that the UAE followed by 
Qatar would have breached the criteria most frequently during the historical 
period of analysis. It was concluded that there would have to be significant 
policy changes in order to be able to meet such convergence criteria in the 
future. 
In addition, the GCC have yet to agree on the policy of setting up a statistical 
organisation, similar to that of the EMU's Eurostat, in order to collate GCC wide 
economic data, yet without such an organisation it would be hard to envisage 
how future monetary decisions could be reached. While the GCC leaders have 
agreed to establish a supranational central bank, preparations have yet to be 
made in this regard despite the fact that its timely establishment will be critical 
to the effective functioning and credibility of the CU. 
This thesis therefore recommends that GCC leaders should take meaningful 
steps in the coming years to implement the prerequisite policies. Failing to do 
so will either mean deferring the CU or going ahead with it regardless, but under 
less than optimal circumstances. 
9.4 The Potential Costs and Benefits of a GCC CU 
Chapter seven of this thesis focused on the potential costs and benefits of a CU 
for the GCC as a bloc, addressing research question four. Based on the 
assumption that the necessary preparatory steps are taken, the economic case 
for forming a CU is favourable for the GCC as a whole. The launch of the GCC 
single currency will present a number of benefits for the GCC states, both direct 
and indirect. 
For instance, the single currency will allow for greater price transparency of 
goods, but consumers will only benefit fully from this if price discrimination is 
eliminated through increased goods market arbitrage by way of a common 
market. Furthermore, if the single GCC currency is to effectively promote intra-
regional trade then the remaining non-exchange rate related barriers to trade 
must be removed likewise through the establishment of a common market. 
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This thesis has identified GCC capital markets as a key beneficiary of a future 
CU (as was the case in the Eurozone). Growth in capital market liquidity and 
reduced cross border risks will improve the mechanisms for an efficient 
allocation of capital across the region and beyond. The benefits for the region's 
capital markets are also important for the broader economic development of the 
region. The region's fast growing sovereign and corporate Islamic security, or 
sukuk, market, in particular, is expected to benefit from increased regional and 
international investor demand. 
The effect of the single currency on private sector confidence and the business 
climate is expected to be positive. The GCC business survey indicates that 
businesses are supportive of the policy decision to establish a CU which 
suggests the costs of adjustment for the private sector will be relatively low. The 
business sector is also confident about the potential impact of CU on their 
businesses which bodes well for future investment decisions and potential 
economic growth both in the lead up to and following the establishment of the 
CU. However, this thesis contends that businesses attitudes may change and 
become more skeptical if concrete preparatory steps do not begin to take place 
in the coming year or so. 
Chapter seven also discussed the choice of the future exchange rate policy. 
Assuming the successful launch of a GCC single currency, there are potentially 
significant indirect economic benefits to be gained from moving to a flexible 
exchange rate arrangement. Critically, it would allow the GCC states to operate 
an independent monetary policy that is predicated on the region's economic 
circumstances and not those of the US' domestic economy. 
The consensus view held by experts considers the optimal policy for the GCC 
post CU would involve an active monetary policy and thus the choice of a more 
flexible exchange rate regime. Many experts felt that either a float or a trade-
weighted basket would be more appropriate for the GCC economies going 
forward. This view seems also to be shared by the UAE's central bank 
governor, Sultan Bin Nasser AI-Suwaidi, who recently said that post CU the 
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GCC single currency "will have a bigger weight on the international arena, so it 
will have to be floated then" .1 
An independent exchange rate policy would also allow the single GCC currency 
to take on a wider role and potentially become a regional anchorage and 
reserve currency. Should the GCC states choose to invoice their oil sales in the 
common currency then this would not only provide the region with significant 
seigniorage revenues but would more than likely also result in increasing capital 
retention within the region. Under such a scenario, the GCC currency would 
undoubtedly become the strongest currency in the Islamic world and one which 
Arab and Islamic states may choose to hold and peg against as an alternative 
to the US dollar. 
A key political-economy benefit of the successful launch of the GCC CU would 
be to strengthen the bloc as a political entity. The GCC will undoubtedly have 
increased international bargaining power in future negotiations and disputes. 
Therefore, the CU project should also be seen as a means to enhancing the 
bloc's standing, not just within the MENA region; but in the international arena. 
Turning to the costs of CU, this thesis has identified several. The divergence in 
GCC inflation rates could mean that the common monetary policy could lead to 
macroeconomic instability in higher inflation economies such as the UAE, Qatar 
and Kuwait. Furthermore, econometric analysis indicated a lack of economic 
cointegration between Saudi Arabia and the UAE and between Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait suggesting that a common monetary policy might be more costly for 
the UAE and Kuwait, than for other GCC members initially. However, the 
potential macroeconomic costs of the common monetary policy should be 
ameliorated by the flexible adjustments of the GCC's labour market and 
increasing cross border capital flows. 
In light of existing differences in national monetary policies and economic 
development strategies, chapter seven concluded that the post CU policy 
choice of exchange rate regime is likely to be an issue of future controversy as 
1 Khalaf, Roula "UAE shifts 10% of its reserves into euros", Financial Times, 13 July 2006. 
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it will require compromises over national interests in favour of implementing the 
most appropriate regime for the region as a whole. Furthermore, this thesis 
contends that it will only be possible to manage a free-float or a trade-weighted 
basket if there is a strong and credible GCC central bank in place. If the GCC 
does not set up a GCC central bank with adequate decision making powers and 
institutional capabilities, then the dollar-peg is likely to remain in place. 
Another potential cost will arise if the GCC does not have a clear set of fiscal 
rules to follow and adhere to post CU. It is important that the monetary stability 
of the CU is not jeopardized by any fiscal indiscipline of member states. This 
thesis contends that several states will face large adjustment costs in meeting 
fiscal rules of the kind embodied in the Euro zone's SGP. 
Analysis in chapter seven shows that limits on fiscal spending and increased 
scrutiny of national public budgets (which in turn will require greater 
transparency) are likely to be considered by some GCC ruling elites as an 
diminution of their powers and a 'loss of fiscal sovereignty'. Yet, for the region's 
private sectors, improvements in data transparency and fiscal accountability will 
undoubtedly be beneficial. 
9.5 Cost-Benefit Analysis for Individual GCC States 
A qualitative cost-benefit analysis of the case for each GCC state joining the CU 
was undertaken in chapter eight, addressing the final research question. The 
chapter identified the most significant prospective costs and benefits for each 
state individually, in order to establish the presence, or otherwise, of sufficient 
incentives to ensure the participation of each country. While previous CUs (and 
CU plans) among the GCC states have not included all of the countries, it was 
the consensus opinion among our panel of regional experts that the 2010 CU 
could not be established without all six members. Saudi Arabia's participation, 
in particular, was deemed as vital. 
Chapter eight concluded by summarizing the major costs and benefits of CU for 
each GCC state in table 8.5. The chapter concludes that, relatively speaking, 
the net economic benefits from joining the CU would be greatest for Bahrain, 
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Oman and the UAE, which would stand to gain relatively more from the process 
of economic integration. Not only are these economies extremely open with 
strong existing intra-regional links, but as they are also relatively well diversified 
and have existing comparative advantages in service sector activities such as 
banking and finance or tourism, areas which should do well from the launch of 
the single currency. 
In contrast, both Kuwait and Qatar are currently much less regionally 
interdependent. Their imperative to diversify through increasing non-oil intra 
regional trade and investment has been much less acute due to their high oil 
(and gas) per capita reserves. However, this does not mean that there are not 
substantial incentives, both economic and political, for both Kuwait and Qatar to 
join the CU. For Kuwait, further integration with its Gulf neighbours, particularly 
with Saudi Arabia, is likely to be considered important for its national security in 
light of the ongoing turmoil and instability in Iraq. While Qatar's aim of building a 
trans-Gulf natural gas pipeline with which to supply the domestic energy needs 
of many of its GCC neighbours, will be facilitated by its inclusion in the CU. 
Importantly, this thesis established the presence of a strong case for Saudi 
Arabia to join the CU, arguably a condition critical to the success of the CU 
project itself. Saudi Arabia is a major beneficiary of significant GCC direct 
investment and Saudi businesses, particularly those in the manufacturing 
sector, are well placed to enter other more lucrative GCC markets. As well as 
the net economic benefits accruing to Saudi Arabia, there will also potentially be 
political gains from its membership of the CU, such as additional political 
leverage over the smaller GCC states and consolidating its position as the 
leader of the GCC. 
9.6 Recommendations for Further Research 
In the course of this thesis, two specific areas worthy of future research have 
become apparent. From the analysis in chapter seven, it was established that 
the exact nature and limits of fiscal discipline rules adopted by the GCC states 
had implications for the costs and benefits of the CU project. While it is currently 
expected that the GCC leaders will adopt fiscal policy rules similar to those of 
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the Maastricht criteria, there are many other options that need to be fully 
considered if the most appropriate rules for the GCC economies are to be 
adopted. 
The Eurozone's experience with SGP has demonstrated that if fiscal discipline 
rules are too strict they are unlikely to be workable. Any fiscal discipline rules for 
the GCC states should therefore be designed to take into account the high 
degree of fiscal dependence on oil and the pro-cyclicality of GCC budgets. 
Future research should explore the options for fiscal rules, as well as the 
mechanism through which to enforce the rules, which will be equally critical to 
the fiscal credibility of the CU. Although this issue has been touched upon in 
several chapters of this thesis we believe it deserves further exploration. 
Another area which warrants further research concerns the technical details of 
invoicing oil in the new currency, such as the nature of the invoicing- whether 
in long term oil contracts or on one of the region's nascent energy bourses. A 
related issue is to estimate the size of the economic gains from this, e.g. the 
size of the seigniorage revenues which would accrue to the GCC states. These 
topics, whilst related to our cost-benefit analysis of CU, were tangential to our 
central research themes, and could not be considered in sufficient detail. It is 
however, an issue which this thesis points towards being an important area for 
further research. 
9. 7 Prospects for the GCC CU 
The evidence presented in this thesis along with its contextually based findings 
have established that the GCC can expect to accrue significant economic 
benefits from entering into a CU. Realising these benefits however, will be 
conditional on sufficient preparations being made in advance. It is the 
contention of this thesis that if the necessary prerequisite conditions are not fully 
in place prior to 2010 two outcomes are likely: the first and most probable, will 
be the deferral of the project, the second will be a loosely managed joint 
currency that is less likely to result in significant benefits, especially indirect 
ones. 
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As many of the preparations are considered to be primarily in the political-
economy domain they require concerted political commitment. These include 
more power being devolved to the GCC Secretariat, a GCC central bank and 
other regional institutions. At the national level, the reliability of statistics will 
need to be improved as will budgetary and fiscal transparency (allowing for 
greater public scrutiny of government spending). 
We contend that such political economy factors will be harder to overcome than 
any purely economic costs incurred in the lead up to and post CU. 
Nevertheless, we argue that the potential benefits, both economic and political, 
should provide ample incentives for changes to take place at the national level. 
It is not inconceivable that the region's ruling elites may consider the loss of 
some autonomy to be a price worth paying. 
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Appendix A: List of Expert Interviewees 
Name Organisation Position GCC State Cat. 
1 Dr. Ahmed Gulf Research Political Scientist UAE 5 
Abdulkareem Saif Center and Research 
Manager 
2 Dr. Belaid Rettab Dubai Chamber of Research Director UAE 1 
Commerce and 
Industry 
3 Buti Khalifa Bin Dubai Islamic Bank Chief Executive UAE 3 
Darwish AI F alasi Office 
4 Dr. Nasser AI Kaud GCC Secretariat Director of Finance KSA 2 
and Monetary 
Integration 
5 Prof. Yousif Khalifa UAE University, AI Professor of UAE 4 
AI Yousif Ain Economics 
6 Dr. Ibrahim Kursany Department for Economic UAE 1 
Economic Development 
Development Advisor 
(OED) 
7 Mr. Essa Kazim Dubai Stock Director General UAE 1 
Exchange 
8 Prof. Khalifa UAE University, Assistant professor UAE 4 
Hassanain Department of 
Economics, 
9 Dr. Hamad Albazai Ministry of Deputy Minister KSA 1 
Planning 
10 Michael Sturn European Central Economic Germany 5 
Bank Consultant to GCC 
11 Dr. Ali Sadik Independent Economist UAE 5 
Economist 
(Previous AMF 
Director) 
12 Dr. Abdulrizak AI UAE University, Director UAE 4 
Faris Professor and 
Director of Labor 
market research, 
Tanmia 
13 Sultan Bin Nasser AI UAE Central Bank Central Bank UAE 1 
Suwaidi Governor 
14 Dr. Jassim AI Manaii Arab Monetary Director General UAE 2 
Fund 
15 Dr. Ali Bolbol Economic Policy Division Chief UAE 2 
Institute, Arab 
Monetary Fund 
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Name Organisation Position GCC State Cat 
16 Mukesh Gandhi National Bank of Manager- UAE 3 
Abu Dhabi Investment 
Marketing 
17 Dr. Nasser Saidi Ministry of Finance Economic Advisor UAE 1 
and Industry 
18 Dr. Nabil Dahdah Economic and Senior Economist UAE 2 
Technical Dept, 
Arab Monetary 
Fund 
19 Abdulla Ahmed AI Ministry of Under Secretary for UAE 1 
Saleh Economy Economic Affairs 
and International 
Cooperation 
20 Manish Agrawal ABNAMRO Senior Dealer, UAE 3 
Rates Markets 
21 Dr. Ali Hamdan Central Bank of Senior Research Oman 1 
Oman Manager 
22 Dr. Fahim AI Sultan Qaboos Head of Economic Oman 4 
Marhubi University Dept 
23 Dr. Hatem AI Sultan Qaboos Finance Dept Oman 4 
Shanfari University 
24 Mustafa Alawati National Bank of Foreign Exchange Oman 3 
Oman 
25 Mr. Shailesh Dash Global Investment Head of Research Kuwait 3 
House 
26 Mrs. Wafa AI Rashid Kuwait Stock Technical Director Kuwait 1 
Exchange 
27 Dr. Yousef AI Prime Minister's Advisor to Prime Kuwait 1 
Ibrahim Office Minister 
28 Dr. Randa Azaar National Bank of Chief Economist Kuwait 3 
Kuwait 
29 Dr. Ali Shihab Central Bank of Head of Research Kuwait 1 
Kuwait 
30 Dr. Nadim Burney Kuwait Institute for Researcher Kuwait 5 
Scientific Research 
31 Dr. lmad Moosa Gulf University Dean Kuwait 4 
32 Fawzy AI Thunayan Central Bank of Manager, Foreign Kuwait 1 
Kuwait Ops 
33 Dr. Belkacem Arab Planning Economist Kuwait 5 
Laabas, Institute 
34 Mr. Ahmed Bumtaia Bahrain Monetary Director of Bahrain 1 
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Name Organisation Position GCC State Cat. 
Agency Economic Research 
35 Dr. Majid AI-Moneef Member of Shura Saudi Arabia KSA 1 
Council Governor to OPEC, 
Member of Shura 
Council 
36 Dr. Manhal Shotar University of Qatar Associate Professor Qatar 4 
37 Dr. Abdel Aziz Abu GCC Secretariat Minister KSA 2 
Hamad Aluwaisheg Plenipotentiary 
Director - Economic 
Integration 
Department 
38 HE Fahad Faisal AI- Qatar Central Bank Deputy Governor Qatar 1 
Thani 
39 Dr. Abdulrahman AI- Saudi Arabian Deputy Governor for KSA 1 
Hamidy Monetary Authority Technical Affairs 
40 Paul Tempest The Qatar and Former Manager UK 5 
Dubai Currency 
Board 
Category Key 
ID Institutional Background 
1 Government and Central Bank officials 
2 GCC Secretariat and AMF officials 
3 Commercial bankers 
4 Academics 
5 Independent researchers 
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Appendix 8: ~nterview letter Sent to GCC 
Experts 
Dr. Jassem el Manai 
Director General 
Arab Monetary Fund 
P.O. Box 2818, Abu Dhabi 
United Arab Emirates 
Fax: 02 6332089 
Mrs. Emilie Rutledge 
P.O. Box 46689 
Dubai, United Arab Emirates 
Mob: 050 8822854 
Email: e.j.rutledge@durham.ac.uk. 
March 9th 2005 
Re: Request for interview on the subject of GCC currency union (PhD research purposes). 
Dear Mr. Manai, 
It was a pleasure to meet with you at the AMFIIMF seminar in Abu Dhabi on 23-24 
February. At the seminar I enquired about the possibility of interviewing you for my 
doctoral research and I am very grateful for you giving me the opportunity to speak with you. 
I am a doctoral research candidate at the Institute for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies 
(IMEIS, University of Durham, UK). My doctoral research is on the proposed 2010 GCC 
currency union, examining the preparations, appropriateness and future prospects of a single 
GCC currency. I am currently based at the Gulf Research Center, Dubai, from where I am 
carrying out fieldwork which involves interviewing regional decision makers and experts on 
their opinion of the implications of the impending currency union. 
I appreciate fully your busy schedule but an opportunity to interview you at any time during 
the coming weeks would be of great benefit to my research. The purpose of the interview 
would be soley for accadernic purposes and to better enable me to understand first hand 
regional views and opinions on the issues surrounding the proposed currency union. 
I attach the list of interview questions which I hope to put to you during our meeting. I am 
interested in your personal responses to the questions and your general views on the issues. 
I look forward to hearing from you, 
Yours sincerely 
f.j ·~ 
Emilie Rutledge, PhD Candidate, 
University of Durham, UK 
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Appendix C: Interview Questions 
No. Question 
1. What do you think is the main motivation behind the decision of the GCC leaders to 
establish a Currency Union (CU) in 201 0? 
2. Do you think the GCC states constitute a cohesive economic bloc, well suited to CU? 
3. What, in your opinion, will be the most significant costs and benefits of CU? 
4. Do you think that some GCC states will benefit from CU more than others? Which ones 
and why? 
5. Which areas of this country's economy do you think will be most affected by the CU? In 
what ways? 
6. How important do you think CU is to the economic development and diversification of the 
GCC states? 
7. Do you think that forming a CU will make the GCC economically and politically stronger? 
8. Do you think forming a CU is in the best interests of the GCC citizens? 
9. In your view how do GCC citizens perceive the forthcoming CU and are they being 
prepared for it? 
10. Do you think the pace of monetary and institutional preparations being made towards CU 
is sufficient? 
11. What do you think are the biggest obstacles to GCC CU? How likely is it that these can 
be overcome? 
12. Do you think that CU could be established with less than 6 member GCC states? 
13. Do you believe the CU will be established as scheduled in 2010? 
14. Do you think continuing the peg to the GCC currencies to the US dollar and following US 
interest rates is appropriate for their economic cycles? Or has it led to greater boom and 
bust swings? 
15. Following CU what do you think is the likelihood of the GCC states switching from the 
existing US dollar peg to an alternative more independent exchange rate arrangement? 
16. Do you think there would be advantages from switching to an alternative exchange rate 
regime? 
17. Do you think it is likely that the single GCC currency could become an anchorage and 
reserve currency held by other central banks in the wider region? 
18. What factors do you think will most heavily influence the single currency's ability to 
become an anchorage and reserve currency? 
19. Can you foresee the GCC states invoicing oil in a currency other than the US Dollar? 
Such as the new GCC currency or the Euro? 
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Appendix D: Letter Sent to GCC Businesses 
GuH Research Center 
May 2005 
Emilie Rutledge 
Gulf Research Center 
187 Oud Melba Tower, 11"' Floor 
303 Sheikh Rashid Road 
P.O.Box 80758, Dubai, UAE 
Telephone: +971-4-3247770 ext 437 
Fax: +971-4-3247771 
Email: emilie@grc.ae 
Re: Request ror participation in business survey on GCC Currency Union. 
Dear Sir/Madam 
The GCC is due to form a currency union in 2010. To date there has been little research into the 
likely impact of this new monetary system on GCC businesses. The Gulf Research Center is 
carrying out an extensive survey of business views on the implications of currency union. The 
results of this survey will be presented to senior GCC economic policy makers and it is therefore 
important that your company makes known its views on the issue. We guarantee that all 
information is strictly confidential and your name and other information will never be associated 
with your responses. 
Ideally someone involved in the management, finance or strategic planning at your company 
should complete the survey as soon as is convenient. The survey is a simple two page 
questionnaire that can be completed within 5 minutes. We would appreciate it if you could return 
the survey to us before 21 11 May when we will be collating all the responses . We will be happy to 
notify you of the results of the survey. 
After completing the survey, kindly fax it to +971-4-3247771. 
Alternatively you may complete the survey on-line: http://www.gcc-economics.com 
Many thanks for your cooperation. 
Yours sincerely 
-t. ; .~ 
Emilie Rutledge 
Economist, Gulf Research Center 
_.,.;....>'l)l'_. .... .,,",......,,.,.su .... .,,niW¥<"-'lU"-Li....,..oiJ..)II-·•·.,...,...,..,.o.(.,~~''' '" .J!WI..U,....,."" v.v 
117 Oud ...._ ~ u• fltla; JO, ....,_ ...... --., 1\0. ... IO'JS, OUMI, '-"DDI ArM B--. 'N: +171 4 D4777D, flac +971 4 J~ ~: ~ 
www.crc.ae 
334 
Appendix E: Questionnaire Distributed to GCC 
Businesses 
Questionnaire (Page 1) 
Contact 
Fax 
Telephone 
Email 
Website 
EmUie Rutledge 
+971 4 3247771 
+971 4 324mo (elll. 437) 
emllle@grc.ae 
www.gn:.ae 
1!1~~~-Yl 
c.------+~ .____._,__.....~ll 
Gulf .Research Center 
Knowledge for All 
Business Survey on GCC Currency Union 
Name of business I GCC state 
~------------------------~----------~ 
Your name I Position 
L-----------------~----------------------~ 
Telephone I Email 
~--------------------~------------------------~ 
Questions: 
!01) Approximately what are t.he annual sales (turnover) of you·r business? 
O Less lhan US$1 mHtion 0 US$1 miUicn- US$10 million 0 US$11 mllllon- US$60 mUiicn 
0 Mare than US$60 miUion 0 Unable to disclose 
........................ ········· ···················· 
Approximately how many people does your business employ? 
011-60 051- 100 
0251- 500 0501 - 1000 
ounable to cisdose 
.............................................. - .......... .. 
io3) in what fieid is the main activitY of your business? (nell all ..... apply) 
D Manufacturing 0 Hatelslnls1aurani8Acurism 0 Cansbucticn/Reel estate 
D AgricultureiFoodstuffs 0 Oil/gasJPelroOiemleels 0 Trenspor11Communicaticns 
0 RetaiiiiMHllesele lrade 0 Bankin!J'finaneial se!Vices: .................. Oiher:.~~.:~:.:· ... ~-~=~-~====~-
jo4) On a scale 01·1 to .. 4 whe .. re 1 ="most" and 4 ="least" please indicate which 
· region you export most to? (Rank "0" If a p.tlculnr region Is not exported to) 
0USA 0Asia 0Nct applicable 
... O_Eu'.ape .. 0GCC Sates ................ .011~~~.~~~~::::-: .... ~.-======== 
:os) Approximately what proportion of your exports Is to other GCC states? 
00-10% 011-40% 0Morelhan40% 0Notapplicable 
....................... . ....... ····················· ············· 
!08) Approximately what proportion Of your Imports-is. from other GCC states? 
c ....... - Q~.=-1~-·- _[:]11-40% 0Marelhan40% 0Notapplicabl~---·············· _ 
.......... . .............. . 
i 07) What do you expect will be the overall effect of a GCC single currency In 2010 
; on your business? 
! ... ~~-~~d····· .. c.::J~ .............. O~Cile ... _ ... .c:::JIJIId .. .... Q\lelybad 
!08) How do you feel about the 201(1-GCC currency .. unlon and Its llke .. ly success? 
!09) On a scale of 1 to 4 where 1 ="highest 'Potential" and 4 ="least potential·; ; 
please indicate which areas you think GCC currency union has the most potential : 
to benefit your business? · 
: 0 Increasing sales 
: ........... c.J.R~~~- 111111118~.~----··· . 
page .IIIli of two 
0 Reduced exchange rate risk 
QNone 
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0 New business opportunities 
cxner.: .. ·····---------.. -----------
Questionnaire (Page 2) 
1o)on a scale of 1 to 3 where 1 = ;;most haum" and 3;;; ;;least harm" please 
· indicate In which ways you think a GCC single market and currency is most 
likely to hann your business? 
O Increased competition 0 Costs of changing payments system 
0 Increased economic uncerlainty 0 None other: ----·--------· 
11) Which GCC state do you think offers your business the greatest potential to find 
new business opportunities? (Please c:h-•• one ans-r) 
0 Bahrain 0 Oman 0 Saudi Arabia 
OK~ o~ o~ 
.12> ln.volil' OJ,inion.wtiat is··c:uiTenuY:t:t.&.main. oil&tacie.to.t:t.&.9row1t..e>r your:··· 
· business within the GCC? (Ch-se all that apply) 
0 Restrictive regulations 
OProtective tariffs and trade 
restrictions 
0Nonw'Unsure 
.. .. .. -. 
0 Exchange rate related costs 
0 Lack of appropriately skilled 
labour 
other: ----··===~-::::. 
0 Lack of clear property rights 
0 Lack of access to credit from banks 
and financial se!Vice companies 
·:t:t).i5Y:olir.busine55·c:uiTeniiY: . .nakinti.l>i-&P8iatioil5·rc;i-·c:lin.enc:y·uniOn.in.2o1o? 
QYes QNo QPianning to do so at a later stage 
. . . 
··15) iias.Y:olil' busine&S.tM!ell .. adViseci .. ol" asSisted. in .. preparing fol' iile··c:lii-l'ency.union?···· 
• ......... [JYE>S... [l~o lf'~es·~_byWho: ·--·------.. ----.. ·---·~:::::::-----.. -... :.~~::c---· 
16) oo yoo feel that tile government stwuiCI ile PioviCiing a&Si~nce and information 
• on preparing for the currency union? 
[]Yes.. 0No .0Yesbutcloserto2010 
17) If your business operates in more than one GCC state, post currency union do 
you expect to charge the same price for identical products across all GCC states?. 
• . J])'e& .. (J No. 
18) If you answered ;No; to g17 why are you not expecting to Charge tt.e same price? 
0 Price wll reflect demand in the local market 0 Price wll include the transportation costs to other GCC states : 
19) Do you expect the introduction of the single currency to increase your costs? 
. DYes QNo 0Notsure 
··2o) .. li Y:oli .. answel'li!d·;y•;to· g19.cio.Y:ou.inteild.to.P8ss .. on.any increase .. in.Y:olir 
· costs to your customers? 
Cl.Yes . 0 No. 
page lr& of two Thank you very much for completing this survey 
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Online Questionnaire 
"'" t.-: !low F...... 1... ~ 
~~http:f,._,gcc._,_ ,,om 
Contact 
Fax: 
En .. R••tedge 
+9714324m1 
Telephona: +9714 324mO (e><S. 437t 
Email: cn.:Zie"fJC.~ 
Wabslta: WWW.!JC.ae 
•
,., __ ,,. ·.(\.A 
1..1~ ~ ..J--..,--
Gulf Research Center 
' ' 
Business Survey on GCC Currency Union 
Buslnus Detoils 
Name 111 Business: GCC Slate: I please select slate 3 
v ... Nilne: 
lkiUIOIITolophotiO: Bu-u&nol: 
01: ApjltoxiiMI~What .. ethe ......... Sales ntiiMMftalyotltMtsiiiOU? 
I please select 
02: Apptoxinalely how mauy people does yo11 IKIIilteas employ? 
I please ;alec I 3 
03: IIWhatlltldtodoou-actMiyalyotl bltslloess?(Tkk althat applyt 
r Manuractu~ng r Hotatsltastaurantsllou~sm r ConstructioniRealestate 
r Aarlt ullurelfoodsturrs r 01Uga81PetroChemicals r Transportteommunlcations 
r RetaiiNVholesale trade r Banking/Financial seMtes Olttet: 
04: On a scale 111 1to 4 wtl01e1• ·most" at•U • "ltas1" pleaselnflcate Wltlctueolonyou e>Q>ott most to? 
IRa .. "0" I a panlct ... I tglottts not t-Ied to) 
["03 uBA ["03 Asia r Not applicable 
["03 Europa ["03 OCC Slates OltlOI : 
05: Appooxllttale4!fwttalpoopotdottofyotl ~lstootllOI GCC states? 
I please se1ell i] 
OS: Appooldtttal~wttalpoopotdottofyoto l!.!!t!!!!tt lshomoltlOI GCC states? 
I please select :=:J 
07: Wltalrloyotte>q>ectwllbon.. ,_alet!Kt 111 aGCC slll!)lec .. tencylt2010ottyotlbttslltess 
I please select 3 
08: HowrloyotriHiaiMMidte 2010 GCC <Utterrcytl..,tandhlik~succeu? 
I Please select iJ 
09: On a scale of 1 to 4 wt181e 1 • ,~,.st Polerot...r atHI4 • ,. ... Polertll.lr' please l><kate wttlch ateas you dill• 
GCC coorency , • ..,,has the most Pol..-1.-.lto benell yo11 buslloeu? 
["03 Increasing sales ["03 Reduced exchange rate risk r None 
["03 Reducing transaction costs ["03 New business opportunttles OdHM: .--------
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Online Questionnaire (continued) 
~ !)It l!oW F..,.atbs lcd5 ~ 
Aghso ~  ~~~~.gcc-econo<rics.com 
010: Ou a scaM of 11o 3whete1··most hc•rn'" and 3 ·~stha~m""pt&.'Ke IIHicateir whkhWt1YIYOU1t*lk il 
GCC M"-" c•wrency Is mostlketyto hillln)ltHI bus~•ess? 
ro--'3 Increased competition ro--'3 Costs of changing payments system 
ro--::J Increased economic uncertainty' r None Odtet: 
011 : 'NIIkh GCC. stilfe do ~·tt*lk otre~a )"Otl bus•nen the tJ•at•st potett'ialtoflnd new btrHtess oppott•••Ms? 
I please selecl slale ~ 
012 : ••Y<H• opinion whal II Clllentlytlle nlilll1 obstacle to dlellfOwdl olyo11 IH1$11101S wl!1llud10 GCC? 
!Choose olltlldl awt./1 
r Res~lcbve regulations r Protective tarills and trade restrictions r Lack of clear property rtghts 
r Exchange rate related costs r Lack of appropriately skilled labour r Lack of access to credit from banks and 
nnanclal service compames 
r NoneJUnsure Otttet: 
013: IS yotl IMISiUIII Ctllet•ly llldl\lltfJ PfeptW;«iOitl fot CUI IIUcyfllliOUit20101 
r Yes r No r Plann1ng to do so at a later stage 
014 : I you answered Yes ' to Qll please explalnyota bttstl~ss's ptep .... ilflons: 
015 : Has yotl IMisilteSSIHtetl dCMSedot olSsldetllt pietJt'WiiHjtOI the Cllrency 11Wn11? 
r Yes r No I'Yes·.~who: 
016 ; 0o)'OUfe.4tlldltheifOY&flllnet .. ShOtltJbept~ ollsistance oliHfllfOIIndtiOII OU 
JHepdfiM)fot the Cllf4tllCYUIItotl1 
r Yes r No r Yes bu1 closer to 2010 
017 : I Y<HII btnitets opetdf&s 11 mOfetlklll oue GCC st.lle. post C:tlleucy tlliotl do youe~ttto cl.a.98 
the s.11ne 1>1kef01 klentki~ ptoducts across.~ GCC $1.ltes? 
c- Yes r- No 
018: lyo.t answeted •t4o' to Q..1l why a.~ you ttof expecttnuto ctwgethe same IJflce? 
r Pr1ce '¥11111 reftect demand In the local market r Pr1ce \llt'illlnclude the transportation costs to other OCC states 
Othet Reason: 
019: Do yo~ I exptct Ute inltoductton of the sin~ ct•reatcyto Increase Y<H• costs? 
r Yes r No r Notsure 
020: I you ooswered Yes· to U12. do you ilfettflto pass Ottalf.;'incae.\Selnyotl costs to )'(KI ctmomets? 
r Yes r No 
f111J:iii11U1il 
THUK YOU FOR COMPLETING THIS SURVEY 
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Appendix F : Principal Economic Characteristics of 
GCC Business Survey Respondents 
This annex examines the principal economic characteristics of the business 
respondents to the first, and to date only, GCC business survey focusing on GCC 
CU. It was carried out during the period June 2005 to September 2005. The 
analysis in this thesis has drawn upon many of the findings of the business survey. 
The business survey methodology was discussed in depth in chapter three of this 
thesis. To briefly summarise, the contact details of GCC businesses with email 
addresses, as well as fax and telephone numbers, were collated from regional 
business databases. Following a pilot survey, the questionnaire was sent to more 
than eleven thousand businesses across the GCC states and was conducted 
predominantly by email but also by telephone and fax. The low response rate, at 
approximately 2.7 percent, was not unanticipated considering the general lack of 
consultation with businesses by policy makers and research bodies in the region 
traditionally, the absence of financial incentives (frequently used by commercial 
polling agencies in the Middle East of late) and the generally poor response rates 
to surveys carried out predominantly by email and the internet. Furthermore, 
regional contact databases of businesses in the public domain are not 
comprehensive and are often outdated. 
While the sample frame of the survey could not be established due to the absence 
of GCC industrial censuses it can be said that the number of responses, which 
amounted to 307, is not an insignificant number from which to ascertain the views 
of businesses on the impending GCC CU and the economic implications for GCC 
businesses. However, as was discussed previously in chapter three, care must be 
taken in interpreting the results of the survey due to the potential presence of 
sampling error, although in a number of cases where we were trying to identify 
whether or not a simple majority (>50 percent) view prevailed, we calculated 95 
percent confidence intervals to confirm the statistical significance of the results. 
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The largest proportion of the 307 business respondents, 37 percent, were based in 
Saudi Arabia while Qatar had the smallest proportion of business respondents at 
only three percent (see Figure F.1). The responses per GCC state are broadly 
consistent with the relative economic size of each state. 
Figure F .1 : Proportion of Business Sample Respondents by GCC Country 
Bahrain -7% 
Oman-12% 
Qatar · 3% 
Source: GCC Business Survey on Currency Union, June-September 2005. 
However, in order to assess more precisely to what degree the survey responses 
were representative of the GCC business community in the absence of national 
industrial censuses, weightings based on GOP, population size and Foreign Direct 
Investment were calculated (see Table F.1). 
An average weighting per GCC state was calculated and represented an ideal 
target for the distribution of responses. When the actual distribution of responses 
was compared to the target weightings the maximum deviation from target was 12 
percent. It was evident from the deviations that the views of businesses in the 
UAE, Oman and Kuwait were all somewhat over-represented in the survey results 
while those in Saudi Arabia , Bahrain and Qatar were rather under-represented, 
(see Figure F.2). 
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Table F .1: GCC Business Survey Weights and Responses 
Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar SA UAE GCC 
GOP 2003 9.61 41.75 21.59 20.43 214.46 79.82 387.65 (US$ bn) 
GOP 2.5% 10.8% 5.6% 5.3% 55.3% 20.6% 100% Weight 
Population 0.69 2.55 2.34 0.64 22.67 4.04 32.92 2003 (mn) 
Population 2.1% 7.7% 7.1% 1.9% 68.9% 12.3% 100% Weight 
FOI 2003 517 67 138 400 208 480 1810 ($mn) 
FOI 28.6% 3.7% 7.6% 22.1% 11.5% 26.5% 100% Weight 
Average 
Target 11.0% 7.4% 6.8% 9.8% 45.2% 19.8% 100% 
Weight 
Actual 21 31 36 8 113 98 307 
responses 
Actual 6.8% 10.1% 11.7% 2.6% 36.8% 31.9% 100% 
weight 
Target 
Weight -4.2% 2.7% 5.0% -7.2% -8.4% 12.1% 0% 
difference 
Source: GCC Busmess Survey on Currency Umon, June-September 2005, GCC National Accounts 
and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2004. 
Figure F.2: Difference between Country Weight and Survey Responses 
Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE 
Sourer. GCC Business Survey on Cumtncy Union, June-September 2005. 
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Questions one to three of the business survey (see Appendix E) provided 
information on the size profile of the business sample and the sector distribution of 
these businesses. The responses to these questions are discussed below. 
Question 1: Approximately what are (is) the annual sales (turnover) of your 
business? 
The majority of businesses - 37.5 percent - that responded had an annual 
turnover of between US$1 - $10 million. The next largest group- 22.5 percent-
of had a turnover of between US$11 -$50 million. Approximately 10.7 percent of 
the business respondents were unable to disclose this information. The response 
to this question was positively skewed with SMEs forming the largest part of the 
business sample at 54 percent of the total (see Figure F.3). Considering the 
preponderance of SMEs in the GCC economies it is likely that in this respect the 
survey sample was representative of the size of GCC businesses. 
Figure F .3: Business Responses to Survey Question One 
100 -+-------t--1 
t' 80 
c 
~ 60 -+-------t--1 
0' 
I! 
&&. 40 --t------+---i 
20 
Less than 
US$1mn 
US$1-lOmn More than 
US$50mn 
Source: GCC Business Survey on Currency Union, June-September 2005. 
Unable to 
dlsctose 
Question 2: Approximately how many people does your business employ? 
Again SMEs represented the largest group of respondents to the survey questions, 
with the number of employees between 11 and 50, forming 28.3 percent of the 
total. The profile of business employees represented in the results of this question 
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are consistent with the findings of question one where the majority of respondents 
had an annual turnover of US$1 0 million or less (see Figure F.4). 
Figure F .4: Business Responses to Survey Question Two 
90 ~----~------~----~----~----~----~------~--~ 
80 --+- --H 
70 --+- --+-
> 60 --+----t-i 
u 
~ 50 -+---~ 
;::, g 40 -+----+ 
..= 30 -+-------1-
20 
10 
0 
Less than 11-50 
10 
51-100 101-250 251-500 501·1000 More than Unable 
1000 to disclose 
Source: GCC Business Survey on Currency Union, June-September 2005. 
Question 3: In what field is the main activity of your business? 
Businesses in the manufacturing sector formed the majority of respondents at 26 
percent of the total, this was followed by the construction/real estate sector at 19 
percent - an expanding area for business operations in the GCC, and then the 
retail/wholesale sector at 17 percent (see Figure F.5). The sector distribution of 
business sample respondents is broadly consistent with the sector composition of 
GOP in most GCC states, (see Table F.2). Following public sector dominated 
activities such as oil and gas production and government services which constitute 
the largest economic sectors in the GCC, manufacturing is the largest sector with 
private sector involvement, and this is followed by the commerce/trade sector and 
then construction, which is consistent with the main sectors represented in the 
business sample. 
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Figure F .5 Business Responses to Survey Question Three 
Other service sector - 10% 
Banking & financial services - 2% 
ManufacturlnQ · 26% 
Retail & wholesale - 17% 
Transport & communications · 8% 
Hotels, restaurants 
& tourism - 5% 
Construction, real estate - 19% 
Agriculture, foodstuffs • 5% 
Source: GCC Business Survey on Currency Union, June-September 2005. 
Table F .2: Sector Composition of GCC GOP in 2004 
2004 Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar 
Agriculture, Fishing 
& Forestry 0.6% 0.4% 1.7% 0.2% 
Mining, Quarrying & 
Fuel 28.2% 47.7% 42.4% 62.2% 
Manufacturing 10.2% 8.0% 8.1% 6.3% 
Construction 3.3% 2.2% 3.0% 5.2% 
Elec. Water & Gas 2.0% 1.9% 1.5% 2.2% 
Commerce, Rest. & 
Hotels 8.2% 7.0% 13.0% 5.0% 
Transport, Comm. 
And Storage 7.0% 4.3% 7.0% 3.3% 
Finance, Ins. & 
Banking 9.4% 6.7% 1.2% 1.6% 
Housing 8.8% ... 3.6% 2.5% 
Govt. Services 15.0% .. 9.0% 9.6% 
Other Services 3.7% 25.0% 8.7% 1.3% 
Net Indirect Taxes 3.6% -3.3% 0.7% 0.6% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Source: AMF, AI Taqnr allqtlsadl a/ Arabi a/ Muwahhad, 2005. 
Note: GOP at current prices. 
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SA UAE 
4.0% 2.6% 
42.2% 32.8% 
10.1% 12.6% 
5.4% 7.5% 
1.1% 1.8% 
6.2% 12.1% 
3.8% 7.1% 
2.9% 3.9% 
5.1% 7.7% 
15.4% 8.4% 
2.8% 2.4% 
0.9% 1.0% 
100.0% 100.0% 
Aven~ge 
2.8% 
41 .4% 
10.0% 
5.3% 
1.4% 
7.8% 
4.8% 
3.5% 
4.9% 
11 .3% 
5.5% 
1.3% 
100.0% 
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